UPPERI RUDRAPPA v. STATE OF KARNATAKA — 1980 DIGILAW 244 (KAR)

K. S. PUTTASWAMY, J. ( 1 ) AN agricultural Produce Market committee called as the Agricultural produce Market Committee Hospet (hereinafter referred to as the APMC) has been constituted and functioning at Hospet town, Bellary District under the provisions of the Karnataka agricultural Producing Marketing (Regulation) Act of 1966 (Karnataka act No. 27 of 1966) (hereinafter referred to as the Act ). In accordance with S-11 of the Act, a new committee of 13 members, consisting of elected representatives and nominated persons, has been constituted in January, 1979. On 15-3-1979 the petitioner elected as a member from the agriculturists constituency, has been elected as the president of the A. P. M. C. and he is functioning in that capacity ever since then. ( 2 ) ON 3-11-1979 the Governor of karnataka in exercise of the powers conferred by clause (i) of Art. 213 of the Constitution, promulgated the karnataka Agricultural Produce marketing (Regulation) (Second amendment) Ordinance of 1979 (Kar natana Ordinance No, 16 of 1979) (hereinafter referred to as the ordinance) inter alia amending S. 11 of the Act by sec. 6 of the Ordinance, (i) increasing the number of members to be elected from the agriculturists constituency to nine as against seven with a reservation of one seat to scheduled caste or scheduled tribe, (ii) reducing the representation to- traders to one member as against two members; and (iii) conferring power on government to nominate two members of whom one shall be a person belong- ing to scheduled caste or scheduled tribe. S, 6 (1) (a) (b) of the Ordinance hag been given retrospective effect from 30-6-1979. The Ordinance has been replaced by the Karnataka agricultural Produce Marketing (Regulation) (Amendment) Act of 1980 (Karnataka Act No. 17 of 1980 (hereinafter referred to as the amendment Act) The Amendment act received the assent of the Governor on 29-4-1980 and has been published; in the Karnataka Gazette on 9-5-1980. S. 6 of the Ordinance has been reenaded as S. 6 of the Amendment act without any change thereto, and the latter one has also been given retrospective effect from 30-6-1979. S. 6 of the Ordinance has been reenaded as S. 6 of the Amendment act without any change thereto, and the latter one has also been given retrospective effect from 30-6-1979. ( 3 ) IN exercise of the powers conferred by clause (ix) of sub-section (1) of S. 11 as amended by the ordinance by Notification No. RDC 268 MMD 79 dated 29-4-1980 (Annexure-B) the government of Karnataka has nominated respondents 2 and 3 one of them being a member of a scheduled caste as members of the A. P. M. C. In this petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution, presented on 26-5-1980, the petitioner has challenged the aforesaid' notification of the Government. On 30-5-1980 Swami, J. , while directing emergent notices stayed the operation of the said notification, which has been continued till the disposal of this writ petition. ( 4 ) SRI C. M. Desai, learned counsel for the petitioner, has contended that it was not open to Government to nominate respondents 2 and 3 as members of the A. P. M. C. Elaborating his contention, Sri Desai maintaned that the power to nominate could be exercised only in respect of a committee that had not been reconstituted prior to the promulgation of the Ordinance and was still to| be reconstituted and not in respect of a a committee that had already been reconstituted. ( 5 ) SRIYUTHS: G. R. Nataraj, learned high Court Government Pleader, appearing for respondent No. 1 and n. Y. Hanumanthappa, learned counsel appearing for respondents 2 and 3 supported the action of Government. ( 6 ) IN the absence of a challenge to the constitutionality of S. 6 of the amendment Act, the Court is only concerned with its construction. Earlier, I have briefly noticed the effect of the amendments made by S. 6 of the Amendment Act to S. 11 of the Act. ( 7 ) A new clause viz. , clause (ix) has been added to sub-section (1) of s. 11 from 30-6-1979 which reads thus;"two members shall be persons nominated by the State Government of whom one shall be a person belonging to the Scheduled Castes or the Scheduled Tribes who shall hold office at the pleasure of the State government. ( 7 ) A new clause viz. , clause (ix) has been added to sub-section (1) of s. 11 from 30-6-1979 which reads thus;"two members shall be persons nominated by the State Government of whom one shall be a person belonging to the Scheduled Castes or the Scheduled Tribes who shall hold office at the pleasure of the State government. "the above clause in unambiguous terms confers power on the State government to nominate two members, one of whom shall be a persoin belonging to the Scheduled castes op scheduled tribes on every market committee reconstituted under S. 11 of the Act and functioning in the State. The said clause nowhere places any restriction or curtails the power of government to nominate two members only in respect of a market committee that is still to be reconstituted under S. 11 of the Act. The power conferred by clause (ix) is general and can be exercised in respect of every market committeie reconstituted or to be reconstitued under S. 11 of the Act. In the absence of a limitation, a law made by a legislature also operates generally. Every rule of construction of statutes supports the above construction. On the other hand, the construction suggested by Sri Desai would postpone the application, of clause (ix) with reference to each market committee to the date of its reconstitution though the legislature has brought that provision into force from a specified date without placing any restriction. The language of the amendment and clause (ix) does not support any such construction. Apart from this, the construction suggested by Sri Desai would result in incongruities and absurdities. A construction which does not flaw from the language of the provision and results in incongruities and absurdities should be avoided by a Court. From this it follows that the contention urged by Sri Desai is totally unsound and requires to be rejected. ( 8 ) INDISPUTABLY the A. P. M. C. had been reconstituted in January, 1979 consisting of seven elected members elected by the Agriculturists of the market area two members elected by a. B. and C. Class traders. But, by the amendment, the number of members to be elected from Agriculturists has been increased to nine a,nd the number of members to be elected from A, B and C class traders has been reduced to one. But, by the amendment, the number of members to be elected from Agriculturists has been increased to nine a,nd the number of members to be elected from A, B and C class traders has been reduced to one. On these facts, Sri desai urged that the legislature did not intend to hold fresh elections from the agriculturists constituency, increase the number of members from that constituency or decrease the number of members to the traders constituency, but intended that that committee alone should continue for 'the required term and the amended section 11 should be enforced in its entirety when an occasion for re- constitution arises and not otherwise. ( 9 ) THE Ordinance while giving retrospective effect to S. 6 (1) (a) (b) and (d) from 30-6-1979, did not make any provision in respect of a market committee to which elections had been completed prior to its promulgation or that provision was given retrop- pective effect. But, that omission was sought to be cured in the Amendment act by introducing a new sub-section (3) to S. 42 of that Aqt which reads thus: -"notwithstanding the amendments made to the principal Act by Secs. 5 and 6 of this Act. the members of a market committee representing the traders as on the 30th day of june, 1979 shall continue to be members thereof till the expiry of their term of office or till the committee is reconstituted, whichever is earlier. "this provision declares that the number of members elected from the traders constituency of a market committee as on 30-6-1979 shall continue to be members thereof till the expiry of their term of office or till that committee is reconstituted, whichever is earlier. But, unfortunately no such provision, was made in respect of the members elected from the agriculturists constituency. The said omission, though unfortunate, cannot itself be a ground to hold that the power of nomination conferred by clause (ix) introduced by the Amendment act, cannot be exercised till a committee is reconstituted. What then should be the rule of construction in such a situation is best set out by Lord denning in Seaford Court Estates LD. The said omission, though unfortunate, cannot itself be a ground to hold that the power of nomination conferred by clause (ix) introduced by the Amendment act, cannot be exercised till a committee is reconstituted. What then should be the rule of construction in such a situation is best set out by Lord denning in Seaford Court Estates LD. v. Asher (1) (see also the Discipline of Law' under the sub-heading 'ironing out the creases' - page 11 and 12 by the same learned Judge) in these inimitable and picturesque words:"the question for decision in this case is whether we are at liberty to extend the ordinary meaning of "burden" so as to include a contingent burden of the kind I have described. Now this court has already held that this sub-section is to be liberally construed so as to give effect to the governing principles emboided in the legislation, winchester Court Ltd. , v. Miller 1944 KB 734 and I think we should do the same. Whenever a statute comes up for consideration it must be remembered that it is not within human powers to foresee the manifold sets of facts which may arise, and, even if it were, it is not possible to provide for them in terms free from all ambiguity. The English language is not an instrument of mathematical precision. Our literature would be much the poorer if it were. This is where the draftsmen of Acts of parliament have often been unfairly criticised. A judge, believing himself to be fettered by the supposed rule tha,t he must look to the language and nothing else, laments that the draftsmen have not provided for this or that, or have been guilty of Home or other ambiguity. It would certainly save the Judges trouble if Acts of Parliament were drafted with divine prescience and perfect clarity. In the absence of it, when a defect appears, a judge cannot simply fold his hands and blame the draftsman. He must set to work on the constructive task of finding the intention of Parliament, and he must do this not only from the language of the statute, but also from a consideration of the social conditions which gave rise to it, and of the mischief which it was passed to remedy, and then he must supplement the written word so as to give "force and life" to ithe intention of the legislature. That was clearly laid down by the resolution of the judges in Heyon's case (1584 (3) Co Rep 7a) and it is the safest guide to-day. Good practical advice on the subject was given about the same time by plowden in his second volume eyston v. Studd P. 465. Put into homely metaphor it is this: A judge should ask himself the question: If the makers of the Act had. themselves come across this ruck in the texture of it, how would they have straightened it out? He must then do as they would have done. A judge must not alter the material of which it is woven, but he can and should iron out the creases. "in my view, it is proper to apply the above rule of construction and effort made to carry out the object and purposes of the amendment ignoring the unintentional omission as it often happens in cases of hasty legislation. On such a construction, I hold that the amendment does not disrupt or undo a committee already reconstituted in accordance with S. 11 prior to its amendment and provides for its continuance till the expiry of its term which of course is subject to the power of Government to nominate two members under clause (ix) of that section. In my view, such a construction achieves the purposes and object of the amendment and does not defeat its object. In this view, I do not see any merit in the alternative contention urged by Sri Desai and reject the same. ( 10 ) IN his petition, the petitioner has vaguely alleged that Government has exercised its power of nomination! only in respect of this A. P. M. C. and two other committees and not in respect of other A. P. M. Cs, and therefore, the same is vitiated. At the hearing Sri desai, in my opinion, rightly did not pursue the same. Moreover this allegation of the petitioner, besides being vague and general, is not even sufficient to constitute an allegation of mala fides requiring respondent No. 1 to traverse and deny the same. Even qtherwise, the nomination made in a given case cannot be invalidated on the ground that the Government had not exercised its power in respect of all other committees. Even qtherwise, the nomination made in a given case cannot be invalidated on the ground that the Government had not exercised its power in respect of all other committees. For these reasons, there is no merit in the plea of the petitioner that the action of government is vitiated by mala fides. ( 11 ) IN the light of my above discussion, i hold that there is no merit in any of the contentions urged for the petitioner and the rule requires to b discharged. Rule issued is, therefore, discharged. ( 12 ) IN the circumstances of the case, I direct the parities to bear their own costs. --- *** --- .