JUDGMENT : S.K. Ray, C.J. - This is a decree-holder's application against the order dated 4-8-1978 of the Subordinate Judge at Baripada passed in M.J.C. No. 120 of 1977 as executing Court, upholding the objection of the judgment-debtor that the decree is not executable. 2. The facts leading to the institution of M.J.C. No. 120 of 1977 are herein briefly stated. The Petitioner advanced paddy loan to the opposite party's father, late Iswar Naik, on 30.4.1970. On 28-2-1974 the Petitioner filed Money Suit No. 23 of 1974 against late Iswar Naik for realisation of his loan in civil Court. Judgment was passed on 26-2-1975 decreeing the suit for a sum of Rs. 1,929.71 and subsequently a decree was drawn up on 7-3-1975. Thereafter, the Petitioner levied execution of the decree in Execution Case No. 7 of 1977 in the Court of the Sub-Judge, Baripada. The original judgment-debtor having died the present opposite party was substituted and he filed an objection u/s 47, CPC challenging the excitability of the decree this objection u/s 47 was registered as M.J.C. No. 120 of 1977. 3. The sale ground of objection to the excludability of the decree was that the opposite party and his late father Iswar Naik being members of Scheduled Tribes residing in Scheduled Areas of the State at Orissa, the Petitioner was bound to file an applications in respect at his debtor Iswar Naik before the appropriate Debt Relief Court u/s 6 of the Orissa (Scheduled Areas) Debt Relief Regulation, 1967 (Orissa Regulation 1 of 1968) (hereinafter called 'the Regulation 1') providing for relief from indebtedness to the Scheduled Tribes in the Scheduled Areas of the State of Orissa, within the time prescribed therein and, in default, the debt shall be deemed to have been discharged. When an application is filed u/s 6, the Debt Relief Court shall, thereupon, proceed to determine the liability of the debtor and prepare a scheme for repayment of the debt as adjudged due. When an application is filed u/s 6, the Debt Relief Court shall, thereupon, proceed to determine the liability of the debtor and prepare a scheme for repayment of the debt as adjudged due. In view of the special procedure for determining the amount of debt payable and for recovery of the same in accordance with Sections 12 to 16 of Regulation 1 and in view of Section 20 thereof vesting the District Court with power and jurisdiction to revise any order of a Debt Relief Court, the jurisdiction of the civil Court to entertain a suit against a debtor for recovery of his debt and in respect of the claim for any debt which has been deemed to have been discharged u/s 6(3) has been expressly ousted by Section 4(1)(i) and Section 23 of the Regulation. It is, therefore, contended that the decree under execution was a nullity. The Petitioner's reply to this is that the Regulation 1 applies only to debts incurred before its commencement and subsisting on the 'appointed date' as defined in Section 2(1) thereof and as the loan in question was incurred after the appointed date, the civil Court's jurisdiction to entertain a suit in respect of this loan transaction and to pails a decree is not ousted. 4. The sale question for determination, therefore, is as to whether the Regulation 1 will apply only to all debts owed by a member of Scheduled Tribes as outstanding on the appointed date or to all debts to be incurred by him thereafter. 5. Regulation 1 was assented to by the President on 19th February, 1968. Section 1 thereof came into force at once and the remaining provisions of the Regulation came into force on 15-11-1969 (vide Notification No. 20868-Law-2/69 dated 31-10-1969). So, the appointed date is 15-1-1969. By Notification No. S.R.O. 198/70 dated 28th March, 1970 issued in exercise of the powers conferred by Sub-section (1) and Sub-section (3) of Section 3 of the Regulation 1, the State Government established a Debt Relief Court at each of the sub-divisional headquarters within the Scheduled Areas and fixed the extent of sub-divisional jurisdiction to be the local limits of jurisdiction of such Courts. By Notification No. S.R.O. 199/70 of the same date in pursuance of Sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the Regulation 1 the State Government appointed all Sub-divisional Officers as Presiding Officers of the Debt Relief Courts to exercise powers under the Regulation 1 within the local limits of their respective jurisdictions. The loan in question was incurred on 30-4-1970 after the appointed date and after establishment of Debt Relief Court. 6. It has been held by the executing Court on evidence that the opposite party is a member of Scheduled Tribes residing in the State of Orissa and that finding of fact cannot be challenged. To determine whether the Regulation 1 applies to debts incurred after the 'appointed date', i.e. after 15-11-1969, its scheme has to be looked into. This Regulation is prospective in operation and has been promulgated as a measure of expediency to give relief from indebtedness, as will be seen from its preamble. The aim and object manifestly is to provide for relief from existing indebtedness and not to deal with future indebtedness. Section 5(1) provides that on and with effect from the appointed date no civil Court shall entertain a suit against a debtor for the recovery of his debt. 'Creditor' has been defined to mean a person to whom a debt is owing and 'debtor' as a member of Scheduled Tribe by whom such debt is owed. 'Debt' has been defined as including liabilities owing to a creditor. 'Secured debt' has been defined as meaning a debt subsisting on the appointed date. So, keeping these definitions in mind, what Section 5(1) prohibits is that no Court shall entertain a suit by a person to whom liabilities are owing by a member of Scheduled Tribes on the appointed date. Two different meanings cannot be attributed to Section 5(1) in the aforesaid context, one regarding secured debt and the other regarding ordinary debt. Section 6 provides for an application to be filed in respect of such debt and provides a limitation therefor after expiry of which the debt shall be deemed to have been discharged. Thus, it is clear that debts incurred after the period of limitation would not be governed by this Regulation. Again the definition of 'secured debt' in Section 2(7) of the Regulation 1 clearly indicates that secured debt incurred after the appointed date is also outside its purview. Thus, it is clear that debts incurred after the period of limitation would not be governed by this Regulation. Again the definition of 'secured debt' in Section 2(7) of the Regulation 1 clearly indicates that secured debt incurred after the appointed date is also outside its purview. Section 6 further indicates that a creditor must file his application in respect of each of his debtors within 60 days of 28-3-1970 when Debt Relief Court was established. That means debts in respect of which applications are required to be filed must be subsisting at least on 28-3-1970. Proviso to Section 6(3) which confers power and discretion on Debt Relief Court to extend the period of limitation by thirty days is patently in respect of those debts for determination of which applications should have been filed u/s 6(1) but could not be filed, that is to say, in respect of debts existing on 28-3-1970. Thus, it is this much clear that unsecured debts incurred after 28-3-1970 and secured debts incurred after the appointed date, i.e. after 15-11-1969 would be outside the purview of this Regulation. If this is the irresistible conclusion from a plain reading of the aforesaid provisions, can it be reasonably argued that unsecured debts incurred during the time gap between the appointed date (15-11-1969) and the date when the Debt Relief Court was established (28-3-1970) would be governed by the Regulation 1? This time gap is an accident as the State Government defaulted and thereby delayed in establishing Debt Relief Court on the appointed date and the scope and intendment of the Regulation 1 cannot be interpreted depending upon an accidental uncertain and variable factor like the executive decision to establish a Debt Relief Court. Reading Sections 5(1)(i) and 6(1) and (3) together the meaning is clear that the cases in respect of which civil Court's jurisdiction is ousted an alternative forum and remedy for the same and limitation therefore are provided in Section 6. As already stated, civil Court's jurisdiction is barred with effect from the appointed date to entertain suits against a debtor, which indicates that the debtor must exist on the appointed date. As already stated, civil Court's jurisdiction is barred with effect from the appointed date to entertain suits against a debtor, which indicates that the debtor must exist on the appointed date. If Section 5 was intended to include a future debtor, the period of limitation provided in Section 6 would be meaningless as obviously debts incurred after expiry of sixty days of establishment of Debts Relief Court cannot be subject-matter of an application u/s 6(1). Since, whatever relief is provided for in this Regulation is to be granted only to those debtors in respect of whom applications can be filed u/s 6(1) and since future debts created subsequent to appointed date cannot be the subject-matter of an application u/s 6(1), it is clear that this Regulation would not be applicable to debts created during the aforesaid time gap. For these reasons, I am of opinion, that having regard to the object and scheme of the Regulation 1 as well as from its various provisions referred to above, that Regulation does not apply to debts created after the appointed date declared by Notification u/s 1(3) thereof. At any rate, as regards the suit debt, it having been created after the establishment of Debt Relief Court, is unambiguously outside the purview of this Regulation. 7. This view is supported by the decisions reported in Channilal and Another Vs. Bundelal dealing with provisions of Madhya Pradesh Anusuchit Janjati Rini Sahayata Adhiniyam similar to provisions of this Regulation, and Namarugunulla Gopal Rao Vs. Maruthi Rao Gongothi dealing with Hyderabad Agricultural Relief Act. Mr. N. K. Misra attempts to distinguish Channilal and Another Vs. Bundelal by inviting my attention to the verbal difference in language in the definition of 'debt' in Section 2(4) of the Madhya Pradesh Act. In that Act 'debt' has been defined as including "all liabilities owing to a creditor and subsisting on the appointed date", Similarly, it includes "arrears of wages or salary subsisting on the appointed date" The expression 'subsisting on the appointed date means nothing more than stating that debt or arrears of salary or wages are not barred by any law of limitation or stand otherwise extinguished. It serves no other purpose than making that position clear as a matter of abundant caution. It serves no other purpose than making that position clear as a matter of abundant caution. The other features in the Orissa Regulation 1 discussed above leave no one in doubt that Regulation 1 does not apply to debts incurred after the appointed date. Similarly, the Andhra Pradesh case is sought to be distinguished by inviting my attention to the expression 'due' in the definition of 'debt'. I do not think this is any distinction. While the Andhra Pradesh Act uses the expression 'due', Orissa Regulation says 'owing to a debtor'. This Andhra Pradesh case concurred with the Full Bench decision of that Court in the case of State Bank of Hyderabad Vs. Joint family of Mukundas Raja Bhagwandas and Sons and Others which in its turn, had been affirmed on appeal by the Supreme Court in Joint Family of Mukund Das Raja Bhagwan Das and Sons etc. Vs. The State Bank of Hyderabad, . 8. The same conclusion is reached viewing the matter from another angle. After the Regulation 1 in question was promulgated the Governor of Orissa promulgated another Regulation called Orissa (Scheduled Areas) Money-Lenders Regulation, 1967 (Orissa Regulation 2 of 1968) which received the assent of the President on 22nd February, 1968. This was to control and regulate the business of money-lending in the Scheduled Areas of the State of Orissa. Section 1 of Regulation 2 came into force at once and the other provisions came into force on 15-11-1969 when Regulation 1 also came into force. Regulation 2 is in pari materia with Regulation 1. Since both these Regulations have almost the same object in view, namely, to give relief to the Scheduled Tribes living in Scheduled Areas of the State in regard to their indebtedness and to protect them in future by regulating the business of money-lending and, therefore, come within the same system, these two Regulations may be taken and construed together as one system and as explanatory to each other. Thus, in interpreting Regulation 1, the possible effect of such interpretation on Regulation 2 will have to be kept in view to carry out and maintain harmony in interpretation. Thus, in interpreting Regulation 1, the possible effect of such interpretation on Regulation 2 will have to be kept in view to carry out and maintain harmony in interpretation. I may here refer to a passage from Maxwell on Interpretation of Statute, 9th Edition, pages 35.36 wherein it is stated: Where there are different statutes in pari materia, though made at different times, or even expired and not referring to each other, they shall be taken and construed together, as one system and as explanatory to each other. Dealing with a similar situation Oraise on Statute Law (6th Edition, page 103) observes: The effect of this is in one sense to supply the equity of the statute; but in truth no more is done than to construe the statute according to its plain language, though the effect of the construction is incidentally and equitably to deny to local authorities an overriding privilege, such as would exempt them from all forms of injunction. I will refer to another passage, in this connection, from Bindra's Interpretation of Statutes, 5th Edition, page 292 which runs as follows: Statutes which relate to the same subject, the same person or things, or the same class of persons or things are deemed to constitute one system of law; they are considered as one statute, subsequent laws are regarded as supplementary or complementary to the earlier enactments. When enacting a new law the Legislature is presumed to have had in contemplation the existing statutes on the same subject, and to have framed its enactment with reference thereto. This is the real basis for the rule in pari materia. Dwarris observe's: It is to be inferred, that a code of statutes relating to one subject was governed by one spirit and policy and, intended to be consistent and harmonious in its several parts and provisions. It is therefore an established rule of law, that all Acts in pari materia are to be taken together as if they were one law; and they are directed to be compared in the construction of statutes, because they are considered as framed upon one system, and having one object in view. The rule is thus an extension of the principle that the whole statute is to be viewed and compared in all its parts, in order to ascertain the meaning of any of its parts. The rule is thus an extension of the principle that the whole statute is to be viewed and compared in all its parts, in order to ascertain the meaning of any of its parts. All laws relating to a particular matter or subject, that is laws in pari materia, bear the same relation to any law within the group or system as the whole statute bears to any of its several parts. These two Regulations are beneficial in nature intended to confer benefits on the Scheduled Tribes in respect of their money-lending transactions or their debts or loans. In comparing with Regulation 1 it is seen that Regulation 2 was enacted on the same date and the appointed date for both the Regulations is same. Regulation 2 permits institution of suits for recovery of loans against a debtor meaning a person to whom a loan is advanced. 'Loan' has been defined in Section 2(ix) of Regulation 2. All loans that are advanced after the appointed date under Regulation 2, that is after 15-11-1969 can be realised by civil Courts subject to its provisions. The loan in question was admittedly advanced after not only commencement of Regulation 2 but also after the appointed date as defined in Section 2 thereof. Regulation 2 instead or prohibiting the creditors from instituting suits for recovery of the loans advanced after the appointed date under Regulation 2, permits filing of such suits. Therefore, Sections 6 and 23 of Regulation 1 which impose a bar on jurisdiction of civil Court in certain matters would not cover suits in respect of loans advanced after the commencement of Regulation 2. Section 3 of Regulation 2 provides that no person shall after the appointed date carryon business of money-lending at any place in the Scheduled Areas, unless certain conditions are fulfilled. Obviously, therefore, Regulation 2 would govern the transaction of suit loan dated 30-4-1970. The rate of interest provided in Scheduled-I to Regulation 1 is different from the rate of interest provided in Section 7 of Regulation 2. If the loan transaction in question is governed by Regulation 2, the debtor has to pay less interest than if Regulation 1 is applied. Sections 11, 12 and 13 of Regulation 2 impose some obligations on and some guidance for civil Courts who entertain suits in respect of loans advanced after the 'appointed date' as notified u/s 1(3) of Regulation 2. Sections 11, 12 and 13 of Regulation 2 impose some obligations on and some guidance for civil Courts who entertain suits in respect of loans advanced after the 'appointed date' as notified u/s 1(3) of Regulation 2. Thus, this Regulation clearly permits the civil Court to entertain the suit in respect of the loan in question. Necessarily, therefore, this loan transaction is out of the purview of Regulation 1. 9. In result, the decision of the Court below is erroneous which, is, accordingly, set aside. The executing Court is directed to proceed further with the execution. The revision is, accordingly allowed, but in the peculiar circumstances of the case, there will be no order for costs. Revision is allowed without costs. Final Result : Allowed