Judgment :- 1. In O.S. No. 953/66, the plaintiff was granted a decree for recovery of the plaint schedule property. The property was Viruthi land. 2. A contention had been raised in the suit itself that in respect of Viruthi lands, the civil court could not exercise any jurisdiction in view of S.8 of the Viruthi Proclamation issued by His Highness the Maharaja of Travancore on 4th Edavom 1061 M E. An issue was framed whether the suit was maintainable, and after trial, the court held that S.8 did not bar its jurisdiction. 3. It is said that there were some proceedings in execution in the year 1969; but that history is not relevant. When E. P. No. 254/78 was filed, the 2nd judgment-debtor raised an objection that he was a tenant entitled to fixity That was rejected and the matter was posted for delivery, to 3rd June, 1980. On 2nd June, 1980, the 2nd petitioner in the CRP. filed another objection contending that the decree itself was not executable as it was a nullity. The point raised again was that the court which passed the decree had no competence to make it in view of S.8 of the Viruthi Proclamation. That objection having been over-ruled, its correctness is now being challenged in the present revision. 4. Counsel for the petitioners submits that the executing court has jurisdiction to go into the question whether the decree is a nullity or not. That is a well-settled proposition. But where the identical question of jurisdiction had been raised before the court trying the suit and had been found against, and that finding has been permitted to become final, the question cannot be raised again in execution proceedings, in view of the general principle of res judicata. The court which tried the suit was certainly competent to decide whether it had jurisdiction or not. The decision might be right or wrong; but when once a decision is rendered and that becomes final, it is a decision by a competent court on an issue raised by the parties, and the parties will be precluded from raising it over again in the same proceedings or in other proceedings. The decision might be right or wrong; but when once a decision is rendered and that becomes final, it is a decision by a competent court on an issue raised by the parties, and the parties will be precluded from raising it over again in the same proceedings or in other proceedings. That is not because the executing court has no jurisdiction to deal with the question of nullity, but because the parties are prevented from raising the same question again, in view of the finality of the decision rendered earlier. The principles of res judicata are part of the principles of estoppel; res judicata is estoppel by judgment. The court may have jurisdiction, but its doors will be shut against a party who had obtained an adverse and final decision earlier on the same question. The rule that the executing court can always go into the question whether a decree is a nullity or not has to be read subject to the procedural rule that matters which have become final cannot be re-agitated. 5. A somewhat similar question arose before this Court in Potti v. Bhargavan (1957 KLT. 1033). The decree holders in that case assigned their rights to one Madathil Patti. The latter applied for recognition of the assignment and for execution of the decree. That was allowed and part of the properties were sold in 1951. After the sale, defendant No. 2 who was a minor at the time of the decree filed a petition under S.47 and 0.21 R.90 for setting aside the sale. One contention raised was that the minor had no been properly represented in the suit. Another contention was that notice required under 0.21 R.16 had not been given to the original decree holders about the assignee's application for recognition of the assignment. The court found that a proper person, namely, an advocate of the court S. R. Pai by name, had been appointed as guardian ad litem and that the contention about want of notice under 0.21 R.16 had been earlier raised by Sri. Pai himself and had been found against. In this view, the executing court held that the point could not be gone into again on the principles of res judicata. Pai himself and had been found against. In this view, the executing court held that the point could not be gone into again on the principles of res judicata. And when its correctness was challenged before this Court, Kumara Pillai J observed: ' The respondent's learned counsel contended that as the notice required under Order XXI, R.16, Civil Procedure Code, had not been served on the assignors all the proceedings which took place on the assignee's application for execution including the adjudication of the objections raised by Sri. S. R. Pai were without jurisdiction and a decision rendered in such a proceeding, without jurisdiction by the court, could not be taken as constituting res judicata. This argument overlooks the fact that the contention that the execution proceedings were without jurisdiction was raised and negatived in these very execution proceedings themselves at earlier stages of the proceedings, and that defendant 2 is now only repeating at a subsequent stage of the same execution proceedings the very contention which had been overruled at the earlier stage. The rule of res judicata is based on the principle that there should be some finality to litigation. If a question of jurisdiction, once decided at an earlier stage of the litigation after hearing both sides, is allowed to be raked up again at a subsequent stage of the very same litigation, there would be no finality at all, and it would be allowing the defeated party to prolong the proceedings indefinitely by filing a petition questioning the jurisdiction of the court to go on with the proceedings every time a previous petition in which the very same contention was raised is over-ruled." 6. The decision of the Supreme Court in Mathura Prasad v. Dossi Bai (AIR. 1971 SC. 2355) is distinguishable. In that case, the lessee of an open land for construction of buildings applied for determination of standard rent under the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947; and the application was dismissed on the ground that the Act did not apply to . such open lands. The dismissal became final and later, when the Supreme Court held, in another case, that such lands were also within the purview of the Act, the lessee made a fresh application for fixation of standard rent. That was dismissed on the ground that the dismissal of the earlier application operated as res judicata. such open lands. The dismissal became final and later, when the Supreme Court held, in another case, that such lands were also within the purview of the Act, the lessee made a fresh application for fixation of standard rent. That was dismissed on the ground that the dismissal of the earlier application operated as res judicata. This view was confirmed in appeal and also by the High Court; but the Supreme Court held that: "When the law is altered since the earlier decision, the earlier decision will not operate as res judicata". The court cited with approval a passage from the decision of Rankin C. J. in Tarini Charan v. Kedar Nath (AIR 1928 Cal. 777) to the effect that questions of procedure or of limitation affecting jurisdiction are questions where "rights of parties are not the only matter for consideration". The principle laid down by the Supreme Court was that a decision on a pure question of law. unrelated to the rights of parties, would not operate as res judicata if the law was subsequently changed by a competent authority so as to create a situation where the application of res judicata would amount to applying a special rule of law for the parties. That was how the position was understood by the Supreme Court in its recent decision in Jai Singh Jairam v. Raman Chand (AIR. 1980 SC. 1201), where a subsequent enactment had taken away the basis of an earlier decision between the parties which was sought to be pressed into service as res judicata. In the present case, however, there has been no change of law after the decree, either by a decision of a superior court or by legislation, and the principle of the two Supreme Court decisions is therefore not attracted. 7. The general principle, to which Mathura Prasad and Jai Singh Jairam appear to be exceptions, was laid down by the Supreme Court in Mohanlal v. Benoy Kishna (AIR 1953 SC. 65) by holding that even an erroneous decision on a question of law, including one relating to jurisdiction, would operate as res judicata. 7. The general principle, to which Mathura Prasad and Jai Singh Jairam appear to be exceptions, was laid down by the Supreme Court in Mohanlal v. Benoy Kishna (AIR 1953 SC. 65) by holding that even an erroneous decision on a question of law, including one relating to jurisdiction, would operate as res judicata. After referring to the facts of the case before their Lordships, Ghulam Hasan J. (with whom Mahajan and Bose JJ agreed) said: "The foregoing narration of the various stages through which the execution proceedings passed from time to time will show that neither at the time the execution application was made and a notice served on the judgment debtor, nor in the applications for setting aside the two sales made by him did the judgment debtor raise any objection to execution being proceeded with on the ground that the execution court had no jurisdiction to execute the decree. The failure to raise such an objection which went to the root of the matter precludes him from raising the plea of jurisdiction on the principle of constructive res judicata after the property has been sold to the auction purchaser who has entered into possession." Differing from the view taken by Harries C. J. in the High Court that "a judgment delivered by a court not competent to deliver it cannot operate as res judicata", the Supreme Court observed: "There is ample authority for the proposition that even an erroneous decision on a question of law operates as res judicata between the parties. The correctness or otherwise of a judicial decision has no bearing upon the question whether or not it operates as res judicata. A decision id the previous execution case between the parties that the matter was not within the competence of the executing court even though erroneous is binding on the parties." I may add that one of the decisions cited with approval by Ghulam Hasan J. was that of the Privy Council in Raja of Ramnad v. Velusami Thevar (48 Ind. App. 45) where a judgment debtor had objected to execution by an assignee of the decree on various grounds, including limitation. The objections were overruled though there was no specific decision on the question of Limitation. App. 45) where a judgment debtor had objected to execution by an assignee of the decree on various grounds, including limitation. The objections were overruled though there was no specific decision on the question of Limitation. In the final proceedings, however, the executing court permitted the judgment debtor to raise the question of limitation again; but the Privy Council held that such a plea was barred by constructive res judicata. 8. Even otherwise, I think that S 8 of the Viruthi Proclamation has to be read along with the Revenue Settlement Proclamation issued on 14th Kumbhom, 1061 and the Service Inams Proclamation of 1068. By the Revenue Settlement Proclamation, His Highness the Maharaja of Travancore had directed that a fresh survey and re-assessment of the entire State embracing an accurate measurement, demarcation, mapping etc. of properties of every description, be carried out. S.24 of this Proclamation specifically dealt with settlement of Inams. The section classified Inams into two; namely personal inams and service inams Para.1 of S.24 dealt with service inams and Para.2 and 3 with other inams. Para.6 provided that after the settlement of the inams under the foregoing rules, the holders shall be at liberty to mortgage, sell or transfer them in any manner at their will and discretion, subject only to the payment of the quit-rent fixed. And Para.7 provided that Government shall not further interfere with such freeholds except as may be necessary for the punctual realisation of the quit rent. 9. It appears that His Highness had second thoughts over Para.6 and 7 of S.24 noticed above, in so far they related to service inams known as 'viruthi'. Therefore the Viruthi Proclamation was issued a few months later, in the same year. Sections (1) to (5) of this Proclamation provided for a scrutiny and revision of all viruthies, including a revision of the prices paid for provisions and materials supplied by the Viruthicars; and S.6 then stipulated that after so paying the viruthicars for the provisions and the materials supplied by them they should still be remunerated for the expenditure of time and labour involved in fulfilling their obligations and performing personal services. For this purpose, the Settlement Peishkar had to make a fresh grant of land and such land was subject to the payment of Rajabhogam only. For this purpose, the Settlement Peishkar had to make a fresh grant of land and such land was subject to the payment of Rajabhogam only. Then followed S.8 reading as follows: ' No Viruthicar shall be at liberty to alienate by sale, gift, mortgage or otherwise, the Inam given to him for the Viruthi Service. All such alienation shall be null and void and the Government shall have the power of resuming any such alienated Viruthi Inam and restoring it to the holder or otherwise disposing of it as to them may seem fit. No action shall lie respecting any such land in any Court of Law." Two views were possible on the construction of this Section: one, that the civil court could not entertain any suit at all respecting viruthi lands, and two, that the civil courts could not entertain any action against the Government in respect of things done by them under the Section. Of these, the first found favour with the Full Bench of the Travancore High Court in Govindan Neelacundhan v. Govindan Peruman reported in 9 TLR. 169. But Kunhiraman Nair J. observed: The effect of the law as now interpreted by the Full Bench, is to deprive a large class of petty and poor land-holders in the State of the protection afforded by the civil courts established in the country for settlement of disputes of civil nature while the declared general policy of Government has always been to make the possession of landed and other property as secure as possible. It is, I think, a matter for the serious consideration of Government and the legislature, whether the existing law should not, in the interests of justice, be so amended as to enable the Viruthi holders to have recourse to the regularly constituted tribunals of the State for enforcing their rights against private individuals, in connection with their Viruthi holdings". 10. A Division Bench of the very same Court said in Velumpan Kunjan v. Mathevan Raman (10 TLR. 60) that the Full Bench decision should be confined to cases where a revision of the viruthi had been completed and a fresh grant made by the Dewan Peishkar under S.6 of the Viruthi Proclamation. It was in this background that His Highness the Maharaja came out with the Service Inams Proclamation of 1 68, dealing with Service Inams of every kind. It was in this background that His Highness the Maharaja came out with the Service Inams Proclamation of 1 68, dealing with Service Inams of every kind. The Proclamation provided that Para.6 and 7 of S.24 of the Settlement Proclamation of 1061 shall not apply to Service Inams covered by Para.1 of that Section It was further provided that alienations of lands comprised in Service Inams ("lands attached to specific services of any description") were to be treated as null and void and that it would be competent for the Government to resume the lands alienated and re-attach them to the service. S.3 then clarified matters by providing that "No Civil suit shall lie against Our Government in respect of anything done under the last preceding Section." 11. The Full Bench decision in Govindan Neelacundhan's case was rendered in Midhunam 1067, and the Proclamation of 1068 was apparently issued in the light of the observations made by Kunhiraman Nair J. It applied to Service Inams of all descriptions and therefore it involved a modification of the rule in S.8 of the Viruthi Proclamation; and the modification was that no suit would lie against the Government when it resumed alienated Viruthi lands and re-attached them to the Viruthi. The prohibition against civil courts dealing with any action relating to Viruthi lands was thus lifted in 1068, and thereafter the courts had jurisdiction to adjudicate disputes between private parties even if they related to such lands. The decree in O. S.953/66 was therefore not a nullity, as the revision petitioners wanted the executing court to hold. 12. It is then argued that the Ist petitioner in the C. R. P. had not been given notice of the execution proceedings at all. This is a point which does not appear to have been raised before the court below. The 1st petitioner is free to raise it if he is so advised and invite a decision thereon from the executing court. In the light of what is said above, the C.R.P. has to be dismissed; and I hereby dismiss it without costs. Dismissed.