JUDGMENT 1. - Heard, Mr. M.C. Bhandari, learned counsel for the appellant and Mr. R.L. Maheshwari, learned counsel for the respondents. 2. Defendant Roshanlal, who has been unsuccessful in both the Courts below, has filed this second appeal against the judgment and decree dated February 28, 1980 of the learned Additional Civil Judge, Udaipur. The plaintiff-respondent No. 1 (Ganesh Lal) instituted a suit for ejectment against the defendant-appellant, Roshanlal and defendant-respondents 2 and 3 (Mohanlal and Shankarlal respectively) to whom, according to the plaintiff, the shop in question was sublet. The plaintiff sought ejectment on three grounds : (1) That the shop in question is required by him reasonably and bonafide in other words, he based his suit on the ground covered by Section 13(1)(h) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, (No. XVII of 1950) for short 'the Act' hereafter); (2) That the defendant has committed default in payment of rent and has, therefore, rendered himself liable to eviction under Section 13(1)(a) of the Act; (3) That the defendant has sub-let the shop in question to defendant Nos. 2 and 3 without permission of the landlord and, therefore, the plaintiff is entitled to evict him under Section 13(1)(e) of the Act. 3. The learned Munsif by his judgment dated January 31, 1975 decreed the suit for ejectment. On appeal, the learned Additional Civil Judge confirmed the decree. 4. Learned counsel for the appellant has assailed the judgment of the learned Additional Civil Judge in respect of the aforesaid three grounds, on the basis of which, the decree for ejectment, was confirmed. In the first instance, he contended that the finding of the learned Additional Civil Judge that the plaintiff is entitled to evict the defendant on the ground of reasonable and bonafide necessity, is not sustainable for the simple reason that he did not decide the question relating to comparative hardship (balance of convenience) under Section 14(2) of the Act. It is correct that no separate issue relating to comparative hardship was framed. But in the facts and circumstances of this case, non-framing of the issue in my opinion will not vitiate the finding. The learned Additional Civil Judge in the impugned judgment had observed that it is not necessary to go into the question relating to comparative hardship as he found that the shop in question was sublet to defendant Nos. 2 and 3. The learned Additional Civil Judge in the impugned judgment had observed that it is not necessary to go into the question relating to comparative hardship as he found that the shop in question was sublet to defendant Nos. 2 and 3. As the learned Additional Civil Judge has found that the shop in question was sublet to defendant Nos. 2 and 3, in my opinion, he was right when he observed that it is not necessary to go into the question of inconvenience of the defendant. In view of the other grounds for ejectment being established, in my opinion, the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant regarding non-framing of the issue relating to comparative hardship is not of much consequence. 5. So far as the second argument relating to default is concerned, suffice it to mention that on an application being made by the plaintiff under Section 13(6) of the Act, the learned Additional Munsif by his order dated April 26, 1973 struck out the defence against eviction. An appeal was lodged by the defendant against the order striking out the defence and the learned Civil Judge vide Civil Misc. Appeal No. 33 of 1973 (Appellant Roshanlal v. Respondent : Ganeshlal) decided on October 13, 1973 held that the Addl. Munsif had correctly struck out the defence for non-compliance of Section 13(4) of the Act. In this view of the matter he dismissed the appeal. A revision against the appellate Order dated October 13, 1973 of the learned Civil Judge was filed in this Court. It is not disputed that S.B. Civil Revision Petition No. 490 of 1973 (Roshanlal v. Ganeshlal and others) filed against the appellate order dated October 13, 1973 was dismissed summarily with the observations that "defence has been rightly struck out by the trial Court". The certified copy of the order dated May 3, 1974 of this Court was shown to me by the learned counsel for the respondent. In this view of the matter, when the defence against the eviction was struck out for failure to comply with the order under Section 13(4) of the Act, the finding that the defendant is liable to be evicted under Section 3(1) of the Act is not open to challenge. Strong reliance was placed by the learned counsel for the appellant on Ram Chandra v. Nanakram . Strong reliance was placed by the learned counsel for the appellant on Ram Chandra v. Nanakram . This decision is distinguishable on facts and is not applicable to this case. 6. Coming to the last contention regarding subletting of the shop in question, it may be mentioned that both the Courts below have concurrently found that the defendant-appellant has sublet the shop in question to defendant Nos. 2 and 3. Issue No. 3, which was framed by the trial Court forms the subject-matter of subletting. I have read para 3 of the plaint and also para (3) of the written-statement in reply thereto. In para (1) of the rejoinder, the plaintiff has stated that in the beginning, the defendant had sublet the shop in question to defendant Nos. 2 and 3 and after the institution of the suit, it was sublet to Narain son of Mangilal, who is running the hotel and as subletting to Narain was made during the pendency of the suit, it does not legally, effect the right of the plaintiff to eject the defendant. A perusal of the statement of Roshanlal (DW-1) (defendant) shows that at the time of his deposition, i.e. September 6, 1974, the shop in question was being run by one Jai Chand Jai Singh who has been paying Rs. 5/- per day to him. In the cross-examination, he has admitted that defendant Nos. 2 and 3 used to pay Rs. 2/- per day for electricity etc. Learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff-respondent No. 1 could not show from the statement of Roshanlal (DW2) whether he has deposed any thing regarding Narain son of Mangilal. The learned Additional Munsiff, on an appraisal of the evidence on record, decided issue No. 3 against the defendant and held that the defendant has sublet the shop. The learned Additional Civil Judge has affirmed the finding in this regard after taking into consideration the statement of Ganeshlal (PW-1); Heeralal (PW-2); Ambalal (PW-3) and Ahmad Bux (PW-4). He also took note of Ex. A.1 to Ex. 4 and scrutinised the statement of Roshanlal (DW-1) and noticed the statements of Basantilal (DW-2) and Nandlal (DW-3). After considering all the relevant material on record, he concurred with the conclusion arrived at by the learned Addl. Munsiff in regard to question of subletting. I am not satisfied that while recording the concurrent finding relating to subletting the learned Addl. 4 and scrutinised the statement of Roshanlal (DW-1) and noticed the statements of Basantilal (DW-2) and Nandlal (DW-3). After considering all the relevant material on record, he concurred with the conclusion arrived at by the learned Addl. Munsiff in regard to question of subletting. I am not satisfied that while recording the concurrent finding relating to subletting the learned Addl. Civil Judge has committed any error of law or substantial error of procedure. It cannot be held that in recording the finding relating to the question of subletting, the learned Addl. Civil Judge has committed any mistake of law. It is not the case that the finding is based on no evidence. In the facts and circumstance of this case, it cannot be characterised as perverse also. The contention that the case of the plaintiff has not been proved to be covered by Section 13(1)(e) of the Act cannot be accepted. 7. As all the three contentions raised by the learned counsel for the appellant are without force, there is no alternative but to dismiss the appeal, as it does not involve any substantial question of law. 8. The result is that the appeal has no force and it is accordingly dismissed summarily. 9. Learned counsel for the appellant states that the appellant shall hand-over vacant and peaceful possession of the shop in question to the plaintiff-respondent within three months from today. Learned counsel for the respondent No. 1 opposes the prayer made by the learned counsel for the appellant. Having regard to the circumstances of the case, I consider it reasonable to grant three months' time to the appellant to deliver vacant and peaceful possession of the shop in question to the plaintiff-respondent No. 1. The order granting time will be effective on furnishing an undertaking to this effect by the defendant in the trial Court within a week from today. *******