Judgment :- 1. Tenants in Rent Control proceedings initiated by the same landlord, are the revision petitioners. The five tenants are occupying different portions of the same building and four of them are carrying on some trade or other from their premises The landlord is living just behind this buiding, and he has a big family. He wants to have a bigger house for the family. The one he is using now, and the one occupied by the tenants, are both old and dilapidated; and the two are situated in six cents of land. His idea is to pull down both and to put up a new residential building for the occupation of himself and the members of the family. The Rent Control Court found, after a detailed examination of the evidence, including the report of the commissioner, that the landlord's case was genuine. He bona fide needed extra living space. The two buildings were in such a condition that his requirement for reconstruction was also bona fide. The plan and licence had been obtained. He had the financial capacity to reconstruct and his proposal was not a pretext. On these findings, eviction was allowed, and the Appellate Authority concurred. The District Court was also not persuaded to differ, in proceedings under S.20 of Act 2/65. 2. One should have thought that this was a simple case where little could be done by this Court under S.115 CPC., as the facts have been concurrently found by the two tribunals below, and even the District Court was not, prepared to interfere under its comparatively wider revisional jurisdiction. Counsel for the petitioners however thought otherwise. They were armed with a good number of points and a large number of decisions on the elaboration of which the better part of a day and half was spent, and one could not without discourtesy, decline to partake of this "embarrassment of riches". 3. The first point raised is that the grounds under sub-section (3) and sub-section (4) (iv) of S.11 are mutually exclusive, so that if a landlord seeks eviction under both, that itself is fatal to his application. The argument was developed like this. The different sub-sections/clauses of S.11 confer different rights on landlords to apply for eviction, with separate defences for the tenants in each case. The argument was developed like this. The different sub-sections/clauses of S.11 confer different rights on landlords to apply for eviction, with separate defences for the tenants in each case. S.11(3) allows eviction for own occupation by the landlord, and sub-s.(12) requires him to occupy the building so resumed within one month and continue to occupy it for at least six months. These provisions contemplate the continued existence of a building suitable for the occupation of the landlord for a reasonable period of time, while sub-section 4(iv) conceives of a building which has to be demolished and reconstructed without delay, to be offered to the tenant for re-occupation, under the third proviso. If the landlord wants to reconstruct under sub-s.4(iv), he cannot occupy the new building; and if he wants vacant possession for own occupation under sub-s.(3), he cannot simultaneously pull it down. The claim under one head is incompatible with the other, it is said. 4. The argument is attractive at first blush, but does not appear to be sound on mature consideration. The rent control legislation is not designed to confer 'rights' on landlords or provide defences to tenants. As the preamble indicates, the Act is intended to regulate leasing of buildings and control the rent of such buildings. Without the Act, the rights of a landlord to terminate the lease of a building are practically unfettered; such rights are there, subject of course to the terms of the contract and those engrafted by other statutes, if any. The purpose of the Act is not to confer rights which are even otherwise there, but to restrict the exercise thereof, in order to protect the interests of tenants. The effect of S.11 is to carve out some of those rights for survival and to obliterate some others. And what counsel called 'defences' are really additional restrictions imposed by statute, to ensure that even the grounds that survive are not misused. The effect of S.11 is to carve out some of those rights for survival and to obliterate some others. And what counsel called 'defences' are really additional restrictions imposed by statute, to ensure that even the grounds that survive are not misused. Thus, when the provisos to S.11(3) insist that eviction shall not be ordered even on the ground of bona fide need for own occupation if the landlord has another building of his own, or if the tenant depends for his livelihood on the income derived from trade carried on in the building, or when sub-s.(12) obliges the landlord to occupy the building within a specified time and to continue using it for a reasonable length of time, what is really done is to impose additional restrictions on the landlord so as to ensure that he does not throw out the tenant on pretexts, or that he does not seek eviction where alternate accommodation is available for himself. Considerations relating to the very subsistence of the tenant are also to outweigh the bona fide need of the landlord. Similarly, the provisos to sub-s.4(iv) are intended to see that reconstruction is not used as a means of driving out a tenant; they too are further restrictions. 5. Suppose a landlord applies for eviction under S.11(3) alone and obtains possession of the building. Under sub-s.(12), he should occupy it within one month. But if he has a 'reasonable cause' the period can be prolonged. He can very well say that his family is a big one and that he wants to make some modifications to the building, say by adding one or two rooms or by providing new bathrooms or latrines; that will be a reasonable cause for extending the one-month period. Again, he can reoccupy the building forthwith and leave it the next month, if he can show reasonable cause for so doing. Can he not say that after having re-occupied the building, he finds that for the convenient enjoyment of the same some major "repairs or alterations are found necessary? If he vacates before the end of the six-month period for the specific purpose of pulling down the existing structure and putting up a more fashionable and convenient one in its place, can he be accused of violating sub-s.(12)? If he vacates before the end of the six-month period for the specific purpose of pulling down the existing structure and putting up a more fashionable and convenient one in its place, can he be accused of violating sub-s.(12)? At any rate, he can vacate the building with impunity after six months and pull it down for purposes of reconstruction. An eviction obtained under S.11(3) therefore is not altogether destructive of the landlord's right to reconstruct. And if that be so, it will be too much to say that he cannot attempt to reconstruct merely because eviction was obtained under S.11(3), or because he mentioned the need for reconstruction as an additional or alternative ground. S.11(4) (iv) provides an independent ground depending on the condition of the building, the need to reconstruct and the ability of the landlord to do so; it is distinct from and unrelated to the need for own occupation under S.11(3). But that does not mean that the two are mutually exclusive in the sense counsel would like to have it. If the application for eviction is under S.11(4)(iv) alone, the landlord's need for own occupation has no relevance; but if it is under both S.11(3) and S.11(4)(iv), the circumstance that the building requires reconstruction for the purpose of own occupation does not affect or alter the bona fide nature of the landlord's need under S.11(3). 6. In Mohammed Kannu v. Asanar Kunhu 1965 (1) KLR 323, this Court held that a need for own occupation was wide enough to embrace a case where the landlord wanted to evict a tenant from a residential building in order to put up a lorry shed. Mathew J. (as he then was) found no difficulty in holding that 'the purpose of the occupation may be such that the building may have to be demolished and reconstructed; that does not mean that the landlord's claim is not under S.11(3)". The position was again considered by Krishnamoorthy Iyer J. in Sarada v. Kumaran (1969 KLT 133) where the need of the landlord under S.11(3) was to demolish the building so as to provide a passage to another building of his; and it was clearly indicated that the continued existence of the old building was not a condition precedent for ordering eviction under the sub-section. Reference was made to the provisions of S.11(17) to observe that while a landlord could seek eviction under that sub-section for residential purposes alone, there was no such limitation in S.11(3). Faced with these pronouncements, counsel sought to rely on the decision in CRP. Nos. 219 and 221 of 1977 where the application for eviction was made under S.11 (without specifying the sub-sections) for own residence, for conducting trade and for reconstruction. The matter was remanded because the District Court had not properly analysed or discussed the relevant questions, in spite of the divergent views taken by the Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority; there was also "confusion" as to the relevant provision of law under which eviction was ordered. In the course of remand an observation was no doubt made that an application under S.11 (3) and S.11 (4) (iv) could not "coexist", but this was made, so far as I could see, for drawing the attention of the court below to the distinctive and different nature of the elements which were to be established before ordering eviction under the one or the other. Even counsel was fair enough to concede that the learned Judge could not have intended, while making the passing observation, to give the go-by to the earlier decisions of this Court to which his Lordship's attention was not apparently drawn. 7. The point based on "mutual exclusiveness" of the two grounds should therefore fail, and it is also useful to notice in this connection the following passage from the common order passed by the District Court: "It is settled law that a landlord seeking eviction of a tenant from the building rented out to him on the ground that he bona fide needs the building for his own occupation, need not, after evicting the tenant, occupy the building in the very same state in which it is at the time the tenant is evicted, and it is open to him to reconstruct the building and make it more fit for his own occupation. This position was in fact not challenged before me at the time of hearing." 8. The second point raised, as a corollary to the first, is that having ordered eviction under S.11 (4) (iv) also, the courts below should have, under the third proviso to the sub-section given the first option to the tenants to occupy the reconstructed building. This position was in fact not challenged before me at the time of hearing." 8. The second point raised, as a corollary to the first, is that having ordered eviction under S.11 (4) (iv) also, the courts below should have, under the third proviso to the sub-section given the first option to the tenants to occupy the reconstructed building. Such an option could not obviously have been given where eviction for own occupation was allowed under S 11 (3) also. The giving of such an option under similar circumstances was held to be illegal, in Narayana Panicker & another v. Daveed Sail (1968 KLJ. 478). A fervent plea was of course made, with the support of the decisions of the Supreme Court in Jivabhai v. Chhagan (AIR. 1961 S.C. 1491) and Onkar Nath v. Ved Vyas (AIR. 1980 S.C. 1218), that rent control enactments should be so interpreted as to benefit tenants; and Ammini Pandarathy v. Leelamma (1977 KLT. 441) was cited to contend that the 3rd proviso to S.11 (4) (iv) confers a valuable right on the tenant The latter decision of this Court takes the view that where a landlord proposes to reconstruct a residential building in the place of a non-residential one, no eviction at all could be ordered as its effect would be to deprive the tenant of his option; and if this were to be followed, ail that I need do is to set aside the orders of the court below in so far as they relate to eviction under S.11 (4) (iv), leaving the other part in tact. The result would only be to deprive the petitioners of many of their other contentions. 9. The third contention of the petitioners is that eviction could not be ordered at all under S.11 (3), where a landlord proposes to build a residential house in the place of non-residential buildings; and the decision pressed into service is the one by the Supreme Court in Bhapuba Mohanbai v. Mahila Sahakari Udyog Mandir ((1975) 2 S. C. C. 492). That was a case which arose under Bombay Act 57/47, where S.13 (1) (g) provided for eviction if the landlord "reasonably and bona fide" required the building for own occupation, and S.25 provided that a landlord should not use and should not also permit the tenant to use a residential building for non-residential purpose. That was a case which arose under Bombay Act 57/47, where S.13 (1) (g) provided for eviction if the landlord "reasonably and bona fide" required the building for own occupation, and S.25 provided that a landlord should not use and should not also permit the tenant to use a residential building for non-residential purpose. The application by the landlord was to recover possession of a residential building for being used as fair price shops, provision stores and godowns. The court held that use of a residential building for non-residential purposes of the above nature was prohibited by S.25, and that what was prohibited by law could not be considered as "reasonable" for the purposes of S.13 (1) (g) The provisions of Kerala Act 2/65 are different; the word "reasonably" does not appear in S.11 (3) and there is also no embargo in the Act against a landlord demolishing a residential building and constructing a non-residential one in its place, as in S.25 of the Bombay Act. The decision cannot therefore be of any assistance. 10. Counsel argued, somewhat vehemently, that S.17 (1) of the Kerala Act is similar in content to S.25 of the Bombay Act. S.17 reads: "Conversion of buildings and failure by landlord to make necessary repairs. (1)No residential building shall be converted into a non-residential building or vice versa and no such building shall be divided into separate portions for letting on rent for other purposes except with the permission in writing of the Accommodation Controller: Provided that where such conversion involves structural alteration of the building, the consent of the landlord shall also be necessary. (2) Notwithstanding any law, custom, usage or contract to the contrary, the landlord shall be bound to attend to the periodical maintenance and necessary repairs of the building. If a landlord fails to attend to such maintenance or repairs to the buildings and amenities thereto within a reasonable time after notice is given by the tenant, it shall be competent for the Accommodation Controller to direct on application by the tenant that such maintenance and repairs may be attended to by the tenant and that the charges and cost thereof may be deducted with interest at six per cent per annum from the rent which is payable by him". The proviso to Sub-section (1) indicates, as held in Ammini Pandarathi (1977 KLT 441), that the prohibition in the sub-section is directed against tenants only. It is also possible to read the sub-section, though couched in negative language, as a provision enabling tenants to make minor alterations to the building let out to them, with the permission of the Accommodation Controller and in spite of landlords' objections, so long as they do not involve structural changes to the building. It is common knowledge that many tenants occupying residential premises on the road side use the front portions for carrying on a small business, say, in pan and tobacco, coupled with sale of cool drinks and the like. The capital invested will be negligible and the trade will sustain a family where its bread-winner is too old for physical work. It will often supplement the family's resources. Now, if the building has been let out only for being used as a residence, the landlord may conceivably start a litigation for breach of covenant, for the only reason that a room has been partitioned by a bamboo-mat screen to convert that portion into a 'shop'. Where the conversion is more substantial, an attempt at eviction is also possible, alleging reduction or destruction of the value and utility of the building. The legislature apparently thought that tenants should not be exposed to such flimsy accusations and should be permitted to make minor alterations, even if prohibited by the contract, under the supervision of the Accommodation Controller. The provisions of sub-s (2) also suggest that the legislative attempt was to do away with some other oppressive provisions of the contract of tenancy, a contract between unequals, by bringing in the Accommodation Controller to the extent provided. So understood, the purpose of S.17(1) may not be to prohibit anything being done, but to permit the doing of something otherwise considered impermissible. Suffice it to say that S.17(1) of our Act is dissimilar in language and content to S.25 of the Bombay Act. The decision in Bhapubai is thus insufficient to whittle down the scope of S.11(3) as explained by the two decisions of this Court earlier noticed, even if it is assumed that 'conversion' and 'reconstruction' denote the same thing. 11. Firm Punjumal Doulatram v. Sakhi Gopal (AIR 1977 SC. The decision in Bhapubai is thus insufficient to whittle down the scope of S.11(3) as explained by the two decisions of this Court earlier noticed, even if it is assumed that 'conversion' and 'reconstruction' denote the same thing. 11. Firm Punjumal Doulatram v. Sakhi Gopal (AIR 1977 SC. 2077) does not also affect the position, as the provisions there considered (Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961) were entirely different. The contention that eviction cannot be allowed under S.11(3) if it involves conversion of a residential building into a non-residential one, cannot therefore succeed. 12. The fourth point urged is that it was for the the landlord to prove, under the second proviso to S.11(3), that no other suitable buildings were available in the locality for the tenants to carry on their trades; but the Division Bench decision in Kochappan Pillai v. Chellappan (1976 KLT 1) concludes the question against the petitioners 13. The finding on the availability of alternate accommodation is also attacked as perverse. It is argued that the tenants concerned had stated from the witness box that no such accommodation was available. The courts below were obviously not prepared to accept the assertions as true, without anything more, and it is not for this Court to say otherwise, in the present proceedings. 14. The last point, ingenious indeed, is that eviction of the 'residential tenants' alone would have satisfied the landlord's need for extra space, and that the trading tenants could have been spared on that basis. The five tenants are under a common roof and if demolition for reconstruction is necessary, it is difficult to see how the suggestion could have been accepted No data were also available for working out the details. And on what principle any particular tenant could be marked out for receiving the marching order. All the points thus fail and the revision petitions are therefore dismissed. Parties will bear their own costs. Dismiss.