Judgment This Rule is directed against an appellate order where by an appeal from a decision of the learned Munsif in a pre-emption proceeding was allowed in part. The pre-emption proceeding arises out of an application under S. 8 of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955. The present opposite party No.1 as the pre-emptor filed an application under S. 8 of the said Act praying for an order enabling him to exercise his right of pre-emption in respect of .02 acres of land which was transferred by one of the co-sharers of the holding in question to the present petitioners. The learned Munsif allowed the application for pre-emption. He however found that the consideration that passed at the time of the lflll1sfer on the basis whereof the pre-emption is claimed was Rs. 1000/- and not Rs. 3000/- as stated in the kobala in question. 2. On appeal by the present petitioners before the court of appeal below, it was held that Rs. 3000/- was the consideration and not Rs. 1000/- as found by the learned Munsif. The appellate court however affirmed the learned Munsif's order granting pre-emption. 3. Mr. Saktinath Mukherjee, learned Advocate appearing in support of the Rule contends, in the first place, flat the application under S. 8 does not disclose such materials as are pre-requisites of an application under S. 8 of the said Act and that on that ground alone the application for pre-emption should have been dismissed. Mr. Mukherjee further contends that the land in question was not agricultural land and that accordingly the application under section S of the said Act will not lie. 4. In support of the first contention of his, Mr. Mukherjee relies on the decision in Saranan Mondal & Anr. v. Bejoy Bhusan Ghosh, AIR 1979 Cal 174 ; In that case it is held that before an application under S. 8 of the said Act may lie it is incumbent on the petitioner to state that there was transfer of either a portion or a share of the holding of a raiyat and that in the absence of the such an averment the application should be dismissed. In the said application under S. 8 it is stated, inter alia, that the land in question originally belonged to the father of the applicant and others, that though at the time of preparation of the Record of Rights that land was recorded as sali the father of the applicant constructed several shop rooms on the land which was by the side of a big thoroughfare known as Benaras Road and that after the death of the father of the applicant his heirs and legal representatives were possessing the same by realising rents. It is further case of the applicant appearing from paragraph 2 of the said application under S. 8 that after the Government demolished those rooms for the purpose of widening the said big thoroughfare, the applicant at a considerable cost built new rooms in 1975 including five shop rooms and has been in possession of the same by realising rents from the tenants. Thus the case of the applicant is that even though at the time of the settlement record the land in question was recorded as sali laud which means agricultural land, it was not used as such but it was used for purposes non-agricultural by constructing shop rooms thereon and by inducting tenants in those rooms. Nowhere in the said application under S. 8 did the applicant state that the transfer made by the O.P. No. 3 Sabitri Bala, who was one of the co sharers in respect of the land, to the present petitioner was a transfer of a share or a portion of a holding of a raiyat. On the other hand the averments referred to above would show that there were room, constructed on the land in question and those rooms were let out to tenants and were being used as shop rooms. 5. Mr. Bankim Chandra Dutta, learned Advocate appearing for the opposite party contends that the character of the land should be determined with reference to its user at the time of the Record of Rights. According to Mr. Dutta, when the land was recorded as sali in the R.S. Record the courts below rightly held that the land in question was agricultural land and accordingly a transfer of a portion or a share of that holding would attract the provisions of S. 8 of the said Act. According to Mr. Dutta, when the land was recorded as sali in the R.S. Record the courts below rightly held that the land in question was agricultural land and accordingly a transfer of a portion or a share of that holding would attract the provisions of S. 8 of the said Act. In this regard, the definition of a raiyat as contained in S. 2(10) of the said Act is material. There, 'raiyat' has been defined as meaning a person who holds land for purposes of agriculture. It is significant to note in this connection that even though the Record of Rights was prepared much earlier the provisions of S. 2(10) of the said Act and also S. 8 of the said Act came into force on October 22, 1963. Accordingly, the point of time which is material for, determining whether a person holds land for purposes of agriculture must be not the point of time when the Record of Rights was pro pared but the time when the said provisions of the Act, viz., S. 2(10) and S. 8 came into force. If on October 22, 1963 the land in question was held for purposes of agriculture, the holder of such land would be regarded as raiyat within the meaning of S. 2(10) of the said Act. It appears from the deposition of Ganesh, the applicant under S. 8 that his father died some 15 or 17 years before the date of his deposition. He was deposing in 1977. Accordingly his father died sometime between 1960 and 1962. Thus the father of Ganesh died before the said S. 2(10) and S. 8 of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act came into force. Further according to the averment made in the said application under S. 8, the father of Ganesh constructed shop rooms on the land in question and there was no whisper about the agricultural user of the said land from the time of the construction of the shop room by the father of Ganesh, the applicant. In the circumstances, there is no escape from the conclusion that the land in question was being used for purposes other than agriculture. In that view of the matter, transfer of a portion of such a holding cannot confer on a co-sharer of such holding the right of pre-emption under S. 8 of the said Act. In the circumstances, there is no escape from the conclusion that the land in question was being used for purposes other than agriculture. In that view of the matter, transfer of a portion of such a holding cannot confer on a co-sharer of such holding the right of pre-emption under S. 8 of the said Act. On that ground alone, the application under S. 8 should have been dismissed. In this regard, Mr. Dutta, learned Advocate appearing for the opposite party, contends that when there is a concurrent finding of the courts below' to the effect that there was a portion of a raiyati holding transferred, this court exercising its revisional power cannot go into that question again as that is a question of fact. This contention of Mr. Dutta is repelled by Mr. Mukherjee, appearing for the petitioner, on the strength of the principle laid down in in Rukmini Devi v. Mihir Bala Sarkar, 81 CWN 481 and Pandurang Dhondi Chougule & ors v. Maruti Hari Jadhav & ors, AIR 1966 SC 153 Before I advert to the principle laid down in those two cases, I like to point out that the question raised before me in this Rule by Mr. Mukherjee is seeminglya question of fact but it cannot be regarded as a question of fact simpliciter. It is a question of fact on the determination of which the question whether the courts below did have jurisdiction or not would depend. In the case of Rukmini Devi (supra), it is laid down that when the jurisdiction of a court or tribunal is dependent on the existence of certain state of affairs, the existence of such facts will have to be determined by the court for the purposes of ascertaining whether the court has or has not jurisdiction to entertain the Case. In the Supreme Court decision referred to above, it is held that as a general rule, the High Court cannot interfere while exercising its jurisdiction under S. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, to correct errors of fact, however gross they may be, or even errors of law. It is further laid down that the High Court can do so when the said errors have relation to the jurisdiction of the court to try the dispute itself. It is further laid down that the High Court can do so when the said errors have relation to the jurisdiction of the court to try the dispute itself. According to S.115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the High Court can interfere in revision when the subordinate court exercised jurisdiction not vested in it by law, refused to exercise its jurisdiction so vested or acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity. Thus when in answering a question as to whether a particular court has or has lot jurisdiction to entertain a case, certain questions of fact have to be decided. Such questions ceased to be questions of fact simpliciter, as they relate to question of jurisdiction of a court. In the present case, the courts below would have jurisdiction to entertain an application under S. 8 of the ,aid Act only if there is a holding of a raiyat and a portion or a share of such holding is transferred by one or more of the co-sharers of such holding. So to determine the question whether the trial court did have jurisdiction to entertain the said application under S. 8, the court in view of the objection taken by the pre-emptees, should have first determined whether the land in question was being held by a raiyat. In view of the definition of 'raiyat' referred to above, a person would be a raiyat only if he holds land for purposes of agriculture. Thus the court would be called upon in the present case to determine whether the land in question was being held for purposes of agriculture. In view of what is stated above. I find no substance in the contention of Mr. Dutta when he wants me not to interfere with the finding of fact in this regard by the courts below, in exercise of my revisional jurisdiction under S. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 6. In answering the first contention of Mr. Mukherjee, I have also in effect answered the second contention raised by him. According to him, the land in question was not agricultural, for, it was used at the relevant time for purposes other than agriculture. This is patent from what is stated in the application under S. 8 itself. I have referred to those material averments earlier. I need not repeat them. According to him, the land in question was not agricultural, for, it was used at the relevant time for purposes other than agriculture. This is patent from what is stated in the application under S. 8 itself. I have referred to those material averments earlier. I need not repeat them. It will appear from those statements that the applicant himself took the stand that from the time of the father of the applicant, the land in question was not being used fur agricultural purposes, When in the original application under S 8 there are those statements the burden on the pre-emptee is very much lightened. Further the pre-emptee also adduced evidence to the effect that the land in question was used for purposes other then agriculture. In this regard, Mr. Dutla draws my attention to the schedule to the Kobala whereby the transfer which forms the basis of the application for pre-emption was made. There, there is a reference to sali land. Mr. Mukherjee in this regard rightly contends that in the schedule the reference to sali land was there, for, the parties had described the land in terms of what appeared in the Revisional Settlement Record of Rights. Further that description of the land appearing in the schedule loses much of its importance in view of the fact that there is clear averment in the application under S. 8 itself to the effect that the land in question was being used for purposes other than agriculture. Mr. Dutta referred me to a statement made by Bholanath, one of the pre-emptees During his deposition, he stated that the opposite party no. 3 meaning Sabitri Bala who was the transferor of the land in question planted some vegetables. This statement should not be read dissociated from its context. If the statement is read in its proper context, it will appear that by so saying, Bholanath, one of the co-sharers, intended to say that Sabitri Bala was exercising her possession by planting some vegetables. The fact that Sabitri Bala planted some vegetables cannot detract from the agricultural character of the land in the aforesaid circumstances. I cannot but hold that the courts below had no jurisdiction to entertain the said application under S. 8 inasmuch an the land in question was not used for agricultural purposes and the holding, therefore, was not that of a raiyat, 6. I cannot but hold that the courts below had no jurisdiction to entertain the said application under S. 8 inasmuch an the land in question was not used for agricultural purposes and the holding, therefore, was not that of a raiyat, 6. In the result, the Rule is made absolute and the impugned orders are set aside and the application under S. 8 is dismissed. There will however be no order for costs. Rule made absolute.