MAHENDRA BHUSHAN, J.—This is defendants Misc. appeal against the judgment of the learned Additional District Judge No. 2, refusing to set aside the ex-parte decree passed against him by the learned trial court on March 13, 1977. 2. The facts so far as they are relevant for the disposal of this appeal now may be set out in brief: 3. One Mulkraj, respondent No. 1, filed a suit for eviction against the appellant Vasudeo and his father Naraindas relating to a house, plot No. 579, situated in Adarsh Nagar, Jaipur. Summonses in the suit for the appellant as well as his father Narain Das were issued more than once by the ordinary process, but the same were returned by the Process Server as unserved. It was, therefore, directed by the court that the summonses be sent by ordinary process as well as by registered post. The summonses by registered post for November 22, 1974 for the appellant and respondent No. 2 were sent. The registered envelop meant for Narain Das respondent No. 2 was received with endorsement (Refused) of the Postman whereas registered envelop meant for the appellant was received by an inmate of the house. The Court treating the service on the appellant as complete made an order on February 18, 1976 that suit be heard ex-parte against the appellant. Thereafter the suit was tried in the presence of Naraindas and after trial the suit for ejectment on the ground of default under section 13(l)(a) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent & Eviction) Act. 1950 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) was decreed against Naraindas after contest and against the appellant as ex-parte. 4. An application under Order 9 Rule 13 C. P. C. was filed by the appellant in the trial court on May 13, 1977 for setting aside the ex-parte decree against him on the ground that he had not been duly served and came to know about the passing of the decree against him through D. S. Baxi and Lotumal Girdhani on May 12, 1977 and after getting the file inspected through his counsel, filed the application on May 13, 1977. As such the application for setting aside the ex-parte decree was within limitation under Article 123 of the Limitation Act. As such the application for setting aside the ex-parte decree was within limitation under Article 123 of the Limitation Act. The application was contested on behalf of the plaintiff-respondent No. 1 on both the grounds and the learned trial court after making an inquiry, dismissed the application of the appellant. 5. Mr. Pagaria, learned Advocate for the appellant has contended that the service by registered post cannot be said to be due service on the appellant because the acknowledgement of the registered letter is neither signed by the appellant nor by any member of his family and as such the bare statement of the appellant that Ex. 1 acknowledgement is not signed by him or any body on his behalf is sufficient to rebut the presumption which arises under Section 114 illustration (g) of the Law of Evidence as well as under Sec. 27 of the General Clauses Act. He submits that once the appellant examined himself, it was necessary for respondent No. 1 to examine the Postman in order to prove that the registered envelop was tendered either to the appellant or to some body at his house and the same was received and in token thereof Ex. 1, the acknowledgement was signed. Because the Postman has not been examined, the learned trial court should have held that the appellant was not served and as such should have set aside the ex-parte decree. Mr. Agarwal, learned Advocate for the respondent on the other hand contends that a bald statement of the addressee that the registered envelop was not tendered to him and that the acknowledgement which is purported to be signed by some one on his behalf is not so signed, alone is not sufficient to rebut the presumption which arises in case of postal article in view of section 114 illustration (f) and Section 27 of the General Clauses Act. According to learned Advocate in the facts and circumstances of this case apart from the bald statement of the appellant, who is interested in denying the service, there should have been some other evidence on record to rebut the presumption which arises in such cases. 6. Both the learned counsel have cited a number of authorities in support of their respective contentions. Mr. 6. Both the learned counsel have cited a number of authorities in support of their respective contentions. Mr. Pagaria has relied on Kassim Ebrahim Saleji vs. Johrumull Khemka (1), M/s. Sitaram Ramavtar vs. M/s. Lohiya Murlidhar Meghraj(2), Sunder Spinner vs. Mukan Bhula(3), Appabhai Motibhai vs. Laxmi Chand Zaverchand and Co. (4), Meghji Kanji Patel vs. Kundanmal Chamanlal Mehtani (5), Puwada Venkateswara Rao, vs. Chidemana Venkata Ramana (6), Jagat Ram Khullar vs. Battu Mal (7) and B Padmavathi Rai vs. Parvathi-amma (8). Salejis case (supra) is a case of substituted service by affixture not on the residential house of the addressee but on business premises. It was held that in case of substituted service, it is most essential that the requirements of the rules of Code of Civil Procedure should be strictly observed. It was further held that before the mode of substituted service could be resorted to sincere efforts must be made to personally serve the defendant. For that end the Process Server should not only go to the house of the addressee but also should make an inquiry and if necessary follow him and should go to the house at the time the address may be found there. This ruling will not apply to the facts of the instant case inasmuch as it is not a case of service by affixture and moreover a perusal of record shows that several attempts were made earlier by the Process Server to serve the appellant, but he was not available at his house. M/s Sitarams case (supra), also has no relevance to the present case because it was a case under Order 5 Rule 20-A C.P.C. and it was held that before recourse can be had to the provisions of Order 5, Rule 20-A C. P. C. a genuine attempt of service in ordinary mode is to be made first and if the summonses are returned unserved only then a summons by registered post either in lieu of or in addition to the service under ordinary course can be resorted to. Sunder Spinners case (supra), Appa Bhais case (supra) and Meghji Kanji Patels case (supra) all of Bombay High Court are cases of endorsement of the Postman on the registered envelop "refused" and it was held that mere denial of the defendant in the court on oath that he refused to receive the envelop on being tendered by the Postman rebuts the presumption which arises under section 114 illustration (f) of the Law of Evidence. 7. Venkateswara Raos case (supra) is important. It was also a case of return of the registered envelop with endorsement of the Postman as "refused". Meghji Kanji Patels case as also the case of Nirmalabala Debi vs. Provat Kumar Basu (9) were referred and approved. It was observed by their Lordships of the Supreme Court as under: "It may be that, on a closer examination of evidence on record, the court could have reached the conclusion that the defendant had full knowledge of the notice and had actually refused it knowingly. It is not always necessary, in such cases, to produce the postman who tried to effect service. The denial of service by a party may be found to be incorrect from its own admissions or conduct." 8. Jagat Rams case (supra) is also a case of an endorsement of the Post-man on the registered envelop as "refused". It was held that ordinarily a statement of addressee on oath that the postal cover said to have been refused by him was never tendered to him, would be sufficient to rebut the presumption shifting the onus on other side to establish by evidence that the service had been duly affected. But it can only be so if the statement of a party on oath inspires confidence. In Padmavathis case (supra) also a similar view was taken. 9. From the discussion of the various authorities referred to above, it can be said that if the evidence of the defendant on oath that he did not refuse to accept the postal article when the same was tendered to him by the Postman, inspires confidence, a presumption which generally arises under Section 114 illustration (f) of the Law of Evidence and Section 27 of the General Clauses Act generally will stand rebutted. But if there is other material on record such as admission or conduct of the defendant which makes his statement unreliable, then a bald statement of the defendant on oath will not rebut the presumption which is no doubt; a rebuttable presumption of fact. 10. According to Mr. Agarwal, learned Advocate for the respondent No. 1, cases of endorsement by the Postman as "refused" stand on a different footing than the cases where the acknowledgement is purported to be signed by the addressee or some body on his behalf. He submits that in such cases a bald statement of the addressee will not rebut the presumption which is raised under sec. 114 illustration (f) of the Law of Evidence and section 27 of the General Clauses Act. According to him in eviction cases a tenant will always be interested in denying due service and because in the instant case the appellant besides examining himself, has not led any other evidence, presumption does not stand rebutted. Mr. Agarwal in support of his submissions has relied upon Harihar Banerji vs. Ramshashi Roy(l0) wherein their Lordships have held that if the postal article containing the document, properly addressed is proved to have been put in the post office, it is presumed that the letter reached its destination at the proper time according to the regular course of business of the Post Office and was received by the person to whom it was addressed. That presumption would apply with still greater force to letters which the sendor has taken precaution to register and is not rebutted but strengthened by the fact that a receipt for the letter is produced signed on behalf of the addressee by some person other than the addressee himself. 11. In Commissioner of Income-tax, West Bengal Calcutta vs. Malchand Surana, Calcutta (11) service of the registered letter was on the brother of the assessee. It was held that the presumption that a proper service had been effected would still be there. In Balgovind Rastogi vs. M/s Bhargava School Book Depot(12) acknowledgement of a notice under Sec. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act was purported to be signed by one Omprakash. It was held that the presumption that a proper service had been effected would still be there. In Balgovind Rastogi vs. M/s Bhargava School Book Depot(12) acknowledgement of a notice under Sec. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act was purported to be signed by one Omprakash. It was held that the onus was on the defendant to prove that the person who signed as Omprakash was neither an agent nor a member of his family and in the absence of proof on this point, the presumption which arises that the registered letter was delivered at the shop could not be rebutted. 12. In M. Janakiram Naidu vs. T. R. Arumugha Mudaliar (13), notice under Sec. 106 of Transfer of Property Act was sent by registered post. It was neither received by the lessee nor by his family members nor servant but was received by one T. Shanmugham. Evidence was led by the defendant that there is no person by name Shanmugham in his household. It was held that the mere statement on oath that the notice has not been received, will not rebut the presumption contained under Sec. 114 (e) of the Law of Evidence and the deeming provisions in sec. 27 of the General Clauses Act. 13. In Bharat Glass Factory vs. Sales Tax Officer, II Allahabad, (14) which was also a case of service by post, it was held that even if the service is affected on a different person and the acknowledgement of receipt was signed by him, a presumption will arise that proper service has been effected. In Asa Ram. vs. Ravi Prakash (15), placing reliance on Wasu Ram vs. R.L. Sethi (16) it was held that the appellants bare denial was not sufficient to rebut the presumption unless he was believed by the court. 14. After discussing the various authorities, to my mind the principle of law which emerges is that whenever a communication is sent by post, there is a presumption that it was duly delivered or tendered. If the communication is returned by the post office with an endorsement of the Postman as "refused" the presumption will be that it was tendered by the postal authorities in the ordinary course of business to the addressee who refused. If the communication is returned by the post office with an endorsement of the Postman as "refused" the presumption will be that it was tendered by the postal authorities in the ordinary course of business to the addressee who refused. Cases where the acknowledgement is purported to be signed by the addressee or some body on his behalf, stand on a different footing as it is presumed that in ordinary course of business the Postman delivered it and it was received by the addressee or some body on his behalf. If the acknowledgement is received and is purported to be signed by the addressee or some body in his behalf, then this presumption is all the more strengthened. But the strength of the presumption will vary according to the facts and circumstances of each case. If the addressee states on oath that he never received the communication and the court believes the addressee, then presumption may stand rebutted. But depending on facts and circumstances of each case, the court may not hold the presumption to be rebutted on the bald statement of the addressee if after considering all the surrounding circumstances, the court comes to the conclusion that the addressee should not be believed. It cannot be said that as and when an addressee appears in the witness-box and denies the receipt of the communication, it is incumbent on the other side to examine the Postman. The question is always one of fact as to whether the presumption stands rebutted or not and a bare denial by a person who stands to profit by his denial in a given case, moreso, in case of acknowledgement said to be signed by him or some body on his behalf, may not be sufficient to warrant the presumption. 15. Let us now examine the facts of the case in the light of the above preposition of law to see as to whether in the instant case from the statement of Vasudeo presumption which arises in case of postal articles under s. 114 illustration (f) of Law of Evidence and s. 27 of the General Clauses Act, stands rebutted. As already observed above, it is first to be seen as to whether the statement of Vasudeo is reliable. The suit was filed against Vasudeo and his father Naraindas. It was stated that both were residing together in the leased premises. As already observed above, it is first to be seen as to whether the statement of Vasudeo is reliable. The suit was filed against Vasudeo and his father Naraindas. It was stated that both were residing together in the leased premises. It is not disputed that communications sent to the appellant at the address "Vasudeo son of Naraindas Sindhi. Plot 579, Adarsh Nagar, Jaipur-4" reach the addressee in the ordinary course of business. Registered acknowledgement containing the documents including the summons meant for November 22, 1974, was sent to the appellant on the above address. The acknowledgement is purported to be signed by some body on Nov. 15, 1974 on behalf of Vasudeo appellant. The onus that the registered envelop was not received is definitely on the appellant. The question of making sincere efforts to personally deliver the postal article to the appellant would have arisen if the inmate of the house would have refused to take the delivery, of the article. Vasudeo has appeared in the witness-box and he has no doubt, stated that none on his behalf signed Ex. 1 acknowledgement. The statement of Vasudeo does not inspire confidence inasmuch as he says that he does not know where his father resides. Normally a son is expected to know as to where his father is residing in the same city. He is unable to say as to who had signed Ex. 1 at A to B. There is a presumption that the postal article must have been tendered or delivered by the Postman to the addressee or some inmate of the house on his behalf. Though in second part of his statement he has stated that his father is not living with him for the last 5-6 years and both were not on speaking terms, but in another portion of his statement he has stated that his father is not living with him since 1974-75. Therefore, in the facts of this case the trial court has rightly observed that only on the bald statement of Vasudeo the presumption that the postal article was delivered at his house and some inmate of the house signed Ex. 1 on behalf of Vasudeo does not stand rebutted. Some other evidence was required to rebut the presumption. 16. There is no force in this appeal and it is hereby dismisssed with costs.