Order This is a petition to quash the proceedings in C.C. No. 341 of 1979 on the file of the Court of the V Metropolitan Magistrate, Hyderabad. 2. A private complaint was filed before the V. Metropolitan Magistrate, Hyderabad. It was sent for investigation under section 156 (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Station House Officer, Nampally Police Station, after due investigation, filed the charge-sheet against the accused for offences punishable under sections 120-B ,468 and 471 of the Indian Penal Code. 3. The case of the prosecution is that the complaint is the owner of the shop bearing municipal Nos. 5-7-568 to 5-7-575, situated at Nampally, Hyderabad and that A-3 and A-4 are the tenants. A-1 is the son of A-2. They have cloth business opposite to the shop of the owner i.e., the complainant. The complainant wanted to sell the shops as he was getting very low rent and he made this known to some of the accused. Therefore, A-3 and A-4 were afraid that the shops would be purchased by somebody else and A-4 and A-4 would be asked to vacate these shops. Therefore, A-1 and A-2 with the evil intention of getting the shops for a negligible price, conspired with A-3 and A-4 and fabricated a document by using a revenue stamp containing the signature of the complainant in favour of A-1 and also brought into existence a forged receipt for a sum of Rs. 10,000. On the basis of this document, A-1 filed a suit for specific performance of the agreement of sale. On the basis of the above facts mentioned in the charge-sheet, the learned Magistrate took cognizance of the offences punishable under sections 120-B , 468 and 471, Indian Penal Code. 3. In this petition Mr. Somakonda Reddy, the learned Advocate, strenuously contends that having regard to the provisions of section 195(i) (b) (ii) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the private complainant of the SHO Nampally Police Station, cannot file the charge-sheet. If at all, a complaint would be filed in writing by the Court before which the civil suit for specific performance of the agreement of sale on the basis of the alleged forged document is pending. If at all, a complaint would be filed in writing by the Court before which the civil suit for specific performance of the agreement of sale on the basis of the alleged forged document is pending. The learned Advocate further submits that although the offence punishable under section 468 , Indian Penal Code, is not specifically mentioned in section 195 (i) (b) (ii) , Criminal Procedure Code, nevertheless, having regard to the opening phrase “of any offence described in section 463” found in the clause ( ii) of section 195(1)(b) , Criminal Procedure Code, the offence punishable under section 468 , Indian Penal Code, would also within the category of the offence described in section 463. So far as section 120-B, Indian Penal Code, is concerned, Mr. Somakonda Reddy states that section 195(i)(b)(ii), Criminal Procedure Code, specifically provides for that offence. Therefore, submits the learned Advocate that so far as these offences are concerned, the trial Court has taken cognizance of the offences punishable under sections 120-B , 468 and 471 , Indian Penal Code, on the basis of the charge-sheet filed by the Police, whereas all these three sections are found in section 195 (1) (b) (ii) and (iii), Criminal Procedure Code, and, therefore, since the prosecution has not been laid on the basis of a complaint in writing by the civil Court before which the alleged document is pending decision, the proceedings, are liable to be quashed., 5. Mr. Padmanabha Reddy, the learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the private complainant, contends that a perusal of section 195(i)(b)(ii) , Criminal Procedure Code, would show that only those offences which are described in section 463 , Indian Penal Code, and mentioned specifically as punishable under sections 471 , 475 or section 476 are the only offences for which the Court can take cognizance of on the basis of the complaint in writing of that Court before which the civil suit is pending. Therefore, since sections 468 , 120-B read with 468 are involved in this case, with regard to which section 195 (1) (b) (a) , Criminal Procedure Code, is completely silent, the trial Court was correct in taking cognizance of the offence punishable under sections 120-B and 468. So far as section 471 is concerned, Mr. Therefore, since sections 468 , 120-B read with 468 are involved in this case, with regard to which section 195 (1) (b) (a) , Criminal Procedure Code, is completely silent, the trial Court was correct in taking cognizance of the offence punishable under sections 120-B and 468. So far as section 471 is concerned, Mr. Padmanabha Reddy contends that, section 471 as mentioned in sub-clause (ii) of section 195 (1) (b) only applies to the parties to the document and to no other person. Hence, he submits that the proceedings should not be quashed. In support of his contention, Mr. Padmanabha Reddy has cited: Govind Mehta v. State of Bihar1 and Yellappa Gowder v. State of Karnataka2. 6. Mr. Somakonda Reddy has cited the following rulings: Assistant Sessions Judge, North Arcot v. Ramammal and four others3, Montajaddin and Dena Nath v. Hansraj5. 7. I am of the opinion, having regard to the circumstances of the case and the provisions of law involved, that the contention advanced by Mr. Somakonda Reddy has to be accepted. 8. In this case, we are not concerned with section 195 (1) (a) , but are conferred with section 195 (1) (b) (ii) and (iii), which provides as follows: “195 (1) No Court shall cognizance: (b) (ii) of any offence described in section 463 , punishable under section 471 , section 475 or section 476, of the said Code, when such an offence is alleged to have been committed in respect of a document produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in any Court, or (iii) of any criminal conspiracy to commit, attempt to commit, or the abetment of, any offence specified in sub-clause (i) or sub-clause ( ii), except on the complaint in writing of that Court, or of some other Court to which that Court is subordinate”. A plain reading of this section would show that for offences mentioned in clause (b) (ii) and (iii) of section 195 (1), Criminal Procedure Code, the Court can take cognizance of those offences only when the complaint is in writing filed by the Court or some other Court to which that Court is subordinate, before which the document in question is found to be a forged one and the accused before that Court are found to have committed any offence. In the instant case, on the basis of the alleged forged document, the accused have filed a suit in the civil Court. Therefore, it would be, the civil Court which would be the proper complainant in this case and not a Private individual or the police. As pointed out above, the trial Court has taken cognizance of the offence punishable under sections 120-B , 468 and 471, Indian Penal Code. Section 195 (1) (b) (iii) applies to section 120-B , Indian Penal Code, specifically and similarly section 195 (1) (b) (ii) also includes specifically the offence punishable under section 461, Indian Penal Code. Therefore, so far as these offences are concerned, taking cognizance by the Court is hit by the provisions of section 195 (1) (b) (ii) and (iii), Criminal Procedure Code. The main dispute centres round section 468, Indian Penal Code, which is being attracted in respect of commission of offence of forgery for the purpose of cheating. Mr. Padmanabha Reddy contends that, having regard to the phrase “of any offence described in section 463” only those offences of forgery simpliciter as mentioned in section 463 , Indian Penal Code, will be hit by the provisions of section 195 (1) (b) (ii) , Criminal Procedure Code, and not offences punishable under section 468 , Indian Penal Code, because section 468 has not specifically been mentioned in sub-clause (ii) of clause (b) of section 195 (1), Criminal Procedure Code. In support of this contention Mr. Padmanabha Reddy relies on a ruling of the Supreme Court reported in Govind Mehta v. State of Bihar1. It is true that I am bound by the ruling of the Supreme Court. But, in order to be bound, it is necessary that the Supreme Court had applied its mind and had considered the provisions of law and had given a considered opinion on that point of law. But, where the Supreme Court decides a case on the basis of a concession or admission made by an advocate on behalf of a party, then, in that case, the effect of such a decision would not be so potent as one based on a consideration of a question of law involved. But, where the Supreme Court decides a case on the basis of a concession or admission made by an advocate on behalf of a party, then, in that case, the effect of such a decision would not be so potent as one based on a consideration of a question of law involved. It is to be noted that in a Govind Mehta's case6 the Supreme Court has held in paragraph 14 as follows: “We have referred to the sections of the Penal Code under which the appellant has been charged. They are sections 167 ,466 and 471. Admittedly, none of these sections is covered by clause (b) of section 195 (1). Therefore, clause (b) prima facie will not in terms bar the jurisdiction of the Magistrate to take cognizance of the offence under section 167 of the Penal Code”. In paragraph 15, the Supreme Court held: ‘The offence under section 466 of the Penal Code is, admittedly, not covered by clause (b) or clause (c) of section 195 (1) of the Code. Therefore, that section does not operate as a bar in respect of this offence”. It would he noticed that the decision in this case was on the basis of an admission made by the Counsel and not on a consideration of the provision of section 195 (1) (b) (ii) and specially the phrase appearing in sub-clause (ii) viz., “of any offence described in section 463”. I am of the opinion that section 463 defines a forgery simpliciter whereas the following sections i.e., sections 465 ,466 ,467 ,468 ,469 ,470 and471 define an aggravated form of forgery. Hence, to my mind, the Supreme Court ruling does not help the respondent in this case; and in the fight of the phrases “of any offence described in section 463 ”, section 468 also will be hit by the provisions of section 195 (1) (b) (ii) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. I am supported in my view by a judgment of the Jammu and Kashmir High Court in Dena Nath v. Hansraj2 9. I am supported in my view by a judgment of the Jammu and Kashmir High Court in Dena Nath v. Hansraj2 9. So far as the offence punishable under section 471 is concerned, the phrase “by a party to any proceeding in any Court” appearing in section 196 (1) (c) of the old Code of Criminal Procedure, is not to be found in the new Code of Criminal Procedure and instead, the words “when such an offence is alleged to have been committed in respect of a document produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in any Court”, now appear. Therefore, in the light of this amendment, the contention advanced by Mr. Padmanabha Reddy in respect of section 471 cannot be accepted. 10. Hence, to my mind, the proceedings in C.C. No. 341 of 1979 on the file of the Court of the V Metropolitan Magistrate, Hyderabad are liable to be quashed and are hereby quashed. G. S. M. ----- Petition allowed.