JUDGMENT- The petitioner is a Road Transport Corporation known as Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation established under the Road Corporation Act. It has a depot at Washim in Akola district. Respondent Na. 1 was a conductor in the service of the petitioner and on the relevant date, Le., 'On 12-5-1970, he was working on the Loni-Washim raute. His bus was checked 'On the way and it was found that he was carrying certain passengers without issuing tickets though fare was recovered from them. The petitioner considered this conduct to be a mis-conduct on the part of respondent No. I. The Depot Manager at Washim was the competent authority to initiate disciplinary action against respondent No. 1. He, therefore, served a charge-sheet on 25-9-1970 on respondent No.1. He held disciplinary enquiry as per the regulations and ultimately passed order of dismissal of respondent No. 1 on 7-5-1971. 2. In the meanwhile, it appears that conciliation proceedings were started before the Conciliation Officer at Akola. According to respondent No. 1, their Union known as 'Vidarbha State Transport Mazdoor Sabha, Akola had served a notice dated 28-4-1971 in Form No. 21 informing the petitioner that they proposed to call the employees to strike work an Akola Division an any day after 14-6-1971 after receipt of the notice by the employer for certain demands and reasons annexed to that notice. According to the petitioner, this notice was received by them on 1-6-1971. The demand No.2 annexed to the notice under section 22 of the Industrial Disputes Act referred to above was regarding withdrawal of charge-sheet against respondent No.1. A copy of this notice was received by the Conciliation Officer on the same day, i.e., on 28-4-1971. The Conciliation Officer issued notices to the parties and requested them to attend the conciliation proceedings on 4-5-1971. The petitioner contended that a copy of the notice was not served upon the employer and they were unaware of any such notice of strike. From the record, it appears that such a notice was received by the employer on 1-6-1971. There is nothing on record to show that the same was served at any time earlier on the employer. 3. As already seen, the order of dismissal was passed on 7-5-1971. From the record, it appears that such a notice was received by the employer on 1-6-1971. There is nothing on record to show that the same was served at any time earlier on the employer. 3. As already seen, the order of dismissal was passed on 7-5-1971. The petitioner, therefore, by way of abundant caution applied to the Labour Court under section 33 (2) (b) of the Industrial Disputes Act for getting approval of the action taken by the employer namely, dismissal of respondent No. 1. In fact, according to the petitioner, such an approval was not necessary as no conciliation proceedings were pending when the order of dismissal was passed. The Conciliation Officer refused to accord approval to the action of dismissal taken by the employer, by his order dated 24-12-1971. The petitioner now challenges this order in the present petition. 4. According to Shri S. V. Gol walkar, the learned counsel for the petitioner, no notice under section 22 of the Industrial Disputes Act was served upon the employer till 1-6-1971. According to him, even though the notice under section 22 was received by the Conciliation Officer on 23-4-1971, the conciliation proceedings had not commenced as contemplated by section 20 (l) of the said Act. Since no conciliation proceedings were pending on the date of the order of dismissal which was passed on 7-5-1971, approval under section 33 (2) (b) of the said Act was not necessary. The application was made to the Conciliation Officer by way of abundant caution. On the other hand, Shri V. M. Golwalkar, the learned counsel for the respondent No.1, argued that, in fact, a notice under section 22 of the said Act was served on the employer on the same day, i.e., 28-4-1971, and it was also sent to the Conciliation Officer and was also received by him on 28-4-1971. According to him, therefore, the conciliation proceedings should be deemed to have commenced on 28-4-1971 when the notice of strike was received by the Conciliation Officer on that day. He submitted that it is not necessary for the commencement of the conciliation proceedings under section 20 that notice under section 22 should have been served on the employer before such a notice was received by the Conciliation Officer. He submitted that it is not necessary for the commencement of the conciliation proceedings under section 20 that notice under section 22 should have been served on the employer before such a notice was received by the Conciliation Officer. According to him, it is the date of receipt of such notice by the Conciliation Officer which is material, and even though the employer was not served, the proceedings must be deemed to have commenced on the date on which such a notice was received by the Conciliation Officer. 5. In order to appreciate the rival contentions, it would be necessary to note certain provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act. Section 12 of the said Act lays down the duties of the Conciliation Officers. Under sub-section (1) of section 12, where any industrial disputes exists or is apprehended and where the dispute relates to the public utility service and a notice under section 22 has been given, the Conciliation Officer is, under a statutory obligation, to hold conciliation proceedings in the prescribed manner. Subsections (2) to (6) of section 12 provide for further procedure to be followed by the Conciliation Officer and conclusion of the conciliation proceedings. We have then ~o turn to section 20 of the Act. It provides that conciliation proceedings shall be deemed to have commenced on the date on which a notice of strike or lock-out under section 22 is received by the Conciliation Officer, or on the date of order referring a dispute to a Court, as the case may be. Sub-section (2) of section 20 provides as to when the conciliation proceedings shall be deemed to have concluded. Sub-section (3) deals with the proceedings before the Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal, and provides for the commencement and the conclusion of the proceedings before those respective authorities. In the present case, we are concerned only with sub-section (1) of section 20. 6. We may then turn to section 22 of the Act. It provides for prohibition of certain strikes and lock-outs. Sub-section (I) provides that the persons employed in public utility service shall not go on strike in breach of contract without fulfilling certain conditions mentioned in clauses (a) to (d). We are concerned with clause (a) in the present case. 6. We may then turn to section 22 of the Act. It provides for prohibition of certain strikes and lock-outs. Sub-section (I) provides that the persons employed in public utility service shall not go on strike in breach of contract without fulfilling certain conditions mentioned in clauses (a) to (d). We are concerned with clause (a) in the present case. It says that a person employed in public utility service shall not go on strike in breach of the contract without giving to the employer notice of strike as hereinafter provided in the Act within six weeks before striking. Sub-section (2) deals with the prohibition on the employer carrying on public utility service not to lockout any of his workmen without fulfilling certain conditions mentioned in clauses (a) to (d) thereof. Sub-section (3) lays down the circumstances under which a notice of lock-out or strike is not necessary, and the procedure to be followed in such a case. Sub-section (4) provides that a notice of strike referred to in sub-section (I) has to be given by such number of persons to such person or persons and in such manner as may be prescribed. Here the manner is prescribed by rules to which we will refer later on. Subsection (6) provides that if on any day an employer receives from any persons employed by him any such notices as are referred to in sub-section (I) or gives to any persons employed by him any such notices as are referred to in sub-section (2), the employer is bound to report to the appropriate Government or to such authority as the Government may prescribe, the number of such notices received or given on that day within five days of receipt of such notices by him, or given by him. 7. The object of these provisions, therefore, appears to be that whenever persons employed in a public utility service want to go on strike in breach of the contract, then they have to serve a notice of strike within six weeks before striking the work. Such a notice has to be given to the employer and when such notice is given to the employer, under section 12 the Conciliation Officer is bound to hold conciliation proceedings in the prescribed manner. Such a notice has to be given to the employer and when such notice is given to the employer, under section 12 the Conciliation Officer is bound to hold conciliation proceedings in the prescribed manner. What is important is the knowledge of the employer that the employees are going to strike the work for their demands from a particular date, and when such a notice is received by the employer, he is made aware of the dispute raised by the employees. A copy of this notice has also to be endorsed to the Conciliation Officer, and the Conciliation Officer then starts proceedings. Now, the only question that arises is when are the conciliation proceedings deemed to have commenced. 8. There is no dispute that the Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation is a public utility service, and if any industrial dispute exists or .is apprehended in such a public utility service and where notice under section 22 has been given, the Conciliation Officer is bound to hold conciliation proceedings under section 12 of the Act. The obligation upon the Conciliation Officer to hold conciliation proceedings, therefore, arises when two conditions laid down under section 12 are fulfilled, and those conditions are (1) That an industrial dispute should exist or is apprehended in a public utility service. (2) A notice under section 22 of the Act bas been given. It is, therefore, necessary to see to whom such a notice under section 22 has to be given. When we turn to section 22, sub-section (I), it is clear that such a notice has to be given to the employer. A notice of strike under section 22 has to be given in Form No. 21 prescribed under Rule 76 of the Industrial Disputes (Bombay) Rules, 1957. This rule also casts a duty upon the employer to intimate the fact to the Conciliation Officer concerned on receipt of notice of strike from the employees in Form No. 21. It appears that under law, the employee as well as the employer are bound to intimate the fact of service of notice under section 22 to the Conciliation Officer. When these conditions are fulfilled, then the Conciliation Officer is bound by law to hold conciliation proceedings. It appears that under law, the employee as well as the employer are bound to intimate the fact of service of notice under section 22 to the Conciliation Officer. When these conditions are fulfilled, then the Conciliation Officer is bound by law to hold conciliation proceedings. From the various provisions of the Act, it appears that unless and until such a notice of strike under section 22 is served upon the employer, the jurisdiction of the Conciliation Officer to hold conciliation proceedings does not operate. Section 20 says that the conciliation proceedings are deemed to have commenced on the date on which a notice of strike or lock out under section 22 is received by the Conciliation Officer. As we have already seen, the employees are bound to serve a notice under section 22 upon the employer. Under Rule 76 (2), employer is bound to intimate this fact to the Conciliation Officer. Form No. 21 as prescribed shows that a copy of such a notice is to be endorsed to the Conciliation Officer. What the law, therefore, contemplates is that the employer must know that the employees are going on strike for certain demands for which conciliation proceedings are bound to be held, if the demands are not met with. In my opinion, therefore, it is only when a notice has been served upon the employer and a copy thereof is endorsed to the Conciliation Officer and is received by him, which the law contemplates either simultaneously or within a margin of a few days, that the conciliation proceedings are deemed to have commenced. 9. In the present case, it was contended that the notice was served on the same day, i. e, on 28-4-1971, on the employer. However, on perusal of record, I found that there is no proof that the notice was so served on the employer. It appears that the notice was served on the employer on 1-6-1971 and not on 28-4-1971, though such a notice was sent to the Conciliation Officer on 28-4-1971. It must, therefore, be held that the conciliation proceedings should be deemed to have commenced from I ·6-1971 and not from 28-4-1971. It is, therefore, obvious that on the day on which the order of dismissal was passed, no conciliation proceedings were pending, and it was not necessary for the employer to get approval to his action of dismissal. It must, therefore, be held that the conciliation proceedings should be deemed to have commenced from I ·6-1971 and not from 28-4-1971. It is, therefore, obvious that on the day on which the order of dismissal was passed, no conciliation proceedings were pending, and it was not necessary for the employer to get approval to his action of dismissal. In this view of the matter, I allow the petition and set aside the order passed by the Conciliation Officer, Akola, in Application No. 27 of 1971 decided on 24-12-1971. Rule is made absolute. There will be no order as to costs. Petition allowed.