JUDGMENT : Lalit Mohan Sharma, J. 1. In this writ application by the Management the award as contained in Annexure 1 given by the Labour Court, Ranchi is under challenge. The petitioner is a limited company and runs a factory at Ratu, Ranchi. The case, as made out in the writ application, is that on 7-5-1975, at about 8 in the morning, a large number of people belonging to neighbouring villages assembled near the factory gate and prevented the officers and staff from entering the factory premises. In absence of police assistance, it became impossible to carry on work and as the agitation on the next day, i.e. 8-5-1975, the Management had to suspend the working of the factory and it was accordingly closed by giving notice to all concerned including the workmen. The further admitted facts are that the factory opened on 4-8-1975, when the workmen, represented by Bharat Ball Bearing Karamchari Sangh, respondent No. 3, demanded wages for the period for which the factory was closed. During the pendency of a negotiation between the Management and the respondent No. 3 for settlement of their dispute amicably, a reference under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") was made by the State Government, a true copy whereof is Annexure 2. Subsequently, Shriram Bearing Karamchari Sangh, the respondent No. 4 and Shriram Bearing Company Workers' Union, the Respondent No. 5 were also impleaded as parties in the reference by the Labour Court. It was stated by Mr. Ranen Roy, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner that a settlement could have been reached with the workmen through the respondent No. 3 but due to addition of the other two Unions which did not agree to a negotiated agreement, attempts in this direction failed and the matter was decided by the Labour Court as per its Award, Annexure 1. It has been held that the workmen are entitled to their full wages with other benefits for the period for which the factory remained closed. 2. Learned counsel appearing for the parties referred to the language of the reference and interpreted it differently. It will be useful to quote the relevant portion of Annexure 2 which is as follows: Whether the lock-out from dated (Sic) the 8th May, 1975 to the 4th August, 1975 declared by the Management is proper and justified? 2. Learned counsel appearing for the parties referred to the language of the reference and interpreted it differently. It will be useful to quote the relevant portion of Annexure 2 which is as follows: Whether the lock-out from dated (Sic) the 8th May, 1975 to the 4th August, 1975 declared by the Management is proper and justified? If not, whether the wages for the period is payable to the workers? Mr. Roy, learned counsel for the petitioner, contended that the closure of the factory in the present case cannot be characterised as 'lock-out' within the meaning of the Act and in that view it must be held that the reference by the State Government was without jurisdiction. Dealing with the second part, the learned counsel suggested that the occasion for answering the question whether the wages for that period are payable to the workers or not cannot arise unless the closure be held to be 'lock-out' and further that it was not justified. Great reliance was placed on the finding given by the Labour Court in paragraph 16 of the Award holding that as the closure of the factory did not amount to 'lock-out', reference itself was illegal and invalid. It was further urged that after recording the aforesaid finding, the Labour Court was unjustified in dealing with the question in regard to payment of wages on merit. For these reasons it is suggested that the entire Award must be set aside. Mr. Roy also challenged the finding on merits of the Labour Court that the workmen are entitled to their wages on several grounds including non-consideration of important evidence and circumstances. 3. On behalf of the petitioner, serious objection was taken to the attempt of the respondents to challenge the finding of the Labour Court on the invalidity of the Reference, on the ground that in absence of a writ petition by them, they are not entitled to do so. Mr. Durjodhan Dash, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent No. 3 argued that the respondent was entitled to challenge the aforesaid finding, while supporting the Award, without filing a separate writ petition. He referred to certain materials, not considered by the Labour Court, which were according to him, relevant on this point. Mr. Mr. Durjodhan Dash, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent No. 3 argued that the respondent was entitled to challenge the aforesaid finding, while supporting the Award, without filing a separate writ petition. He referred to certain materials, not considered by the Labour Court, which were according to him, relevant on this point. Mr. C.B. Mitter, learned counsel who appeared for the respondent No. 4 said that the Court is right in holding that the closure of the factory did not amount to technical 'lock-out', but for that reason it was not correct to hold that the reference was illegal. The expression 'lock-out' was used in a loose sense to mean the factual closure of the factory, whether it amounted to 'lock-out' or "lay-off" or mere stoppage of the working of the factory. Proceeding further, he said that if this interpretation be not acceptable, then alternatively the fourth respondent contends, that the closure of the factory must be held to amount to technical "lock-out" and finding of the Labour Court regarding the invalidity of the reference should be reversed. He also suggested that the petitioner has not approached this Court with clean hands and should, therefore, be refused any relief. 4. The learned counsel for the parties debated at some length the point whether a respondent in a writ case can be permitted to challenge the finding recorded against him in the impugned ORDER :, but failed to cite any helpful decision. It has been well-established that the power of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is discretionary, and the Court should issue a writ only in the interest of justice and equity, and not merely for enforcing technicalities. The High Court should exercise its authority to remedy a wrong and not where it would promote one or where it is likely to result in a situation untenable in law merely to satisfy a procedural requirement. Acting on this principle the courts have refused to quash an ORDER :of an authority even where it has been found to be in excess of the powers of that authority, where thereby it would be restoring an earlier illegal ORDER :. It follows, therefore that if the operative part of an ORDER :of an authority is correct it should not be reversed merely on the ground that the conclusion has been reached by following a wrong line of reasoning. It follows, therefore that if the operative part of an ORDER :of an authority is correct it should not be reversed merely on the ground that the conclusion has been reached by following a wrong line of reasoning. The party in whose favour such an ORDER :has been passed must be permitted to request the Court to correct the findings so as to sustain the ORDER :. I do not see any logic for holding that before a respondent can do so he must file a separate independent writ petition. Such an application, challenging merely a finding recorded in an ORDER :which is in his favour will only multiply litigation, put uncalled for strain on the litigant, encumber the Court with unnecessary cases and will not at the same time serve any purpose. A respondent, therefore, should not be driven to the unhappy situation as suggested on behalf of the petitioner. Realising this aspect the Civil Procedure Code, dealing with appeals under Rule 22 of ORDER :XLI permitted a respondent to support the decree challenged in appeal by the appellant on a ground different than that given by the Court. I am, therefore, of the view that the respondent are entitled to challenge the finding recorded by the Labour Court against them. 5. The expression "lock-out" has been defined in Section 2(1) of the Act in the following terms: (1) 'lock-out' means the closing of a place of employment or the suspension of the work, or the refusal by an employer to continue to employ any number of persons employed by him. Relying upon the decision in the case of (1) Kairbetta Estate, Kotagiri V. Rajamanlcham and others, (1960) 2 LLJ 275, Mr. Roy, learned counsel for the petitioner argued that as the factory had to be closed on account of trouble created by the neighbouring villagers and not on account of any demand or dispute by the workmen of the company, it must be held that it was not a case of "lock-out" within the meaning of Section 2(1) of the Act. The finding of the Labour Court must, therefore, be accepted as correct. The agitation which necessitated the closing down of the factory was in support of the demand by the people of the locality that they should be employed as workmen in the factory Mr. The finding of the Labour Court must, therefore, be accepted as correct. The agitation which necessitated the closing down of the factory was in support of the demand by the people of the locality that they should be employed as workmen in the factory Mr. Dash in reply argued that the workmen already employed in the factory were also joining hands with the villagers in this demand and it is, therefore, not correct to suggest that the workmen were not involved in the agitation. By way of illustration, he referred to paragraph 9 of the written statement filed on behalf of the Management before the Labour Court which stated as follows: That from 6 a.m. on 8.5.1975 the local people along with workers of the company did not allow any workmen, staff and officers to enter in the factory except security personnel. Placing reliance on the written statement of the respondent No. 3, Mr. Dash, referred to paragraph No. 7, which stated that the respondents had been making the demand for giving preference in the matter of employment to the local people but the Management refused to concede the demand. In paragraph No. 8, it was stated that a conciliation proceeding in regard to the demand for giving preference in the matter of recruitment to the local people was pending before the Assistant Labour Commissioner, Ranchi since 1973. Reference was also made to the notice given by the Management in regard to the closing of the factory. In this notice the Management itself described the closure as "lock-out". Mr. Dash claimed that there were other relevant materials on the, records of the case not considered by the Labour Court, which clearly indicated that it was a case of technical "look-out". He prayed that the finding should be reversed. In reply Mr. Roy relied upon ground (c) taken by the respondent No. 3 before the Labour Court that no workman was in any way responsible for the "lock-out". He prayed that the finding should be reversed. In reply Mr. Roy relied upon ground (c) taken by the respondent No. 3 before the Labour Court that no workman was in any way responsible for the "lock-out". Learned counsel however stated that all the relevant materials in support of their respective contention had not been placed before us, during the course of their arguments, and it was jointly suggested by them that this Court, in the interest of justice, may go through the entire evidence in the case and record its finding on this point and also on the merits of the claim of the workmen if the finding recorded by the Labour Court be considered to be bad and for this purpose the entire records may be called for from the Labour Court. I do not consider the suggestion feasible and as admittedly all the relevant materials have not been considered by the Labour Court before coming to a finding against the validity of the reference, I am of the opinion that the matter must be remitted to it for reconsideration. 6. Mr. Mitter, who supported the argument of Mr. Dash learned counsel for the respondent No. 3 by his alternative argument, urged as his main point that the expression "Jock-out" must be interpreted, in the facts and circumstances of the case, in a broad sense so as to include a closing down of the factory by locking its gate. He supported this interpretation on the ground that the management itself, in its notice, described it as a case of lock-out. All the materials relevant on this point also are not available to us and have not been placed before us and so I am of the view that this question should also be left to be agitated before the Labour Court. I accordingly hold that the finding of the Labour Court on the question of validity of the reference mast be set aside on the ground of non-consideration of relevant and important materials. 7. Mr. Roy, learned counsel also challenged the finding of Labour Court that the Management was responsible for the agitation which resulted in the closing down of the factory and he supported his argument on several grounds. During the hearing of the case before the Labour Court, the petitioner had prayed for summoning Mr. 7. Mr. Roy, learned counsel also challenged the finding of Labour Court that the Management was responsible for the agitation which resulted in the closing down of the factory and he supported his argument on several grounds. During the hearing of the case before the Labour Court, the petitioner had prayed for summoning Mr. D.P. Maheshwari who was the Labour Commissioner in 1975 but the prayer was rejected. The petitioner then came to this Court in C.W.J.C. No. 565 of 1979 (R) which was allowed on the 15th November, 1979. Dasti summons were thereafter issued to Mr. Maheshwari and another person for their appearance as witnesses on a particular date. It has been contended that the Labour Commissioner was unavoidably engaged on that date and wanted a short adjournment which the Labour Court unreasonably refused and consequently he was not examined. Thus, according to the petitioner, it resulted in serious prejudice to his case. Dealing with another ground, Mr. Roy stated that after the close of the evidence by the petitioner, Witness No. 1 for the respondent No. 4 produced a document which was marked as Ext. B-1 and which had not been filed in the court earlier. The petitioner did not get any opportunity to meet the same and the Labour Court by relying on it and rejecting petitioner's witness on that ground has violated the principle of natural justice. Reliance has been placed on the observations in the case of (2) Associated Cement Companies, Ltd. V. Their Workmen and another, (1968) 2 LLJ 386 at page 402, by the Supreme Court. It was further urged that several assumptions has been made by the Labour Court against the Management in regard to its responsibility for the closure of the factory. Without any evidence to the effect that the petitioner could have avoided the agitation by appointing a few local persons a conclusion to that effect has been reached. The Labour Court in paragraph 22 of its Award observed that it was in the power of the company to appoint a few persons temporarily in the lowest grade of the Labourers and this could have saved the factory from being closed and the company from heavy losses. Before it can be said that the Management could have made those appointments it was necessary to examine the question whether there was any vacancy. Before it can be said that the Management could have made those appointments it was necessary to examine the question whether there was any vacancy. Objection has been taken by the learned counsel to the suggestion that some persons should have been appointed on temporary basis. If the observation meant to Suggest that a few workmen should have been appointed for a short while, so as to pull down the agitation and then they could have been dismissed it cannot be considered valid and proper. Mr. Roy said that this, besides being a wrong labour practice, could have led to a more serious labour trouble. Dealing with other similar observations, on the basis of which the finding on the merit of the claim of the workmen has been given by the Labour Court against the petitioner, it was contended, that they were untenable, as being not supported by any evidence or circumstances and were merely speculative and they vitiated the Award. Since none of the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents attempted to meet any of the points raised by Mr. Roy, I do not consider it necessary to deal with all his arguments. As the matter is going back to the Labour Court, I direct that this part of the case also will be reconsidered by it. A reference was also made to the ORDER :of the Labour Court dated 27.8.1979 as contained in Annexure 10, (at page 107 of the High Court's record), whereby prayer for permission to lead evidence on certain points were refused. It appears that, in view of what I have held above, this ORDER :was not correctly passed, and so the parties should be permitted to lead further evidence if they so desire. Before the arguments were finally concluded in the case, in reply to a quarry by the Bench, the counsel of each of the parties appearing stated that if the case was going to be remanded, they should be allowed to lead further evidence. I agree with them. The contention of Mr. Mitter that the petitioner has not been acting in a bona fide manner could not be developed and substantiated by him. He suggested that this writ application has been filed with the sole object of gaining advantage in another Reference case between the parties. I do not find myself in a position to accept the point. The contention of Mr. Mitter that the petitioner has not been acting in a bona fide manner could not be developed and substantiated by him. He suggested that this writ application has been filed with the sole object of gaining advantage in another Reference case between the parties. I do not find myself in a position to accept the point. In the result, the writ application is allowed, the Award, Annexure 1 is quashed and the Reference is sent back to the Labour Court for a fresh decision on all the questions on which the parties differ after giving them opportunity to lead further evidence. There will be no ORDER :as to costs. Gobind Mohan Misra, J. I agree. Application allowed.