ORDER 1. This revision has been filed be the State of Maharashtra through the Secretary, Home Department of the Government of Maharashtra. Respondent No. I was employed in the State of Maharashtra and was serving as a wireless operator in the Government of Maharashtra. He was dismissed by an order dated 17-8- 1973 issued from Maharashtra. It was served on him on 28-8-1973 at his home address in district Pratapgarh. He filed the suit in 1976 in the Court of the Munsif Kunda in Pratapgarh claiming relief against the order dismissing him from the service. 2. An objection was raised on behalf of the State of Maharashtra to the effect that the suit was not cognizable in a Civil Court in Pratapgarh. The trial court has negatived the contention. Against the order refusing to return the plaint for presentation to proper court and proceeding with the suit the defendant Secretary. Home Department of the Government of Maharashtra has preferred this revision. The suit is admittedly governed by the Code of Civil Procedure. Section 20 of the Code provides that a suit can be instituted either at the place of residence of the defendant or in a court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the cause of action wholly or in part arises. According to the plaintiff a part of the cause of action for the suit arose in Pratapgarh where the order of dismissal was served on him. The contention of the applicant-defendant is that no part of cause of action arose in Pratapgarh as the order had been passed finally in Maharashtra and the mere communication of the order could not be sufficient to give rise to a cause of action in Pratapgarh. 3. Cause of action as is well-known means every fact which it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right to the judgment of the Court, but it does not comprise every piece of evidence which is necessary to prove each fact but every fact which is necessary to he proved (AIR 1937 All 208 Guardian Assurance Co. v. Shiva Mangal Singh), Cooke v. Gill, (1873)8 CP 107 : 42 LJ CP 98 : 28 L T 32 : 21 W R 334, Murti v. Bhola Ram (1894) ILR 16 All 165: 1894 All W N 65 (FB). v. Shiva Mangal Singh), Cooke v. Gill, (1873)8 CP 107 : 42 LJ CP 98 : 28 L T 32 : 21 W R 334, Murti v. Bhola Ram (1894) ILR 16 All 165: 1894 All W N 65 (FB). and Chand Kour v. Partap Singh (1889) ILR 16 Cal 98 : 15 Ind App 156: 5 Sar 243 (PC). The plaintiff could therefore institute the suit in Pratapgarh if the service of dismissal order would constitute a part of the cause of action. 4. In the State of Punjab v. Amar Singh I AIR 1966 S C 1313) it was held that (at p. 1316). "an order of dismissal passed by an appropriate authority and kept on its file without communicating it to the officer concerned or otherwise publishing it will take effect as from the date on which the order is actually written out by the said authority; such an order can only be effective after it is communicated to the officer concerned or is otherwise published." The order in question therefore could take effect only on the date it was served on the plaintiff. The service of the order was ,therefore a necessary cause of action in the transaction. 5. The learned counsel for the applicant defendant has contended that the service of the dismissal order even though may be a part of the total cause of action it was not sufficient to give jurisdiction to the Civil Court in Pratapgarh because the defendant could not be interested in denying the service of the order on the plaintiff and hence the question of proof would not arise. What the defence would be is wholly immaterial for determining the question whether the suit is cognizable in Pratapgarh or not because if a cause of action has arisen in Pratapgarh the suit by reason of clause (c) of section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure would be maintainable in Pratapgarh. Whether the defendant will deny or admit a fact cannot be the determining factor for the plaintiffs selecting the forum for the institution of the suit. The plaintiff cannot expect or presume that the defendant will admit the date of service of the order. Unless the plaintiff proves the service on a particular date the, suit may be thrown out on the ground that it is not proved to he within limitation. The plaintiff cannot expect or presume that the defendant will admit the date of service of the order. Unless the plaintiff proves the service on a particular date the, suit may be thrown out on the ground that it is not proved to he within limitation. Cause) of action for a suit to challenge the order of dismissal depends the service of the order also for the purpose of calculating limitation for the suit. 6. In S. R. Goel v. Municipal Board, Kanpur (AIR 1958 S C 1036) it was held (at p. 1042) : "The cause of action in the present case accrued to the appellant the moment the resolution of the Board was communicated to him and that was the date of the commencement of the limitation. The remedy, if any, by way of filing a suit against the Board in respect of his wrongful dismissal was available to him from that date and it was open to him to pursue that remedy within the period of limitation prescribed under Section t 326 of the Act." The plaintiff could therefore fail if he did not prove that the suit was within limitation from the date of the service of the order. It was accordingly a necessary cause of action for the institution of the suit. 7. Learned counsel placed reliance on an unreported decision of learned single Judge of this Court in Union of India v. Ratan Singh (Civil Revn. No. 1042 of 1975 decided on 14-12-1977) : (since reported in 1978 Lab I C 448 (All)). In that case the plaintiff had instituted the suit in Kanpur where he was initially appointed and posted. He was later on transferred to other places and t disciplinary proceedings as well as the order of dismissal was passed outside Kanpur. It was held that the suit could not be instituted in Kanpur because it was not necessary for the plaintiff to prove that he was appointed in service in Kanpur because the question was not of appointment but of dismissal and the necessary cause of action for such a suit could arise only where actions connected with his dismissal were taken. That case has therefore no relevance to the present case. 8. The case relied upon by the learned counsel is Ujjal v. Netai Chand ( AIR 1969 Cal 224 ). That case has therefore no relevance to the present case. 8. The case relied upon by the learned counsel is Ujjal v. Netai Chand ( AIR 1969 Cal 224 ). In that case it was held that the cause of action arose as soon as the resolution was passed and communicated. The second formal communication of the resolution could not confer jurisdiction on the court of the place where the formal notice was subsequently served. In the present case, the order by which the decision of dismissal has been communicated and made effective was according to the parties served at no place other than Pratapgarh. 9. Another case on which reliance has been placed by the learned counsel is the Full Bench decision of this Court in Zila Parishad v. Shanti Devi, ( AIR 1965 All 590 ). It was held therein that for purposes of jurisdiction the actions of the defendant are relevant and not those of the plaintiff. the plaintiff cannot by his own action confer jurisdiction on a court. The learned counsel contended that this case helps him because the plaintiff in the present case had by his own option left the State of Maharashtra and come to Pratapgarh and it was because of this that the order had to be served in Pratapgarh. It is contended that by changing his place of residence the plaintiff cannot confer jurisdiction on courts in Pratapgarh. The fallacy in the argument is that the learned counsel seeks to regard the change of residence by the plaintiff as the basis or part of the cause of action for the suit. It is the action of the defendant in serving the order on the plaintiff that has given rise to the cause of action and not the change of residence by the plaintiff. The post office through which the order was served was the agent of the defendant and the service of the order was the action of the defendant himself. That action was performed in Pratapgarh and the Pratapgarh court will therefore have jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The suit was accordingly maintainable in Pratapgarh. 10. In the result, the revision fails and is dismissed with costs.