S. P. S. Selvaraj v. V. Muthusamy Naicker — 1980 DIGILAW 264 (MAD)

Judgment :- This appeal coming on for hearing on this day the court delivered the following order:- 2. This is a petition under section 10 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (Act No. 70 of 1971) filed by one S.P.S Selvaraj who will be herein after referred to as the petitioner, against V. Muthuswamy Naicker: the respondent. The petitioner is a partner of a firm known as M/s S.P.S Jayam & Co. which manufactures tooth powder, which is marketed under the name and style of "Gopal Tooth Powder". It has a registered trade mark, the mark having been registered on 30th April 1947 in class 3 as Mark No. 129120 in relation to the tooth powder under the law then in force viz., the Trade Marks Act, 1940. It has been renewed subsequently under the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958. It is claimed that the firms annual turnover is in the reign of Rs. 50.000 and it spends on advertisement through various media a sum of Rs. 4, 00, 000. A packet of tooth powder manufactured by the firm is said to cost about 35 paise. 3. The respondent was found to be marketing tooth powder in similar packets under the name and style of Ram Gopal Tooth Powder. A complaint was lodged before the Police and the respondent was prosecuted in C.C. No. 126 of 1971 before the Additional First Class Magistrate No. II Madurai. He was found guilty under sections 482, 483, 485, 487 and 488 of the Indian Penal Code read with the sections 78 and 79 of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958, He was sentenced to undergo three months simple imprisonment. There was an appeal to the Sessions Court, Madurai, which was dismissed on 26th February 1972. 4. Subsequently the respondent continued to trade in tooth powder in packets similar to those of the petitioner. The petitioner filed O.S.No. of 1978 in the Court of the District Judge, Madurai in accordance with the provisions of sections 105 and 106 of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act 1958. There was a prayer for permanent injunction and other relief's. The respondent submitted to decree on 16th November, 1976. 5. The petitioner filed O.S.No. of 1978 in the Court of the District Judge, Madurai in accordance with the provisions of sections 105 and 106 of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act 1958. There was a prayer for permanent injunction and other relief's. The respondent submitted to decree on 16th November, 1976. 5. During the tendency of the aforesaid suit the respondent was found again to be selling tooth powder in packets similar to those of the petitioner and a notice was issued by the petitioner through his counsel on 28th November, 1973 to the respondent threatening further proceedings. It is stated that the activities of the respondent has subsided for sometime, but again in the middle of 1976 there was a resumption of the trade in the name and style of lion brand tooth powder. There was a change in the manufacturing address which was originally in the name and style of Sri Murugan Chemicals, and which was changed to N.S.M. & Sons. Sri Prakash Cottage Industry, Madurai. O.S. No. 17 of 1976 was filed by the petitioner in accordance with the provisions of sections 105 and 106 of the act and on 28th October 1976, the defendant appeared in person and submitted to a decree as prayed for. Consequently, there was and injunction restraining the respondent from using his label lion brand tooth powder. It is alleged that as the malpractice continued, the petitioner has comeforward with the present petition under section 10 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 for committing him for contempt consequent on the willful violation and disobedience of the order of injunction passed in O.S. No. 17 of 1976 on 28th October, 1976. 6. The respondent filed a counter denying the allegations made in the affidavit in support of the petition under section 10 of the Act. 7. During the course of the hearing the petitioner marked Exs. P. 1 to P. 6 Exs. P. 1 and P-2 are the bills said to have been issued by the respondent. Ex. P. 3 is one packet of lion brand tooth powder for which Ex. P. 4 bill was issued on the 6th March 1980. E. P. 6 is a bundle of 10 packets of lion brand tooth powder said to have been sold by the respondent. The petitioner's Manager one Mr. P. James was examined as P.W. 1. Ex. P. 3 is one packet of lion brand tooth powder for which Ex. P. 4 bill was issued on the 6th March 1980. E. P. 6 is a bundle of 10 packets of lion brand tooth powder said to have been sold by the respondent. The petitioner's Manager one Mr. P. James was examined as P.W. 1. He stated that he went with one Chandran and purchased 60 packets of tooth powder. On 14.9.1978. This Chandran is said to be an employees of Topaz Private Investigations Madurai and to prove that the said Chandran was an employee of Topaz Private investigators Ex. P. 5 produced. The respondent marked Exs. D1 and D2 which are respectively packets of tooth powder. Ex D2 relates to the goods which are manufactured by the petitioner. The respondent was also examined as R.W. 1 and according to him he never sold any goods or issued any of the bills, which were produced by the petitioner and which have been marked as mentioned earlier. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the respondent is guilty of willful disobedience of the decree dated 28th October, 1976 in O. S. No. 17 of 1976 on the file of the District Judge Madurai. The earlier proceedings were referred to as showing that the respondent was bent upon violating court's order without the least compunction. It was therefore, contended that a different sentence should be passed on the respondent so that he did not indulge in such activities at any rate hereafter. 8. For the respondent Mr. R. S. Venkatachari has learned counsel, took two objections to the maintainability of the present petition. The first submission was that the proceeding for contempt was not available in any case where it was open to a party to execute a decree that was passed against him and that contempt proceedings should not be used as a mechanism or substitute for execution. His second submission was that section 10 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, provided that the High Court shall not take cognizance of a contempt alleged to have been committed in respect of a court subordinate to High Court where such contempt is an offence punishable under the Indian Panel Code. The Point urged was that assuming without admitting that there was an infringement of the trade mark of the petitioner. The Point urged was that assuming without admitting that there was an infringement of the trade mark of the petitioner. The petitioner could also take proceeding in criminal court as he did earlier and that the present proceedings were, therefore, incompetent and unsustainable. There was also a third contention that there was no violation at all of any order or decree of the court and, therefore, there could be no proceedings under the Contempt of Courts Act. 9. It would be convenient to turn to the third contention first as in case it is established that there was no disobedience of any court order or decree. There is no question of any contempt proceedings going on further as against the respondent. In that event, it would be unnecessary to get into the other submissions made on behalf of the respondent. 10. Section 2(b) defines "Civil contempt" as meaning "willful disobedience to any judgment" decree, direction order writ or other process of a court or willful breach of an undertaking given to a court. This is not a case of any undertaking given to the Court. Therefore, the present matter can it at all fall only within the first part of Section 2(b) Section 12 provides that a contempt of court, may be punished with simple imprisonment for a tern which any extend to six months or with fine which may extend to two thousand rupees, or with both. It is in the background of these provisions and on the facts that we have to find out whether there has been a willful disobedience of the order of the Court. 11. It may be seen that originally the respondent suffered a conviction in a criminal court for having committed offences punishable under the Indian Penal Code read with Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958. Subsequently when he started infringing the trade mark again. The petitioner filed a Suit O S. No. 2 of 1972 and the respondent submitted to a decree on 16th November, 1976. The decree was in respect of Ram Gopal tooth powder ". The petitioner took steps to restrain him from doing so. In O. S. No. 17 of 1976 in which also he submitted to a decree on 28th October, 1976. As the present petition alleged to the violations of this decree, it would be useful to refer to the decreetal order. The petitioner took steps to restrain him from doing so. In O. S. No. 17 of 1976 in which also he submitted to a decree on 28th October, 1976. As the present petition alleged to the violations of this decree, it would be useful to refer to the decreetal order. Under the said order the respondent his agents men and representatives were restrained by means of a permanent injunction from using his label filed along with the plaint or any other label which was a colorable imitation of the petitioner's registered trade mark label to the tooth powder packets manufactured and sold by him. We have before us the marks used by the respondent and by the petitioner. Though the respondent stated that he had ceased to use the mark. According to the respondent as R.W. 1 he was supplying only one or two packets to retail dealers and for the supply made by him he had not issued any bills. He did not therefore admit having issued any bill for 60 packets which were sold on 14th September. 1979. The purchase on 14th September, 1979 Ex. P. 2 was by the employee of the detective agents. Similarly on 6th March, 1990, 500 packets were said to have been purchased by one Arunachalam who also an employee of the private detective agents. The bill issued has also been produced. In both these bills R. W. 1 stated that there is no signature and that he had not issued these bills. As regards Ex. P 3 which is a packet of lion brand tooth powder sold to the petitioner. It was stated that he was using the said mark last year and that he was not using the same now. He stated that he did not know if an injunction order was passed or not. But he however, accepted having singed on the plaint compromising the matter. 12. We accept the evidence of P. W. 1 insofar as he stated that he alongwith Chandran to Arunachalam went and purchased the goods with the offending trade mark. Though the bills do not contain any signature we see no reason to disbelieve P.W. 1 when he stated that these bills were issued by the respondent shop. 12. We accept the evidence of P. W. 1 insofar as he stated that he alongwith Chandran to Arunachalam went and purchased the goods with the offending trade mark. Though the bills do not contain any signature we see no reason to disbelieve P.W. 1 when he stated that these bills were issued by the respondent shop. Thus sale of goods as well as the use of the mark in the respondents goods is clearly established looking into the respective labels, we are satisfied that they are deceptively similar and that any unwary purchaser is liable, to be taken in by the mark used by the respondent as if the said mark related to goods of the petitioner. The placing of the lion the way in which the words lion brand tooth powder are printed the way in which the address of the respondent is introduced into the labels all these go to show that the respondent has attempted to make use of a colourable mark which violates the teems of the decree. Though for the respondent it was stated during the hearing that there was a change in the mark and that the placing of the manufacturers' name was different now, still the way in which the mark is printed, is deceptive and it is likely to mislead unwary purchaser. Having regard to the manner in which the labels are printed, we are satisfied that the respondent has insofar as the labels on record are concerned, committed a gross violation of the terms of the decree inspire of having submitted to a decree on his own in the District Court. We are also satisfied from the way in which the respondent has been attempting to circumvent the proceeding taken earlier by trading in different marks deceptively similar to that of the petitioner that the respondent is bent upon violating the terms of the decree. The modus operandi adopted by him is merely to change the name every time some proceeding were taken but continue to use a deceptively similar mark so as to the infringes the petitioner's trade mark. We therefore, find that there is a willful disobedience of the decree to which the respondent himself submitted in the Court below. We reject the contention for the respondent that there has been no infringement of a registered trade mark or violation of the terms of any decree. 13. We therefore, find that there is a willful disobedience of the decree to which the respondent himself submitted in the Court below. We reject the contention for the respondent that there has been no infringement of a registered trade mark or violation of the terms of any decree. 13. In view of this finding are obliged to consider the two other objections of the learned counsel for the respondent. The first contention, as seen earlier, was that the petitioner could execute his decree and that contempt proceeding cannot be use as a substitute for execution. The object of a contempt proceeding is of course to vindicate the dignity of the Court are not a satisfy the grudge of any private individual. 14. Before examining the cases, which were cited to us on this point, we may briefly trance the history, of the law on this point, Inherent powers to commit for contempt exist in Courts of Record. In 1976 Act XII of 1976 was passed. At that time it appears that there were some doubts which had arisen at to powers of a High Court to punish contempts of Courts. The Act was a short one. It contained only three section. Section I contained the short title extent and commencement, Section 2 provided that the High Courts of Judicature established by letters patent have and could exercise the same Jurisdiction, Powers and authority in accordance with the same procedure and practice in respect of contempt of court subordinate to them as they had and exercise in respect of contempt of themselves. Clause (iii) of Section 2 provided that High Court should take cognizance of a Contempt alleged to have been committed in respect of a Court subordinate to it where such contempt was an offence punishable under the Indian Penal Code Section 3 prescribed the punishment for a contempt with simple imprisonment for a term extending to six months or fine extending to two thousand rupees or with both. The accused could be discharged if he tendered an apology and the High Court could not impose any sentence in excess of that prescribed in the statute. Subsequently in 1952 this Act of 1926 was repeated by Act 22 of 1952. This Act which slightly longer also contained only five provisions. The accused could be discharged if he tendered an apology and the High Court could not impose any sentence in excess of that prescribed in the statute. Subsequently in 1952 this Act of 1926 was repeated by Act 22 of 1952. This Act which slightly longer also contained only five provisions. Section 2 defined the High Court as meaning the High Court for a State including the Court of Judicial Commissioner of a Union Territory. Section 3 enacted power to punish contempt's of subordinate Courts and Section 4 imposed the limit of punishment therefore. Section 5 provided that a High Court would have jurisdiction to inquire into or try a contempt of itself or any Court subordinate to it whether the contempt was alleged to have been committed within or outside the local limits of its jurisdiction and whether the person alleged to be guilty of the contempt was within or outside such limits. 15. The present Act of 1971 came to be passed as result of the recommendation of a Committee called the Sanyal Committee, which was presided over by a former, Solicitor General Late H N. Sanyal. It is this Act that there is a definition of 'Civil Contempt' and Criminal Contempt'. More elaborate provisions have been made in this Act which contains 34 sections. It is unnecessary for our present purpose to go into the several provisions of the Act, as we have already referred to sections 2(b) and 12 which are the only material provisions. It is enough to mention here that section 13 provides that no Court could impose a sentence under the Act for a contempt of Court unless it was satisfied that the Contempt was of such a nature that it substantially interfered or tended substantially to interfere with the due course of Justice. 16. Having regard to what we have stated earlier we consider that this is a case where the contempt is of such a nature that is substantially interfere, on substantially to interfere with the due course of Justice. The respondent appears to be taking the Courts' proceedings too lightly. It is in this context that some of the earlier decisions have to be considered. 17. The learned counsel for the respondent drew our attention to some of the Bench decisions of this Court in a Ramalingam Vs V.V. Mahalinga Nadar 1966 AIR(Madras) 21). The respondent appears to be taking the Courts' proceedings too lightly. It is in this context that some of the earlier decisions have to be considered. 17. The learned counsel for the respondent drew our attention to some of the Bench decisions of this Court in a Ramalingam Vs V.V. Mahalinga Nadar 1966 AIR(Madras) 21). The facts are not clear from the judgment. The Court took it that there was a temporary prohibitory injunction which was disobeyed by the respondent in the sense that he had erected buildings in infringement of the temporary prohibitory injunction. In such a case it is obvious that order Rule 2(3) of the Code of Civil provided at a clear and adequate remedy. The court can in such a case exercise the punitive powers against the person in disobedience under the terms of that rule. The question was whether he could be punished for contempt that it is in this context that it was observed that essentially, contempt of court is a matter which concerns the administration of justice and the dignity and authority of judicial tribunals and that a party can bring to the notice of court, facts constituting that might appear to amount to contempt o court, for such action as the court deemed it expedient to adopt. It was also pointed out that jurisdiction in contempt was not a right of a party to be invoked for redress of his grievances, not was it a mode of which the rights of a party, adjudicated upon by a tribunal, could be enforced against another party. From that we have observed about that case, it would be clear that it was a case where other remedies were available under the Code itself to deal with the party. There was a specific provision to deal with disobedience of prohibitory orders. It was help that the party could not invoke contempt proceedings for any disobedience of the prohibitory order when other provisions equally effective were available. There was no history behind the activities of the particular litigant which went to show as have that he was trying to take the courts orders to lightly so that he had to be reminded of the majesty of the law. There was no history behind the activities of the particular litigant which went to show as have that he was trying to take the courts orders to lightly so that he had to be reminded of the majesty of the law. The decision of the Calcutta High Court in Calcutta Medical Stores v. Stadmed Private Limited and others, 81 C.W.N. 209 is to the same effect as the decision of this Court considered above and we do not think it necessary to get into it further except to observe that what we have said regarding this courts decision would equally apply to the said decisions also. 18. There was also a later decision in Abdul Razack Shahib v. Mrs. Azizunnissa Begum and Others, 1970 AIR(Madras) 14. In that case a petition for eviction of a tenant on the ground of willful default in the payment of rent was dismissed. A Civil Revision Petition was filed by the landlord before this Court. During the tendency of the Civil Revision Petition, a Civil Miscellaneous Petition was filed in which there was a direction against the respondent to deposit into court the arrears of rent within two months from the date of the order of the Court. As the respondent did not comply, proceedings were taken for punishing the respondent for the contempt of the courts order Kailasm, J. as he then was when the matter came before him in the first instance found the respondent to be guilty of contempt. There was an appeal which came before a Division Bench and the learned Judges (Ananthanarayanan CJ. and Natesan, J.) held that mere failure to deposit into court and ordered claimed by the opposite party and ordered to be deposited could not be taken as consisting contempt of court. It was observed that not a single instance where default of an order for payment of money had been held to constitute contempt of court. The unfailing criterion was said to be whether or not there has been interference or a tendency to interfere with the administration of Justice. Contempt jurisdiction was reserved and exercised for that essentially brought the administration of Justine into contempt or unduly weakened it, as distinguished from a wrong that might be inflected on a private party by infringing a decretal order of court. Contempt jurisdiction was reserved and exercised for that essentially brought the administration of Justine into contempt or unduly weakened it, as distinguished from a wrong that might be inflected on a private party by infringing a decretal order of court. It was pointed out that contempt proceedings should not be used as a legal thumb to screw of his claim. 19. With reference to this case it requires to be remembered that it was rendered at the time when section 2(b) had not been enacted. Now a specific jurisdiction has been conferred on courts to deal with willful disobedience to any judgment or decree. Therefore, this decision cannot be of assistance after the new Act came into farce. 20. The decision of the Calcutta High Court in Mira Bose v. Santhosh Kumar Pose, 1973 AIR(Calcutta) 483 was relied on by the petitioner. It that case the defendant's husband did not obey the interim order of the court. The wife came forward with a prayer for adjournment of hearing of her suit at least for two months so as to enable her to get the interim order for custody of children executed. A Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court consisting of A. C. Gupta, J, as he then was and S. K. Bhattacharrayya, J. held that no court could allow a party to the action to defy its orders and to take the law into his own hands. After referring to a passage from Halsbury's Laws of England (third edition) Vol. 8 at pages 20-21 under the heading contempt in procedure and a decision in Phonographic Performance Ltd. v. Amusement Caterets Ltd. holding that deliberate defiance of an order constitute contempt of court the learned Judges pointed out that only because of an order was enforceable by a party to the action in whose favour it has been made it did not follow that disobedience to it could not be contempt of court. We respectfully agree with the principle of this decision. 21. As already seen Section 2(b) read with section 12 confers a specific power to deal with willful disobedience of courts decrees or orders. It appropriate cases like the one before us, this power is not exercised then the present provision of law would almost be reduced a dead letter. We respectfully agree with the principle of this decision. 21. As already seen Section 2(b) read with section 12 confers a specific power to deal with willful disobedience of courts decrees or orders. It appropriate cases like the one before us, this power is not exercised then the present provision of law would almost be reduced a dead letter. When Parliament has conferred specific power on superior courts, so that the order of courts or decrees of courts are not too lightly flouted, the power has to be exercised though not too readily. Whatever may have been the position earlier. In view of the provision of the Act of 1971 the power to commit for contempt will have to be exercised in those cases where the court is satisfied that there is a willful disobedience of the decree or the order of a court. There is thus no merit in first objection taken on behalf of the respondent. 22. The learned counsel for the respondent drew our attention to a recent decision of the Supreme Court in Sabu Ram Gupta v. Sudhir Bhasin and Another. In that case there was a dispute between the partners as a result of which an application under section 20 of the Arbitration Act was made before the Delhi High Court. The matter was referred to a sole arbitrator. Alongwith the said application there was also an application for appointment of a Receiver. Which was allowed and one of the parties was appointed as Receiver of this Cinema Theatre, which was the property of the partnership. An appeal was filed in which a consent order was passed appointing an Advocate as Receiver. Who was directed to run the Cinema Theatre after taking possession. There was no express direction to the party in possession of the theatre of hand over possession to the Receiver. The question was whether the failure to hand over the possession of the theatre could be dealt with under the Contempt of Courts Act. The High Court convicted the party in possession under Section 2(b) of the Contempt of Courts Act for his failure to deliver possession. The Supreme Court on appeal did not agree with the conviction and set it aside. The High Court convicted the party in possession under Section 2(b) of the Contempt of Courts Act for his failure to deliver possession. The Supreme Court on appeal did not agree with the conviction and set it aside. In the Course of the judgment their Lordships held that it was to be held that non-compliance of a consent order amounted to contempt of court the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure relating to execution of decrees might not be resorted to at all. It was held also that unless there was an express undertaking given in writing before the court, there was no question of any offence of contempt of court. 23. It may be pointed out here that the Supreme Court had to deal with a case where the order itself was ambiguous as there was no direction for handing over possession to the Receiver of the consent order. It was in this context that the court held that there was no offence committed. However, in the present case the same cannot be stated. As already seen, here is a case of history of either a conviction or consent order being passed and the respondent driving the petitioner to other proceedings, from time to time. It is in this context of the present facts that we have to hold that the principle of the decision of the Supreme Court cannot be brought in for application. 24. The second objection of the respondent has equally little merit. Section 10 runs as follow:" * 10 every High Courts shall have and exercise the same jurisdictional powers and authority in accordance with the same procedure and practice, in respect of contempt's of courts subordinate to it as it has exercises in respect of contempt's of itself". 25. Provided that no High Court shall take cognizance of a contempt alleged to have been committed in respect of a court subordinate to it where such contempt is an offence punishable under the Indian Penal Code. 26. The proviso which is relied on by the respondent in support of the contention that if there is any offence punishable under the Indian Penal Code the provision of the Contempt of Courts Act would not be attracted. We consider that this submission ignores the interpretation placed on section 3(ii) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952. 26. The proviso which is relied on by the respondent in support of the contention that if there is any offence punishable under the Indian Penal Code the provision of the Contempt of Courts Act would not be attracted. We consider that this submission ignores the interpretation placed on section 3(ii) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952. Which is now in the shape of the proviso to Section 10. In construing the said provision the Supreme Court in Bathina Ramakrishnana Reddy V. State of Madras affirming a decision of this Court dealt with a case where there was an article relating to the sub Magistrate Cover. The attention of the State Government had been drawn to this article. There was an application by the Advocate General of Madras praying that suitable action might be taken against the author of the article and the paper which it was published. This Court sentenced the concerned persons to simple imprisonment for three months. The matter was taken on appeal to the Supreme Court. One of the contentions taken for the appellant before the Supreme Court was based on the provisions corresponding to the proviso to Section 10. This contention was repelled in the following passage at page 151." * In our opinion, the sub-section referred to above excludes the jurisdiction of High Court only in a cases where the acts alleged to constitute of a subordinate court are punishable as contempt under specific provisions of the Indian Penal Code but not where these acts merely amount to offences of other description for which punishment has been provided for in the Indian Penal Code. This would be clear from the language of the sub-section which uses the words "Where such contempt is an offence", and does not say where the act alleged to constitute such contempt in an offence". 27. This would be clear from the language of the sub-section which uses the words "Where such contempt is an offence", and does not say where the act alleged to constitute such contempt in an offence". 27. Again, in the same page at the end of paragraph 9 it was observed as follows:" * It seems, therefore, that there are offences which are punishable as contempt under the Indian Penal Code and Subordinate Courts can sufficiently vindicate their dignity under the provisions of Criminal law in such cases the Legislature deemed it proper to exclude them from the jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 2(3) Contempt of Courts Act, but it would not be correct to say that the High Court jurisdiction is excluded even in cases where the act complained of which is alleged to constitute contempt, is otherwise an offence under the Indian Penal Code". 28. It was also pointed out at page 152 in paragraph 11 that what was made punishable in the Indian Penal Code was the offence of defamation and not as contempt of court and that if the defamation of a subordinate court amounted to contempt of court. Proceedings could certainly be taken under section 2 of the Contempt of Courts Act, quite a part from the fact that other remedy might be open to the aggrieved officer under Section 499 of the Indian Penal Code. 29. Thus, this case is clear authority for the proposition that the jurisdiction of the Court is excluded only in those cases where there was a specific provision available in the Indian Penal Code for dealing with Contempt of Court as in Section 228. The decision has been followed in the State of Madhya Pradesh v. Revashankar. 30. In Advocate General of Madras v. Sr. Amanulkhan, Advocate, Market Street, Fort Salem, I 1966 II MLJ 219 this court pointed out that the essential ingredients of the offence under section 228 of the Indian Penal Code were (1) intention (2) insult or interruption to a public servant and (3) the fact that the servant concerned was then sitting in any stage of a Judicial proceeding. If the averments went beyond that the scandalized the Court itself and further impaired the administration of Justice they amounted to Contempt of Court and not merely to the offence punishable under Section 228 of the Indian Penal Code. If the averments went beyond that the scandalized the Court itself and further impaired the administration of Justice they amounted to Contempt of Court and not merely to the offence punishable under Section 228 of the Indian Penal Code. The present case does no fall within the proviso to Section 10. The provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act were thus attracted. 31. During the entire course of the proceedings, it is unfortunate that there was no expression of penance on the part of the respondent at any time. However, we think it proper to take a lenient view in regard to punishment that has to be imposed on him for the offence that he has clearly committed in willfully disobeying the decree of the District Court, Madurai. We think that the interests of Justice would be served by imposing a fine of Rs. 100/- or in default to suffer simple imprisonment for a period of two weeks in civil prison. Time for payment of fine amount is two week from this day. The petition is ordered accordingly and there will be no order as to costs. Held : Held that the modus operandi adopted by the respondent is merely to change the name every time some proceedings were taken but he continued to use a deceptively similar mark so as to infringe the petitioner's mark. Thus there being a willful disobedience of the decree to which the respondent himself submitted in the Court below, the respondent's contention that there is no infringement or the violation of the terms of any decree is rejected. The Respondent's contention that the petitioner could execute his decree and that contempt proceedings cannot be used as a substitute for execution is also rejected, in view of willful disobedience and the facts that there was no expression of penance on the part of the respondent at any time during the entire course of proceedings. However taking a lenient view of the matter a fine of Rs. 100/- is imposed falling which the respondent is to suffer simple imprisonment for a period of two weeks in civil prison.