S.K. MAL LODHA, J.—This appeal raises a very important and interesting question of law in regard to interpretation of Sec. 13(1) (c) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act (No XVII of 1950) (for short the Act hereafter). 2. The facts leading to filing this appeal may briefly be recounted here: The plaintiff-appellant (landlord) instituted a suit for ejectment against the defendant-respondents in the Court of Munsif, Hanumangarh on January 6, .1965 in respect of a shop situate in Bazar, Hanumangarh junction, described in para 1 of the plaint. The ejectment was sought, inter alia, on the ground that the defendants have, without the permission of the landlord, made construction which has materially altered the premises (shop). Para 4 of the plaint contains this ground for ejectment which is as under: ^^¼4½ ;g fd eqnk;yk ua- 2 us eqnbZ dh vxq.k eq[kh nqdku ds vkxs tks vkjkth lQsn E;qfufliy cksMZ guqekux<+ dh iM+h gqbZ Fkh ml vkjkth dks uktk;t rjhds ij esjh nqdku dks jksdus ds fy;s vius uke rgcktkjh :Yl esa vyksV djokyh ftlls eqnbZ dks nqdku dk gd [kyy gksrk gS vkSj eqnbZ dh nqdku ds vkxs vkjkth jkt dks vyksV djokdj eqnk;yk ua- 1 us ml txg esjh nqdku ds njokts dks jksdrs gq, dejk rkehj dj fy;k gSa vkSj esjh nqdku dk lnj njoktk vk/kk cUn dj fn;k gS ftlls esjh nqdku dk gd geskk ds fy;s [kyu gksrk gSA eqnk;yk ua- 2 esjh nqdku dks [kRe djds o esjh nqdku dk njoktk cUn djds mlds vkxs dh txg ij dCtk dj fy;k gS tks uktk;t gS vkSj esjh nqdku dk eSfVª;y vkYVªsku djds nqdku dk njoktk cUn fd;k gS blfy;s Hkh dkfct csn[kyh gSA** The defendant contested the suit. It regard to material alteration, it was stated that they had not done any material alteration in the shop, which was taken on rent by them from the plaintiff. 3. The learned Munsif, framed necessary issues and recorded evidence of the parties. It regard to material alteration, it was stated that they had not done any material alteration in the shop, which was taken on rent by them from the plaintiff. 3. The learned Munsif, framed necessary issues and recorded evidence of the parties. I am concerned with issue No. 3 in this appeal, which, when translated into English, reads as under: — "(3) Whether defendant No. 2 has done material alteration in the shop in dispute as detailed in para 4 of the plaint, and, therefore, the defendants are liable to be evicted?" After trial, the learned Civil Judge, by his judgment dated August 29, 1969, in view of the finding recorded regarding issue No. 3, decreed the suit for ejectment. Dissatisfied with the judgment and decree, the defendants went in appeal and the learned Additional District Judge No. 2, Sri Ganganagar, accepted the appeal and set aside the judgment and decree of the learned Civil Judge granting ejectment vide his judgment dated August 18, 1970. Aggrieved, the plaintiff has come up in appeal to this Court. 4. I have heard Mr. H.M. Parakh for the plaintiff-appellant and Mr. Rajendra Mehta for the defendant-respondents and have gone through the record of the case. 5. Learned counsel for the appellant has assailed the finding of the learned Additional District Judge that the defendants had not made any construction in the premises (shop in suit) and as as such it has not been materially altered. In other words, the finding on issue No. 3 was challenged. On the other hand, Mr. Rajendra Mehta supported the judgment of the Additional District Judge and contended that as the alleged construction was not made in the shop in suit itself, the plaintiff is not entitled to eject the defendants under Sec. 13(1) (c) of the Act. 6. I have bestowed my most anxious and thoughtful consideration to the rival contentions raised by the learned counsel for the parties. 7. Before I proceed to examine them, I consider it necessary to state the findings of the learned Civil Judge in this regard. 6. I have bestowed my most anxious and thoughtful consideration to the rival contentions raised by the learned counsel for the parties. 7. Before I proceed to examine them, I consider it necessary to state the findings of the learned Civil Judge in this regard. He found that when Rame-shwarlal got the land, in front of the shop allotted from the Municipality and constructed the room on this land, there remains no other way for going into the shop and as such the defendants had made material alteration in the demised shop and as so on account of this, the defendants have rendered themselves liable to eviction under Sec. 13(1) (c) of the Act. The Additional District Judge held that the defendants have not made any construction in the shop in suit and, therefore, it cannot be said that it has been materially altered. In these circumstances, the question that crops up for determination is whether the view taken by the learned Additional District Judge that in order to entitle the plaintiff (Landlord) to evict the defendants (tenants) from the premises, the construction complained of should have been made in the premises let out to the latter resulting in its material alteration, is correct ? 8. I may read the relevant portion of S. 13 (1) of the Act:— "Section13. Eviction of tenants—(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law or contract, no Court shall pass any decree, or make any order, in favour of a landlord, whether in execution of a decree of otherwise, evicting the tenant so long as he is ready and willing to pay rent therefor to the full extent allowable by this Act, unless it is satisfied— (a).................................... (b)................................... (b)................................... (c) that the tenant has without the permission of the land lord made or permitted to be made any such construction as, in the opinion of the court has materially altered the premises or is likely to diminish the value thereof; or ............................................................................................................................." It is clear from clause (c) of S. 13 (1) that three conditions have to be satisfied before passing a decree for eviction on the ground mentioned in it and these are: (1) that the defendant has made construction or permitted to be made: (ii) that the construction has been made without permission of the landlord : and (iii) that such construction has materially altered the premises or such construction is likely to diminish the value of the premises. Section l3(l)(c) contains the words "without the permission of the landlord or permitted to be made". So permission for construction resulting in material alteration of the premises or likely to diminish the value thereof, which is contemplated under Section 13 (1) (c) is of the landlord. Section 108 of the Transfer of Property Act (No. IV of 1882) (in short the Act of 1882) deals with rights and liabilities of lessor and lease. Cl. (p) under the head (g) Rights and Liabilities of the Leasee, reads as under:— "he must not, without the leasers consent, erect on the property any permanent structure, except for agricultural purposes." According to Mr. Parakh, the words "such construction" need not be confined to construction in the demised premises, for, clause (c) of S. 13(1) is conspicuously silent as the words "such construction" are not preceded by the words "in the premises". According to the learned counsel for the appellant if any construction is made outside the premises taken on rent and such construction, if in the opinion of the Court has materially altered the premises or is likely to diminish the value thereof, if it has been made without permission of the landlord, the tenant is liable to be evicted. Strong reliance was placed on Sita Ram Sharan vs. Johri Mal (1) in which, amongst others, Manmohandas Shah vs. Bishnu Das (2) was considered. 9. What is material alteration has been explained in a number of cases of this Court. Suffice it to mention Hemara Radio and General Industries Co. Strong reliance was placed on Sita Ram Sharan vs. Johri Mal (1) in which, amongst others, Manmohandas Shah vs. Bishnu Das (2) was considered. 9. What is material alteration has been explained in a number of cases of this Court. Suffice it to mention Hemara Radio and General Industries Co. Ltd. vs. State of Rajasthan (3), Bansidhar vs. Hindu Anatha Ashram (4) and Sampat Raj vs. Bhagwatilal (5), which were cited by the learned counsel for the appellant and Manmohan Dass case (2). 10. Section 3(1)(c) of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act (No. III of 1947) is more or less identical with S. 13(1) (c) of the Act. The aforesaid Act No. III of 1947 came up for consideration in Manmohandass ease (2). In that case, the tenant had lowered the level of the ground floor of the rented shops by excavating earth therefrom and putting up a new floor and consequently lowering the front door and putting up instead a larger door, lowering corresponding the height of the Chabutra so as to bring it on the level of new door step. He had also lowered the base of the staircase which entailed addition of new steps thereto and cut the plinth band on which the door originally rested; so as to bring the entrance to the level of the new floor. A suit by the landlord for the eviction of the defendant on the ground of 3(1)(c) was decreed by the trial court and also by the first appellate court. On Second Appeal, though the High Court agreed with the two courts below that the constructions made by the defendant materially altered the accomodation, it dismissed the suit on the ground that the constructions Were not likely to diminish its value. The Supreme Court held that the suit was liable to be decreed if the landlord established that the constructions made by the defendant materially altered the accomodation, and he was not required further to prove that they were likely to diminish its value. 11. In para 7 of the report, it was observed:— "As regards the alteration, there is no dispute that the respondent carried them out without the permission of the appellants. The question then is whether they were such that they materially altered the accommodation as provided by Cl. (c). 11. In para 7 of the report, it was observed:— "As regards the alteration, there is no dispute that the respondent carried them out without the permission of the appellants. The question then is whether they were such that they materially altered the accommodation as provided by Cl. (c). Without attempting to lay down any general definition as to what material alterations mean, as such a question would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case, the alterations in the present case must maan material alterations as the construction carried out by the respondent had the effect of altering the form and structure of the accommodation. The expression material alterations in its ordinary meaning would mean important alterations, such as those which materially or substantially change the front or the structure of the premises. (Italic added) Mr. Parakh laid emphasis on the above - mentioned italic portion and according to him in the case in hand when the defendants had made construction on the land in front of the shop in suit, it has materially or substantially changed its (shops) front though there is no alteration in its structure. 12. In Sita Rams case (1), in view of the difference of opinion between the two Judges, the reference was made to a Full Bench. The appellants, in that case, were the owners of a row of shops numbered 277, 278, 279, 289 and 281, which were single storeyed. The respondents were tenants of the shops No. 278 and 279. The tenancies were created at different times. The appellants filed the two suits out of which those appeals arose for the eviction of the respondents from the two shops, inter-alia, on the ground that the respondents had made certain constructions over all the five shops without the consent of the appellants and had thereby materially altered them. According to the plaint averments. in that case, the appellants alleged that the roofs of the two shops were not included in the tenancy of the respondents. The respondents admitted to have made the constructions but pleaded that they had done so with the consent of the appellants. They further stated that the roofs of shops Nos. 277, 280 and 281 were included in the tenancy of shops No. 278 and 279. The averment that the constructions materially altered the accommodation, was denied. The respondents admitted to have made the constructions but pleaded that they had done so with the consent of the appellants. They further stated that the roofs of shops Nos. 277, 280 and 281 were included in the tenancy of shops No. 278 and 279. The averment that the constructions materially altered the accommodation, was denied. The question that arose for determination before the Full Bench was whether the appellants case covered by the provisions of S. 3(1)(c) of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act. 1947. In other words, the question was whether the appellants have succeeded in establishing that the tenants had, without their permission in writing, made any such construction so, in the opinion of the court, had materially altered the accommodation? Accommodation has been defined in Section 2(a) of the aforesaid Act of 1947. After considering the definition, it was opined by the Full Bench that the two shops let out to the respondents were accommodation as contemplated by that Act and that those shops consist of the flooring, the walls and the roof. In those circumstances, it was observed, in para 7 of the report, as under:— "There are no qualifying words attached to the words construction in clause (c) of Section 3 (1) but it is clear that the construction must have some connection with the accommodation or the premises that have been let out. Such construction may be inside the demised premises or on the outside or over it. It is not confined to constructions in the demised premises. Therefore, the constructions made on the roof of the demised premises are within the mischief of Section 3(1)(c). It is immaterial for this purpose whether the tenant was or was not entitled to use the roof as a part of the premises let out to him. Therefore, in our opinion, the construction made by the respondents are as contemplated by clause (c) of Section 3 (1)." The Full Bench was of the opinion that it was immaterial for the purpose whether the tenant was or was not entitled to use the roof as a part of the premises let out to him. The observations of the Full Bench have to be read in the light of the peculiar facts and circumstances of that case. 13. The observations of the Full Bench have to be read in the light of the peculiar facts and circumstances of that case. 13. The premises have been defined in Sec. 3 (v) of the Act, which runs as under: "Premises" means any building or part of a building which is, or is intended to be, let separately for use as a residence or for commercial use or for any other purpose and includes- (a) the gardens, grounds and out-houses, if any, appurtenant to such building or part ; (b) any furniture supplied by the landlord for use in such building or part; and (c) any fitting affixed to and amenities provided in such building or part for the more beneficial enjoyment thereof, but does not include accommodation in a hotel, Dharamshala, inn, Serai or lodging house." 14. The principles laid down in Sita Rams case(l), in my opinion, cannot be of any avail in view of the definition of the premises contained in S. 3(v) of the Act. However, if the Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Sitarams case (1) is considered to have laid down that the words "such construction" used in Cl. (c) of S. 3 (1) of the aforesaid Act of 1947 need not be in the premises rented out to the tenant and they may be outside the premises. I, with profound respect, dissent from that view. In Sitarams case (1), the Division Benchs decision given in Dr. Jai Gopal Gupta vs. Budh Mal (6) was distinguished. In that case, the appellants were the landlords of the house and the respondent was tenant. The house had a courtyard. On a portion of the courtyard, the respondent enacted a kitchen and a bath room. He made these constructions without obtaining permission from the appellants They instituted a suit for ejectment, inter alia, on the ground that he had made material alterations in the house without their permission. The suit was decreed by the trial court. The trial court took the view that the construction made by the respondent amounted to material alterations. In appeal, the lower appellate court took a contrary view. It held that the constructions did not amount to material alterations accordingly, dismissed the appellants suit. The suit was decreed by the trial court. The trial court took the view that the construction made by the respondent amounted to material alterations. In appeal, the lower appellate court took a contrary view. It held that the constructions did not amount to material alterations accordingly, dismissed the appellants suit. The Division Bench held that the constructions made by the respondents have not materially altered the accommodation The Full Bench in Sita Rams case (1) while examining the decision in Jai Gopals case (6), held that the Division Bench took the view as it found that the constructions were essentially of a temporary nature which was evidenced by the fact of the tenant using the side of a bed as a support for the roof of one of the rooms and that the constructions in that case, were of a very different nature from these in the case before it. The Division Bench in Dr. Jai Gopals case (6) has observed as follows:— "In this case the tenant had made alterations in the building which was let to him. And they were to be material alterations. In the case before us the tenant has not touched the house which was not let to him. It remains as it was when it was let out to him. He has, however, added two rooms on a portion of the courtyard. These additions are a kitchen and a bathroom. They appear to be necessary for the proper and convenient use of the house let out to him. They have no foundation, although they are of a temporary character. They can be demolished at any time without causing any damage to the accommodation. Their temporary character is also evicted by the tenants use of a side of a bed as a support for the roof of one of them. They also occupy only a small portion of the courtyard. It cannot be said that they have changed the front or the structure of the house let out to the tenant. It is difficult to say on the facts of this case that the constructions made by the tenant have materially altered the accommodation." The wards "such construction", occurring in cl. (c) of sec. 13(1), in my opinion, refer to the construction made in the demised premises. It is difficult to say on the facts of this case that the constructions made by the tenant have materially altered the accommodation." The wards "such construction", occurring in cl. (c) of sec. 13(1), in my opinion, refer to the construction made in the demised premises. If any construction is made outside the premises, which has not been let out to the tenant, the question of obtaining permission of the landlord would not arise, for, the landlord cannot grant permission for construction in or on the property, which does not belong to him. In my opinion, the words "such construction" used in cl. (c) of sec. 13(1) refer to the construction in the premises. In the case in hand, the construction was made in the shop in suit. In these circumstances, it cannot be said that defendants had changed the front or structure of the shop in suit. I am unable to hold on the facts of this case, that the construction made by the defendants has materially altered the shop in suit. The view taken by the learned District Judge that as the defendants had not made any construction in shop in suit, it cannot be said that it has been materially altered so as to pass a decree for ejectment under sec. 13(l)(c) of the Act, is correct. It may be, as argued before the learned Additional District Judge by the learned counsel for the appellant, that the door of the shop has been obstructed on account of the construction made on the land in front of the demised premises (shop in suit), which was allotted to Rameshwar Lal by the Municipality where by there remains no independent ingress to the shop in suit except through the construction (room) on the land in front of the shop. To my mind, that will not be a material alteration in the demised premises so as to entitle the plaintiff to evict the defendants under Cl. (c) of sec. 13(1) of the Act. The remedy in this regard lies not by instituting a suit for ejectment. 15. To my mind, that will not be a material alteration in the demised premises so as to entitle the plaintiff to evict the defendants under Cl. (c) of sec. 13(1) of the Act. The remedy in this regard lies not by instituting a suit for ejectment. 15. Learned counsel for the respondents informs that after the filing of this second appeal, the plaintiff-appellant has instituted a suit for mandatory and perpetual injunction under Sections 38 and 39 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 in the Court of Munsif, Hanumangarh in November, 1970 in respect of the alleged construction on the land in front of the shop in suit, which was allotted to Rameshwarlal from the Municipality and that suit is pending. 16. As I have affirmed the finding on issue No. 3 recorded by the learned Additional District Judge and have found the contention raised on behalf of the appellant devoid of force, the appeal deserves to be dismissed. 17. The result is that this appeal has no merit and it is, accordingly, dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.