JUDGMENT A. N. Verma, J. This petition by a tenant is directed against orders passed by the respondents Nos. 1 and 2 under Section 21 (lA) of the U. P. Act No, XIII of 1972 releasing the accommodation in dispute in favour of the husband of respondent No. 6, the original landlord. These are the relevant facts: The accommodation in dispute consists of a portion of house No. C 4/306 Sarai Gobardhan, Varanasi. It was originally owned by one Sri Jagat Ram. He gifted the said house in favour of his son Niranjan Singh, the husband of Smt. Kailashwati Devi, the respondent No. 3. Niranjan Singh was thus the owner and landlord of the aforesaid house which is the accommodation in dispute. The petitioner was a tenant of Jagat Ram and, subsequently, after the gift mentioned above, of Niranjan Singh. Niranjan Singh filed an application for eviction of the tenant from the aforesaid accommodation on 29111975 on the ground that he needed the accommodation in dispute for his residence. While that application was pending Subsection (lA) was added to U P Act No. XIII of 1972 by U. P. Act No. 28 of 1976. Under Section (lA) it was provided, that the landlord who was in occupation of a public premises for residential purposes which he had to vacate on account of cessation of his employment, could apply for an order of eviction of the tenant occupying a building belonging to the landlord and upon such an application, the Prescribed Authority under the Act was enjoined to order the eviction of the tenant. Relying on subsection (IA) Niranjan Singh applied for the amendment of his application under Section 21 (I). The said amendment was allowed. The tenant filed objections against the application of Niranjan Singh. The prescribed Authority overruled the objections of the tenant and ordered his eviction from the accommodation in dispute under Section 21 (IA). The tenant filed an appeal. During the pendency of the appeal Niranjan Singh died on 2781978. On 15111978 his widow made an application before the Appellate Court to the effect that the tenant not having taken steps to bring her on the record within the prescribed period of limitation, the appeal be declared as having abated. This widow made another application on 611979 to the same effect. It was thereafter that the tenant filed an application for substitution. This widow made another application on 611979 to the same effect. It was thereafter that the tenant filed an application for substitution. This substitution application was contested but was eventually allowed. The appellate Court then considered the case on merits, and, agreeing with the Prescribed Authority, dismissed the tenant's appeal. Hence this petition. Counsel for the petitioner has urged that the lower appellate Court fell into a patent error of law in dismissing the tenant's appeal. His argument is that the privilege which is conferred on the landlord under Section 21. (1A) is personal and individual in character and by its very nature, it cannot be availed of by other members of the family of the original landlord. The submission is that, therefore, upon the death of Niranjan Singh even if his widow is held to have the right to continue the proceedings or to defend the tenant's appeal, she could only rely on her own personal need unaided by the provisions of Section 21 (1A). The learned District Judge, urged counsel for the petitioner, was, therefore, in error in holding that the widow of Niranjan Singh was also entitled to rely on the provision. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, I find no substance in any above mentioned submissions of the petitioner's counsel. In order to appreciate the submission of counsel for the petitioner, it would be useful to have the relevant provisions extracted here: "21. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, I find no substance in any above mentioned submissions of the petitioner's counsel. In order to appreciate the submission of counsel for the petitioner, it would be useful to have the relevant provisions extracted here: "21. (IA), Notwithstanding anything contained in Section 2, the prescribed authority shall, on the application of a landlord in that behalf, order the eviction of a tenant from any building under tenancy, if it is satisfied that the landlord or such building was in occupation of a public building for residential purposes which he had to vacate on account of the cessation of his employment: Provided that an application under this subsection may also be given by a landlord in occupation of such public building at any time within a period of one year before the expected date of cessation of his employment, but the order of eviction on such application shall take effect only on the date of his actual cessation." Another provision which was subject of considerable debate at the Bar is subsection (7) of Section 21, which runs as under: "21 (7) Where during the pendency of an application under clause (a) of subsection (1), the landlord dies, his legal representatives shall be entitled to prosecute such application further on the basis of their own need in substitution of the deceased." As it happens subsection (7) of Section 21 (i) was also added by U. P. Act No. 28 of 1976. Counsel mainly relied on subsection (7) of Section 21 for his submission that upon the death of the original landlord, his legal representatives are entitled only to prosecute the application filed by the original landlord but on the basis of their own need. Elaborating on this argument, counsel submitted that the privilege contemplated under Section of (1A) is personal in nature which extinguished upon the death of Niranjan Singh, After the death of Niranjan Singh, his widow could, by virtue of subsection (7) of Section 21, or principles analogous thereto, rely on her own need in contradistinction of the need ct her husband. She could succeed or fail only upon proof of her own need. She could not claim the privilege available to her husband under subsection (1A) of Section 21. Having given the matter my best consideration, I find myself unable to accept the contention. She could succeed or fail only upon proof of her own need. She could not claim the privilege available to her husband under subsection (1A) of Section 21. Having given the matter my best consideration, I find myself unable to accept the contention. A short answer to counsel's submission based on subsection (7) of Section 21 is that subsection 7 of Section 21 has no application to a case covered by subsection (1A). It is expressly limited in its application to an application under clause (a) of subsection (I). However, even otherwise, in my view, the surviving members of the family of the landlord where the landlord dies during the pendency of an application under Section 21 (1A), are entitled to rely on the said provision and claim eviction of the tenant from the building under his tenancy, provided of course, the conditions laid down for the application of subsection (1A) are otherwise satisfied. The argument that the privilege conferred upon the landlord under subsection (1A) of Section 21 does not survive proceeds on the assumption that the benefit envisaged under that provision is personal to the landlord and that consequently the privilege or benefit extinguishes upon the death of the landlord, if he dies before the application is allowed. The hypothesis is wrong, I shall give below the reasons why I say so. In or about the year 1973, a controversy was raging in various High Courts as regards what is to happen to suits or proceedings initiated by a landlord for ejectment of tenants under the Rent Control Legislation of various States, in the event of the landlord dying during the pendency of the suit of proceedings where the suits or proceedings were based on the ground that the accommodation, from which eviction of the tenant was sought, was bona fide required for the residence of the landlord himself and his family members. Some High Courts took the view that such a cause of action was personal in character, and that consequently, it perished with the death of the landlord during the pendency of sail proceedings. Other High Courts took a contrary view. In their opinion, the caused of action survived notwithstanding the death of the original landlord, inasmuch as, the requirements of a residence for the landlord himself and the members of the family was a requirement of the entire family and not of the landlord alone. Other High Courts took a contrary view. In their opinion, the caused of action survived notwithstanding the death of the original landlord, inasmuch as, the requirements of a residence for the landlord himself and the members of the family was a requirement of the entire family and not of the landlord alone. The Supreme Court seems to have put that controversy at rest for the time being with its decision in the case of Smt. Phool Ravi and another v. Sh. Naubat Rai Ahluwaliya A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 2110. The Supreme Court held that the mere fact that the application for ejectment was bused on the ground that the premises in possession of the tenant were required by the landlord for the residence of himself and the members of his family did not malice the requirement pleaded in the application any the less a personal requirement of the plaintiff. It was observed that the fact that the members of the family might have occupied the accommodation in dispute on the success of the application along with the landlord made no difference to the above conclusion. In short, the Supreme Court held that such a suit or application was liable to be dismissed as abated upon the death of the original landlord. Doubts were cast by the Supreme Court on the validity of the above view and in the case of Shanti Lal Thakur Das and others v. Chiman Lal Magan Lal Telwala A.I.R. 1976 S. C. 2358 the Supreme Court expressly reversed it. It was held in the case of Shanti Lal Thakur Das and others (supra) as follows; "In our considered opinion in face of the wording of Section 14 (1) (e) of the Delhi Act, the view expressed in Phool Rani's case (supra) as stated above, is not correct. If the law. permitted the eviction of the tenant for fie requirement of the landlord "for occupation as a residence for himself and members of his family," than the requirement was both of the landlord and the members of his family. On his death the right to sue did survive to the members of the family of the deceased landlord. If the law. permitted the eviction of the tenant for fie requirement of the landlord "for occupation as a residence for himself and members of his family," than the requirement was both of the landlord and the members of his family. On his death the right to sue did survive to the members of the family of the deceased landlord. We are unable to take the view that the requirement of the occupation of the members of the family of the original landlord was his requirement and ceased to be the requirement of the members of his family on his death. After the death of the original landlord the senior member of his family takes his' place and is well competent to continue the suit for eviction for his occupation and the occupation of the other members of the family. Many of the substituted heirs of the deceased landlord were undoubtedly the members of his family and the two married daughters and the children of a deceased daughter in the circumstances could not be held to be not members of the family of the deceased landlord." Had this decision been rendered earlier, possibly it would not have been necessary for the Legislature of Uttar Pradesh to insert subsection (7) into Section 21. For according to the dictum of the Supreme Court laid down in the case of Shanti Lal Thakurdas (supra) the death of the original landlord during the pendency of the application which is founded on the ground that the landlord requires the accommodation in dispute for occupation by himself and the members of his family does not and cannot result in the abatement of the application as, in the opinion of the Supreme Court, such a requirement is not the personal or individual requirement of the landlord but both the landlord and the members of his family. It seems clear that subsection (7) of Section 21 was added by the legislature only because of the Supreme Court decision in the case of Phoola Rani (supra). In my judgment, the position under Section 21 (1A) is basically much the same. Here, too, the landlord requires the building for his residence. The provision has been enacted to enable a landlord to obtain a place for his residence after he has been deprived of his official residence which he was occupying by virtue of his employment. In my judgment, the position under Section 21 (1A) is basically much the same. Here, too, the landlord requires the building for his residence. The provision has been enacted to enable a landlord to obtain a place for his residence after he has been deprived of his official residence which he was occupying by virtue of his employment. It is also obvious that when one speaks of one's residence, one means residence not only of himself but also of his family. For, one's residence is where one resides with his family. Furthermore, it is obvious that if a landlord's application under Section 21 (1A) is allowed, not only he but the members of his family occupying the public building also become entitled, as members of the landlord's family, to occupy the building under the tenancy and to use it as their residence. It, therefore, follows exhypothesis that an order passed under subsection (1A) ensures to the members of the family of the landlord. The requirement of occupation by the landlord of the building under tenancy is not a personal and individual requirement of the landlord which perishes with his death but is a requirement of the members of the family as well and consequently the cause of action survives. The members of the family of the landlord are, therefore, entitled to continue the proceedings commence by the original landlord. They are a fortiori entitled to defend and contest the appeal filed by the tenant against the order allowing an application under subsection (1A), if the landlord dies during the pendency of the appeal. The learned District Judge was, therefore right in taking the view that the application initiated by Niranjan Singh was not liable to be dismissed and that his widow was entitled not only to contest the appeal, but also to rely on subsection (1A). Learned counsel contended that even if it be assumed that the surviving members of the family of the landlord are entitled to continue the proceedings initialed by the original landlord under subsection (1A) it is the need of the surviving members which has to be considered unaided by section (1A). The argument has no substance. Learned counsel contended that even if it be assumed that the surviving members of the family of the landlord are entitled to continue the proceedings initialed by the original landlord under subsection (1A) it is the need of the surviving members which has to be considered unaided by section (1A). The argument has no substance. The process of reasoning by which I have arrived at the conclusion that the surviving members are entitled to continue the application initiated by the original landlord logically leads to the conclusion that the heirs are not merely entitled to continue the proceedings but they are entitled to rely on the original cause of action on which the landlord had initiated the proceedings. As mentioned above, the requirement of the original landlord for occupation as residence for himself is really the requirement both of the landlord and the members of his family. The needs of the landlord and those of the members of his family, in the case of a residence accommodation are indistinguishable. As the cause of action survives, the members of the landlord's family are entitled to rely on subsection (1A) of Section 21. I, therefore, find no substance in the contention of counsel for the petitioner. Counsel for the petitioner next submitted that even in a case covered by by subsection (1A) of Section 21, the Prescribed Authority is bound to find out whether the landlord does bona fide require the accommodation in dispute. Counsel submitted that the only difference between subsections (1A) and (1) of Section 21 is that in the case of former there has not be a comparison between the hardship likely to be caused to the landlord and the tenant, such as there has to be in a case covered by the latter. But he contended, in both cases there has to be an enquiry whether the landlord does bona fide require the accommodation in dispute. I find no substance in this argument Under subsection (I) of Section 21 there is a specific mention of the words "that the building is bona fide required." These words are conspicuous by their absence in subsection (1A). The language of subsection (1A) is express and peremptory. I find no substance in this argument Under subsection (I) of Section 21 there is a specific mention of the words "that the building is bona fide required." These words are conspicuous by their absence in subsection (1A). The language of subsection (1A) is express and peremptory. It says, the Prescribed Authority shall, on the application of a landlord in that behalf, order the eviction of a tenant from any building under their tenancy if it is satisfied........." All that therefore, the Prescribed Authority has to be satisfied about is that the landlord was in occupation of a public building for residential purposes which he has had to vacate on account of cessation of his employment. I find no warrant, either on the plain language of the section or having regard to the scheme of the Act for holding that even under Section 21 (1A) there has to be an enquiry into the question whether the landlord bona nde requires the building under the tenancy of the tenant such as there has to be under clause (a) of Section 21 (I). Acceptance of the argument of counsel for the petitioner could clearly imply reading into the statute words which are not there. Counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on a decision of this Court reported in 1978 Allahabad Law Journal 1306 in support of his above submission. Far from assisting the view canvassed by counsel it clearly and completely supports the view I am taking. The learned Judge has held that in an application under Section 21 (1A) it is not necessary for the landlord to establish further that he bona fide requires the accommodation. Counsel for the petitioner lastly urged that there have been some fresh developments during the pendency of the writ petition which have altered the position of the respondent No. 3. He placed reliance on some averments made in the writ petition to the effect that the respondent No. 3 has come to acquire some additional accommodation which has rendered her need for the accommodation in dispute no longer bona fide or genuine. Apart from the fact that there has not to be an enquiry under subsection (1A) of Section 21 into the question whether the landlord bona fide requires the accommodation in dispute, the averments relied on by the petitioners have been specifically refuted by the said respondents. Apart from the fact that there has not to be an enquiry under subsection (1A) of Section 21 into the question whether the landlord bona fide requires the accommodation in dispute, the averments relied on by the petitioners have been specifically refuted by the said respondents. The respondent No. 3 has asserted in her counteraffidavit that she is a childless widow and on account of not having any accommodation available to her she is residing in a tenanted accommodation under considerable difficulty. There is thus no substance in any of the arguments advanced by counsel for the petitioner. The petition, therefore, fails and is dismissed. There will b: no order as to costs. The petitioner is, however, granted three months time to vacate the accommodation. He will handover vacant possession of the accommodation in dispute to the respondent No. 3 within these three months.