Judgment :- 1. The writ petitioner in O. P. No. 4787 of 1975 which was dismissed by a learned single judge of this court is the appellant before us. It will be convenient to refer to the parties on the basis of their ranking and array in the original petition. 2. The writ petitioner was employed for about 23 years as a medical representative under the 3rd respondent-The Cochin Pharmacal Company, Trichur. The petitioner's service was dispensed with in 1972 without payment of any gratuity. Thereupon the petitioner filed an application before the Controlling Authority under the Kerala Industrial Employees' Payment of Gratuity Act, 1970 (hereinafter called the Act) - the District Labour Officer, Trichur - under S.8 of the Act for recovery of the amount of gratuity claimed by him as payable by the employer. That petition was resisted by the employer by contending firstly, that the petitioner was employed in the State of Tamil Nadu and hence the provisions of the Act did not apply to him and secondly, the petitioner was not in any event an'employee' falling within the scope of the definition of the said expression contained in S.2 (d) of the Act and hence he was not entitled to maintain the application under S.8 of the Act. The Controlling Authority by its order Ext P4 dated 8-4-1974, upheld the second objection aforesaid raised by the employer and dismissed the petitioner's application holding that the petitioner did not fall within the definition of the term 'employee' contained in the Act. The Appellate Authority - the Deputy Labour Commissioner, Ernakulam - before whom the petitioner preferred an appeal under sub-section (5) of S.8 upheld the conclusion reached by the Controlling Authority that the petitioner was not an'employee' under the Act. Ext. P6 is a copy of the order so passed by the Appellate Authority. The prayer in the original petition was to quash Exts P4 and P6. 3. The learned single judge held that the petitioner who was working as a medical representative could not be said to have been employed to do any manual, clerical or supervisory work and hence he was not an 'employee' within the meaning of the term as defined in the Act. Accordingly it was held that the orders Exts. P4 and P6 did not call for any interference and the original petition was dismissed. 4. Accordingly it was held that the orders Exts. P4 and P6 did not call for any interference and the original petition was dismissed. 4. On behalf of the appellant it is contended that the aforesaid view taken by the learned single judge is not corrector sound. We do not, however, find any merit in the said contention. 5. S.2 (d) of the Act defines the expression 'employee' thus: - "'employee' means any person employed in any factory, plantation, establishment or undertaking to do any skilled or unskilled, manual or clerical or supervisory work for hire or reward but does not include any such person - (i) whose monthly wages exceed rupees seven hundred and fifty; or (ii) who is subject to the Army Act. 1950, or the Air Force Act. 1950. or the Navy Act, 1957 or the Toddy Workers' Welfare Fund Act 1969 (Kerala Act 22 of 1969); or (iii) who is employed in the police service or as an officer or other employee of a person." It was contended on behalf of the appellant that under this definition any person employed to do any skilled or unskilled work for hire or reward would come within the scope of the definition unless he falls within any of the exempted categories specified in sub-clauses (i) to (iii) of clause (d). In support of the appellant's contention strong reliance was placed on the existence of a comma immediately after the word 'unskilled' Clause (d) read as a whole clearly indicates that the words 'skilled or unskilled' have been used to qualify the words immediately following thereafter 'manual or clerical or supervisory work.' If it was the intention of the legislature to include within the scope of the expression 'employee' any person employed in any factory etc. to do any skilled or unskilled work for hire or reward it was wholly necessary for it to incorporate in the definition clause the words 'manual or clerical or supervisory work'. It is clear that those words must have been used by the legislature with a specific intent and purpose and that purpose can only be to restrict the scope of the definition to persons employed in any factory etc. to do manual or clerical or supervisory work for hire or reward, irrespective of whether such work is skilled or unskilled work. to do manual or clerical or supervisory work for hire or reward, irrespective of whether such work is skilled or unskilled work. It is a well-established principle of interpretation of statutes that the court should try to give full effect and meaning to every word used by the legislature in a statutory provision and avoid a construction of the section which would render any part of the provision superfluous or nugatory. 6. As pointed out by a Division Bench of this Court in M. G., Kollan-kulam v. Commissioner of Income Tax, 1977 KLT. 990, it may not always be safe to rely on punctuation as a deciding factor in a question of construction of a statutory provision and greater importance should be attached by the court to the language employed by the legislature. If it is found that the words used in the section, when read as a whole, clearly furnish a clue to the legislative intent underlying the section and they admit of an interpretation consistent with the said legislative intent, any punctuation mark which is inconsistent with such construction will be disregarded. 7. In view of what we have stated above regarding the intention of the legislature as gatherable from a reading of the definition clause as a whole we are not inclined to attach much significance to the existence of a comma after the word 'unskilled' in clause (d). In our opinion that comma has to be treated as a misplaced punctuation mark and disregarded and it cannot be allowed to control the plain meaning of the words used by the legislature in clause (d). 8. S.2 (s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 as amended by Act 36 of 1956 defines the expression 'workman' "as meaning any person (including an apprentice) employed in any industry to do any skilled or unskilled, manual, supervisory technical or clerical work for hire or reward, whether the terms of employment be expressed or implied". In Burmah Shell Oil Storage and Distributing Co. of India, Ltd. v. The Burmah Shell Management Staff Association and Others, AIR. In Burmah Shell Oil Storage and Distributing Co. of India, Ltd. v. The Burmah Shell Management Staff Association and Others, AIR. 1971 S. C. 922, a contention was put forward that the above definition is all comprehensive and contemplates that all persons employed in an industry must necessarily fall in one or the other of the four clauses mentioned in the definition clause and consequently the court should proceed on the assumption that every person is a'workman' unless he is shown to fall within any one of the four exceptions contained in the definition. Rejecting this contention the Supreme Court made the following observations: - "If every employee of an industry was to be a workman except those mentioned in the four exceptions, these four classifications need not have been mentioned in the definition and a workman could have been defined as a person employed in an industry except in cases where he was covered by one of the exceptions. The specification of the four types of work, obviously is intended to lay down that an employee is to become a workman only if he is employed to do work of one of those types, while there may be employees who, not doing any such work, would be out of the scope of the word 'workman' without having to resort to the exceptions. An example, which appears to be very clear, will be that of a person employed in canvassing sales for an industry. He may not be required to do any paper work, nor may he be required to have any technical knowledge. He may not be supervising the work of any other employees, nor would he be doing any skilled or unskilled manual work. He would still be an employee of the industry and, obviously, such an employee would not be a workman, because the work, for which he is employed, is not covered by the four types mentioned in the definition and not because he would be taken out of the definition under one of the exceptions." We may also refer with advantage to an earlier pronouncement of the Supreme Court in May & Baker (India) Ltd. v. Their Workmen. AIR. 1967 SC. AIR. 1967 SC. 678, on the same question concerning the interpretation of S.2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 as it stood prior to its amendment of 1956 whereby only the words 'supervisory' and 'technical' were added in the definition clause. One of the questions raised in that case was whether a person employed by a company manufacturing medicines etc as a representative to canvass sales was a 'workman' within the meaning of S.2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act as it stood on 1st April. 1954 when the said employee was discharged from service. Dealing with the said question Wanchoo, J. observed: "The next contention on behalf of the company is with respect to the order of reinstatement of Mukherjee. The company's case is that Mukerjee was discharged with effect from April 1. 1954. At that time the definition of the word 'workman' under S.2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act did not include employees like Mukerjee who was a representative. A'workman' was then defined as any person employed in any industry to do any skilled or unskilled manual or clerical work for hire or reward. Therefore, doing manual or clerical work was necessary before a person could be called a workman. This definition came for consideration before industrial tribunals and it was consistently held that the designation of the employee was not of great moment and what was of importance was the nature of his duties. If the nature of the duties is manual or clerical then the person must be held to be a workman. On the other hand if manual or clerical work is only a small part of the duties of the person concerned and incidental to his main work which is not manual or clerical, then such a person would not be a workman. It has, therefore, to be seen in each case from the nature of the duties whether a person employed is a workman or not, under the definition of that word as it existed before the amendment of 1956. The nature of the duties of Mukerjee is not in dispute in this case and the only question, therefore, is whether looking to the nature of the duties it can be said that Mukerjee was a workman within the meaning of S.2(s) as it stood at the relevant time. The nature of the duties of Mukerjee is not in dispute in this case and the only question, therefore, is whether looking to the nature of the duties it can be said that Mukerjee was a workman within the meaning of S.2(s) as it stood at the relevant time. We find from the nature of the duties assigned to Mukerjee that his main work was that of canvassing and any clerical or manual work that he had to do was incidental to his main work of canvassing and could not take more than a small fraction of the time for which he had to work. In the circumstances the tribunal's conclusion that Mukerjee was a workman is incorrect. The tribunal seems to have been led away by the fact that Mukherjee had no supervisory duties and had to work under the directions of his superior officers. That however, would not necessarily mean that Mukerjee's duties were mainly manual or clerical. From what the tribunal itself has found it is clear that Mukherjee's duties were mainly neither clerical nor manual. Therefore, as Mukherjee was not a workman his case would not be covered by the Industrial Disputes Act and the tribunal would have no jurisdiction to order his reinstatement." The definition of the expression 'employee' contained in S.2 (d) of the Act is substantially identical in terms with the definition of 'workman' contained in S.2 (s) of the Industrial Disputes Act and hence the observations made by the Supreme Court while considering the scope of the definition of the expression 'workman' contained in S.2 (s) of the Industrial Disputes Act are fully applicable to the present case. The view that we have already expressed regarding the interpretation to be placed on S.2 (d) of the Act is fully consistent with the dictum laid down by the Supreme Court in the rulings referred to above. 9. The decision in May & Baker's case, AIR. 1967 SC. 678, is also authority for the position that a person like the present writ petitioner employed by a pharmaceutical company as a medical representative to canvass sales for its products will not come within the scope of the definition 'employee' contained in S.2 (d) of the Act. 9. The decision in May & Baker's case, AIR. 1967 SC. 678, is also authority for the position that a person like the present writ petitioner employed by a pharmaceutical company as a medical representative to canvass sales for its products will not come within the scope of the definition 'employee' contained in S.2 (d) of the Act. We may also refer in this connection to the decision of a Division Bench of this court in J. & J. De Chine Distributors v. State of Kerala and others, 1973 KLT. 798, wherein it was held that a medical representative whose duty consisted of advertising and canvassing for sales of its products manufactured by a company cannot be regarded as a 'workman' within the definition of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. 10. In the light of the foregoing discussion we have no hesitation to agree with the conclusion recorded by the learned single judge that the writ petitioner will not fall within the scope of the expression 'employee' contained in S.2 (d) of the Act and hence the orders Exts P4 and P6 did not call for any interference. 11. Reliance was sought to be placed on behalf of the appellant on the provisions of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 (Central Act 39 of 1972) but the said Act came into force only on 16-9-1972 subsequent to the termination of the petitioner's employment under the 3rd respondent which took place on 12-6-1972. The provisions of the Central enactment are not, therefore, attracted to this case. 12. The writ appeal accordingly fails and it is dismissed. We direct the parties to bear their respective costs.