Judgment :- 1. Ext. P-2 which is impugned in this petition is the order of the Kerala Co-operative Tribunal, Trivandrum, dated 13-12-1974. This order reads as follows: "The Counsel and party called. Absent. The Petition dismissed for default. No costs." When an order of this kind was made one would have expected the petitioners to rush up to the Tribunal with a petition to have that order set aside. That was not done. The petitioners, however, filed the present O. P., but they waited for four years to do so. They challenge the order on the ground that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to make it. Petitioners' counsel submits that R.113 and 114 of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Rules, 1969 ('the Rules') do not contemplate dismissal for default, but only an ex parte order where a party or his counsel is absent. These Rules read as follows: "113. Heating.-(1) Where on the date fixed for hearing or on any other date to which the hearing may be adjourned, any party does not appear when the proceeding is called on for hearing, the Tribunal may dispose of the proceeding ex parte. (2) 114. Restoration of appeals and applications.-(1) Where a principal application is disposed of ex parte any absentee party, if aggrieved, may apply to the Tribunal, within 30 days from the date of communication of the order, for restoring such proceeding to the file and where it is shown to the satisfaction of the Tribunal that he was prevented by sufficient cause from appearing when the proceeding was called on for hearing, the Tribunal shall restore the same and proceed with it: Provided that where the other party had appeared at the hearing such party shall be given notice and an opportunity of being heard before the order for restoration of the appeal or application is made. (2) The provisions of these rules relating to appeals or applications shall mutatis mutandis apply to application for restoration." It is true that the Rules refer only to ex parte orders and not orders of dismissal for default. 'Ex parte' means in the absence of the other party. It means that if the appellant is absent the Tribunal may hear the respondent and pass an order which it deems fit. Likewise if the respondent is absent the Tribunal may hear the appellant and pass an order as it deems fit. 'Ex parte' means in the absence of the other party. It means that if the appellant is absent the Tribunal may hear the respondent and pass an order which it deems fit. Likewise if the respondent is absent the Tribunal may hear the appellant and pass an order as it deems fit. R.114 provides for restoration of an appeal which was disposed of ex parte. An application for restoration has to be presented within 30 days from the date of communication of the order. 2. S.82 (1) (f) says: "82. Appeal to Tribunal.-(1) Any person aggrieved by (f) any award of the arbitrator under sub-section (3) of S.70, may, within sixty days from the date of such order, decision or award, as the case may be, appeal to the Tribunal, and the Tribunal may pass such order on the appeal as it may deem fit. This section confers upon the Tribunal power to pass any order which it may deem fit. The provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure and the Civil Rules of Practice are made applicable by R.122. Those Rules and the Section read together seem to indicate that in the absence of the appellant, the Tribunal has sufficient power to dispose of the appeal without hearing the appellant. 3. Petitioners' counsel, however, states that it is true that the Tribunal can dispose of the appeal without hearing the appellant, if he is absent, but such disposal has to be on merits, and not a mere dismissal for default. He refers to R.109 (2) which reads: "(2) The notice shall also state that if the party concerned does not appear either in person of through his pleader or authorised agent on the date specified in the notice or on any subsequent date on which the hearing may be adjourned, the Tribunal shall hear and decide the appeal or application as the case may be, ex parte." (emphasis supplied) Relying on this provision, counsel says, that the Tribunal has to hear and decide the appeal, albeit ex parte, when the appellant is absent, but not a peremptory order of dismissal for default. 4. There may be merit in the contention. 4. There may be merit in the contention. But it is unnecessary for me to decide the point, for, even if it were true that the Tribunal ought to have disposed of the matter on merits despite the absence of the appellant, R.114 provides for restoration of an ex parte order within the prescribed time It was therefore open to the present petitioners to approach the Tribunal for restoration. It is true that R.114 speaks of restoration of only ex parte orders and not any other order. Petitioners' counsel therefore points out that the ex parte order cannot take in an order of dismissal for default. I do not read R.114 so restrictively, as such restrictive construction would close all doors against a person against whom an order of dismissal has been made for default. Whether the order is made for default or ex parte on merit it should be open to the party against whom the order has been made to have it restored if he is able to give satisfactory explanation for his absence. As I stated earlier, 'exparte' only means in the absence of the other party and is not confined to orders made on merits. An order of dismissal for default is also in that sense an ex parte order. It is in that sense that the expression is used in R.114. Even if the argument that an order of dismissal was not contemplated and the Tribunal ought to have made, as postulated under R.109, an order on merits is sound-which it may very well be-a point on which I do not express any view-nevertheless it is open to the person aggrieved to have the proceeding restored if it was terminated by an ex parte order. R.114 contemplates restoration of proceedings which ended by an order without hearing the party aggrieved. This conclusion is fortified by the wider power vested in the Tribunal under S.82 read with R.122 Even if there is any merit in the contention that there was no remedy open to the petitioners to challenge an order of dismissal, they ought to have approached this Court earlier than they did As I stated the impugned order was made in 1975 whereas the petitioners approached this Court as late as June 1978 For all these reasons the petition lacks merits. It is dismissed. No costs.