JUDGMENT A.N. Verma, J. - This is tenant's Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution arising out of proceedings under Section 21 of U.P. Act XIII of 1972 (hereinafter called the Act) in respect of shop. The proceedings were commenced in the year 1970 by the landlord by filing an application under Section 3 of U.P. Act III of 1947, for permission to file suit for ejectment but after the enforcement of Act XIII of 1972, the application was got amended into an application under Section 21 of the present Act in accordance with Rule 43(2)(a) of the Act. 2. The disputed premises are on east facing Do Khani shop with a tin-shed and then a Chaubtra in front. The total dimensions of the shop and the tin-shed are approximately 30 feet east west and 12-13 feet north-south as per site-plan Annexure RA-1. There is a road to north of the shop also and it has door to north too. To south of this is another east facing shop of which formerly one Lallu Singh was the tenant. The north-south width of this shop is about 17 feet. The petitioner is an approximately 45 years old tenant at Rs. 14/- per month and has been using the disputed shop as a parchun shop. The landlord sought eviction of both the petitioner and Lallu Singh, the southern shop owner, under the provisions of Section 21(1)(a) and 21(1)(b)(1). Under Section 21(1)(a) on the ground that the landlord required the premises after reconstruction for his own Parchun shop (2) under Section 21(1)(b) on the ground that the shops were dilapidated and they required for demolition and reconstruction. So far as Section 21(1)(a) is concerned, the case was that the landlord had been carrying on his own Parchun shop in a rented shop at Rs. 60/- per month which was insufficient for his purposes. He asserted that after demolition of the shops of Lallu Singh and the petitioner he would construct six shops and would let out one shop each to the petitioner and Lallu Singh too so that they can continue their business. Pending the proceedings Lallu Singh compromised with the landlord and surrendered half of his shop which the landlord reconstructed and converted into a 10' x 7" x 8' wide shop. The remaining eastern half was sold by him to Lallu Singh. Pending the proceedings Lallu Singh compromised with the landlord and surrendered half of his shop which the landlord reconstructed and converted into a 10' x 7" x 8' wide shop. The remaining eastern half was sold by him to Lallu Singh. This 10' x 7" x 8' shop was offered by the landlord to the petitioner as alternative accommodation in accordance with his allegations in the application. The landlord had also asserted that he would construct a residential flat on the first floor but this plea was later given up and is no longer in controversy. The Prescribed Authority held that the disputed shop was "not in dilapidated condition but it is not safe and double storey cannot be constructed on the present structure.' Secondly that the landlord was running his Parchun business in a rented shop at Rs. 60/- per month and also had rented a godown at Rs. 17/- per month at some distance from the shop which proved that the accommodation in the rented shop was not sufficient for his increasing business and his requirement was bonafide. It did not compare the hardship in view of the fact that Rule 16(1) of the Rules framed under the Act had been held ultra vires by a Full Bench of this Court and the fourth proviso had not yet been introduced in Section 21(1) by U.P. Act 28 of 1976. On these findings per its order dated 1.5.1976 the Prescribed Authority allowed the application. In appeal the District Judge confirmed the finding regarding bonafide requirement. Thereafter in view of the fourth proviso to the section which had come in force he proceeded to compare the hardships and noted that the landlord of the respondent had served a notice dated 18.7.1974 on the respondent to vacate the rented shop, that there was evidence to show that the petitioner had another shop in his occupation which was laying vacant, and that pending the proceedings the landlord had offered the newly constructed half portion of Lallu Singh's shop to the petitioner as alternative accommodation and in this situation the test of comparative hardship worked in favour of the landlord. The District Judge also found that the disputed premises were in a dilapidated condition and required demolition and reconstruction and the conditions of Section 21(1)(b) as well as Rule 17(i) had been fulfilled. The order of the Prescribed Authority was therefore, confirmed. The District Judge also found that the disputed premises were in a dilapidated condition and required demolition and reconstruction and the conditions of Section 21(1)(b) as well as Rule 17(i) had been fulfilled. The order of the Prescribed Authority was therefore, confirmed. The findings have been challenged by this petition. 3. The finding on the question of comparative hardship shows that the District Judge only considered the need of the landlord due to his allegedly increasing business (income tax assessment orders showed an income of approximately 22,000/- and 18,000/- during 1969-70 and 1970-71 and the alleged notice of ejectment-served by his own landlord in July 1974 pending the proceeding. There was no attempt to consider the distinction between mere service of notice of ejectment pending the proceedings and a real threat of immediate ejectment making the need very pressing. But more important there was no attempt to consider the tenant's need or hardship and how shifting from his 30" wide shop with road on two sides to an eight feet wide shop opening on a road would affect him. Nor was any mind applied to the question as to why the landlord himself could not manage with this extra 8 feet wide shop which he was offered to the petitioner. It is true that the comparison of hardship by the Prescribed Authority or Appellate Authority does not require any particular degree elaboration but Section 34(7) requires recording of reasons for all orders under the Act. Therefore, it is expected that a reading of the order should show that the Authority was alive to the important aspects of the matter. This is not so in the present case. Again the observation of the District Judge that there was evidence that the petitioner had another shop which he was keeping vacant was also misconceived because he totally failed to consider the petitioner's plea in his written-statement and the supporting affidavit that he did not have any such other shop, that there had been a small shop of the Masjid which he had taken for storing goods but the Masjid people got it vacated for constructing a bathroom. In these circumstances, the comparison of hardship made by the Appellate Authority is vitiated by the omission to count material circumstances pertinent to the tenant' hardship which makes the finding one sided and perverse, and this part of the finding must be struck down. 4. In these circumstances, the comparison of hardship made by the Appellate Authority is vitiated by the omission to count material circumstances pertinent to the tenant' hardship which makes the finding one sided and perverse, and this part of the finding must be struck down. 4. As regards the application of Section 21(1)(b) of the Act the learned counsel for the petitioner questioned the finding that the disputed premises were dilapidated. He contended that the word dilapidated' has not been properly interpreted or applied by the authorities below and that in the light of the landlord's duty under Section 26 to keep the premises wind-proof and water proof and to carry out periodical white-washing and repairs, the word "dilapidated" in Section 21(1)(b) must be interpreted as meaning beyond repairs. It is not possible to accept this contention. The word "dilapidated" means in a state of disrepair but it is not necessary that the building should be in a fallen state or ruinous condition. No hard and fast rule can be laid down as to the point at which a building becomes dilapidated and the matter has to be left to the decision of the individual judge on the facts of each case. In the present case the landlord filed the certificate of Sri B.N. Gaur, Engineer, dated 13.1.1971 according to which the shop was old and dilapidated and this was apparent from the north wall and the stair-case and that the timber pieces on the Chajja were on the verge of falling down. He also noted that the building is over 75 years old and completed its life, that the plaster was washed away or deteriorated and had lost the sticking property and the floors and the roofs were also unsafe for use. The petitioner's Engineer Nandi had given the contrary stand that the building was sound for another 25 to 30 years but conceded that the parapet walls of the roofs, the Chhajja and the steps were in broken condition. The Prescribed Authority had himself inspected the premises in March 1976 and found the proof at places but tressed by horizontal supports and some curvature here and there. In this note the Rent Control and Eviction Officer observed that the roof was old with minor curvatures here and there but not in a dangerous condition. The Prescribed Authority had himself inspected the premises in March 1976 and found the proof at places but tressed by horizontal supports and some curvature here and there. In this note the Rent Control and Eviction Officer observed that the roof was old with minor curvatures here and there but not in a dangerous condition. As already noted in its order, the Prescribed Authority curiously recorded the finding that the shop was not in (sic) condition lent unsafe. This is practically converse of the Prescribed Authority's inspection note. However, not withstanding the disparity between Sri Gour's report of 1971 and the Prescribed Authority's inspection of 1976 it does not seem possible to say that there was no evidence for the finding that the shop was in dilapidated condition even if we take it that not her view was also possible. Therefore, the finding of the Appellate Authority about the dilapidated condition of the building cannot be assailed as suffering from any manifest error of law. 5. Before a building can be released under Section 21(1)(b) the landlord has not only to satisfy the conditions of that section but must also meet the requirement of Rule 17 including Rule 17(1). The relevant provisions may be usefully reproduced : "Section 21. Proceedings for release of building under occupation of tenant; (1) the Prescribed Authority may, on an application of the landlord in that behalf order of the eviction of a tenant from the building under tenancy or any specified part thereof, it is satisfied that any of the following grounds exists, namely. (a) .... .... .... (b) that the building is in dilapidated condition and is required for purposes of demolition and new constructions Rule 17. Before allowing an application for release of a building under Section 21(1)(b) on the ground that it is required for purposes of demolition and new construction, the Prescribed Authority shall satisfy itself - (i) that the building requires demolition; (ii) .... .... .... (iii) .... .... .... Thus the section requires the Prescribed Authority to find (1) that the building was in a dilapidated condition and (2) that it was required for the purposes of demolition and new construction. But Rule 17(i) requires fulfilment of a third condition that the building required demolition. In this connection the difference in the language in Rules 16 and 17 is noticeable. But Rule 17(i) requires fulfilment of a third condition that the building required demolition. In this connection the difference in the language in Rules 16 and 17 is noticeable. Rule 16 which relates to Section 21(1)(a) merely states that the Prescribed Authority shall have regards to the factors given in the rule. These words have been authoritatively interpreted as merely a guide and not a fetter. On the other hand, Rule 17 states that before allowing an application under Section 21(1)(b) the Prescribed Authority 'shall satisfy itself'. This means that the requirements of Rule 17 are mandatory and the Prescribed or Appellate Authority has to find that the building 'requires demolition'. The Prescribed Authority has not considered the applicability of Rule 17(i) at all while the Appellate Authority had noted the contents of Rule 17(i) and thereafter discussed the question whether the premises were or were not in dilapidated condition. After considering the material it has recorded the finding that 'it is, therefore, a dilapidated building and requires reconstruction after demolition and the landlord has made compliance of Rule 17'. The above observation of the Appellate Authority shows that it equated compliance with Rule 17(i) with the dilapidated condition of the building. The trend of the finding is that if a building can be found to be dilapidated, it would follow that it requires demolition. This is not correct. The connotation of the phrase 'requires demolition' is clearly not the same as of 'it required for the purposes of demolition and reconstruction' which occurs in Section 21 of the Act. Indeed if it were coextensive with the meaning of either of the two conditions in the section there would be no need to provide this third condition by a rule. The fact that 'requires demolition' is more objective than is required for the purposes of demolition and reconstruction is clearly brought out in a number of decisions relating to provisions under the various Rent Control Acts permitting release where landlord bonafide required the premises for reconstruction. It was emphasised in these cases that the landlord's bonafide requirement for reconstruction was not the same thing as that the building required demolition and reconstruction vide Bhulan Singh v. Gyanendra Kumar, AIR 1950 Calcutta 74; Mahboob Badshah v. Monga Devi, 1955 ALJ 209 and Panchmal Narain v. Basthi Venkatesha, 1970 Rent Control Reporter 307 : AIR 1971 Supreme Court 942. These and some other cases are found discussed in Smt. Champa Kunwar Trust v. District Judge, 1978 UPRCC 272. The words in Section 21(1)(b) are slightly different from those in the statutes considered in the above cases, but in substance the phrase is the same. In 'is required for the purposes of demolition and reconstruction' the landlord's intention is the primary and principal factor. Of course the word 'require' means something more than mere desire and implies an element of need. There is, therefore, an objective element concerned with the state of building also in the above condition. But the role and degree of this element is subordinate and best uncertain and apparently any building that can be regarded as dilapidated may well be said to satisfy this objective element. The rule making authority (State Government) may be presumed to have been conscious of the decisions above discussed and in keeping with objects of the Act to have felt it proper to restrict eviction under Section 21(1)(b) to buildings which clearly called for demolition. This restriction was necessary to prevent abuse of the provisions of Section 21(1)(b) to the prejudice of tenants, a majority of whom in our poor country happen to occupy remarkable structures. The sub-rule in substance adds an explanation to the effect that a building shall not be treated as required for the purposes of demolition and reconstruction' under Section 21(1)(b) unless it is in such a condition that it can be said to require demolition. This explanation clarifies the scope of Section 21(1)(b) to exclude buildings which may be charactersiable as dilapidated and may also be required for demolition and reconstruction yet may have many years life left in it and considering all the circumstances may not be considered by the Authority concerned as required for demolition. 6. It was urged in the course of the argument that such an interpretation of Rule 17(1) was not possible because on this view the rule would operate to abridge the right given by the legislature by Section 21(1)(b) and as such would be in breach of the provisions of the Act and, therefore, invalid. I am inclined to agree with the contention. I am inclined to agree with the contention. Section 41 of the Act empowers the State Government to make rules "to carry out the purposes of this Act." Section 34(8) provides "for the purposes of any proceeding under this Act and for purposes connected there with the said Authorities shall have such powers and shall follow such procedure, principles of proof rules of limitation and guiding principles as may be prescribed." The objects of the Act as given in the long title are "two provide, in the interest of the general public for the regulation of letting and rent of, and the eviction of tenants from certain classes of buildings situated in urban areas and for matters connected." When the legislature has specifically authorised the Government by Section 34(8) to frame rules laying down guiding principles and the principles of proof to be followed by the Prescribed Authority and the Appellate Authority in proceedings under the Act the fact that such principles affect the scope of certain provisions of the Act cannot make them invalid. Any principles of proof or guiding principles are bound to result in excluding or including certain border line cases which otherwise might have been treated to fall within the statutory provision. But for this it would to superfluous to prescribe guiding principle or principles of proof. But on this ground alone the principles of proof or guiding under Section 34(8) cannot be held to abridge the section or be in breach of its Provisions. The Act itself visualises its provisions to be explained and elucidated by guiding principles and principles of proof duly prescribed in the rules. The real question is of the scope of the power under Section 34(8). When and to what extent can this power be exercised and has it been exceeded while framing Rule (17). These would seem to be three conditions for the valid exercise of this powers, (a) the power must be exercised in furtherance of the objects of the Act, (b) it can only be exercised if the need for such guide lines is legitimately felt. These would seem to be three conditions for the valid exercise of this powers, (a) the power must be exercised in furtherance of the objects of the Act, (b) it can only be exercised if the need for such guide lines is legitimately felt. In other words if the provisions of the statute on account of some vagueness in meaning are likely to lead to a hardship at variance with the object of the Act and (c) the power must be restricted to provide guiding principles or principles of proof for the authority concerned for exercise of its power under the Act. The rule framed under this power should be genuine guiding principles or principles of proof. It should be clarify or elucidate to further the objects of the Act to use a metaphor it can trim and perhaps bend a little to avoid injury to the objects of the statute but cannot cut away provision or part of the provision or engraft a new one. All these conditions are satisfied in the present case. In the light of the decisions earlier noticed there was a risk that the conditions is required for the purpose of demolition and reconstruction would be judged primarily from the point of view of landlord's intention. The requirement of the building being in a dilapidated condition in Section 21(1)(b) was not satisfactory check against this risk because this test in practice becomes unsatisfactory as we approach building hereby the dividing line between dilapidated and undilapidated buildings because this line itself is not clear. This was really a problem of firing meaning of the condition is required for the purposes of demolition and reconstructions' regarding applicability of which to a particular case difference answer are likely to be given by different tribunals. The result would be that decisions under Sections 21(1)(b) could vary a great deal according to the individual fancy of the Authority concerned and buildings which have sufficient life left in them might be regarded as dilapidated and covered by Section 21(1)(b). The Authority empowered under Section 34(8) in such a case had power to intervene with a view to obviate hardship to tenants in such a technically dilapidated buildings and was competent to form guide principle in Rule 17(i). This as more tangible and objective principle than appears in the section and goes to minimise the border area or hard cases. The Authority empowered under Section 34(8) in such a case had power to intervene with a view to obviate hardship to tenants in such a technically dilapidated buildings and was competent to form guide principle in Rule 17(i). This as more tangible and objective principle than appears in the section and goes to minimise the border area or hard cases. It thus serves the objects of the Act. It also merely guides the authorities in deciding which buildings are to be treated to be covered by is required for the purposes of demolition and reconstruction'. Therefore, it is not a case of abridgement or breach of the provisions of Section 21(1)(b). It is only elucidatory or explanatory of one part of that section in furtherance of the objects of the Act. The rule is, therefore, valid. The fact that a result of this elucidation is to exclude certain cases and in that sense to narrow the scope of Section 21(1)(b) as it stands the rule is immaterial and cannot affect the validity. 7. In the majority of cases where the building is dilapidated and is required for demolition and reconstruction it would also answer the prescribe criterian viz. that it requires demolition but in border line cases the distinction would have importance. While no detailed discussion is necessary the Authority concerned has to decide the matter after appreciating this distinction and realising that it is not every dilapidated building that requires demolition. This is material in the present case because of the divergence between the Engineer's report of 1971 and the Prescribed Authority's own inspection of 1976. As it is, the order shows that there has been no application of mind to this aspect and the finding of the dilapidated condition has been assumed to carry with it complaisance of Rule 17(1). The order is, therefore, unsustainable. 8. In the result the petition is allowed and the Appellate Authority's order dated 22.4.1978 is quashed. The Appellate Authority is directed to decide the matter afresh according to law in the light of the observations made in this order. Parties shall bear their own costs.