ORDER: — This writ petition is to quash the order of the Rent Controller (first respondent) in E. A. No. 160 of 1977 in E. P. No, 446 of 1975 in R. C. O. P. No. 400 of 1966, dated 26th July, 1977, impleading respondents 4 to 6 therein (writ petitioners herein) as the legal representatives of deceased Aziz Khan, who was a tenant along with respondents 3 and 4 herein in respect of the premises in question. 2. The facts of the case which led to this writ petition as set out in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, can be briefly stated thus: The second respondent herein as the landlord filed R. C. O. P. No. 400 of 1966 on the file of the Rent Controller (District Munsif), Coimbatore, against the tenants viz., respondents 3 and 4 herein and the predecessor-in-interest of the petitioners herein, and obtained an order of eviction against them. It is not in controversy that this order of eviction was affirmed by the appellate and revisional authorities. Aziz Khan died on 20th September, 1972 leaving the petitioners herein as his legal representatives. Thereafter the second respondent on 12th June, 1974 filed E. P. No. 446 of 1975 before the Rent Controller Coimbatore, under Order 21 , rule 35, Civil Procedure Code, for delivery of possession of the property. The writ petitioners filed a memo, before the Rent Controller on 18th November, 1976 bringing to the notice of the Court the death of Aziz Khan. The second respondent, the landlord, thereafter filed E. A. No. 160 of 1977 on 26th February, 1977 before the Court seeking to bring on record he petitioners herein as the legal representatives of the deceased Azia Khan. This application was opposed by the proposed legal representatives, viz., respondents 4 to 6 therein, the writ petitioners herein, mainly on the ground that the landlord, though admittedly aware of the death of Aziz Khan admittedly 18th November, 1976 when they filed the memo., in Court, has taken out this application only on 26th February, 1977, viz., after the expiry of a period of thirty days from the date of his acquiring the knowledge of the death of Aziz Khan, thereby contravening rule 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Rules, 1974 (hereinafter referred to as the Rent Control Rules). The learned Rent Controller rejected the contention and allowed the execution application holding that “it is obvious that since section 18 of the Act empowers the Controller to execute the order passed in R. C. O. P. just as a civil Court will execute a decree, the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code will be applicable to the execution proceedings in R. C. O. P. also” and that “an application for bringing a legal representative as a party in a civil Court can be filed within three months of the date of the knowledge of the person concerned and so it is obvious that even in an execution proceeding in a Rent Control proceeding, a petition for bringing the legal representatives on record can be filed within three months from the date of the knowledge of the death of the person concerned.” In support of this view he has placed reliance on the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Subramania Pillai v. Rajakkani Nadar and another1. Accordingly, he impleaded the petitioners as parties to the proceedings. Aggrieved by the said order, the legal representatives of the deceased tenant have directed this petition seeking a writ of certiorari. 3. The order of the Rent Controller has been challenged mainly on the ground that the Controller ought not to have entertained the application taken out by the second respondent-landlord for impleading the writ petitioners as the legal representatives of the deceased tenant after the expiry of a period of one month from the date of knowledge of the death of the tenant as specifically provided in rule 25 of the Rent Control Rules. Learned counsel for the petitioners would further submit that the decision in Subramania Pillai v. Rajakkani Nadar1. Learned counsel for the petitioners would further submit that the decision in Subramania Pillai v. Rajakkani Nadar1. which related to execution proceedings under section 18 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) as it stood then, has no application to execution proceedings taken out under section 18 of the Rent Control Act as amended by Act XXIII of 1971 since as per the provisions of the Act as now amended the execution applications in rent control matters have to be laid before the Rent Controller himself as persona designata and that therefore, the order of eviction now sought to be executed against the petitioners herein cannot be deemed to be a decree or order passed by a civil Court as defined in the Civil Procedure Code , and consequently, the procedure laid down in the Civil Procedure Code , applicable to the execution of a decree cannot be attracted to the present case and therefore, Article 120 of the Limitation Act, which prescribes a period of 90 days to have the legal representatives of a deceased plaintiff or appellant or of a deceased defendant or respondent made parties in matters arising under the Civil Procedure Code , would not apply to the execution proceedings arising out of an order of eviction passed by the Controller, especially when there is a specific provision under rule 25 of the Rent Control Rules prescribing the time-limit for bringing the legal representatives on record in proceedings under the Act. According to him the landlord could proceed against the petitioners herein, if he is so advised, by filing an independent application for execution as provided under the Act. 4. A cursory reading of section 18 of the Act as amended, shows that the power of execution of orders made under sections 10 ,14 ,15 ,16 and17 and every order passed on appeal under section 23 or on revision under section 25, is vested exclusively in the Controller, viz., the persona designata appointed by the Government by a notification to exercise the power of a Controller as defined in section 27 (1) of the Act, whereas under section 18 prior to amendment the said power was vested in the civil Court. Section 27 (1) of the Act provides that any application made or appeal preferred or proceedings taken under this Act by or against any person may in the event of his death, be continued by or against his legal representatives. But, the question is, what is the time-limit within which such legal representatives have to be brought on record so as to be proceeded against in the same application or proceeding. It would be worthwhile in this connection to note the following observations made by Ramaprasada Rao, J., as he then was in his inimitable language, in Vijayaraghavan v. Mohammad Yakub Rowther1: “The right to process an order of eviction is already in the stream of execution and it cannot be stemmed by reason of the death of the father”. Therefore, the right of the second respondent-landlord to proceed against the petitioners as the legal representatives of the deceased tenant is always there. The only question that arises for determination is whether the second respondent can exercise the said right to proceed against the petitioners in E. P. No. 446 of 1975, itself by invoking the provisions contained in Article 120 of the Limitation Act and Order 22 , rule 4, Civil Procedure Code, or whether E. P. No. 446 of 1975 has to be dismissed in view of the provisions contained in rule 25 of the Rent Control Rules on the ground that the landlord has not impleaded the legal representatives within one month from the date of knowledge of the death of the deceased tenant. 5. For a better understanding of the present legal position and the applicability of the decision in Subramania Pillai v. Rajakkani Nadar1, to cases arising after the amendment let us have a comparative study of section 18 as it stood before the 1973 Amendment and the section as it stands after the amendment (c) if there is no such District Munsif or Subordinate Judge, by the District Judge having jurisdiction, as if it were a decree passed by the said Court or by him: Provided that an order passed in execution under this section shall not be subject to an appeal, but shall be subject to revision under section 25”. (The under linings are mine) 6. (The under linings are mine) 6. A reading of the above comparative table reveals that the mode of execution of the order made by the Controller under the Act as it stood before the amendment was quite different from the one that prevails after the amendment, in that before the amendment the said order was to be executed only by the Judge of the City Civil Court in the City of Madras or by the District Munsif, Subordinate Judge or the District Judge as the case may be in the mofussil, as if it were a decree passed by the said Court (City Civil Court) or by him (the District Munsif, Subordinate Judge or District Judge) whereas after the amendment, such orders have to be executed only by the Controller ( persona designata) as if such order is an order of a civil Court and for this purpose the Controller shall have all the powers of a civil Court. 7. Ramaprasada Rao, J., as he then was, while dealing with the scope of section 18 of the un-amended Act has in Ramaswami Iyer v. Ramakrishnayya1, observed as follows: “While dealing with the execution of orders this section provides that every order passed by the Rent Controller (it is not necessary to set out other details in this section for the purpose of this case) shall be executed by the City Civil Court in the City of Madras as if it were a decree passed by the said Court. By such a fiction the order passed by the Rent Controller is converted into a decree of a civil Court and this notional conversion by the operation of the fiction makes it a decree of a civil Court.” 8. In Mohamed Hussain v. Pitchai1, Ramanujam, J., has observed as follows: “Once the eviction order is treated as a decree of Court and taken to a civil Court for execution as per section 18 , such proceedings will be governed by the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code , relating to execution of decrees so long as the provisions of the Rent Control Act did not modify or restrict the power of the civil Court under the Code. It is well established that an application for restitution is treated as an application for execution. It is well established that an application for restitution is treated as an application for execution. Unlike under the Madras Act XXV of 1955 the order of eviction passed under the Rent Control Acthas been specifically made executable only in a civil Court and there is no provision in the Act itself curtailing or modifying its power under the Code in matters of execution. It is because of this special feature by which an order of eviction is brought before a regular Court for execution, Ramaprasada Rao, J., had held in Ramaswamy Iyer v. Rama Krishnayya1, that the provisions of the Limitation Act would become applicable to the proceedings for eviction arising under the Rent Control Act. This is also the view taken by the Division Bench in Thangaswamy Chettiar v. Bapoo Sahib2" 9. In Subramania Pillai v. Rajakkani Nadar5, on which reliance was placed by the Rent Controller in this case, the Division Bench of this Court consisting of Veeraswami, CJ., and Gokulakrishnan, J., sharing with the view expressed in Abdul Fatha v. Mehamed Jabbar6, and in Narayanaswami v. Renuka Devi7, on the question about the period of limitation for bringing the legal representatives on record in an eviction proceeding taken under section 18 of the unamended Act and the applicability of rule 32 of the Rent Control Rules, 1961 (corresponding to rule 25 of the 1974 Rules) held thus: “Section 18 says that an order of eviction shall be executed in the City of Madras by the Madras City Civil Court and elsewhere by the District Munsif and if there is no District Munsif, by the Subordinate Judge. The execution by the District Munsif has to be carried out as if the order of eviction were a decree passed by him. We do not decide the question whether the capacity in which the City Civil Court Judge or the District Munsif is called upon to execute, is in any way different, for, no argument has been addressed to us on that point. Treating the District Munsif in the section as referring to his Court, the fiction enjoined attracts to the eviction order the entire procedure applicable to execution of a decree. When a ficition is created statutorily, it must no doubt be limited to its purpose, but for the purpose for which it was created, the putative state of affairs should be excluded. When a ficition is created statutorily, it must no doubt be limited to its purpose, but for the purpose for which it was created, the putative state of affairs should be excluded. In other words, the expression” as if it were a decree passed by the District Munsif “would have the effect of a decree passed by him. On that view we should think rule 32 would have no application to the execution of an eviction order. We do not read rule 32 as a provision in conflict with or contrary to any of the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code, relating to execution of a decree. In fact section 27(1) enables proceedings by or against the legal representatives. But, if it is regarded that section 18 only enables the execution of an eviction order, but the rest of the Act does not provide for the procedure for execution in the sense the execution of an eviction order is not a proceeding under the Act, even so, inasmuch as the procedure for execution in the Civil Procedure Code , would give (sic) no room for applying rule 32 it seems to us that by its language, it can be invoked only in the proceedings pending before the Rent Controller.” 10. There are a number of other decisions holding the above view in cases arising before the 1973 amendment, but I feel that I need not swell this judgment by citing all those decisions; and suffice it to note that all the above decisions were rendered at a time when section 18 of the Act which by a fiction converted an order of eviction passed by the Rent Controller into a decree passed by the civil Court, was not amended. However, by the 1973 amendment which came into effect on 30th June, 1973, section 18 has been modified, completely altering the procedure relating the execution of eviction orders, in the sense that execution proceedings after the 1973 amendment are placed in the hands of the Controller himself and he alone has to execute the order. Thus, the power vested in the civil Court, which alone was originally the authority competent to execute such an order as if it were a decree passed by the said civil court itself, is mow taken away. Thus, the power vested in the civil Court, which alone was originally the authority competent to execute such an order as if it were a decree passed by the said civil court itself, is mow taken away. Therefore, the effect of the amendment is that the order of eviction can no longer be deemed to be a decree of a civil Court and the only thing to be noted is that the Controller, for the purpose of execution of such orders has all the powers of a civil Court. In the above circumstances the principles laid down in the above three decisions are not applicable to proceedings taken after the 1973 amendment of the Act. 11. It is well settled that legal fictions are created only for some definite purpose and that the said fictions created by the statute cannot be extended beyond the purposes for which they were created. In interpreting the legal fiction of a statute, the court is not expected to travel beyond the provisions by which the fiction is created and the court also cannot extend such a fiction by importing another fiction. The fiction enacted by the legislature must be restricted by the plain terms of the statute: Vide Bengal Immunity Company v. State of Bihar1, Commissioner of Income-tax v. Amarchand2, and Commissioner of Income tax Bombay City II v. Shakuntala and two others etc3., Therefore, the Rent Controller ought to have seen that the fiction created by section 18 of the Act can be extended only for the limited purpose of exercising the powers vested in a civil Court, while executing the orders of eviction, such as those provided under Order 21 of the Code, but cannot be extended to matters such as those contained in Order 22 and the other provisions of the Code relating to the execution of a decree. 12. 12. The Rent Controller, while acting under section 18 of the Act in executing the orders passed under the Act exercised his jurisdiction only as persona designate and not as a Court Gokulakrishnan, J., in Ganapathi v. Kumaraswami1, after having referred to a plethora of decisions has concluded that as far as the Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority created under the Rent Control Act , are concerned such authorities are persona designata and hence legislations such as the Limitation Act applicable to a Court cannot be invoked in proceedings before such persona designata. N. S. Ramaswamy, J., in J. Easwaran v. Palaniammal2, has categorically held that the Appellate Authority constituted under the Rent Control Act is persona designata and as such section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot be invoked before such authority. Likewise, Ramaprasada Rao, J., in Nachimuthu Gounder v. Kanaka Ratnam3, in a similar situation, while dealing with a case under the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Cultivating Tenants Protection Act, 1958 , has held that the Revenue Divisional Officer or the Revenue Court under the said Act, though is a statutory functionary under the Act, having the trappings of a Court, in that certain provisions of the Civil Procedure Code are made applicable to proceedings before him, and undoubtedly decides certain rights of parties, is not a Court, and in that sense the provisions of section 5of the Limitation Act cannot be invoked by such authorities. It was further observed in the said decision that a creature of a statute should function strictly within the frame-work of the Act which creates it and it has no power to act beyond the framework of such prescription. 13. In Fernando v. Authorised Officer4, this Court has held that the Authorised Officer under the Tamil Nadu Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling on Land) Act, 1961 , cannot be equated to a Court for the purpose of section 213 (1) of the Indian Succession Act though as a statutory functionary he is clothed with some of the procedural powers mentioned in Civil Procedure Code governing the conduct of proceedings before a civil Court. 14. I myself have in Lakshmi Opticals by Proprietor. 14. I myself have in Lakshmi Opticals by Proprietor. E. N. Mohanasundaram v. N. Ramakrishnan5, taking into consideration the amendment of section 18 of the Act, held that the execution application pending before a Rent Controller cannot be transferred to a civil Court after the coming into force of the amendment, since no Judge of the City Civil Court, Madras has been appointed as a Controller, within the meaning of the Act so as exercise the powers of a Controller. 15. For the above reasons I hold that the “Controller” within the meaning of the Act is not a Court, but only a statutory functionary competent to exercise the power given to him under the statute and therefore, the provisions of the Indian Limitation Act are not applicable to proceedings pending before him, though he is clothed with all procedural powers of a civil Court in executing the orders passed by him. 16. Accordingly, I hold that Article 120 of the Limitation Act is not applicable to the facts of the present case since the Rent Controller is not a Court and what is sought to be executed in E. P. No. 446 of 1975 is only an order passed by the Controller, which is not converted into a decree passed by a civil Court by any fiction as was the position before the 1973 amendment under section 18 of the Act. Consequently, Rule 25 of the Rent Control Rules of 1974 alone would be applicable to the facts of the present case. Since E. A. No. 160 of 1977 has admittedly been filed beyond a period of one month from the date of knowledge of the death of the deceased tenant, the said application is clearly barred by limitation, and the order passed by the Rent Controller allowing the said application and impleading the writ petitioners as legal representatives of the deceased tenant cannot be sustained. 17. In the result, the writ petition is allowed and the impugned order is quashed. It is unnecessary to mention that it is always open to the second respondent-landlord to take separate proceedings against the writ petitioners, if he is so advised, under the provisions of the Act. There will be no order as to costs. S. J. ----- Petition allowed.