JUDGMENT-The petitioner was a tenant of house No. 44/ A in the City of Daund, District Poona. On 31-10-1972, the landlord respondent sent a notice to the petitioner tenant addressed at Baramati also in the District of Poona requiring him to quit and vacate premises in his possession. He called upon him to vacate by the end of December 1972. The notice also demanded arrears of rent which were said to be due from the defendant and also sought possession on the ground that the premises were kept closed for a period over 3 years and were not being used. The plaintiff also alleged that she required the premises bona fide for her occupation and further that the defendant-petitioner has gone to reside permanently with his sister at Daund. 2. The petitioner resisted the suit. He denied that he has gone per manently to reside at Baramati or that he had not been occupying the premises for a period of 3 years and had not used them. According to him, he had been going of and on to Daund and had been staying in the premises during the period in question. As regards the allegation that the defendant had not paid rent, he also denied it. In the plaint, the landlord-plaintiff claimed rent only for a period of 3 months from 1-10-1972 to 31-12-1972. The suit came to be filed on 6-S-1973 in the Court of the Civil Judge, Junior Division, Daund. 3. The learned trial Judge framed issues on the pleadings raised by the parties and the second issue framed, read thus :- Does she prove that the defendant was not using the suit premises for the purposes of residence '? A somewhat similar issue was issue No. 1 which called upon the plaintiff to prove that the defendant was not using the suit premises since 3 years before the suit. The learned trial Judge found against the plaintiff and therefore dismissed the suit. 4. Aggrieved by that decision of the trial Court, the landlord preferred an Appeal in the Court of the District Judge, Poona being Civil Appeal No. 49/16. The Appeal came to be heard by the Assistant Judge who by his decree and order dated 21-12-1976 reversed the decree passed by the trial Court and awarded instead, a decree in favour of the plaintiff for possession. The Appeal came to be heard by the Assistant Judge who by his decree and order dated 21-12-1976 reversed the decree passed by the trial Court and awarded instead, a decree in favour of the plaintiff for possession. He held that the plaintiff was entitled to possession on the ground that defendant had not used the premises for a period exceeding 6 months immediately prior to the date of the suit without any reasonable cause. it seems that, that was the only point which was pressed before him, all the other points having been given up apparently. In any event, the plaintiff had not claimed possession on the ground that she required the premises bona fide for her occupation. This was the only ground under section 13(1)(k) therefore, on which she succeeded. 5. The learned Assistant Judge observed that in the reply to the notice to the plaintiff-landlord, the defendant had made a statement and that statement "read between the lines" would show, the learned Judge felt, "even according to the defendant, he was residing at Baramati and he used to visit Daund only for the purposes of paying rent or for some other work." Now, the marathi statement appearing in the reply Ex. 41 is, that the petitioner comes to Daund often for payment of rent and "for other purposes and resides." Apparently, the learned Judge in reading between the lines has omitted to read that portion where he says that he used to come to Daund for other purposes and also used to stay there. 6. The learned Judge found that the plaintiff was not supported by the witnesses whom she examined Nonetheless, on the basis of the other evidence and circumstance3, he chose to accept the case of the plaintiff and found that the occupation of the premises by the niece of the petitionerdefendant was subsequent to the institution of the suit and that, the petitioner had no intention to revert to these premises and use them and occupy them for the purposes of residence. 7. It is against this judgment and decree for possession passed against the petitioner, that the petitioner has filed this Writ Petition. 8. It is contended for the petitioner that a case which has succeeded under section 13 (I) (k) of the Bombay Rent Act was not as such, made out by the plaintiff in her plaint. 7. It is against this judgment and decree for possession passed against the petitioner, that the petitioner has filed this Writ Petition. 8. It is contended for the petitioner that a case which has succeeded under section 13 (I) (k) of the Bombay Rent Act was not as such, made out by the plaintiff in her plaint. Therefore, it is urged that the defendant can not be said to have been called upon to meet that case. The issues framed in the trial Court did not disclose that those aspects of the matter were present to the mind of the parties or the Court when the parties went to trial. It was contended that the plaint generally alleges that the premises have not been used for a continuous period of 6 months without a reasonable cause for the purposes for which they were let by the defendant. 9. Now the learned Assistant Judge has clearly addressed himself to the question as to whether the plaint allegations did make out such a case. I have already referred to the issues framed by the trial Court. They do not use the word "continuously" or "without a reasonable cause" as part of the grounds required to be proved by the plaintiff before the plaintiff can get a decree. 10. Coming to the plaint itself, if we see paragraph 3 of the plaint, it makes a combination of 2 clauses, 13(1) (k) and 13(1)(1) and neither clearly. It says that the defendant has gone to stay at Baramati and that, he has not been residing in the premises of Daund during the last 3 year~. The plaintiff does not say that the defendant has acquired suitable alternative accommodation at Baramati. The plaintiff also does not say that the defendant has not used the premises continuously for a period of 6 months prior to the date of the suit. Paragraph 3 merely says that the premises in the possession of the defendant have been kept closed and therefore there is loss to the premises and damage to them that he does not require them and his intention is to assign or sublet those premises and to obtain financial advantage upto himself. He does not need those premises for himself. 11. He does not need those premises for himself. 11. Now, it is needless to say that section 13(l)(k) enables a landlord to recover possession of premises where they have "not been used without reasonable cause," for the purpose for which they had been let "for a continuous period of 6 months immediately preceding the date of the suit." The section therefore emphasises a continuous period of 6 months preceding immediately before the date of the suit. What gives a cause of action therefore is a continuous non user for a period of 6 months immediately preceding the date of the suit. It is not merely enough that there should be actual non user for a continuous period of 6 months immediately preceding the date of the suit, but that, such non use must be further "without a reasonable cause." Unless therefore, the landlord makes out a case of non user for a continuous period of 6 months immediately preceding the date of the suit, there is no further question. Even where such a case is made out, a further case has also to be made out that the non use was without any reasonable cause. Both parts of the section therefore, namely, the continuous non use up to the date of the suit and the absence of reason for such non use are material and important. 12. If we analyse the plaint in the light of the requirement of the section, it will be seen that the words "without reasonable cause" are wholly absent in the plaint. If that is so, I do not think that it could be said that the plaintiff had made out a case under section 13 (I) (k) so that, the tenant could be required to meet such a case. It is also not shown and not alleged that the non use of the premises had been for a continuous period of 6 months immediately preceding the date of the suit. The section emphasises the situation, and a continuation of a situation and its existence at the date of the suit. If such a situation and its existence for a continuous period of 6 months does not exist at the time when the suit is launched, then the cause of action does not accrue. The section emphasises the situation, and a continuation of a situation and its existence at the date of the suit. If such a situation and its existence for a continuous period of 6 months does not exist at the time when the suit is launched, then the cause of action does not accrue. Even if the tenant has not used the premises for a period of 6 months some time before the filing of the suit, or for more period, that would not give a landlord a cause of action. That state of affairs must continue till the date of the filing of the suit. If therefore, a tenant who had not used the premises for a long period, but had started using them before the date of the suit, the cause of action is gone. It is therefore necessary to emphasise the words "continuous" and "immediately preceding the date of the suit" occurring in clause (k) of sub-section (l) of section 13 which only bring out clearly that the cause of action claimed is on that account. As I pointed out, this must be further supported by an allegation that the non use was without reasonable cause. As pointed out, neither of these two aspects are clearly present in the plaint. 13. Shri Hoshing who appeared for the respondent contended that the pleading by implication means so. Where it is alleged that for the last 3 years the premises have been kept closed, it means that they have been kept closed continuously for the period of 3 years right till the date of the suit. He concedes however, that the words "without reasonable cause" do not appear in the plaint. Even if the allegations in the plaint are liberally construed, it is quite clear that one of the vital ingredients of the cause of action is missing. Besides, the plaint does not say that that is the state of affairs on the date on which the suit is filed. As I pointed out, that is a very material part of the cause of action which the plaintiff has to allege and must be proved. 14. Besides, the plaint does not say that that is the state of affairs on the date on which the suit is filed. As I pointed out, that is a very material part of the cause of action which the plaintiff has to allege and must be proved. 14. On merits also, I am unable to hold as was held by the learned Assistant Judge that it is possible by reading between the lines to come to a conclusion that the petitioner must not have been using these premises without a reasonable cause continuously for a period of 6 months before the suit. According to the defendant, he used to come of and on and reside in the premises. If he was doing so, it could not be said that the premises were not continuously used for a period of 6 months before the suit without a reasonable cause. According to the petitioner, he was unemployed and was working as a mechanic repairing diesel engines. For that purpose, he had to, move from place to place. It is true that the petitioner has not said that for the purposes of this mechanical business, he had kept his headquarters at Baramati which is an irrigated taluka. Even then, according to him, he used to visit Daund and villages nearby and come and reside at Daund whenever it was necessary. 15. The learned Judge has also found that there was no evidence supporting the plaintiff. In other words, it was the plaintiff's word as against the word of the defendant. The learned Judge has however observed, that the defendant has not produced any other evidence such as receipt of communications, letters, etc., by him at Daund. He has also not produced his ration card to show that prior to 1973, he was drawing rations at Daund. It is true that this evidence is Dot produced. But, the question one has to ask oneself is, not whether this evidence is produced or not and why this evidence is not produced, but whether, in the circumstances, that evidence was required to be produced. If the plaint allegations are missing, then it could not be said that the defendant is required to meet those allegations which were never made and sought to be established for the first time inferentially and during evidence. Better evidence of the occupation by the defendant petitioner could have been produced. If the plaint allegations are missing, then it could not be said that the defendant is required to meet those allegations which were never made and sought to be established for the first time inferentially and during evidence. Better evidence of the occupation by the defendant petitioner could have been produced. The mere fact that he has not kept any letters or has not produced any, the circumstance that he has not produced his ration card does not establish that he was not coming of and on and staying at Daund in these premises. The requirement of section 13 (1) (k) in a sense is rigorous and that lays down that there must be a non use continuously, and the word "continuous" has to be emphasised, for a period of 6 months. That the non use must further be "without a reasonable cause." I do not think that the evidence in this case which was no~ liable to be considered at all, even comes up to the standard of proof. Shri Hoshing for the respondent, sought to place reliance upon observations in the judgment of Chief Justice Chagla in Civil Revision Application No. 1527/53 decided on 30-7-54. I do not see how that case or those observations are of any assistance to Shri Hoshing in the present case. The principle which that case to my mind lays down is that, occupation of premises is not the same thing as residing in the premises. Therefore, a mere occupation of the premises for some brief spells of time on behalf of a tenant does not mean that the tenant has used the premises for the purposes for which, they were let namely, residence. I do not think that it is possible to say that if as contended by the defendant, he was of and on coming and residing at Daund in the premises in question. His stay in the premises during those periods when the premises were let for his residence cannot be described as occupation and not residence. 16. The result therefore is that, this petition must be allowed and succeeds. Rule made absolute. No order as to costs. Petition allowed.