Judgment :- 1. The first respondent firm was the agent of the Indian Oil Corporation for attending to the entry and clearance of tankers with the Customs and Port departments of Cochin. In 1967, the I O.C. chartered a vessel for carriage of their finished goods from Cochin to other Indian Ports. On conversion from foreign trade to coastal trade, the stores and bunkers on board the vessel became liable for Customs duty. This was assessed at Rs. 48467 and in 1979, the Revenue authorities of the State attempted to collect the amount from the 1st respondent. The firm thereupon filed O. S. No. 614/79 in the Munsiff's Court for injunction to restrain the defendants from realising the amount from it. It was alleged that the agency fee for the firm was only Rs. 250/- and that the liability to pay all charges including the Customs duty was on the I. 0. C. Court fee was paid under S.27(c) of the Kerala Court fees and Suits Valuation Act. 1959 (Act 10/60). The Collector of Customs (3rd defendant) objected to the valuation for the purposes of Court-fee and jurisdiction, contending that in substance, the plaintiff was suing for a declaration that the amount of Rs. 48467/-was not due from it and that court fee had to be paid under S.25(d)(i) of the Act. The Munsiff over-ruled the objections, and hence this revision by the Customs Collector. 2. The question decided by the Court below involves a question as to its jurisdiction also, and the revision is therefore maintainable. 3. Ss 25 and 27 of Act 10/60 read as follows:- "25. Suits for declaration. The Munsiff over-ruled the objections, and hence this revision by the Customs Collector. 2. The question decided by the Court below involves a question as to its jurisdiction also, and the revision is therefore maintainable. 3. Ss 25 and 27 of Act 10/60 read as follows:- "25. Suits for declaration. In a suit for a declaratory decree or order, whether with or without consequential relief, not falling under S.26 (a) where the prayer is for a declaration and for possession of the property to which the declaration relates, fee shall be computed on the market value of the property or on rupees three hundred, whichever is higher; (b) where me prayer is for a declaration and for consequential injunction and the relief sought is with reference to any immovable property, fee shall be computed on one-half of the market value of the property or on rupees three hundred, whichever is higher; (c) where the prayer relates to the plaintiff's exclusive right to use, sell, print or exhibit any mark, name, book, picture, design or other thing and is based on an infringement of such exclusive right, fee shall be computed on the amount at which the relief sought is valued in the plaint or on rupees four hundred, whichever is higher; (d) in other cases (i) where the subject-matter of the suit is capable of valuation, fee shall be computed on the market value of the property, and (ii) where the subject-matter of the suit is not capable of valuation, fee shall be computed on the amount at which the relief sought is valued in the plaint or on rupees three hundred, whichever is higher." "27. Suits for injunction. Suits for injunction. In a suit for injunction (a) where the relief sought is with reference to any immovable property, and (i) where the plaintiff alleges that his title to the property is denied, or (ii) where an issue is framed regarding the plaintiff's title to the property, fee shall be computed on one-half of the market value of the property or on rupees one hundred and fifty, whichever is higher; (b)where the prayer relates to the plaintiff's exclusive right to use, sell, print or exhibit any mark, name, book, picture, design or other thing and is based on an infringement of such exclusive right, fee shall be computed on the amount at which the relief sought is valued in the plaint or on rupees two hundred, whichever is higher; (c) in any other case, whether the subject-matter of the suit has a market value or not, fee shall be computed on the amount at which the relief sought is valued in the plaint or on rupees one hundred and fifty, whichever is higher." 4. S.27 deals with suits for injunction. If the injunction sought for is with reference to immovable property and a question of title is also involved, court fee is payable under clause (a), on half the market value of the property. Clause (b) specifies another rate for injunction suits relating to certain types of exclusive rights. And in all other cases, whether the subject matter of the suit has a market value or not, court fee is payable at the rates indicated in clause (c). If the suit in question is an injunction suit, there is no dispute that clause (c) above is attracted, and that the fee paid by the plaintiff is correct, as held by the court below. But the contention is that the suit is really one for declaration with injunction coming in only as a consequential relief. ; 5. In H. R. Patel v. Venkatalakshamma (AIR. 1955 Mysore 65) a; Full Bench of the Mysore High Court held that controversies of this type have to be resolved by looking into the nature of the "main relief" claimed. Injunction will be consequential if it cannot be granted except on a declaration of the right of the plaintiff; but it will not be. consequential where the plaintiff only wants to prove his right. Injunction will be consequential if it cannot be granted except on a declaration of the right of the plaintiff; but it will not be. consequential where the plaintiff only wants to prove his right. Thus in a suit for recovery of possession of land, if the plaintiff is entitled to possession on proof of title, court fee is payable only on the basis that the suit is one for possession, even if the plaintiff has mistakenly included a prayer for declaration of title. The court is to be guided by the substance of the matter and not by the plaintiff's mistake or astuteness The suit there was for a declaration that the defendant was bound to construct his building in the neighbouring plot in accordance with certain conditions laid down by the Municipality, and for injunction against constructing it contrary to those conditions. Though there was thus a prayer for declaration, the Court held that the suit was one for injunction, as there was no legal impediment to be removed by declaration, before grant of the injunction prayed for. An illustration as to what would constitute such an impediment was also furnished by referring to a suit for possession of property where the plaintiff's title was under a cloud by a sale made by himself or through court. 6. The same principle was enunciated by the Punjab High Court in Harchand Singh v. Dalip Singh (AIR. 1965 Punjab 468), where the plaintiff had sued for injunction to restrain the defendant from selling a truck in which the former had a half-share. The trial court held that since the truck was in the defendant's possession and since the plaintiff's title to the half-share was being disputed, a declaration regarding that share was legally necessary before injunction could be granted. In other words, the suit was held to be one mainly for declaration with injunction sought for as consequential relief. The High Court reversed this view by observing that a mere assertion of title by the plaintiff did not mean that it was necessary for him to get a declaration as to his rights before seeking injunction. In other words, the suit was held to be one mainly for declaration with injunction sought for as consequential relief. The High Court reversed this view by observing that a mere assertion of title by the plaintiff did not mean that it was necessary for him to get a declaration as to his rights before seeking injunction. Grover J., (as he then was) said: "The correct test which has been laid down in decided cases is that where there is any legal necessity for the plaintiff to get a declaration of his right before he can get an injunction to protect it the suit will fall under S.7 (iv) (c) even though the plaintiff sought declaration by means of averments in the body of plaint and not prayed for declaration specifically at the end of the plaint. When there is some legal obstacle which has to be removed before a consequential relief can be granted, it is incumbent upon the plaintiff to pray for a declaration which will have the effect of removing the obstacle. If the plaintiff merely avers a title which can be established without the cancellation of a document or the nullification of any adverse title and only the reliefs are claimed which will naturally flow from the establishment of the title which he avers, it is not necessary for the plaintiff to pray expressly for a declaration of that title and the suit would fall under S.7 (iv) (d) and not under S.7 (iv) (c)" The reference, of course, was to S.7 of the Court Fees Act, 1870. 7. Where two sons sued for a declaration that a decree obtained by a mortgagee on the foot of a mortgage executed by their father was not binding on them, the Supreme Court took the view, in Shamsher Singh v Rajinder Prasad (AIR. 1973 SC 2384), that they were really asking either for setting aside the decree or for a consequential relief of injunction restraining the decree holder from executing the decree against the mortgaged property as he was entitled to. The suit was for declaration only in form; in substance, it was for setting aside a decree with a prayer for consequential relief, covered by S.7 (iv) (c) of the Court Fees Act, 1870, read with the proviso to that Section. 8. The suit was for declaration only in form; in substance, it was for setting aside a decree with a prayer for consequential relief, covered by S.7 (iv) (c) of the Court Fees Act, 1870, read with the proviso to that Section. 8. Based on the above rulings, the petitioner contends that what the plaintiff really wants in the suit under consideration is a declaration that the assessment made by the Customs authorities is not binding on it, and that the injunction prayed for is only consequential, so that the matter should squarely be placed under S.25 (d) (i) of Act 10/60 The argument is that the assessment order is a cloud, obstacle or impediment which has first to be removed before grant of injunction. I am however not persuaded to take such a view. The plaintiff's case, so far as I could see, is that on a proper interpretation of its agency contract with the I. O.C., it could be seen that the liability to pay is on the latter, and not on itself When the contract is proved, and on such proof the court finds that the liability is on the I O.C. and not on the plaintiff, the court can grant the injunction prayed for, without declaring any right or removing any pre-existing obstacle. The plaintiff is not asserting any right or title which is clouded; it is only disclaiming liability by attempting to prove the real nature of the agency contract. All that the plaintiff seeks to do is to tell the court: "please look into this contract and restrain the other side, if I am not liable under the contract". It is not seeking to set aside any decree or order which has cast a shadow over any of its rights. 9. The decision of the Supreme Court in V. P. Sugar Works v. C. I. of Stamps (AIR 1968 S. C. 102) seems to conclude the question The Sugar Works was assessed to pay Rs. 33/- lakhs as cess and purchase tax under certain enactments of Uttar Pradesh, and the suit was to restrain the State from recovering the same. The plaint alleged that the enactments concerned were invalid and void for the reasons stated in the plaint; and the question was whether the suit was one for injunction, or one for a declaratory decree with injunction as consequential relief. The plaint alleged that the enactments concerned were invalid and void for the reasons stated in the plaint; and the question was whether the suit was one for injunction, or one for a declaratory decree with injunction as consequential relief. The Supreme Court held that the prayer in substance was for injunction, and said: "It is true that for purposes of the Court-fees Act, it is the substance and not the form which has to be considered while deciding which particular provision of the Act applies. It cannot, however, be gainsaid that the actual relief prayed for in the plaint was an injunction restraining the State and its authorities to realise from the appellant-company the aforesaid cess and the purchase tax. It is clear from the plaint when read as a whole that though the appellant-company alleged that the Acts were void and therefore non est for the reasons set out therein, it did not seek any declaration that they were void. The plaint proceeds on the footing that the said Acts were void and that therefore the state of U. P. or its authorities had no power to realise the said tax and the said cess. It may be that while deciding whether to grant the injunction or not, the court might have to consider the question as to the validity or otherwise of the said Acts. But that must happen in almost every case where an injunction is prayed for. If for the mere reason that the court might have to go into such a question, a prayer for injunction were to be treated as one for a declaratory decree of which the consequential relief is injunction all suits where injunction is prayed for would have to be treated as falling under Cl. (a) of sub-s, (iv) of S.7 and in that view Cl. (b) of sub-s. (iv-B) of S.7 would be superfluous. The contention urged by Mr. Bishan Narain, therefore, cannot be accepted." It is unnecessary for the purposes of the present case even to go to the above extent, as there is no challenge in the suit to the validity of any enactment or order. (b) of sub-s. (iv-B) of S.7 would be superfluous. The contention urged by Mr. Bishan Narain, therefore, cannot be accepted." It is unnecessary for the purposes of the present case even to go to the above extent, as there is no challenge in the suit to the validity of any enactment or order. An assessment of duty made by the Customs authorities in this case cannot stand on a footing different from the assessments made by the authorities of the U. P. State in the case considered by the Supreme Court; and if astuteness of drafting a plaint cannot mislead the court, so must be the case with astuteness in raising objections designed to deter litigants from approaching the court at all. For the reasons stated above, the revision fails and is dismissed, leaving the parties to suffer their own costs. Dismissed.