Judgment Guman Mal Lodha, J.-“Price control” with “cheers” or “tears” is the real question though it has been camouflaged in legal constitutional debate. 2. These 324 writ petitions have been filed by the Sugar Dealers of Rajasthan challenging the validity of the Levy Sugar Supply (control) Order, 1979 (hereinafter to be called as ‘Levy Sugar Order’) Sugar Retention and Sale (By Recognised Dealers) Order, 1979 (hereinafter to be called as “Retention Order”), Sugar Price (Determination of 1978-79) Order 1979 (hereinafter to be called as ‘the Price Determination Order’), and the various directions issued therein, including the orders issued by the collectors of the various places and other administrative orders demanding sale of 65% of Sugar stock, to the State Government. Earlier 231 such writ petitions were heard by the Jaipur Bench of this Court and on March 14, 1980 by a composite order, this Court dismissed those writ petitions and while doing so, adjudicated the controversies raised therein, summary of which contained in that judgment (civil Writ Petn, No. 6 of 1980 and other 231 writs M/s. Chand Behari Lal Heeralal vs. Union of India decided on 14-3-1980) is reproduced below for ready reference:- (1) the ‘sine qua non’ for invoking the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the constitution, in a case of the present nature is that the petitioners should be able to throw, that they have been adversely affected by impugned orders, because grave injustice or substantial injustice, harm damage or loss of any kind have been caused to them. The deletion of ‘substantial injury’ from Article 226, which was introduced by the 42nd Amendment of the constitution earlier, has not dispensed with, this important constitutional requirement, which has been insisted upon both in English Courts and the Indian Courts in equitable writ jurisdiction even earlier. (2) thepetitioners have failed to show that the impugned orders have caused them any injustice, much less, grave injustice or substantial injustice, damage injury or harm. In fact howsoever unwittingly it may be, the Sugar (Retention and Sale by Recognised Dealers) Order, 1979 and Levy Sugar Supply (control) Order, J979 coupled with de-control of sugar price has resulted in a ‘dealers paradise’ as on each quintal of sugar effected by these orders, each one of them would earn additional profit of Rs. 16.50/-to Rs. 41/-per quintal. In fact howsoever unwittingly it may be, the Sugar (Retention and Sale by Recognised Dealers) Order, 1979 and Levy Sugar Supply (control) Order, J979 coupled with de-control of sugar price has resulted in a ‘dealers paradise’ as on each quintal of sugar effected by these orders, each one of them would earn additional profit of Rs. 16.50/-to Rs. 41/-per quintal. The preliminary objections of the respondents is liable to be accepted and the writs deserve to be dismissed on this ground alone; (3) the fixation of the ‘controlled price’ at Rs. 280/-per quintal under Clause 4 of the ‘Retention Order’ is legal as it has been done under Section 3 (2) (c) of the Act; (4) the ‘Retention and Levy Orders’ fully comply with the requirements of Section 3 (3) of the Essential Commodities Act and full effect has been given to Clause (a), (b) and Clause (c) of it; (5) the prices to be paid to the dealer for levy has been governed by Section 3 (3) of the Act and Section 3 (3A) has got no relevancy to it, nor it is applicable in the present case. (6) themarket price admittedly being much more than Rs. 280/-per quintal, the respondents were justified in applying Clause (a) and Clause (b) of Sub-section (3) of Section 3 of the Act; (7) since the market price prevailing in the area was much more than to Rupees 280/-per quintal having shooted up like a ‘gas balloon’ to Rs. 45 0/-to 600/-per quintal, the functionaries of the State, were justified in not making attempt for any agreement with the dealers, under Section 3. (3) (a) of the Act and were further justified in calculating the price under Sub-clause (b) of Section 3 (3) of the Act, at the rate of Rs. 280/-per quintal. 45 0/-to 600/-per quintal, the functionaries of the State, were justified in not making attempt for any agreement with the dealers, under Section 3. (3) (a) of the Act and were further justified in calculating the price under Sub-clause (b) of Section 3 (3) of the Act, at the rate of Rs. 280/-per quintal. (8) the Food Commissioner other State functionaries and the Collectors were duly authorised to take levy from the dealers, under the Retention and Levy Orders; (9) the explanation of Clause (3) of the Retention Order, for including the sugar in ‘pipe line’ having been delivered or despatched before the date 17-12-79 to the dealers, either in their own name or in the name of the bearer, is valid; (10) all those despatches which were made before 17-12-79 to the dealers but were received later on, would be treated as covered by explanation; (11) the inclusion of the sugar in pipe line in the closing stock of the 17th Dec., 1979 would not result in prosecution of any dealer on the ground that the stock if so, taken would increase the limit of the permissible stock for the licence or the licensing order; (12) the fixation of price at the rate of Rs. 280/-per quintal for the dealer, is not violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution; (13) taking of the levy at price Rs. 280/-per quintal for the dealer, is not violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution; (13) taking of the levy at price Rs. 280/-per quintal from the dealers of the 65% of the closing Stock of Dec., 1979 is not violative of Art. 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution; (14) Article 300-A of the Constitution has not been violated because the Retention & Levy Orders, both have been enacted under the Essential Commodities Act, and are valid, and thus even if the property is being taken away, it is under the authority of law; (15) Article301 of the Constitution has not been violated, because there has been no restrictions on any trade or business without authority of law; (16) the Retention and Levy Orders are socio-economic legislation; and though they are orders issued by the delegated legislative authority; they are for fair distribution, with the object, to provide to the consumer, sugar at a fair price, and therefore, even if some loss is caused to a few with corresponding benefit to larger chunks of people, the same is justified both under the Constitution and the law; (17) the writ petitions cannot succeed, on any ground and since they are even liable to be dismissed on preliminary, objection, the respondents are entitled to be allowed costs from the petitioners. 3. After the above judgment of Rajasthan High Court, Delhi High Court in Kasturi Lal Rakesh Kumar vs. Union of India (Civil Writ Petal. No. 25/80) dismissed the similar writ petitions on Mar, 21, 1980 and declared that the Levy and Retention Orders are valid. 4. Hon’ble Justices Mr. Harish Chandra and Mr. B. N, Kirpal constituting a Division Bench repelled the submissions of the petitioners regarding the validity of the notifications on various grounds, while dismissing the writ petitions. After the judgments of Rajasthan and Delhi High Courts, Calcutta High Court in Gokul Chandra Dey & Sons vs. Joint Secretary, Govt. of India (C. R. No. 7397 (W) of 1979) accepted the writ petitions on Apr. After the judgments of Rajasthan and Delhi High Courts, Calcutta High Court in Gokul Chandra Dey & Sons vs. Joint Secretary, Govt. of India (C. R. No. 7397 (W) of 1979) accepted the writ petitions on Apr. 1, 1980 : (Reported in 1981 Cri U 401) and held that the fixation of the price by Clause (4) of the retention orders, is bad and if that clause goes then other provisions cannot be given effect to, that is to say, there cannot by any obligation to hand over the detained stock at a particular price fixed on that date by the impugned order.: In this view of the matter, the Court quashed the order dated 17th Dec., 1979 (Annexure-D) before that Court; 5. It is precisely in the background of the above divergent views expressed by the Rajasthan and Delhi High Courts on the one side and Calcutta High Court on the other side, that this bunch of 324 writ petitions have come up for consideration. In fact, during the course of hearing of the arguments, only a press cutting was submitted by the petitioners, but on the insistence of the Court, the petitioner have availed of the opportunity and filed a copy of the judgment of Calcutta High Court along with written arguments. 6. I had occasion to deal with the manifold submissions of the petitioners and the objections of the respondents, in the judgment referred to above at Jaipur and that judgment was read in the Court verbatim during arguments. In view of this, it would be unnecessary to mention the entire history of the levy and retention orders, and the price determination order, accompanied with it, and also the various submissions which were made, considered and adjudicated as per the summary reproduced above. The sole question which is to be considered, is whether either on the basis of the arguments advanced afresh or the reasoning given by the Calcutta High Court, the view taken by this Court at Jaipur, requires reconsideration, warranting a reference to a Division Bench or a larger Bunch of this Court. 7. The sole question which is to be considered, is whether either on the basis of the arguments advanced afresh or the reasoning given by the Calcutta High Court, the view taken by this Court at Jaipur, requires reconsideration, warranting a reference to a Division Bench or a larger Bunch of this Court. 7. As would be obvious from the reading of the judgment of this Court in M/s. Chand Behari’s case (supra) at Jaipur, narrow compass in which the crucial controversy was considered, depends upon the interpretation put on the various judgments of the Karnataka and Allahabad High Courts on the one hand and Andhra Pradesh High Court on the other hand, i.e., Sitaram Jwala Prasad vs. State of U. P., AIR 1975 All 272, K. B, Jinaraja Hegde vs. State of Mysore, AIR 1971 Mys 12, Joe Pereira vs. Union of India, AIR 1979 Kant 12, Sri Venkateswara Rice Mill vs. State of Andh, Pra., AIR 1975 Andh Pra 84, the decision of Diwan Sugar & General Mills (Private) Ltd. vs. Union of India, AIR 1959 SC 626 , provided a general guidance. I would first deal with the case of Allahabad High Court. Mysore and Karnataka High Court’s judgment would be dealt with jointly later on and thereafter I would examine the Andhra Pradesh’s view and the guidance provided by the Supreme Court in Diwan Sugar & General Mills’s case (supra). 8. U. P. Coarse Foodgrains (Levy) Order, 1974 was under challenge in the Allahabad case. According to Section 3 of it, every licence dealer was required to sell 50% of the Coarse Foodgrains’ in stock. The price was fixed in a Schedule, which was known as Sch. 1 at “74/-per quintal”. The submission made before the Court was that in view of the mandatory provisions, contained in Sub-section (3-B), the State Government was bound to pay to the petitioners, the prize of the foodgrains, which they have been required to sell to it in the manner contained in the aforesaid two, Sub-clause. 1 at “74/-per quintal”. The submission made before the Court was that in view of the mandatory provisions, contained in Sub-section (3-B), the State Government was bound to pay to the petitioners, the prize of the foodgrains, which they have been required to sell to it in the manner contained in the aforesaid two, Sub-clause. Sub-section 3 (3-B) in the unamended form at that time was as under;-“(3-B) Where any person is required by an order made with reference to Clause (i) of Sub-section (2) to sell any grade or variety of foodgrains, edible oilseeds or edible oils to the Central Government or a State Government or to an officer or agent of such Government and either no notification in respect of such foodgrains edible oilseeds or edible oils has been issued under Sub-section (3-A) or any such notification have been issued has ceased to remain in force by efflux of time; then notwithstanding anything contained in Sub-section (3), there shall be paid as the price for the foodgrains, edible oilseeds or edible oils- .(i) The controlled price, if any, fixed under this section or by or under any other law for the time being in force for such grade or variety of foodgrains, edible oilseeds or edible oils; or .(ii) Where no such price is fixed the price for such grade or variety of food-grains, edible oilseeds or edible oils prevailing or likely to prevail during the post-harvest period in the area to which that order applied.” Clause (i) of this Section 3 (3-B) mentioned that the ‘Controlled price,’ if any, fixed under this section or by or under any other law, for the time being in force, be for such grade or variety of foodgrains, edible oilseeds or edible oils. Admittedly, in that case, no ‘controlled price’ under Section 3 (2) (c) was fixed or even was purported to have been fixed, under the relevant Levy order or some other order, issued at that time. It was further contended, that the petitioners were entitled to get price fixed as contemplated by Clause (2) of Section 3 (3-B). 9. The contention of the State was that the price mentioned in the schedule was the ‘controlled price’ fixed by the Government, in exercise of the powers conferred on it, by Section 3 (1) in general and Section 3 (2) (c) in particular. 9. The contention of the State was that the price mentioned in the schedule was the ‘controlled price’ fixed by the Government, in exercise of the powers conferred on it, by Section 3 (1) in general and Section 3 (2) (c) in particular. The fixation of the price in the schedule for the purpose of the levy was sought to be justified as the ‘controlled price’. This justification sought to be made by the State, was held to be unjustified in view of the scheme of the Act. The Court held that the controlled price, contemplated by Clause (i) of Section 3 (3-B) has to be with reference to either the grade of foodgrain or its variety, and whatever the price State fixed in the schedule of the order as the price to be paid to the dealer cannot be considered as the ‘controlled price’. The reason given was that, the Sub-clauses (i) and (ii) of Section 3 (3-B) would become redundant, if it is accepted that the price automatically becomes controlled price. The Court directed that it must fix price as contemplated by Sub-section (3-B) of Section 3 of the Act after the same is fixed. 10. It would thus be seen, that in this case, the controlled price was never fixed, but all that was fixed was that the price, at which levy sugar, was to be purchased, and that too was done by mentioning, it in the schedule. It is further to be seen, that Sub-section (3-B) was held to be applicable and therefore, the price under Sub-section (3-B) and Sub-clauses (i) and (ii) could be fixed only. At first the ‘controlled price’ was required to be fixed under Sub-section (3-B) read with Clauses (i) and (ii), of Section 3 of the Act That having not been done, the price fixation for levy simply by making mention in the schedule was held to be invalid. 11. However, while doing so, it is important to note, that on principle, the Advocate General’s submission that it is open to the Government to fix the ‘controlled price’ and to require a certain percentage of foodgrains to be sold to the State Government, at that price, in one and the same order was accepted. 11. However, while doing so, it is important to note, that on principle, the Advocate General’s submission that it is open to the Government to fix the ‘controlled price’ and to require a certain percentage of foodgrains to be sold to the State Government, at that price, in one and the same order was accepted. The relevant observations made in para 7 are as under:-“We are in agreement with the learned Advocate General that it is open to the Government to fix the controlled price and to require a certain percentage of foodgrains to be sold to the State Government at that price in one and the same order.” 12. Now in order to see whether the principles enunciated in this case can apply to the present case, it will have to be appreciated, that the scheme of the levy order, and Retention order, by which the prices are to be fixed, in the instant cases shows that controlled price is not imaginary or illusory. As already pointed out above the ‘controlled price’, has been fixed under Clause (4) in terms, specifically and categorically, as it has been mentioned as the ‘controlled price’. Not only that, but by virtue of Clause (2) of the Levy Order, Sub-clause (3) of Section 3 has been taken note of , and it has been mentioned that the dealer would supply levy sugar at a price, not exceeding the price determined under Sub-section (3C) of Section 3 of the Act. The maximum limit or ceiling limit of Section 3 (3) was thus specified in this order and then came Retention Order, in which, Sub-section (3), again mentions, the very phraseology or Clauses (a) and (b) of Sub-section (3) of Section 3 of the Act. Clause 4 of this Retention Order fixed the ‘controlled price’ as Rs. 280/ - and was meant to precede the fixation of the ultimate price under Sub-clause (3). 13. Itwould, thus be seen that all the three Clauses (a), (b) and (c) of Sub-section (3) were not only taken note of , in these two orders, but acted upon, and it was in order to arrive at the price under Sub-clause (3) of Section 3 that alternative choice was given of either adopting method contained in Clause (a) or (b) Sub-section 3 of the Act. The controlled price under Clause (4) was to provide foundation for working out the figures under Sub-clause (3) by either method of Clauses (a) and (b). 14. That being so, so far as the Allahabad’s case is concerned, I am of the opinion that, it has got no application on the facts of the present cases. 15. Admittedly, so far the present case is concerned, there is no application of Section 3 (3-B) of the Act, as it is nobody’s case that the price was to be fixed under Section 3 (3-B) of the Act. Moreover, Section 3 (3-B) as is stood in 1975 has undergone a radical change by an amendment. 16. Then come three cases of Mysore and Karnataka High Courts which require serious consideration. 17. Thelevy order of Mysore Paddy Procurement (Levy) Order, 1966 was challenged in K. B. Jinaraja Hegde’s case (AIR 1971 Mys 12) (supra). The price for purpose of sale of levy to the State was contained in Schedule-Il of that order. This was struck down and the Mysore High Court held as under:-“The Levy Order does not mention how the purchase price mentioned in Sch.-II to that order has been fixed, nor does it prescribe the manner in which it has to be fixed. The fixation of this price is based on Section 3 (3-B) of the Essential Commodities Act. 1955. The first factor which the State Government has to consider in fixing, purchase price is the controlled price, if any, fixed under the section or under any other law for the time being in force for any grade or variety of foodgrains, edible oilseeds or edible oils. The second factor is the price for the same or likely to prevail during the post-harvest period in the area to which that order applies. It would, therefore, be clear from this subsection that the price to be paid is neither the controlled price nor the market price, but the price which the State Govt. fixes while promulgating the relevant order after having regard to both of them. Section 3 (3B) (ii) gives considerable guidance to the State Government in taking into account the price prevailing at a time and required by law to be taken into consideration. This clause has reference to two factors viz; (a) the point of time and (b) the area. fixes while promulgating the relevant order after having regard to both of them. Section 3 (3B) (ii) gives considerable guidance to the State Government in taking into account the price prevailing at a time and required by law to be taken into consideration. This clause has reference to two factors viz; (a) the point of time and (b) the area. So far as the point of time is concerned, it refers to the price prevailing during the harvest period. The explanation to this sub-section clarifies as to how the post-harvest period should be determined. The State Government should consider whether the harvest period in all the areas of the State in regard to paddy would be the same or would differ materially. The post-harvest period is the period of four months beginning from the last day of the fortnight during which harvesting operations normally commence. If the post-harvest periods differ in a manner so as to create fluctuation in prices, the State Government would be required to take the time factors into consideration in determining the prices prevailing or likely to prevail during the post-harvest period.” 18. Itwould thus be seen that the entire decision depends upon the interpretation of Section 3 (3-B) of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 as it was in existence in unamended form at that time. 19. As pointed out above, in the Allahabad case Section 3 (3-B) at that time required that the State Government should take into consideration the price prevailing at the time and in that area for the time and the price prevalent during the harvest period was relevant and the explanation was added to clarify as to how the post-harvest period should be determined. This shows that the harvest period can be “different for different purpose in the State and so also the price can be different. That being so, before a price was to be fixed for taking the levy of the paddy, the State Govt. was required to consider two factors contained in Sub-clauses (1) and (2) of Sub-section (3-B) of Section 3. 20. On the facts of that case the Court was of the opinion that this was not done. Not only it was not done, but even the levy order, did not prescribe manner in which it was to be done. was required to consider two factors contained in Sub-clauses (1) and (2) of Sub-section (3-B) of Section 3. 20. On the facts of that case the Court was of the opinion that this was not done. Not only it was not done, but even the levy order, did not prescribe manner in which it was to be done. It was not in dispute that the ‘control price’ was not fixed at all, either under this section or under any law for the time being in force, for any grade or variety of food grains, edible oilseeds or edible oils. On the basis of these findings, the Court came to the conclusion that the price fixed in the paddy order, can neither be treated as ‘controlled price’ nor the market price. Since Sub-section (3-B) of Section 3 was not complied with, Mysore High Court, quashed the price fixation by way of mentioning the same in a schedule only. When justification was being made, by the State, of the price mentioned in the Schedule, as ‘control price’, the Court did observe that a control price should have necessarily reference to the object of the State for fixing up a maximum price, beyond which sale cannot be legally made by the grower or dealer and since paddy was sold at much higher price in the open market, this cannot be said to be ‘control price’ as contemplated by Clause (1) of Sub-section (3-B) of Section 3 of the Act, and therefore, what was fixed in Schedule-Il was a purchase price and not the ‘control price.’ 21. These observations of the Mysore High Court that ‘control price’ is the maximum price beyond which sale cannot be legally made by the grower or dealer, certainly helps the case of the petitioner, inasmuch as when the State allows a dealer to sell the sugar at any price so far as 35% quota is concerned, then this requirement is not fulfilled and on that count it cannot be said to be ‘control price’ in terms of the judgment of the Mysore High Court. This observation of the Mysore High Court will be examined by me a little later. 22. This judgment of Mysore High Court was later on followed by another judgment of M/s. A. S. Kasarkod & Sons vs. State of Karnataka, W. P. No. 2126 of 1974, decided on 2-7-1974. This observation of the Mysore High Court will be examined by me a little later. 22. This judgment of Mysore High Court was later on followed by another judgment of M/s. A. S. Kasarkod & Sons vs. State of Karnataka, W. P. No. 2126 of 1974, decided on 2-7-1974. relevant portion of which has been extracted in Joe Pereira vs. Union of India (AIR 1979 Kant 12) (supra), which reads as under:-The price fixed under Clause (c) of Section 3 (2) of the Act in respect of an essential commodity, in my opinion, governs both sales and purchases of that commodity. The price fixed under Clause (c) of Section 3 (2) inrespect of an essential commodity is, in my opinion, intended to control all sales and purchases generally of that commodity. If Clause (c) of Section 3 (2) is intended to control the price of a particular category of sales only or a particular category of purchases only, then the very object of controlling the price namely, making that commodity available at fair prices, will be frustrated I am unable to accept the contention that under Clause (c) of Sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the Act the Government can control only the price at which an essential commodity should be sold under Clause (f) of that sub-section, without controlling the price at which all other sales or purchases of that commodity can take place.” 23. The Karnataka High Court in the above case relying upon the above observations of Chandra Shekhar Justice, as he then was, observed as under:-“From these observations, it becomes clear that the controlled price is a price which is required to be determined by taking into consideration all the circumstances like interest of the grower, the consumer and the general public. It must be fair from the point of view of the producer and also from the point of view of the consumer. It has to be determined in such a way that the producer does not perish and the consumer is not crippled. The controlled price once fixed must be applicable to all sales and purchases. It should not be intended to control the price of a particular type of transaction. The price which the State Govt. It has to be determined in such a way that the producer does not perish and the consumer is not crippled. The controlled price once fixed must be applicable to all sales and purchases. It should not be intended to control the price of a particular type of transaction. The price which the State Govt. fixed in the Levy Order or paid to the petitioner was evidently intended to govern the particular type of transaction i.e., compulsory sale by the grower to the State. Such a price, in oar opinion cannot automatically become the price as contended for the State Government.” 24. It would, thus, be seen that the three judgments of Mysore High Court which was later on named as Karnataka High Court enunciates the principle that ‘control price’ is a price which is not restricted in its application to a particular transaction of sale to the Government of a part of the stock, permitting the dealer to sell the other part at any price. According to this view the controlled price should be a price at which essential commodity should be treated for all sales and purchases generally of that commodity. 25. It will have to be seen, whether this view that the controlled price once fixed must be applicable to all sales and purchases and the price fixed only for the purposes of levy, cannot be termed as controlled price, should be followed or not. 26. A different view was expressed by the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Shri Venkateswara Rice Mill vs. State of Andh. Pra. (AIR 1975 Andh Pra 84). A procurement order was issued by the State in order to restrict sale and movement of rice within the State of Andhra Pradesh, the underlying idea being to maintain a price level and to make the essential commodity viz: rice available at a reasonable price to the consumer. It was contended that there was no compliance of Section 3 (3). It was also contended that the procurement order has been made in excess of the powers under the Act. The relevant observations of this judgment are as under: --“What Mr. It was contended that there was no compliance of Section 3 (3). It was also contended that the procurement order has been made in excess of the powers under the Act. The relevant observations of this judgment are as under: --“What Mr. Babulu Reddy contends is that while it is open to the Government to control the price line and fix a price for any essential commodity, it is not open to it to ask for sale of rice at a notified price which means a sale for purchase price. In other words according to him Section 3 (2) (c) only provides for control of price and does not speak of fixing any sale price or purchase price. In support of his contention the learned Counsel relied upon an unreported decision of the Mysore High Court W. P. Nos. 2126 to 2161 of 1974 and batch dated 2-7-1974 (Mys). Justice Chandra Shekhar relied upon an earlier decision of the same Court reported in Jinaraja Hegde vs. State of Mysore, (3970) 2 Mys U 224 at p. 227: (AIR 1071 Mys 12 at p. J.4). The contention of the Government pleader in Jinaraja Hegde’s case was that the prices specified in the Schedule to the Levy Order should themselves be regarded as the controlled prices referred to in Clause (i) of Sub-section (3-B) of Section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act. That was repelled by the Division Bench. The learned Judges were of the view that the price fixed under Schedule II is not the controlled price. According to thorn, it was common knowledge that paddy was sold at much higher price in the open market both by the growers and the dealers than the price mentioned in the Schedule.” The learned Judges were of the view that “We cannot, therefore call this price as the controlled price, as contemplated by Clause (i) of Sub-section (3-B) of Section 3 of the Act. The wording of the Levy Order leaves no doubt in our mind that the price that has been fixed in Schedule II is the ‘purchase price’, and not the controlled price. Chandra Shekhar J., expressed his agreement with that learned Counsel Mr. Babulu Reddy here.” 27. The wording of the Levy Order leaves no doubt in our mind that the price that has been fixed in Schedule II is the ‘purchase price’, and not the controlled price. Chandra Shekhar J., expressed his agreement with that learned Counsel Mr. Babulu Reddy here.” 27. After extracting the above, the Andhra Pradesh High Court disagreed with the view of Mysore High Court and observed as under:-“We are unable to subscribe to the view expressed by the Mysore High Court in the two cases referred to above. The expression ‘control’ in Section 3 (2) (c) takes within its ambit restrictions, regulations curbs, restraints. To control a thing is to have the right to exercise a directing or governing influence over it. (Black’s Law Dictionary page 399). The object of procuring from millers or dealers by the Government is to make rice available at reasonable price to the consumers. A dealer or miller is called upon only to sell a portion of the total quantity of each variety of rice at a notified price, it is not the case of the petitioners that the Government while fixing the notified price has not taken into consideration the rate at which a dealer or miller purchased paddy, conversion charges, transport charges and other incidental expenses and also the marginal profit. So, as notified price is fixed only alter taking the relevant factors into consideration, that is to say, to see that no dealer or miller suffers loss by his having to sell a portion of the total quantity of the rice which he produces or manufactures. The fixation of the price has not been questioned before us. What Mr. Babulu Reddy contends is that the notified price is not the controlled price and Sub-section (c) of Section 3 (2) only empowers the Government to control prices and not to notify prices. We are unable to see any force in this contention. The word. ‘Control’ as has already been observed by us, takes in regulation of the prices also by notifying a particular PRICE. To the extent of Sub-clause (1) of Clause (3) the price at which levy price should be sold is contracted. It is not open to a miller or dealer to sell at a rate above the notified price. In other words, that price at which a miller or dealer is to sell is controlled. To the extent of Sub-clause (1) of Clause (3) the price at which levy price should be sold is contracted. It is not open to a miller or dealer to sell at a rate above the notified price. In other words, that price at which a miller or dealer is to sell is controlled. The expression ‘control’ is of very wide amplitude. Clause (i of Section 3 (2) as already seen empowers the Government to require any person holding in stock any essential commodity to sell the whole or a specified part of the stock to the Central Government or to the State Government The procurement order is issued in exercise of the powers conferred upon the Government under Sub-clause (f). We see absolutely no merit in the attack on the procurement order.” 28. Itwould, thus, be seen that the Mysore view which was followed by the same High Court as Karnataka High Court and the view of Andhra Pradesh High Court are divergently different on this point. Whereas the Andhra Pradesh High Court has taken the view that the word ‘control’ is of very wide import and it means regulation of the price by notifying a particular price for purchase or levy. The expression control being of very wide amplitude, it covers the price fixed for Clause (f) of Section 3 (2) also. It is not necessary, that a price c