JUDGMENT : S. Acharya, J. - The Plaintiff in Title Suit No. 79/77 pending in the Court of the First Additional Subordinate Judge, Cuttack, has filed this appeal against the order dated 25-9-1979 passed by that Court in Miscellaneous Case No. 172/78 registered in that suit on an application under Order 39, Rule 1, Code of Civil Procedure. 2. The suit is for a declaration that there is no Union as Respondent No. 1; the notice for conciliation dated 15-11-1973 given by Respondent No. 3 (the Conciliation Officer) on the charter of demands filed by Respondent No. 1 before Respondent No. 3 is illegal and inoperative; and Respondent No. 3 cannot hold conciliation on the said charter of demands. It is inter alia, alleged by the Plaintiff-Appellant herein, that Respondent No. 1 ceased to exist as a Trade Union after the closure of the Appellant on 3-10-1967, and so Respondent No. 1 could not legally raise any industrial dispute in respect of the Appellant after it started working again with the new workmen now working therein without specifically indicating and showing that the said Trade Union was reformed and registered once again after that time. It is also alleged by the Plaintiff that the workmen of the Appellant-industry are not members of the Respondent No. 1 and that there is no industrial dispute either existing or apprehended so as to confer jurisdiction on Respondent No. 3 to imitate proceeding for conciliation. On the filing of that suit and application under Order 39, Rule 1, CPC was filed by the Appellant to restrain Respondent No. 3 from continuing the conciliation proceeding instituted at the instance of Defendant No. 1, Respondent No. 1 herein. The said petition has been resisted by Respondent No. 1 on the ground that Respondent No. 1 - Trade Union was registered u/s 10 of the Trade Unions Act, it has been continuing as a Trade Union; and that the charter of demands raised and filed before the Conciliation Officer (Respondent No. 3) by Respondent No. 1 is perfectly legal and the same can be taken cognizance of by the Conciliation Officer. It is also alleged that the civil Court has no jurisdiction to settle the industrial disputes; Section 41(b) of the Specific Relief Act bars the jurisdiction of the court below to pass the injunction prayed for; and that the balance of convenience lies In favour of Respondent No. 1. 3. The learned Subordinate Judge has dismissed the said petition on the ground that Respondent No. 1 continued as a Trade Union despite the closure of the Appellant-industry in the year 1961; the Conciliation Officer has the jurisdiction to decide as to whether Respondent No. 1 can represent the cause of the workmen of the industry; the civil court has no jurisdiction to settle the industrial disputes and Section 18 of the Trade Unions Act and Section 41(b) of the Specific Relief Act bar the jurisdiction of the civil court to entertain the suit; some of the workmen of the Appellant-industry are members of the Respondent No. 1. Trade Union and so the latter can legally raise an industrial dispute before the Conciliation Officer; and that balance of convenience lies in favour of Respondent No. 1, and so the injunction prayed for cannot be granted. 4. It is mainly contended on behalf of the Appellant by Mr. Nanda that the closure of the Appellant industry in the year 1967 Respondent No. 1 - Trade Union automatically ceased to exist and so without proof of the fact that the said Union was reformed, reconstituted and registered as a trade union, Respondent No. 3 cannot initiate any action on the basis of the charter of demands submitted before him by Respondent No. 1. The above contention is without any force. At the outset it must be stated that there is nothing in law to say that only a registered trade union can initiate a conciliation proceeding in respect of an industrial dispute. The definition of the term 'industrial dispute' in Section 2(k) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, hereinafter referred to as the Act, is as follows: 2(k). 'industrial dispute' means any dispute or difference between employers and employees or between employers and workmen or between workmen and workmen, which is connected with the employment or non-employment or the terms of employment or with the conditions of labour of any person. Section 12(1) of the Act is as follows: 12. 'industrial dispute' means any dispute or difference between employers and employees or between employers and workmen or between workmen and workmen, which is connected with the employment or non-employment or the terms of employment or with the conditions of labour of any person. Section 12(1) of the Act is as follows: 12. Duties of conciliation officers: (1) Where any industrial dispute exists or is apprehended, the conciliation officer may, or where the dispute relates to a public utility service and a notice u/s 22 has been given, shalt hold conciliation proceedings in the prescribed manner. Sub-section (2) of that section provides: The conciliation officer shall, for the purpose of bringing about a settlement of the dispute, without delay, investigate the dispute and all matters affecting [he merits and the right settlement thereof, and may do all such things as he thinks fit for the purpose of inducing the parties to come to a fair and amicable settlement of the dispute. Section 11(2) of the Act inter alia provides that the Conciliation Officer may, for the purpose of enquiry into any existing or apprehended industrial dispute after giving reasonable notice enter the premises occupied by any establishment to which the dispute relates. For Section 12(1) of the Act it is dear that a Conciliation. Officer can start a conciliation proceeding as soon as he comes to know from some source that an industrial dispute actually exists or is apprehended soon. He is, u/s 4 of the Act, charged with the duty of mediating and promoting the settlement of industrial disputes. Reading Sections 12(1), 12(2) and Section 4 of the Act it becomes clear that a Conciliation Officer can, it should better be said he should, start a conciliation proceeding as soon as he gets information from any source whatsoever about the existence or an apprehension of an industrial dispute. The above provisions in the Act are made for the prevention and speedy settlement of industrial disputes which is the paramount consideration with which the Industrial Disputes Act has been enacted. There is nothing in the Act to lend support to a contention that a conciliation proceeding can be initiated before a Conciliation Officer only when he is formally moved in that direction by a registered trade union or for the matter of that by any other agency or person. In the case reported in State of Bihar Vs. There is nothing in the Act to lend support to a contention that a conciliation proceeding can be initiated before a Conciliation Officer only when he is formally moved in that direction by a registered trade union or for the matter of that by any other agency or person. In the case reported in State of Bihar Vs. Kripa Shankar Jaiswal it has been held: It would be an erroneous view if it were said that for a dispute to constitute an industrial dispute it is a requisite condition that it should be sponsored by a registered union or that all the workmen of an industrial establishment should be parties to it. In Shambu Nath Goyal Vs. Bank of Baroda their Lordships of the Supreme Court, on a perusal of the definition of 'industrial disputes' in Section 2(k) of the Act, have held: 5. A bare perusal of the definition would show that where there is a dispute or difference between the parties contemplated by the definition and the dispute or difference is connected with the employment or non-employment or the terms of employment or with the conditions of labour of any person there comes into existence an industrial dispute. The Act nowhere contemplates that the dispute would come into existence in any particular, specific or prescribed manner. For coming o existences of an industrial dispute a written demand is not a sine qua non, unless of course in the case of public utility service because Section 22 forbids going on strike without giving a strike notice. The key words In the definition of industrial dispute are' 'dispute' or 'difference', What is the connotation of these two words. In Beetham v. Trinidad Cement Ltd. (1960) 1 All ER 274 at p. 279, Lord Denning, while examining the definition of expression 'trade dispute' in Section 2(1) of Trade Dispute (Arbitration and Inquiry) Ordinance of Trinidad observed: by definition a 'trade dispute' existe and a difference can exist long before the parties become locked in a combat. It is not necessary 'that they should have come to blows. It is sufficient that they should be sparing for an opening. In the case reported in Avon Services Production Agencies (P) Ltd. Vs. It is not necessary 'that they should have come to blows. It is sufficient that they should be sparing for an opening. In the case reported in Avon Services Production Agencies (P) Ltd. Vs. Industrial Tribunal, Haryana and Others their Lordships, while dealing with the power of the appropriate government to refer industrial disputes to boards of conciliation, Courts of inquiry, labour Courts or tribunals under the Act, have held: 6. Section 10(1) of the, Act confers power on the appropriate Government to refer at any time any industrial dispute which exists or is apprehended to the authorities mentioned in the section for adjudication. The opinion which the appropriate Government is required to form before referring the dispute to the appropriate authority is about the existence of a dispute or even if the dispute has not arisen, it is apprehended as imminent and requires resolution in the interest of industrial peace and harmony. Section 10(1) confers a discretionary power and this discretionary power can be exercised on being satisfied that an industrial dispute exists or is apprehended. There must be some material before the Government on the basis of which it forms an opinion that an industrial dispute exists or is apprehended. The power conferred on the appropriate Government is an administrative power and the action of the Government in making the reference is an administrative act. All that has been stated above with reference to Government's power to refer industrial disputes u/s 10(1) of the Act applies on principle to the initiation of a conciliation proceeding u/s 12(1) of the Act. From the discussion made above it would be wrong to say that a conciliation preceding cannot at all he started by a Conciliation Officer so long he is not formally moved in that direction by somebody, much less by a properly constituted registered trade union. 5. In the present case before me, the Conciliation Officer on receiving the charter of demands filed before him by Respondent No. 1 has issued notice of the said charter of demands to the Appellant. The demands made in the said charter evidently come under the definition at the term 'industrial disputes' in Section 2(k) of the Act as they are disputes or differences between the employer and the workmen and are matters connected with the employment or the terms of employment or the conditions of labour of any person. The demands made in the said charter evidently come under the definition at the term 'industrial disputes' in Section 2(k) of the Act as they are disputes or differences between the employer and the workmen and are matters connected with the employment or the terms of employment or the conditions of labour of any person. On receiving the said charter of demands the Conciliation Officer had reason to form an opinion that an industrial dispute existed or was apprehended between the Appellant-employer and its workmen. On that subjective satisfaction the Conciliation Officer was justified in initiating the conciliation proceeding u/s 12 of the Act. The formation of the above opinion and initiation of the conciliation proceeding are both administrative acts of the Conciliation Officer, It would be open for the Appellant, on appearing before the Conciliation Officer, to show to the latter that there was no industrial dispute or that the industrial disputes on which the conciliation proceeding has been started do not relate to the Appellant-industry or the workmen working in that industry. On the above considerations, there was nothing illegal on the part of the Conciliation Officer to initiate the conciliation proceeding and to issue the notice to the Appellant in the said proceeding. 6. The contention of Mr. Nanda, that the Conciliation Officer was not at all justified in initiating the conciliation proceeding without at first instituting an enquiry as to whether the trade union which has filed the charter of demands is actually a trade union in existence and whether it represents the workmen of the Appellant-industry, is without any substance. As stated above, the Conciliation Officer has the jurisdiction to initiate a conciliation proceeding suo motu as soon as he finds on some materials or information before him that an industrial dispute exists or is apprehended. So, the initiation of a conciliation proceeding by a properly constituted union, or for the matter of that by a group of workmen, is not an essential preliminary to vest the jurisdiction on the Conciliation Officer to start a conciliation proceeding. An industrial dispute can of course be validly raised by a trade union or by a group of workmen. So, the initiation of a conciliation proceeding by a properly constituted union, or for the matter of that by a group of workmen, is not an essential preliminary to vest the jurisdiction on the Conciliation Officer to start a conciliation proceeding. An industrial dispute can of course be validly raised by a trade union or by a group of workmen. The term 'trade union' has been defined u/s 2(h) of the Trade Unions Act as follows: Trade Union means any combination, whether temporary Of permanent, formed primarily for the purpose of regulating the relations between workmen and employers or between workmen and workmen or between employers and employers, or for imposing restrictive conditions on the conduct of any trade Of business, and includes any federation of two' or more Trade Unions. In the present case before me, 7 workmen of the Appellant-industry have filed affidavits in the Court below stating that they are workmen of the Appellant-industry and are members of the Respondent No. 1 - trade union. They have also affirmed that there are 535 members on the roll of the Respondent No. 1 trade union. From the wide scope of the term 'trade union' it is evident that a combination of any number of persons, may be even two, formed primarily for the purposes mentioned in that definition, can form a trade union. Undisputedly, the questions raised in the charter of demands well nigh come within the definition of the term 'industrial disputes' in Section 2(k) of the Act. So, Respondent No. 1 was legally competent to present the charter of demands before Respondent No. 3 espousing the cause of the workmen of the Appellant-industry or at least a section of them, and the Conciliation Officer was legally competent and justified to initiate the conciliation proceeding on the presentation of the said charter of demands. Moreover, a trade union of one establishment can espouse the cause of workmen of another establishment. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in paragraph 12 of the decision in Workmen of Dharam Pal Prem Chand v. Dharam Pal Prem Chand AIR 1956 S.C. 182 have held: ...in a given case, it is conceivable that the workmen of an establishment have no Union of their own and some or all of them join the Union of another establishment belonging to the same industry. In such case, If the said Union takes up the cause of the workmen working in an establishment which has no Union of its own. it would be unreasonable to hold that the dispute does not become an industrial dispute because the Union which has sponsored it is not the Union exclusively of the workmen working in the establishment concerned. 7. Moreover, there is nothing in law that only a registered trade union can raise or initiate a conciliation proceeding in respect of an industrial dispute. Provision for registration of a trade union is made in the Trade Unions Act to define the law relating to registered trade unions, thereby regulating the functions and conduct of work of such trade unions. There is nothing in that Act or in the Industrial Disputes Act to say that only a registered trade union can raise or initiate a conciliation proceeding relating to an industrial dispute. For good reasons the legislature in Its wisdom has rightly not placed any such restriction or fetters, and has left wide scope, as stated above for the initiation of such proceedings. 8. The Appellant in this case immediately on receiving the notice issued by the Conciliation Officer filed T.S. No. 107/73 inter alia for of declaration that since Respondent No. 1 had a legal death due to the closure of the Plaintiff-industry on 31-11-1967, the proceeding initiated by Respondent No. 3 on the basis of the charter of demands presented before him by Respondent No. 1 was illegal and inoperative. Ex parte, ad interim injunction - was granted by the learned Subordinate Judge in that suit, but that suit was withdrawn under Order 23, Rule 3 CPC by saying that the statutory notice u/s 80, CPC had not been given to Respondent No. 3. Thereafter the present suit (T.S. No. 79177) and a petition under Order 39, Rule 1, CPC were filed by the Appellant. On that petition Misc. Case No. 95/77 (renumbered as Misc. Case No. 157/78) was started and an ex parte ad interim injunction was obtained against Respondent No. 3 herein. That miscellaneonus case was dismissed for default on 28-11-1978, but the Appellant did not take any steps for the restoration of the said miscellaneous case. Thereafter on a fresh petition filed by the Plaintiff under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2, Code of Civil Procedure. That miscellaneonus case was dismissed for default on 28-11-1978, but the Appellant did not take any steps for the restoration of the said miscellaneous case. Thereafter on a fresh petition filed by the Plaintiff under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2, Code of Civil Procedure. Miscellaneous Case No. 172/78 was started, and an ex parte ad interim Injunction order restraining Respondent No. 3 from proceeding with the above conciliation proceeding was obtained by the Plaintiff. On the vacation of that order by the Court below on hearing both the parties the present appeal has been filed. In this appeal as the operation of the order of the Court below has been stayed, the Conciliation Officer has stayed his hands from proceeding with the conciliation proceeding. The above facts show that because of the above proceedings initiated by the Plaintiff-Appellant in the Civil Court the Conciliations Officer after legally initiating the conciliation proceeding and till now has bad no opportunity to consider any possible objections against the conciliation proceeding. 9. Considering the la w on the subject and the facts stated above I do not find any reason to grant the Appellant's prayer to injunct the Conciliation Officer to proceed with the conciliation proceeding. For reasons stated above I uphold the ultimate decision of the Court below. There is, therefore, no merit in this appeal and it is dismissed with costs. Final Result : Dismissed