Judgment SATYESHWAR ROY, J. 1. The petitioner, a Rakshak in the Railway Protection Force, has been removed from his service by order dated 12-5-1976, Annexure 2 passed by respondent No. 3. The petitioner has prayed for quashing this Annexure and also has prayed for quashing the order of the above date by which respondent No. 3 has held that it was not reasonably practicable to follow the normal procedure prescribed in the rules for inflicting punishment for removal from service, Annexure 1 and order dated 4-6-1976, passed by respondent No. 2 in appeal Annexure 4. 2. In 1976 the petitioner was posted at Sini in the District of Singhbhum. By order dated 12-5-1976, passed by respondent No. 3, Annexure 1 the petitioner was informed that while he was on duty in Railway Yard at Gamharia on 28-9- 1975, outside persons numbering about 22 entered into the Railway Yard at about 9 a. m. and lifted Railway iron materials from the yard which were concealed underneath a tree. The petitioner came and allowed these outsiders to carry stolen iron materials after taking Re. 1 from each of them. He was further informed that an enquiry into charges as required under Rules 44, 45 and 46 of the Railway Protection Force Rules 1959 (the Rules) was considered not reasonably practicable. Respondent No. 3, therefore, in exercise of the power conferred under Rule 47 of the Rules removed the petitioner from his service. The operative part of the order contained in Annexure 1 i.e., order of removal from service with effect from 13-5-1976 was communicated to the petitioner by Annexure 2. An appeal preferred by the petitioner was rejected by respondent No. 2. The case of the petitioner is that the order of removal contained in Annexure 2 contains stigma. The petitioner, therefore, should have been provided with reasonable opportunity to defend himself. According to the petitioner the order has been passed in violation of the principles of natural justice. 3. A counter-affidavit has been filed on behalf of the respondents. It has been contended in the counter-affidavit that procedure prescribed in Rule 47 of the Rules has been followed in the case and there was no obligation on the respondents either to hold enquiry after giving opportunity to the petitioner or to hear him before passing any final order. 4. A counter-affidavit has been filed on behalf of the respondents. It has been contended in the counter-affidavit that procedure prescribed in Rule 47 of the Rules has been followed in the case and there was no obligation on the respondents either to hold enquiry after giving opportunity to the petitioner or to hear him before passing any final order. 4. Rule 44 of the Rules provides that no order imposing on a member of the Railway Protection Force any of the penalties of dismissal, removal, compulsory retirement and reduction to a lower class or grade or rank or to a lower time scale or to a lower stage in the time scale of pay shall be passed except after an enquiry held as far as may be in the manner provided in that Rule. That Rule provides for framing of charge on the basis of allegations on which the enquiry is proposed to be held. Such charges shall be served on the member of the force concerned, who shall be required to submit a written statement of his defence and also to state whether he desires to be heard in person. The disciplinary authority may himself enquire or appoint a superior officer to conduct the enquiry into the charges as are not admitted by the member of the force. At the conclusion of the enquiry, the inquiring authority shall prepare a report of the enquiry, recording its findings on each of the charges together with reasons therefor. If the disciplinary authority is of the opinion that any of the penalties as aforesaid should be imposed he shall give a notice of action proposed to be taken to the person concerned calling upon him to submit his representation against the proposed action. The disciplinary authority, thereafter, shall pass appropriate order on the case. It will thus appear that Rule 44 of the Rules provides for issuing notice to the delinquent member of force at two stages. The first notice to be issued calling upon the delinquent member of force to submit his written statement of defence against definite charges of allegations oft which enquiry is proposed to be held. And the second notice after the enquiry is concluded and the disciplinary authority forms an opinion that any of the penalties enumerated above should be imposed. The first notice to be issued calling upon the delinquent member of force to submit his written statement of defence against definite charges of allegations oft which enquiry is proposed to be held. And the second notice after the enquiry is concluded and the disciplinary authority forms an opinion that any of the penalties enumerated above should be imposed. But in this case, the special procedure laid down in R. 47 of the Rules has been followed. Rule 47 of the Rules reads as follows: "Notwithstanding anything contained in Rules 44, 45 and 46, where a penalty is imposed on a member of the force (a) on the ground of conduct which has led to his conviction on a criminal charge or (b) where the disciplinary authority is satisfied, for reasons to be recorded in writing, that it is not reasonably practicable to follow the procedure prescribed in the said Rules, the disciplinary authority may consider the circumstances of the case and pass such orders thereon as it deems fit." This rule is, therefore, a departure from the normal procedure that is required to be followed as provided in Rule 44 of the Rules. 5 Mr. Srivastava, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner submitted that the grounds on which the disciplinary authority has come to the conclusion that it was not reasonably practicable to follow the normal procedure prescribed in Rule 44 of the Rules are irrelevant. According to him there must be material on record to show that some enquiry was made by the disciplinary authority to arrive at a finding that the petitioner was guilty of the charge and that having not been done in this case the order of removal is bad in law. 6. The portion of Annexure 1 which is relevant to dispose of this contention of Mr. Srivastava reads as follows: "An enquiry into the above misconduct/delinquency is not considered practicable as provided under Rules 44, 45 and 46 of the Railway Protection Force Rules, 1959, because of the fact that it is not considered feasible Or desirable to procure the witnesses of the security/other Railway Employees since this will expose them and make them ineffective for the future. These witnesses if asked to appear at a confronted enquiry are likely to suffer personal humiliation and insults thereafter or even they and their family members may become targets of acts of violence." The respondents in the counter-affidavit have brought on record the statements of witnesses in this case. From tht statements of witnesses it appears that those persons who were found lifting iron materials from the Railway Yard were arrested under the Railway Property (Unauthorised Possession) Act identified the petitioner as the person who had allowed them to remove the iron materials after taking Re. 1 from each of them. In the facts and circumstances of the case, I am of the opinion that there was sufficient material on record, on the basis of which respondent No. 3 could have been satisfied that it was not reasonably practicable to follow the normal procedure of issuing a charge-sheet and making an enquiry into the same, after giving opportunity to the petitioner to file his written statement of defence. 7. Next contention of Mr. Srivastava is that even if it be found that it was not reasonably practicable to issue charge-sheet and enquire into the same after giving opportunity to the petitioner, since no notice of punishment proposed to be inflicted was given, the order of removal was bad. He drew our attention to the words "may consider" which appear at the end of Rule 47 of. the Rules and contended that in view of the same a notice of .the proposed punishment, ought to have been given. In support of this contention, Mr. Srivastava, drew our attention to. a number of cases of different High Courts including, a Bench decision of this Court in the case of Ramcharitra Sharma v. Union of India (1977 Pat LJR 133): (1977 Lab IC 174). For the reasons stated hereafter, I do not feel it necessary to refer to all the decisions relied upon by Mr. Srivastava. Mr. Prasad, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents contended that once the disciplinary authority is satisfied in a particular case that it was not reasonably practicable to follow the normal procedure prescribed and acts under Rule 47 of the Rules no notice of the punishment proposed is required to be given. Srivastava. Mr. Prasad, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents contended that once the disciplinary authority is satisfied in a particular case that it was not reasonably practicable to follow the normal procedure prescribed and acts under Rule 47 of the Rules no notice of the punishment proposed is required to be given. He urged that in such cases there is no "proposal" to inflict a particular punishment; what is done in such cases is "final" order inflicting the punishment. In support of his contention he relied on the case of M. Gopalkrishna v. State of Madhya Pradesh ( AIR 1968 SC 240 ): (1968 Lab IC 216) and on the case of Chief Mechanical Engineer, Eastern Railway v. Jyoti Prosad, (1975 (2) Serv LR 437): (1975 Lab IC 1288) (Cal), a Bench decision of the Calcutta High Court. It may be mentioned that all the cases of the different High Courts including this Court referred to by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the parties relate to cases under Rule 14 (ii), Railway Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rule, 1968, (D. A. Rules). The Supreme Court case referred by the learned counsel of the respondents also does not relate to R. 47 of the Rules. 8. In the case of M. Gopalkrishna (supra) the Supreme Court was required to interpret the scope of different clauses of Rule 54 of Fundamental Rules and to decide whether it was necessary in that case to give a reasonable opportunity to show cause against the action proposed under that Rule. In that case the Supreme Court has observed as follows (at page 218 of Lab IC): "But there are three classes of. cases as laid down by the proviso in Art. 311 where a departmental inquiry would not be held viz., (a), where a person, is dismissed, removed or reduced in rank on the ground of conduct which has led to his conviction on a criminal charge, (b) where the authority empowered to dismiss or remove a person or to reduce him in rank is satisfied for reasons, to be recorded in writing that it is not reasonably practicable to hold such an inquiry, and (c) where the President or the Governor as the case may be is satisfied that in the interest of security of the State it is not expedient to hold such inquiry. Since there would be no. Since there would be no. inquiry in these, classes . of cases the authority would not have before him any explanation by the Government servant. The authority in such cases would have to consider and pass the order merely on such facts which might be placed before him by the department concerned. The order in such a case would be ex parte without the authority having the other side of the picture." On the basis of this observation Mr. Prasad, contended that the whole proceeding being ex parte, the petitioner was not required, to be heard at any stage. In my opinion, this case has no application to the present case. Proviso to Art. .311 (2) of the Constitution which is material for this case, reads as follows: "Provided that this clause shall not apply (a) ............... or (b) Where the authority empowered to dismiss or remove a person or to reduce him in rank is satisfied that for some reason, to be recorded by that authority in writing it is not reasonably practicable to hold such inquiry; or (c)..............." It will thus be seen that the proviso is not exactly similar to Rule 47 of the Rules which has been Quoted above elsewhere. In the proviso to Art. 311 (2) the concerned authority is not required to "consider the circumstances of the case" which appears in Rule 47 of the Rules. M. Gopalkrishna Naidus case (supra), therefore does not help us in deciding the present case. 9. In the case of Divisional Personnel Officer v. T. R. Challappan ( AIR 1975 SC 2216 ): (1975 Lab IC 1598) Rule 14 of D.A. Rules was involved which reads as follows: "14. Notwithstanding anything contained in Rules 9 to 13 (i) Where any penalty is imposed on a railway servant on the ground of conduct which has led to his conviction on a criminal charge, or (ii) Where the disciplinary authority is satisfied for reasons to be recorded by it in writing that it is not reasonably practicable to hold an inquiry in the manner provided in these rules, or (iii) Where President is satisfied that in the interest of the security of the State it is not expedient to hold an inquiry in the manner provided in these rules. the disciplinary authority may consider the circumstances of the case and make such orders thereon as it deems fit Provided that the Commission shall be consulted, where such consultation is necessary before any orders are made in any case under the Rules." In that case the railway servant was convicted on a criminal charge and R. 14 (i) of the Rules was applicable. The Supreme Court laid down . the ambit and scope of "the disciplinary authority may consider the circumstances of the case and make such orders thereon as it deems fit" occurring in that Rule. It held in that case that "the word consider has been used in contradistinction to the word determine. The rule-making authority deliberately used the word consider and not determine because the word determine has a much wider scope. The word consider merely connotes that there should be active application of the mind by the disciplinary authority after considering the entire circumstances of the case in order to decide the nature and extent of the penalty to be imposed on the delinquent employee on his conviction on a criminal charge. This matter can be objectively determined only if the delinquent employee is heard and is given a chance to satisfy the authority regarding the final orders that may be passed by the said authority. In other words the term consider postulates consideration of all the aspects, the pros and cons of the matter after hearing the aggrieved person. Such an enquiry would be a summary enquiry to be held by a disciplinary authority after hearing the delinquent employee... It further observed that ".........The statutory provision referred to above merely imposes a rule of natural justice in enjoining that before taking final action in the matter the delinquent employee should be heard and the circumstances of the case may be objectively considered. This is in keeping with the sense of justice and fair play........." In the case of Ramcharitra Sharma (1977 Lab IC 174) (supra) a Bench of this Court applied the law so laid down by the Supreme Court in T. R. Challappans case (1975 Lab IC 1598). In Ramcharitra Sharmas case clause (ii) of Rule 14 of D. A. Rules was involved. In Ramcharitra Sharmas case clause (ii) of Rule 14 of D. A. Rules was involved. In the case of Jyoti Prosad (1975 Lab IC 1288) (Cal) (supra) a Bench of the Calcutta High Court in interpreting Rule 14 (ii) of the D. A. Rules held that there was no scope under that Rule for giving a notice about the punishment proposed. Calcutta High Court judgment was delivered before the case of T. R .Challappan. In view of the latter case the decision of the Calcutta High Court cannot be held to be a good law. 10 Rule 14 of D. A. Rules and R. 47 of the Rules have been quoted above. It may be noticed that in both the Rules the disciplinary authority is required to "consider the circumstances of the case" and thereafter pass order thereon as deemed fit. The ambit and scope of these words of Rule 14 of D. A. Rules as laid down by the Supreme Court in T. R. Challappans case will apply with all force to a case where the disciplinary authority had exercised its power under Rule 47 of the Rules. 11. It is admitted position in this case that no notice about the proposed punishment was given to the petitioner. Applying the law laid down in T. R. Challappans case (1975 Lab IC 1598) (SO (supra), it must be held that the order of removal passed against the petitioner by respondent No. 3 and confirmed in appeal by respondent No. 2 without giving any opportunity to the petitioner to show cause against the proposed punishment is bad in law and must be set aside. 12. In the result, Annexure 1 so far as it relates to the decision of respondent No. 3 by which he passed order of removal of the petitioner without giving opportunity to show cause against the proposed punishment, Annexures 2 and 4 are quashed. It will be open to the disciplinary authority to pass a fresh order after giving opportunity to the petitioner to show cause against the proposed punishment. The petitioner shall be entitled to cost assessed at Rs. 250. K.B.N.SINGH, J. 13 I agree.