Judgment :- 1. This revision has been filed against the dismissal of a suit in ejectment filed by the petitioner in the Court of Small Causes at Madras under S. 41 of the Presidency Small Causes Courts Act, 1882. 2. The plaintiff in the suit was R. Abdul Khader, Trustee of 1907 Endowment of N. Pailwan Sahib. The suit was filed in ejectment of a tenant to whom certain property belonging to the endowment had been demised. The tenant in question was one Fakeer Mohideen. He was impleaded as the first defendant in the suit. Besides Abdul Khader who had filed the suit on behalf of the endowment at a trustee, there were two other trustees for this trust by name Nizamudeen and Abdul Ghani, These trustees could not be prevailed upon by Abdul Khader to join him as co-plaintiffs to file the ejectment suit. Hence they were impleaded as the second and third defendants in the suit. 3. The tenant, Fakeer Mohideen, was the only contesting defendant in the suit. He filed written pleas before the Court. In his pleas, he inter alia disputed the legal authority of Abdul Khader to act in isolation as a trustee of the Trust and issue a notice of termination of his tenantcy or to file a suit in ejectment in the Court as the sole plaintiff, when there were other trustees. According to the first defendant, the plaintiff cannot act alone in these matters, because he was not the sole trustee of the Endowment. 4. The issue before the Court was whether the first defendant was liable to be evicted from the demised premises. The Court held that for a suit in ejectment to lie under S. 41 of the Presidency Small Causes Court Act, 1882, there must be a proper determination of the tenancy by the landlord prior to the suit. The Court pointed out that Abdul Khader who had filed the suit as plaintiff was only one of the three trustees appointed to this endowment by an order of the High Court. It was held that when there was a plurality of trustees, all of them must act in unison, in seeking to evict a tenant from the trust property. The Court accordingly held that the notice of termination of tenancy issued under the imprimatur of Abdul Khader alone as a trustee of the endowment was not valid in law. It was held that when there was a plurality of trustees, all of them must act in unison, in seeking to evict a tenant from the trust property. The Court accordingly held that the notice of termination of tenancy issued under the imprimatur of Abdul Khader alone as a trustee of the endowment was not valid in law. In this view, the Court held that the suit was not maintainable. The suit was dismissed on this basis. 5. This revision has been brought by the trustee, Abdul Khader, against the dismissal of his suit. The tenant, Fakeer Mohideen has preferred to remain ex parte in this revision although he was served with notice. Learned counsel for the petitioner, however, has taken me through the relevant records and also the law bearing on the subject in a manner which fairly placed the respective cases both of the petitioner and of the respondent. 6. Learned counsel urged that the whole basis of the decision of the Court below on the question of the authority of one of several trustees to act on behalf of the trust was based on a misconception of the law. He submitted that when a body of trustees is appointed to manage an endowment or public trust, the usual rule may be that they should act as a body. The law, however, would not operate to drive the trust to an impossible situation by a rigorous application of the rule. When trustees are not either willing, or able, to act as a body, by reason of differences between them or some other cause, it would be demanding the impossible to ask them act in unison. There are illustrations as to how the law seeks to get over an impasse in the trust board or any other circumstance in which it becomes impossible for all the trustees to act in unison. Two decisions were cited by learned counsel for the petitioner and they are Kolaganda Poranna v. Palthur Vishweswarayya 1 Ramesh Chandra Roy v. Hemdura Kumar 2. 7. In the Mysore case it was held that if there is more than one trustee in management of a trust property, and the trust property is let out to a tenant, then one amongst them can bring about the termination of the tenancy by issuing a notice to quit. 7. In the Mysore case it was held that if there is more than one trustee in management of a trust property, and the trust property is let out to a tenant, then one amongst them can bring about the termination of the tenancy by issuing a notice to quit. In that case, it was not quite clear whether the trustee who issued the notice of termination of tenancy was the managing trustee. Nevertheless, it was laid down as a proposition of law that even on the footing that all the trustees together can be regarded as landlords of the demised property, the tenant will yet not be entitled to continue in possession of the property belonging to the trust, if any one of the trustees is unwilling to continue his tenancy and brings about the termination. This decision is a complete repudiation of the ground on which the court below had held that the notice issued by Abdul Khader to the first defendant was invalid and was not sufficient in law to terminate the tenancy. 8. The decision of the Calcutta High Court had to address it self, among other things, to the question as to how a suit has to be instituted on behalf of a trust where a body of trustees are unable to pull together and figure as co-plaintiffs. In that case, it was held that while ordinarily the trustees of a trust must act in a body and on that principle a suit on behalf of the trust has to be brought by all of them joining together as co-plaintiffs, an exception to this rule would operate in a case where one or some of the trustees instituted the suit while the rest of the trustees are joined as the defendants, in the event of the latter not being in a position to figure as co-plaintiffs in the suit. 9. The decision of the Calcutta High Court further illustrates the position that a single trustee in a body of trustees can maintain an action on behalf of the trust. 9. The decision of the Calcutta High Court further illustrates the position that a single trustee in a body of trustees can maintain an action on behalf of the trust. Although this point does not arise directly in this case from the decision of the Court below, the ruling of the Calcutta High Court is helpful in one respect, namely, that where a Court finds that all the trustees figure before it in a suit or other proceeding either on the one side or on the other there need be no technical objection to the Court proceeding to decide the case on it merits. I am therefore, satisfied that the dismissal of the suit by the Court below cannot be justified on any technicality. 10. In the course of the hearing of the revision I entertained a doubt for some time on the question whether the setting aside of the decision of the Court below can serve any purpose at the present juncture. My hesitation arose, because I found from the records in the case that Abdul Khader, at whose instance this revision petition was brought, had been appointed as a trustee by by this Court only for a period of three years with effect from 22nd August, 1975. This means that his period of office as trustee would have come to a close, in the ordinary course by 22nd August, 1978. Learned counsel for the petitioner, however, produced a subsequent order of Padmanabhan, J. on the Original Side of this Court in Appln. No. 2697 of 1978 in C.S. No. 117 of 1974 in and by which the trusteeship of Abdul Khader had been renewed for a further term of three years from 22nd August, 1978. This last observation I have made only to reassure myself that the whole thing has not become infructuous by efflux of time. 11. On my finding that the notice of termination was validly issued by Abdul Khader on behalf of the trust and on the follow-up finding that the suit in ejectment was maintainable, further issues touching the merits of the suit will have to be gone into. The Court below had not gone into them since it had held that the suit is not maintainable and had dismissed it on the preliminary issue. The Court below had not gone into them since it had held that the suit is not maintainable and had dismissed it on the preliminary issue. Accordingly, while I set aside the decree of the Court below, I direct that the Court below should take the suit again for trial, and dispose it of on the merits, in accordance with law and the evidence in the case.