Judgment :- 1. The second appeal and the revision petition arise from the same proceedings, namely, A. S. No. 55 of 1975 and an interlocutory application, I. A. No. 333 of 1975 filed therein, both by the defeated plaintiffs in the suit. The plaintiffs' suit was for redemption of Ext. Al otti and Kuzhikanam transaction dated 6-6-1940. Relying on the Full Bench decision of this Court in Rev. Fr. Victor Fernandez v. Albert Fernandez (1971 KLT. 216) (FB) the trial court dismissed the suit holding that the defendants are entitled to fixity of tenure. The trial court held that the transaction falls under S.2 (39A) and 2(56) of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963. The trial court dismissed the suit aforesaid on 25-7-1972. Accordingly, the plaintiffs applied for copies of the judgment and decree of the trial court for preferring appeal against the same. They obtained copies of the judgment and decree in the suit on 9-1-1973. It is their case that since the decision in Rev. Fr. Victor Fernandez v. Albert Fernandez (1971 KLT. 216) (FB) prevailed the field, they were advised by their counsel that there was no good of filing any appeal. For that reason, they kept quiet for about two years. 2. The decision in Rev. Fr. Victor Fernandez v. Albert Fernandez (1971 K.L.T. 216) (FB) was overruled by this Court by the decision in Vivekanadan v. Sadasivan (1975 KLT. 1) (FB), a decision by a Full Bench of five Judges. This decision was rendered on 27-9-1974 A few months thereafter, to be precise, on 30-1-1975 the plaintiffs preferred A. S. No. 55 of 1975 before the lower appellate court. Along with the said appeal the plaintiffs also filed I. A. No. 333 of 1975 praying that the delay in filing the appeal be condoned under S.5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The lower appellate court dismissed I. A. No. 333 of 1975 by its order dated 7-6-1976. This is the order sought to be revised in the revision petition. Consequent upon the dismissal of I. A. No. 333 of 1975, the lower appellate court dismissed A. S. No. 55 of 1975 also. The said decision is impugned in the second appeal. 3. The only question that arises tor consideration is as to whether the dismissal of I.A. No. 333 of 1975 by the lower appellate court is correct. Consequent upon the dismissal of I. A. No. 333 of 1975, the lower appellate court dismissed A. S. No. 55 of 1975 also. The said decision is impugned in the second appeal. 3. The only question that arises tor consideration is as to whether the dismissal of I.A. No. 333 of 1975 by the lower appellate court is correct. If the order on that interlocutory application is held to be correct then the decision in A. S. No. 55 of 1975 dismissing that appeal has to be upheld. If the order on the interlocutory application is held to be unsustainable then the decision in A. S. No. 55 of 1975 has to be set aside and the lower appellate court has to be directed to consider the same on merits. 4. As already pointed out, the delay in filing the appeal is about two years. The reason stated is that the learned counsel for the plaintiffs gave the wrong advice that there is no good of filing any appeal against the decision rendered by the trial court. It is on that basis that it is contended that there is sufficient cause for condonation of the delay in filing the appeal. 5. The learned counsel for the plaintiffs-appellants firstly relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in Sandhya Rani v. Sudha Rani (AIR 1978 SC. 537) and particularly to the discussion therein in Para.8 thereof at page 542. The Supreme Court in the aforesaid decision said as follows: "It is undoubtedly true that in dealing with the question of condoning the delay . under S.5 of the Limitation Act the party seeking relief has to satisfy the Court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within the prescribed time and this has always been understood to mean that the explanation has to cover the whole period of delay, vide Sitaram Ramacharan v. M. N. Nagarshana (1960) 1 SCR. 875 at 889: (AIR. 1960 SC. 260 at pp. 265-66). However, it is not possible to lay down precisely as to what facts or matters would constitute 'sufficient cause' under S.5 of the Limitation Act. 875 at 889: (AIR. 1960 SC. 260 at pp. 265-66). However, it is not possible to lay down precisely as to what facts or matters would constitute 'sufficient cause' under S.5 of the Limitation Act. But those words should be liberally construed so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence or any inaction or want of bona fides is imputable to a party, i.e., the delay in filing an appeal should not have been for reasons which indicate the party's negligence in not taking necessary steps which he would have or should have taken." 6. I do not think that the case on band falls under the principle stated by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid case. This is a case where there was inaction on the part of the plaintiffs, if not, abandonment of the right to prefer the appeal itself. May be, this may not be a case of negligence on the part of the plaintiffs or of want of bona fides but there, was admittedly inaction. Copies of the judgment and decree of the trial court were obtained on 9-1-1973. For whatever reason it may be, they kept quiet till 30-1-1975. I am not prepared to say that the principle stated by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid case governs the instant case. 7. The learned counsel for the plaintiffs-appellants also relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in State of W B. v. Howrah Municipality (AIR. 1972 SC. 749). At page 755 of that decision the Supreme Court said that 'the words sufficient cause should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides is imputable to a party. The principle stated by the Supreme Court in that decision is the same as that stated by that court in the subsequent, decision mentioned in the preceding paragraph. 8. It is then contended on behalf of the plaintiffs-appellants that wrong advice given by the counsel is a sufficient ground for condonation of the delay in filing an appeal. In that connection the learned counsel for the plaintiffs-appellants relied on the decisions in Bhakti Bh. Mondal v Khagendra (AIR. 1968 Calcutta 69) and Shanti Devi v. Satya Pal (AIR. 1964 Punjab 289). I would with advantage quote the following passage from the decision in Highton v. Treheme (1878) 39 LT. In that connection the learned counsel for the plaintiffs-appellants relied on the decisions in Bhakti Bh. Mondal v Khagendra (AIR. 1968 Calcutta 69) and Shanti Devi v. Satya Pal (AIR. 1964 Punjab 289). I would with advantage quote the following passage from the decision in Highton v. Treheme (1878) 39 LT. 412 where Lord Justice Brett said as follows: "A suitor who suffers from want of due skill and care on the part of his legal adviser must take the consequences, but has a remedy against the legal adviser; but when there is a bona fide mistake, not attributable to negligence or want of due skill, it is otherwise. It seems to me obvious that this Court has jurisdiction and right to enlarge the time on the present occasion. If there had been a bona fide mistake not attributable to want of reasonable skill at the time when the mistake was made, and it had also been shown that the profession generally was in doubt as to the practice with respect to this matter, I should have thought that special circumstances existed upon which to grant an extension of time." 9. Referring to the aforesaid passage from the Highton's case and other decisions, the Calcutta High Court pointed out in Bhakti Bh. Mondal v. Khagendra (AIR 1968 Calcutta 69) as follows: "The position in law as it appears from the above quotations seems to be that there is no general rule that whenever a wrong advice is given by a lawyer the party concerned may apply under S.5. But circumstances of a particular case may give rise to 'sufficient cause' envisaged by S.5. An applicant applying for condonation of delay in such cases has to establish by evidence: (a) that the advice was given by a skilled or competent person; (b) that the lawyer who gave the opinion exercised reasonable care; (in other words, the advice was the result of a bona fide mistake not attributable to negligence or want of due skill): and (c) that the view taken by the lawyer was not (sic) such as would have been entertained by a competent person exercising reasonable skill." To the same effect is the decision in Shanti Devi v. Satya Pal (AIR. 1964 Punjab 289). 10. 1964 Punjab 289). 10. It appears to me that one more principle should be added to those stated by the Calcutta High Court and that is: At the time the advice was given the legal profession generally was in doubt as to the practice with respect to the matter on which advice was given So far as this State is concerned the decision of the Full Bench in Rev Fr. Victor Fernandez v. Albert Fernandez (1971 KLT. 216) (FB) was binding law so far as all subordinate courts are concerned. Therefore, it cannot be said that the legal profession generally was in doubt with respect to the matter decided in the above said case. It was in view of this decision that the plaintiffs' learned counsel advised the plaintiffs that an appeal is not feasible. The advice given by the learned counsel as aforesaid could not be characterised as a wrong advice or a mistaken advice at the time it was made. The fact is that the plaintiffs did not dare to challenge the correctness of that decision by pursuing the matter before the lower appellate court and this court by preferring appeals against the decision in the trial court. That long thereafter somebody else dared to challenge the correctness of the decision in Rev. Fr. Victor Fernandez v. Albrt Fernandez (1971 KLT. 216 (FB) and that thereupon this Court held that the aforesaid decision lays down bad law is not, in my view, a sufficient cause for condonation of the delay in preferring an appeal. If it be otherwise, then an appeal could be preferred before the appellate court on every occasion when a principle stated is overruled by another decision of this Court even if it be after a very long time. 11. It may be noticed that a subsequent change in law has not been recognized as a ground for review by this Court in Board of Revenues v. Akbar Sahib (1973 KLT. 497). In Achuthan Nair v, Raman (1979 KLT. 119), this Court referring to the principle of prospective overruling stated that the principle thereof is that "settled matters should not be raked up on the basts of a subsequent declaration of the law by the Supreme Court." 12. 497). In Achuthan Nair v, Raman (1979 KLT. 119), this Court referring to the principle of prospective overruling stated that the principle thereof is that "settled matters should not be raked up on the basts of a subsequent declaration of the law by the Supreme Court." 12. There is no merit in the contention that there was sufficient cause for condonation of delay and that the lower appellate court did not properly exercise its discretion in dismissing I. A. No. 333 of 1975. The result is, there is no merit in CRP No. 5727 of 1976. The same is dismissed, but, in the circumstances of the case, without any order as regards costs. 13. In view of the dismissal of CRP. No. 5727 of 1976, there is no merit in S.A. No. 1045 of 1976. The same is also dismissed, but, again, without any order as regards costs.