JUDGMENT-The petitioner is decree holder. He obtained a Decree on the Original Side of this Court in Summary Suit No. 712 of 1967 against the respondent for a sum of Rs. 33.517 on the 14th June 1968. He then took out execution after getting the Decree transferred to the Court of the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Alibag That was Special Darkhast No. 28 of 1969 in that Decree, the petitioner got two lands from Village Salav, Taluka Murud, being Survey Nos. I and 66 /1B attached in execution. The property 'was put up for up sale and the sale proceedings began from January 1972. The 'sale was adjourned on various occasions for want of bidders on as many as 'twenty occasions. 2. Finally on the 10th August, 1973 the petitioner applied to the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Alibag, for permission to bid. In view of the fact 'that n{) bidders were coming forward though Public Notice as well as Notice in the ,newspapers were widely circulated, that permission was granted and the petitioner gave a bid for Rs. 21,101. He was also allowed the set-off on 'that amount against his decretal dues. The confirmation proceedings were, however, pendif1g and the sale was not confirmed. 3. In the meantime, the petitioner applied under section 63 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 (B. T. and A. L. Act) on the 8th April, 1974, to the Assistant Collector, Mahad, Sub-Division, to purchase this land viz Survey Nos. I and 66 1/B of Village Salav, admeasuring respectively II Acres and 36 Gunthas and 28 Acres and J 5 Gunthas. 4 That application came to be rejected by the Assistant 'Collector by his Order dated 3Jst July 1974 on two grounds. He held that out of these lands, the land bearing Survey No. 66/1 B had been granted to the respondent judgment-debtor on a new impartible and inalienable tenure and, therefore, 'Could not be sold. The second ground was that the sale had already taken place and no permission can be granted after the sale. The Assistant collector was of the view that the permission should have been obtained before the sale took place and the bid given and accepted. 5. The petitioner then took a Revision Application to the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal, Bombay, being Tenancy Revision No. 381 of 1974. The Assistant collector was of the view that the permission should have been obtained before the sale took place and the bid given and accepted. 5. The petitioner then took a Revision Application to the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal, Bombay, being Tenancy Revision No. 381 of 1974. That Revision Application was referred to a Two-Member Tribuna.1 and came to be decided on J 3t h August 1975. The Tribunal did not accept the contention and finding of the Assistant Collector that Survey No. 66.1 I B could not be sold in execution as it was given to the respondent on a new impartible and inalienable tenure. It also held further concur1"ing with the conclusion and finding that permission under section 63 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act read with Rule 36 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Rules cannot be given as the sale has already taken place. 6. The Tribunal referred to the provisions of section b5 -of the Civil Procedure Code and noted that under the said provisions the property is deemed to be vested in the purchaser from the time of sale and not from the time when the sale becomes absolute. If this be the position then in its view the permission under section 63 must be obtained before the property is sold and not before the sale becomes absolute. The scheme of the Civil Procedure Code according to it in the matter of sale in execution of a decree seems to suggest that the sale is complete when the bids are accepted. 7. It then proceeded to examine the various provisions of Order 21 and relevant rules in that behalf, and in particular Rules 68, 69, 71, 85, 89, 90 and 91 of Order 21 and proceeded to observe that:- "Thus it is clear from these several provisions that the sale takes place when the final bid is accepted by the Court." In that view of the matter, it rejected the application and held that the order passed by the Assistant Collector was correct. It also referred to certain other conditions with which, for the purpose of the present petition we are not concerned. 8. It is this order which is challenged by this petition. It also referred to certain other conditions with which, for the purpose of the present petition we are not concerned. 8. It is this order which is challenged by this petition. It was urged that the view of the Assistant Collector as well as the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal that a 'sale' takes place in a Court sale when the bid is offered by the decree-holder or the auction purchaser and is accepted. It was not correct that confirmation proceedings and the sale becoming absolute has no relation to the actual sale taking place It was contended that section 65 of the Civil Procedure Code creates a fiction which is unnecessary or irrelevant for the purpose of obtaining a permission under section 63 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act. The provisions of section 63 it was contended, do not speak of any time at which the permission can be applied for. A distinction, it was contended, had to be made between a private sale and a Court sale or compulsory sale. Whereas in a 'private sale' the property passes immediately, that does not happen in the case of a 'compulsory sale' or a 'Court sale' under the Civil Procedure Code. Though the Tribunal referred to some of the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code, °it did not consider some other material and relevant provisions and the law in that behalf. Consequently the Tribunal's Judgment is clouded and erroneous. It does not take into account the law established in this behalf. 9. I may first refer to the provisions of section 63 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 (B. T. and A. L. Act). That section so far as it is relevant for our purposes is as follows:- "Section 63. It does not take into account the law established in this behalf. 9. I may first refer to the provisions of section 63 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 (B. T. and A. L. Act). That section so far as it is relevant for our purposes is as follows:- "Section 63. (1) Save as provided in this Act- (a) no sale including sales in execution of a decree of a Civil Court or for recovery of arears of land revenue), gift, exchange or lease of any land or interest therein, shall be valid in favour of a person who is not an agriculturist, or who being an agriculturist, will after such sale, gift, exchange, lease or mortgage, hold land exceeding two-thirds of the ceiling area determined under the Maharashtra Agricultural Lands (Ceiling on Holdings) Act, 1961 or who is not an agricultural labourer : Provided that the Collector or an officer authorised by the State Government in this behalf may grant permission for such sale, gift, exchange, lease or mortgage, on such conditions as may be prescribed." 10. It will be seen from the aforesaid section that a sale of any land shall not be valid in favour of a person who is not an 'agriculturist' or who is not an 'agricultural labourer' It is conceded that the petitioner is neither an agriculturist nor an agricultural labourer. However, the petitioner's case is that it is not necessary for him, particularly in the case of a Court sale, to apply to the Collector as provided under the proviso for a permission to bid and purchase the property, and he could do so if he offered his bid and his bid is accepted but before the sale is confirmed. The section enacts as pointed above, a complete ban upon sales in favour of persons other than ‘agriculturists’ or 'agricultural labourer'. However, the Legislature has also provided that the Collector or any officer authorised by the State Government may grant permission for such sale and other dispositions in accordance with the conditions which may be prescribed and which follow in that section and as also laid down by the Rules. However, the Legislature has also provided that the Collector or any officer authorised by the State Government may grant permission for such sale and other dispositions in accordance with the conditions which may be prescribed and which follow in that section and as also laid down by the Rules. Therefore, where a permission is granted by the Collector or by an authorised officer for a sale of any land even if the person is a non-agriculturist and not an agricultural labourer he can still buy agricultural land and the sale in his favour would not be invalid. 11. ‘Land' has been defined under section 2 (8) of the Act and means 'land' which is used for agricultural purposes. The present is a ‘land’ which is used for agricultural purposes and the petitioner who is not an agriculturist nor an agricultural labourer, if he had obtained a permission from the Collector then a sale in his favour would not become invalid. 12. The terms of section 63 speak of sale being invalid and permission being granted by the Collector. Though it does not say in so many terms that permission in case of a non-agriculturist and person not an agricultural labourer must be sought before the sale is effected the propriety and object of the section is clear. The permission therefore must be secured by a 'nonagriculturist' and a person not an agricultural labourer before the sale takes place. To the extent, therefore, the Tribunai and the Assistant Collector held that permission must be obtained before the sale takes place, in view of the provisions of section 63 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, are right. 13. The question, however, is whether in a "Court sale', the 'sale' takes place when the third bid is accepted by the Court or the Officer conducting the sale, or whether it takes place when the sale in confirmed and become absolute. If in the case of a Court sale, the sale becomes absolute only when it is confirmed and, therefore, at that time becomes a sale in the real sense of the term, then a permission can be had and obtained between the time of offering the third bid and its confirmation by the Court. If in the case of a Court sale, the sale becomes absolute only when it is confirmed and, therefore, at that time becomes a sale in the real sense of the term, then a permission can be had and obtained between the time of offering the third bid and its confirmation by the Court. The most material and crucial question, therefore, in the present case is as to whether in a Court sale, sale takes place no sooner a third bid in offered and accepted, as held by the authorities below, or otherwise. Before proceeding to deal with that question, in passing I may refer to Rule 36 of the Rules made under the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act. That rule does not throw any further light in regard to the matter of time when the application has to be made. That rule says that the Collector shall grant the permission when he is satisfied that the conditions which are mentioned in the rule are satisfied. For purposes of Court sales, sub-rule (h) says that where a land is being sold in execution of a decree of a Civil Court, the Collector must he satisfied that no agricultural labourer or "agriculturist holding land less than the ceiling area is prepared to bid at such sale." Therefore, under Rule 36, the Collector will grant permission if he is satisfied in the case of a Court sale in execution of a decree of a Civil Court, that no agricultural labourer or an agriculturist holding land less than the ceiling area, IS prepared to make any eachl1bid. That is the only condition which must be satisfied before the Collector can grant permission In the present case, the: Corrector has not addressed himself to that question. As r shall presently Indicate the nature of the enquiry and the circumstances and conditions of which he must be satisfied are only those as appearing in Rule 36, sub rule I {h) and none other. 14. In order, therefore, to find out in the case of execution sales as to the time when the sale becomes a 'sale', we have to the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code. 14. In order, therefore, to find out in the case of execution sales as to the time when the sale becomes a 'sale', we have to the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code. One obvious answer and result of those provision is, as bas been found by the authorities below is that in the case of a sale in execution of a decree before a court, the sale takes place when the third bid is offered and accepted. Reliance for that purpose was placed upon the provisions of section 65 or the Civil Procedure Code and the scheme of ‘sale’ as is to found in the provisiol1 of Order 21, Rule 66, and the following rules in that behalf t1pto Rule 90. I shall presently refer to these rules. But it may be pointed out that the authorities below were considerably influenced by the argument based on the provision of the Civil 65 of the Civil Procedure Code. Section 65 in these terms: Purchaser’ s title "65. Where Immovable property is sold in execution of a decree and such sale has become absolute, the property shall be deemed to have' vested in the purchaser from the time when the property is sold and not from the time when the sale becomes absolute." It will be seen from the marginal note to that Section and the fiction which is created thereunder also that a Purchaser acquires title to the property and the property vests in him when it is sold in execution of a decree where the sale has become "absolute" from the date the property is sold and not from the time when the sale becomes ·'absolute". The occasion for operation of section 65 arises only when and after the sale has become ·'absolute". The vesting of the title and the vesting of the property relates back to the time of sale "only ""hen the sale has become absolute." It follows, therefore, from the above that where the sale has not become absolute, the properly neither vests nor the title to it is acquired, even though it might have been sold. The clear intention and Object of the Section, therefore, is that there is an interregnum or intervention of time between a sale taking place and the sale becoming absolute It is this distinction which seems to have been overlooked by the authorities below. The clear intention and Object of the Section, therefore, is that there is an interregnum or intervention of time between a sale taking place and the sale becoming absolute It is this distinction which seems to have been overlooked by the authorities below. A sale of immoveable property may take place in execution of a decree. But unless the sale has become absolute, there is no vesting of property and passing of title. A sale becomes absolute, as I shall presently point out, under the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code, not when the sale takes place but only when certain matters and events which intervene and which may intervene have ceased to have effect. The Tribunal erred il1 my opinion in slipping over the distinction and thinking that the 'sale' is complete when the bids are accepted. 15. I may now refer to the other provisions of Order 21 relating to 'execution sales'. It is not necessary to refer to all the provisions but it would be sufficient to refer to only some. Rule 54 of Order 21 speaks of attachment of immoveable property which is necessary in case the property is not already subject to a charge. If the property is attached and there is no objection to the attachment raised and the property is ordered to be sold under Order 21, Rule 64, under Rule 66 a proclamation has to be issued in that behalf As set out in the rule the said proclamation itself has to state "the time and place of sale" and other material particulars which are laid down in parts of that Rule. Therefore, on the dates fixed in the proclamation the sale takes place. Rule 69 empowers the Court to adjourn the 'sale' from time to time specifying 'the date and hour' to which the sale is adjourned. We are not concerned with the other sub-rules of Rule 69. Rule 71 empowers the Court to recover any deficiency in price in case there is a default on the part of the purchaser in payment of money and also all expenses attending such re-sale are to be recovered from the defaulting purchaser. Rule 71, therefore, enacts that though a purchase, or sale and bid may be made, offered and accepted, the same is not final, and if the purchaser makes a default in payment, then the property is liable to be re-sold. 16. Rule 71, therefore, enacts that though a purchase, or sale and bid may be made, offered and accepted, the same is not final, and if the purchaser makes a default in payment, then the property is liable to be re-sold. 16. A decree-holder is not permitted to bid in a Court sale unless with the express permission of the Court. Where he does purchase with the permission of the Court, then the Court may also allow him a set-off of the amount to be paid against the decretal dues. Rule 84 then is material and lays down that a person who is declared to be the purchaser has to pay immediately thereafter a twentyfive per cent deposit on the amount of his purchasemoney to the officer conducting the sale. If he fails to deposit that twentyfive per cent immediately, then the property is forthwith re-sold. Even if, therefore, a bid is given and the bid is accepted by the officer conducting the sale, the sale may not become effectual and final and the property is liable to be re-sold, if the purchaser makes a default in payment of the twentyfive per cent of the purchase money required to be deposited. 17. Rule 85 then lays down that the balance of the amount has to be paid on or before the fifteenth day from the sale of the property. If the contention accepted were to be right that on an offer or bid being given, a sale becomes final or sale is complete so that a person thereafter cannot make an application under section 63 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, then Rules 71 and 85 in terms negative such a contention. If the purchaser does not pay on or before the 15th day, the balance of the purchase money, then in terms of Rule 71 he makes a default and the property is sold again, though his bid had been accepted and be did deposit the 25 per cent required to be deposited at the time when his bid was accepted. Rule 86. lays down that on default of the purchaser, the deposit made may be forfeited after defraying the expenses of the sale and property shall be re-sold. Rule 86. lays down that on default of the purchaser, the deposit made may be forfeited after defraying the expenses of the sale and property shall be re-sold. The defaulting purchaser in such a case then loses all his claims to the property as well as to any part of the sum for which it may be subsequently sold. It will thus be seen that it is wrong to say that no sooner the bid is given and it is accepted, the sale is complete. 18. Rules 89 and 90 then provide for applications by persons claiming interest in the property including the judgment-debtor so far as Rule 89 is concerned. So far as Rule 90, the rules provide for application even by a person entitled to a share in rateable distribution of assets or whose interest was affected, for setting aside the sale. In cases of applications under Rule 89 where the applicant deposits all the money that is required to be deposited viz. for payment to the purchaser, a sum equal to five per cent of the purchase-money and for payment to the decree-holder, the amount specified in the proclamation of sale, then the 'sale' can be and has to be set aside if the application is allowed. In case of Rule 90, if the applicant succeeds, the 'sale' will also be set aside. In both these cases, upon application made under Rules 89 or 90 the 'sale' will be set aside, notwithstanding that bids had been made and accepted and the deposits being made by the purchaser. It would not, therefore be right to say that no Sooner a bid is given and is accepted, a sale of property in cases of execution sales takes place. 19. Besides these two Rules, Rule 91 of Order 21 permits even an auction purchaser to make an application for setting aside the sale on the ground that at the time when the property "'as sold "the judgment-debtor had no saleable interest in the property." Such an application can be made before the sale is finalised and I shall presently point out that, before the sale is confirmed A stage of confirmation of sale is a necessary stage which must take place before the same can be said to have taken place. It is only after a sale is confirmed that it becomes 'absolute' and section 65 comes into operation. It is only after a sale is confirmed that it becomes 'absolute' and section 65 comes into operation. As I pointed out earlier, Section 65 has no application unless the sale has become absolute. The sale becomes absolute only when, as I shall presently point out, it is confirmed. Therefore, before the sale is confirmed an application for setting aside can be made even by a successful bidder on the ground that the judgment-debtor has no saleable interest. 20. Then comes the most important rule in the scheme of 'Court sale' in the Civil Procedure Code, that is, Rule 92. Though the Tribunal considered all other Rules and in particular Rules 89, 90 and 91, it omitted from its consideration Rule 92. That in my opinion was a grave short-coming resulting in the error in its conclusion. Rule 92 reads thus: "92. (I) Where no application is made under rule 89, rule 90 or rule 91, or where such application is made and disallowed, the Court shall make an order confirming the sale, and thereupon the sale shall become absolute." (Emphasis given) We are not concerned with the proviso in the present case. It only enjoins the Court not to confirm the sale in certain circumstances. Rule 92 clearly says that it comes into operation only where no application under Rule 89, 90 or 91 is made or where it is made and is disallowed then only the Court shall make an order confirming the sale and then "the sale shall become absolute." It will thus be clear that in the scheme of 'Court sale' provided by the Civil Procedure Code there are two stages-one of sale of the property and the other of the sale becoming absolute. Between these two stages, various procedures and proceedings are permitted. It is upon the conclusion of these proceedings and procedures that the finality is acquired by a Court sale. It then reaches the stage of confirmation. The rule also lays down that "the Court shall make an order confirming the sale." An order confirming the sale is, therefore, an essential necessity before the sale becoming absolute. The adverb "Thereupon" in the rule makes the position clear. No sale can become absolute and, therefore, no vesting of the property or passing of title under section 65 unless there is "an order confirming the sale. " 21. The adverb "Thereupon" in the rule makes the position clear. No sale can become absolute and, therefore, no vesting of the property or passing of title under section 65 unless there is "an order confirming the sale. " 21. The necessary result of Rule 92 therefore, is that it is only when a sale is confirmed by an order of the Court that it becomes absolute. It, therefore, contemplates clearly two things-the holding of a sale in which the bid is accepted and the price deposited and the second the confirmation of that sale. Where a sale, therefore, takes place and the price is deposited, the sale does not acquire a finality It so acquires a finality only when it is confirmed. Till then it is incomplete and the rights of the auction purchaser do not become crystallised. They are merely inchoate. If we do not consider the effect of Rule 92 and consider section 65 of the Civil Procedure Code by itself, then we are likely to fall into an error in reaching the conclusion, unwarranted by the scheme and rules of Order 21. A sale in execution proceeding does not become a sale when the third bid is accepted and is not final, as in the case of a private sale, unless it is confirmed, and there is no passing of property, has been held and stated in numerous cases arising in numerous ways. 22. The word 'confirm' appearing in Rule 92 is also of consequence and significance. The word 'confirm' in its context means either to verify or to declare as in the case of confirmation of minutes. It also carries the meaning of 'approve'. 'Confirm' is a word, the other meaning of which is 'endorse' or 'verify'. It is equivalent to 'approve' depending on the context in which the meaning of the word is to be determined. Considering the context to which 1 have made a reference above and the scheme of the 'Court sale' under the Civil Procedure Code, the meaning to be attributed to the word 'confirm' occurring in Rule 92 is, I think, 'approve'. 23. The word 'confirm' occurs in several contexts, circumstances, transactions and places. It means differently on different occasions depending as pointed out on the context. 23. The word 'confirm' occurs in several contexts, circumstances, transactions and places. It means differently on different occasions depending as pointed out on the context. In Queen v. The Mayor, Aldermen And Citizens of York1, Lord Campbell Lord Chancellor observed as to the meaning of the word 'confirm' that “It sometimes means merely 'verify': it is commonly used in that sense at the meetings of public bodies, who confirm the minutes of their last meeting, not meaning thereby that they give them force, but merely that they declare them accurate. The word may be used in that sense in other Acts. But, in this Act, the word seems to me to be used in the sense of 'approve'. In that case the question was of the grant of mandamus against the Aldermen and Citizens of York, to confirm an order made by the Justices of the City appointing John Raper as the Keeper of the Jail on a certain salary. The Town Council refused to confirm the Order and, therefore, the mandamus was sought. It was in this context that Lord Campbell denying the rule stated that the word 'confirm' in this Act means not 'verify' but to 'approve'. To my mind the requirement of the Code in making an order of confirmation under Order 21, Rule 92 of the Civil Procedure Code is not merely 'verify' but to 'approve'. It does not becoming absolute. The adverb "Thereupon" in the rule makes the position clear. No sale can become absolute and, therefore, no vesting of the property or passing of title under section 65 unless there is "an order confirming the sale. 21. The necessary result of Rule 92 therefore, is that it is only when a sale is confirmed by an order of the Court that it becomes absolute. It, therefore, contemplates clearly two things-the holding of a sale in which the bid is accepted and the price deposited and the second the confirmation of that sale. Where a sale, therefore, takes place and the price is deposited, the sale does not acquire a finality. It so acquires a finality only when it is confirmed. Till then it is incomplete and the rights of the auction purchaser do not become crystallised. They are merely inchoate. Where a sale, therefore, takes place and the price is deposited, the sale does not acquire a finality. It so acquires a finality only when it is confirmed. Till then it is incomplete and the rights of the auction purchaser do not become crystallised. They are merely inchoate. If we do not consider the effect of Rule 92 and consider section 65 of the Civil Procedure Code by itself, then we are likely to fall into an error in reaching the conclusion, unwarranted by the scheme and rules of Order 21. A sale in execution proceeding does not become a sale when the third bid is accepted and is not final, as in the case of a private sale, unless it is confirmed, and there is no passing of property, has been held and stated in numerous cases arising in numerous ways. 22. The word 'confirm' appearing in Rule 92 is also of consequence and significance. The word 'confirm' in its context means either to verify or to declare as in the case of confirmation of minutes. It also carries the meaning of 'approve'. 'Confirm' is a word, the other meaning of which is 'endorse' or 'verify'. It is equivalent to 'approve' depending on the context in which the meaning of the word is to be determined. Considering the context to which 1 have made a reference above and the scheme of the 'Court sale' under the Civil Procedure Code, the meaning to be attributed to the word 'confirm' occurring in Rule 92 is, I think, 'approve'. 23. The word 'confirm' occurs in several contexts, circumstances, transactions and places. It means differently on different occasions depending as pointed out on the context. In Queen v. The Mayor, Aldermen And Citizens of York1, Lord Campbell Lord Chancellor observed as to the meaning of the word 'confirm' that "It sometimes means merely 'verify': it is commonly used in that sense at the meetings of public bodies, who confirm the minutes of their last meeting, not meaning thereby that they give them force, but merely that they declare them accurate. The word may be used in that sense in other Acts. But, in this Act, the word seems to me to be used in the sense of 'approve'. The word may be used in that sense in other Acts. But, in this Act, the word seems to me to be used in the sense of 'approve'. In that case the question was of the grant of mandamus against the Aldermen and Citizens of York, to confirm an order made by the Justices of the City appointing John Raper as the Keeper of the Jai] on a certain salary. The Town Council refused to confirm the Order and, therefore, the mandamus was sought. It was in this context that Lord Campbell denying the rule stated that the word 'confirm' in this Act means not 'verify' but to 'approve'. To my mind the requirement of the Code in making an order of confirmation under Order 21, Rule 92 of the Civil Procedure Code is not merely 'verify' but to 'approve'. It does not merely declare that a 'sale' has taken place in favour of the auction-purchaser on a certain date, but it accepts and approves that sale, confirming it and clothing it with the legal consequence of vesting and passing of title. 24. I may usefully draw attention to another decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Ramesh Himmatlal Shah v. Harsukh Jadhavji Joshi2. The facts in that case may be briefly stated to understand the observations to which I will make a reference In that case the decree-holder had brought to sale the judgment-debtor's right, title and interest in a tenant co-partnership housing society. That was sold and purchased by the Appellant Ramesh Himmatlal Shah. A question arose before the Supreme Court as to whether a member who is entitled and permitted on account of his being a member of a co-operative society to reside in a flat given to him because of his membership, can be attached and sold in execution of a decree. Justice Vaidya sitting singly in this Court had held that the said property was not liable to be attached and sold. Both the attachment and sale was, therefore, set aside. A Letters Patent Appeal filed had also failed. The purchaser then approached the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court allowed the Appeal and held that the property could be sold, but the purchaser must be admitted to the membership of the society. Therefore, the record and proceedings in that case were sent back to the Court. A Letters Patent Appeal filed had also failed. The purchaser then approached the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court allowed the Appeal and held that the property could be sold, but the purchaser must be admitted to the membership of the society. Therefore, the record and proceedings in that case were sent back to the Court. In that context it observed:- "Now that attachment and sale have been held to be valid, it will be for the auction-purchaser first to obtain membership of the society and the Court before confirmation of the sale will insist upon his membership of the society which, it would not be unreasonable to assume, will be granted by the society in the ordinary course unless there are cogent and relevant reasons for not doing so." The sale was not confirmed but was merely held. It is when the sale was yet to be confirmed that these proceedings were taken out and the decision given. It will be seen from the aforesaid observation that though the sale had taken place, the obtaining of membership of a tenant co-partnership housing society was necessary before the sale can be confirmed. In cases where an auction purchaser purchases the judgment-debtor's right, title and interest in the society and, therefore, the right to occupy the flat, before confirming the sale, Court can insist upon the auction-purchaser obtaining membership. If the auction-purchaser fails to obtain membership for any reason, then it follows that the Court will not confirm the sale. This decision in my opinion clearly points out the two distinct stages of "sale taking place and confirmation of that sale", which is not automatic. The Court has to approve that sale and before it does so approve the sale, it will examine if there is any legal impediment in the sale taking place Such a legal impediment in the case of a 'sale of agricultural land' would be want of permission, if the auction purchaser was not an agriculturist or an agri cultural labourer. In such a case, Court will also insist on the auction purchaser obtaining permission from the Collector even though the sale in his favour has taken place. This decision, therefore, to my mind is a complete answer to the contentions raised on behalf of the respondent in this petition. In such a case, Court will also insist on the auction purchaser obtaining permission from the Collector even though the sale in his favour has taken place. This decision, therefore, to my mind is a complete answer to the contentions raised on behalf of the respondent in this petition. 25.That ‘confirmation is not mere mechanical thing but involves consideration of matters which may arise, and includes some clement of application of mind was held in the case of Commissioners for the port of Calcutta v. Asit Ranjan Majumday3 There the powers of the State Govern ment to confirm bye-law were called in question. When the bye-law was 'Put tip before the Government by the Commissioners of the Port of Calcutta, the Gavernment deleted a word therefrom. Tile contention was that a confirming, authority has no such power and it has only to accept and confirm whatever put forward. Such a narrow and technical view of the word ‘confirmed’ would mean that even for typographical or grammatical or other mistakes in punctuation the confirming authority is powerless to correct them. Secondly, the word ‘confirmed’ etymologically comes from the old French and Latin Confermer’ meaning thereby to make firm or strengthen. “Confirmation in Such a case should include some element of application of mind and some consequential and necessary correction."This in my opinion is consistent with the view and observations reproduced above in the Supreme Court decision of Ramesh Himmatlal Shah v. Harsukh Jadhavji Joshi. 26.It seems that the Tribunal thought that where a sale 'takes place and no application under under Order 21 Rule 89, 90 or 91 is filed, confirmation of 'the sale is automatic. The Court must Confirm the sa1e where none such application was filed or having been filed, were rejected. An order of confirmation of sa1e cannot be passed within thirty days of the holding of the sale, but where thirty days elapsed and the contingencies referred above did not occur or having occurred have lost their effect or cease to be of consequence then confirmation is automatic bringing in immediately the provisions of section 65. An order of confirmation of sa1e cannot be passed within thirty days of the holding of the sale, but where thirty days elapsed and the contingencies referred above did not occur or having occurred have lost their effect or cease to be of consequence then confirmation is automatic bringing in immediately the provisions of section 65. In view of what 1 have already pointed out and the exposition of law as appearing in the above two cases of Ramesh Himmatlal Shah v. Harsukh Jadhavji Joshi and that of Commissioners for 'the Port of Calcutta v. Asit Ranjan Majumdar, that confirmation involves an application of mind, a Court would be justified in requiring an auction-purchaser to produce some other document, material permission or authority required in law before the sale can be confirmed. It is not, therefore, an automatic act on the part of the court, but that it comes only after an application of mind by that Court. 27. I may now refer to a few decisions which would point out and emphasise the distinction between a sa1e taking place, and a sale becoming absolute. They also illustrate the proposition which I have pointed out above. The first decision which may be referred is in the 'Case of Sm. Priti Rekha Mitra v. Narayan Chandra Dutta4 There the property had been sold -and proceedings far confirmation of the sale were pending. In the meantime the mortgagor wanted to redeem the property. The mortgaged property had been sold, but the sale was not confirmed and the question was whether if the property is sold but before the sale is confirmed, the mortgagor had a right to redeem. On the view which found favour with the Tribunal, the mortgagor would not be entitled to redeem the property having been sold and therefore lost. It was held otherwise. The Court observed:- "Under the Civil Procedure Code, a sale of immoveable property in execution of a decree has to be confirmed tinder Order 21, Rule 92 which provides that where no application is made under Rule 89 or Rule 90 or Rule 91 or where such application is made and disallowed, the Court shall make an order confirming the sale and thereupon the sale shall become absolute. That is a clear mandate upon the Court. That is a clear mandate upon the Court. It is obligatory upon the Court under that provision to make an order confirming the sale when circumstances require it and it is upon such confirmation that the sale becomes "absolute", As the sale in the above case had not been confirmed, the mortgagor was allowed to redeem and pay the decretal amount. 28. The next case is that reported in Ramchandra Bhagat v. Mrs. Eva Mitra5• The head-note in that case dealing with section 65 says that it is only when confirmation of the sale takes place, that the provisions of this Section as to the retrospective vesting of title from the date of the sale come into operation. A judicial sale becomes absolute only when the requirements of Rule 92 of Order 21 of the Code are fulfilled. 29. In the above case, the properties in question were sold on the 14th August 1952 but the sale was not confirmed and there was a stay regarding confirmation of the sale by the High Court. In the meantime under the Bihar Land Reforms Act, the proprietary interests in the villages which were the subject of sale, by an Order of the Government, vested in the State. It was contended that since after the sale but before the confirmation the property has vested in the Government, there cannot be any confirmation. Causes (d) and (e) of section 4 of that Act provided that an estate which had vested shall not be attached or sold "under the processes of any Court". It also provided that any order of attachment in respect of such an estate shall cease to be in force. While upholding this contention, the Court observed that "the auction sale that has taken place was inchoate and incomplete and not legally adequate to pass good title to the auction purchaser." It further said that "unlike a sale by a private treaty a Court sale is not absolute and complete immediately it takes place." 30. It was contended before the Division Bench that the provisions of Rule 92 provide for an automatic confirmation and "the sale becomes automatically absolute and the confirmation of a sale is a merely formal matter. It was contended before the Division Bench that the provisions of Rule 92 provide for an automatic confirmation and "the sale becomes automatically absolute and the confirmation of a sale is a merely formal matter. But the Court did not accept that there is an automatic confirmation and said:- ''It does not provide that the sale becomes absolute ipso facto on the expiry of thirty days from the date of the sale. The confirmation of sale which comes into operation under rule 92 is not a mere ministerial or formal order; it is a judicial order, and the expression "the Court shall make an order confirming the sale" makes it absolutely clear that this rule requires an order of a Court confirming the sale," The Court then pointed out that:- "Ordinarily, the Court is bound to confirm the sale when it bas not been set aside as provided in the Code. Nevertheless, there must be an order of the Court confirming the sale, and it is only when such order is made, the safe becomes absolute. It is evident, therefore, that there was no automatic confirmation of sale immediately after the expiration of thirty days from the date of the sale." 31. In Kishhanlal v. Kothari Jethma/6, the question was as to upto what date the decree-holdar was entitled to interest. The contention was that the decree-holder was entitled to interest up to date of sale and not tin con6rmation. If the contention that the 'sale' when it takes place by the acceptance of the third bid is complete, then to that extent on that date the decree holder's debt would be satisfied and would not earn interest. The contention was, however, not accepted. It was held that the Appellant was entitled to interest upto the date the sale was confirmed, the reason being that until the sale becomes absolute, the decree-holder does not have the physical possession of the property. 32. In Dave Sadashiv Jaykrislma v. Rane Gvubha7, Justice Bhagwati as be then was held that:- "It is only when the sale is confirmed by the Court under the provisions of Order 21, Rule 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure that the judgment-debt is extinguished and until confirmation of the sale, the judgmentdebt remains outstanding and subsisting." In other words, until confirmation the property does not pass and the sale does not become effective. This was emphasised by Shri Justice Bhagwati by referring to the provisions of Rule 92 of Order 21. He observed :- "So long as the sale of the house was not confirmed by the Court, the debtor continued to remain the owner of the house and similarly the debtor continued to remain the owner of 1 14th share in the land so long as the sale thereof was not confirmed by the Court." In that case also the sale had taken place, but was not confirmed. In the meantime, the Saurashtra Agricultural Debtor's Relief Act, 1954 came into operation and the dues of the judgment-debtor were required to be adjusted. A claim was put forward that the property having been sold to the judgmentcreditor, though the sale was not confirmed he has acquired a right and title to that property which was sold. It was held following a decision of the Division Bench of the Madras High Court, reported in Natraraja v. Rangaswami8 that as long as the sale was not confirmed the decretal debt in respect of the set-off allowed does not become extinguished and satisfied. As in that case where the Madras Debtors Relief Act had intervened, in the Gujarat case the Saurashtra Agricultural Debtors' Relief Act bad intervened. The right to confirmation of the sale had become subject to those statutes. 33. In Chimenlal Narsibhai Patel v. Amratlal Chotalal Shah9, the question arose in a different form. The property was sold on the 14th of December 1957 and the sale was confirmed on 30th April 1959 when it became absolute. During the intervening period, the judgment-debtor recovered rent from the tenants. The auction purchaser claimed that he was entitled to recover that rent since the property vested in him from the date of sale: on the 4th December 1957 was held that :- Till the Sale became absolute, the judgment-debtor continued to be the landlord and as such was entitled to collect rent from the defendants as his tenant.” 34. The auction purchaser claimed that he was entitled to recover that rent since the property vested in him from the date of sale: on the 4th December 1957 was held that :- Till the Sale became absolute, the judgment-debtor continued to be the landlord and as such was entitled to collect rent from the defendants as his tenant.” 34. To the same effect is the finding and confirmation in Lord Krishna Bank Ltd. v. Thomas Joseph10 Referring to the provisions of section 65 and Rule 92 it was held:- "'These provision read together mean that till confirmation of sale or other words till the sale has become absolute the property shall remain to' be that of the judgment-debtor till other word the property that was sold shall remain that of the judgment-debtor till the sale becomes absolute." 35. It would thus be seen from the several decisions to which I have referred that upon the sale taking place, property does- not pass from the hands of judgment-debtor and the title to it continues to remain with him until the sale is confirmed when it becomes absolute unlike in the case of a sale by a private treaty where the passing of title and vesting is immediate, in a Court sale the passing of the title and vesting is deferred. Until then the auction-purchasers are prospective buyers who can clear and remove all the deficiencies or impediments which may come in their way of confirmation of the safe If it is the sale' of a share in the tenant co-partnership housing, society and the right to a flat depends upon the auction purchaser becoming, a member, before confirmation of the sale, be may remove that impediment by being a member. If he is successful in becoming a member, the sale will the confirmed in his favour. 36. Similarly where a sale has taken place in case of an agricultural laud, the same shall not be confirmed if the auction purchaser is not an agriculturist or not art agricultural labourer, unless he obtains permission from the Collector. If his sale can be confirmed upon becoming member of a society in case of Co-operative Society, the auction-purchaser of agricultural land who is not an agriculturist can similarly obtain permission from the Collector and then obtain confirmation from the Court. 37. If his sale can be confirmed upon becoming member of a society in case of Co-operative Society, the auction-purchaser of agricultural land who is not an agriculturist can similarly obtain permission from the Collector and then obtain confirmation from the Court. 37. Applying the ratio and principle in the present case, it must be held that it was wrong on the part of the authorities below to reject the application for per1Ilission on the ground that the sale had taken place. The Order. Therefore, passed by the Assistant Collector as well as by the Tribunal is set aside and the petitioner auction-purchaser's application is sent back to the Assistant Collector for the grant of permission claimed. 38. One subsidiary aspect of the matter may also be referred to at this stage. It this urged that a proceeding under Rule 36 and under section 63 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act is not in the nature of a judicial proceeding. I have already referred to the rule and the Section. It is possible tc1 contend that the question as to grant of permission and the facts and conditions on which the permission can be granted are matters between the petitioner and the Collector only and no other person has a right of being heard. It is also possible to contend that the proceedings are administrative in nature and at the most quasi-judicial subject only to an appeal under section 76 to the Tribunal. In the view, whi.ch I have taken and since the matter has to go back to the Assistant Collector I refrain from expressing an opinion on this contention or aspect of the matter. 39. In the result, the petition is allowed. The Order passed by the authorities below is set aside and Rule is made absolute. Respondents shall pay costs of the petition. Petition allowed.