JUDGMENT - S.C. PRATAT, J.:---This is an application by original accused Nos. 1 and 2 Kishan Menghraj Gehi and Maheshukumar G. Garodia for quashing the process issued against them under section 420 read with section 34 of the Penal Code by the learned trial Magistrate on a complaint filed against them by respondent No. 1 Menghraj Gordhandas Gehi, the father of accused No. 1. The aforesaid complaint is registered as case No. 158/S of 1980 before the learned Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, 24th Court, Borivli, Bombay, and process thereon under section 420 read with section 34 of the Penal Code was issued on 31st July, 1980. 2. As indicated, respondent No. 1--original complainant is the father of petitioner----accused No. 1. In July, 1966, a partnership deed was executed between the complainant and his son accused No. 1 under the name and style of Messrs. Blue Angel Art Dyes and Dry cleaners. By mutual consent of these two partners, Suresh Moti and Anil, the other sons of the complainant but minors at that time were admitted to the benefits of the aforesaid partnership. The aforesaid partnership was, under Clause 1 of the partnership deed, deemed to have commenced from 1st April, 1966. It was a partnership at will. On 23rd May, 1973, a deed of dissolution was executed in respect of the aforesaid partnership, under which the said partnership was mutually agreed to have been dissolved with effect from 31st March ,1973. In the said deed of dissolution, recitals are clear to the effect that accounts of the said partnership upto 31st March, 1973 have been made and finalised and the parties have received their shares of the capital, profits and other assets in the profit-staring proportion and that the parties have no claim whatsoever against each other or the firm of Messrs. Blue Angel Art dyers and Dry Cleaners. Under Clause 2 of the dissolution deed, it is recited that the accounts of the partnership have been duly made up and completed upto the date of dissolution of the partnership business and all the capital and profits of the partnership business have been duly divided between the parties in the profit-sharing proportion. Blue Angel Art dyers and Dry Cleaners. Under Clause 2 of the dissolution deed, it is recited that the accounts of the partnership have been duly made up and completed upto the date of dissolution of the partnership business and all the capital and profits of the partnership business have been duly divided between the parties in the profit-sharing proportion. It was further declared, vide Clause 3, that there were no other debts and liabilities to be paid and whatever debt and liability may become due and payable from the partnership firm shall be borne and paid by the parties in the profit-sharing proportion. It was also further mentioned that income-tax assessments of the firm for assessment years 1971-72, 1972-73 and 1973-74 were pending. It was agreed that whatever tax or any other liability that may be levied thereon shall be borne and paid by the parties in the profit-sharing proportion. Under Clause 6 of the said deed, each of the partners released the other from all proceedings, actions, costs, claims and demands in respect of the partnership but without prejudice to any rights and remedies under the provisions of the dissolution deed itself. This dissolution deed was signed by the complainant as the first partner and by accused No. 1 as the second partner. 2-A. It seems that despite the aforesaid deed of dissolution, some or the other dispute arose between the complainant and accused No. 1 who were, though closely related, not on very friendly terms. However, even these disputes and difference were ultimately settled and the complainant made a categorical declaration in writing in August, 1979 to that effect. In paragraph 8 of the said declaration, the complainant stated and declared that there was at one time a partnership business run under the name and style of Messrs. Blue Angle Art Dyers and Dry Clearners with the complainant, accused No. 1 and the minor sons of the complainant as partners. It is also specifically mentioned in the said paragraph 8 that the partnership deed was executed by the complainant and accused No. 1 on 17th July ,1966 and that on or about 23rd May ,1973, the said partnership was dissolved. It is also specifically mentioned in the said paragraph 8 that the partnership deed was executed by the complainant and accused No. 1 on 17th July ,1966 and that on or about 23rd May ,1973, the said partnership was dissolved. It is further categorically mentioned in the same paragraph 8 of the declaration by the complainant that thereafter accused No. 1 continued as to sole proprietor of the said business and as such sole proprietor, he changed the nature of the business and the name under which he was doing the business into the name and style of Modern Traders. Further statement follows in the said paragraph to the effect that the complainant and his sons Suresh, Moti and Anil had nothing to do with the said proprietary business of Modern Traders started by accused No. 1. Paragraphs 10 to 13 of the said declaration are important and may be reproduced here. "10. Certain disputes and differences have arisen between myself on the one hand and the said Kishan on the other hand and though the mediation and good offices of Shri S.V. Pikale of Messrs. Pikale Co., the said disputes and differences have been settled on certain terms and conditions. 11. It is agreed that I myself and Anil hereby confirm that we have no share, right, title or interest whatsoever in the business premises at Shop Nos. 3-4 in the Ambica Darshan Premises Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. or in the business carried on in the sale proceeds of the sale of any business run in the said premises either in the part or at any time hereafter. 12. It is further agreed and confirmed by me that hereafter I shall have no claim of any nature whatsoever and on any account whatsoever against Kishan or in any assets of his. 13. It is agreed that Kishan shall surrender vacant possession of flat No. G, Gohi Mansion, 3rd floor, Lady Jamshedji Road, Mahim, Bombay-400016 to me and he shall have no claim to the said flat hereafter. If the consent of the landlord is required I shall obtain the same." 3. The main crux of the aforesaid declaration by the complainant was reiterated by further declarations made by his other sons viz., Suresh, Moti and Anil, all of whom also executed declarations to that effect. If the consent of the landlord is required I shall obtain the same." 3. The main crux of the aforesaid declaration by the complainant was reiterated by further declarations made by his other sons viz., Suresh, Moti and Anil, all of whom also executed declarations to that effect. Thus, as at this stage, documentary evidence shows a partnership coming into existence in the year 1966, the said partnership being dissolved in the year 1973, some disputes arising between the complainant, the father and the son accused No. 1 and the settlement of the entire disputes and differences between them some time in the year 1979, corroborated by solemn declarations executed not only by the complainant, the father, but also his other sons Suresh, Moti and Anil. Still further in pursuance of the complainants declaration referred to above, accused No. 1 surrendered, in compliance with Clause 13 of the said declaration, vacant possession of flat No. G, Gohi Mension, third floor, Lady Jamshedji Road, Mahim, Bombay 16 of the complainant. There is no disputed by the complainant in the aforesaid behalf. 4. After all the aforesaid developments, several months thereafter in March 1980, the complainant sent a notice to accused No. 1. There entire tenor of the said notice runs totally contrary to the documents referred to above viz. the deed of partnership, the deed of dissolution of the said partnership and the declarations. In paragraph 2 of the said notice, an allegation was made to the following effect :--- "At the intervention of the neighbours and well-wishers and in their presence you promised to compromise and agreed to pay a sum of Rs. 5,00,000/- to my client, upon my client making a declaration and not taking any further steps as regards the shop premises which belongs to my client. Relying on your representations and believing them to be true, my client executed a declaration on or about 13-8-79 as per your demand." Further averments made in the notice indicated the stand of the complainant that the declaration was executed under misrepresentations or assurances which turned out to be false, fraudulent and dishonest. Relying on your representations and believing them to be true, my client executed a declaration on or about 13-8-79 as per your demand." Further averments made in the notice indicated the stand of the complainant that the declaration was executed under misrepresentations or assurances which turned out to be false, fraudulent and dishonest. The said notice then goes on to state that in the circumstances, accused No. 1 had cheated the complainant and that (accused No. 1) should render to the complainant accounts of all dealings and transactions of Blue Angel Dry Cleaning Laundry from its inception till the date of the notice. The notice concludes that if the complainant did not get a satisfactory reply within seven days, the complainant would proceed to file complainant against accused No. 1 for the offence of chatting, extortion, assault, theft, abuses, mischief, criminal trespass, wrongful restraint and other offences under the I.P.C. 5. This notice was promptly replied to by accused No. 1 on 1st April, 1980. All the allegations made in the notice were emphatically denied. The alleged promise to pay a sum of Rs. 5,00,000/- by accused No. 1 to the complainant was also emphatically denied. The allegation of intervention of neighbours and well-wishers was contended to be connected and got up. It was further averred in the reply that the demand of Rs. 5,00,000/- made in the notice was with an ulterior object of harassing accused No. 1. All other allegations in the notice were also denied. Now, though the notice of 12th March, 1980 threatened action within seven days if no satisfactory reply was received and though reply had in fact been sent in the notice by accused No. 1 on 1st April, 1980, the complainant did not choose to take any further steps expeditiously. It was, however, towards the end of July, 1980 that the complainant filed the present complaint. In this complaint, the complainant specifically sought to make out a case under section 420 read with section 34 of the Penal Code and the allegations made in that behalf are to the effect that accused No. 1 promised to pay to the complainant a sum of Rs. 5,00,000/- but had not yet paid the same to him in spite of repeated demands. 5,00,000/- but had not yet paid the same to him in spite of repeated demands. The complaint goes on to conclude that accused No. 1 had, therefore, cheated the complainant either in respect of the shop and his belongings or to the extent of Rs. 5,00,000/- agreed to be paid in compensation thereof. It is on this complaint that process under section 420 read with section 34 of the Penal Code was issued by the learned trial Magistrate against that two accused person and it is this order of the learned trial Magistrate that is challenged in the present petition. 6. In support of this petition, I have heard Mr. N.H. Gurusahani, the learned Counsel for the petitioner-accused. The original complainant respondents No. 1 is represented by his learned Advocate Mr. R.K. Midha. The State is represented by the learned Public Prosecutor Mr. V.V. Kamat. It may be stated that the learned Public Prosecutor supports the present application. 7. Hearing the rival submissions of the respective Advocates Mr. Gursahani for the accused and Mr. Midha for the complainant and going through the record, I am, indeed, surprised at the learned trial Magistrate issuing process against the accused persons under section 420 read with section 34 of the Penal Code. Bare narration of the facts aforesaid indicates that the dispute, if at all, is purely and entirely of a civil nature. Nowhere in all the documents executed over the years is there any reference to any amount of Rs. 5,00,000/- or any other amount due from or liable to be paid by accused No. 1 to the complainant. Allegation in that behalf of the for the first time appears in the notice of 12th March, 1980 given by the complainant to accused No. 1. This allegation, as indicated, was promptly denied by accused No. 1. Even thereafter, though the complainant felt himself cheated to the tune of Rs. 5,00,000/- he took no steps whatever in that behalf for quite some months and it was only towards the end of July 1980 that he has chose to file the present complaint. Going through the complaint, in the light of the various facts and circumstances already mentioned hereinabove, conclusion is irresistible that this complaint is frivolous, false and an abuse of the process of Court. The complainant is not an ordinary man. He is not an illiterate person. Going through the complaint, in the light of the various facts and circumstances already mentioned hereinabove, conclusion is irresistible that this complaint is frivolous, false and an abuse of the process of Court. The complainant is not an ordinary man. He is not an illiterate person. He is a businessman settled down and residing in Bombay. In fact, he was carrying on the business already referred to hereinabove in partnership with his sons. He also as the record discloses, owns immoveable properties in Bombay. There is no dispute that a deed of partnership was executed between him and his son accused No. 1 in 1966. Record indicates execution of a deed of dissolution in 1973 between the complainant and accused No. 1 and though as of now the complainant conveniently denies execution of a deed of dissolution, his own declaration of 1979 embodies a clear recital to the effect that the deed of dissolution was in fact executed a March 1973. That apart, a zerox copy of the said deed of dissolution has been presented before me by the learned Counsel Mr. Gursahani. The said dissolution deed contains the signatures of the complainant as also of accused No. 1. That apart, we have in the written declaration made by the complainant further clear and solemn recitals to the effect that all differences and disputes between the complainant and accused No. 1 have been settled through the mediation and good offices of Mr. S.V. Pikale of Messrs. Pikale Co. The said declaration of the complainant himself further states and declares and confirms that he has no share, right, tile or interest whatsoever in the business premises in question at shop No. ¾ in the Ambika Darshan Premises Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. (in which shop premises the aforesaid partnership business was once carried on) or in the business carried on or in the sale proceeds of the sale of any business run at the said premises either in the past or at any time hereafter. The said declaration further contains a solemn statement by the complainant the effect that he "..........shall have no claim of any nature whatsoever and on any account whatsoever against Kishan (accused No. 1) or in any assets of his ." 7-A. It is pertinent to note that after the dissolution deed, income-tax returns in respect of the business carried on in the shop premises aforesaid were filed by accused No. 1 himself in his personal capacity as proprietor of Messrs. Modern Traders was the business started by accused No. 1 in his own name after the dissolution. Not only were returns filed accordingly but assessment orders have also been passed accordingly for assessment years 1975-76 onwards. Still further, if, according to the complainant, there was no dissolution of the partnership firm as evidenced by the document of 23rd May, 1973, one would have expected him to produce some material or at least to have referred to some material in his complaint giving a reasonably satisfactory ground at this stage to show that the partnership was in fact not dissolved at all and that it in fact continued its business in the premises in question for years and years thereafter. But we do not find any such reference in the complaint. Reading of the complaint fails to inspire any confidence in the averments made badly and without any basis against the accused persons. Merely because a complaint is clothed ingeniously in a form seeking to apparently cover ingredients of a criminal offence or offences, process cannot be, therefore, issued thereunder mechanically. This is not to say that there was or is even as of today not dispute at all between the parties. But dispute, if any, is one feels convicted, basically and essentially of a civil nature. This is not to say that there was or is even as of today not dispute at all between the parties. But dispute, if any, is one feels convicted, basically and essentially of a civil nature. If the complainant had a grievance about the alleged dissolution either in the year 1973 or thereafter or even after his solemn declaration of 1979 acknowledging the dissolution, nothing prevented him from approaching a Civil Court and filing appropriate proceedings in that behalf and claiming appropriate reliefs, therein, indeed, in September 1980, the complainant has in fact approached the Bombay City Civil Court at Bombay and has in fact filed Suit No. 5171 of 1980 in the side Court inter alia against his son accused No. 1 herein who is defendant No. 1 in the said suit inter alia for dissolution of the above refereed to partnership and accounts. If the complainant had any genuine and real grievance in respect of the said partnership and/or its alleged dissolution, suit of the aforesaid nature or allied nature could have been filed by him long back. In any case, he has in fact now filed the said suit and has approached the appropriate Court by war of a civil proceeding for remedying his alleged grievances. Nothing herein said or observed will effect the merits of the said suit which, or course, will be heard and decided on its own merits and in accordance with law. Point to be reiterated, however, is that the facts and circumstances of the present case unmistakably and irresistibly point in only one direction viz. that there is absolutely nothing of criminality involved, much less any substance whatever in the alleged offence under section 420 read with section 34 of the Penal Code sought to be set up against the accused persons. 8. Mr. Gurusahani, the learned Counsel for the petitioners-accused, rightly relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court in (Hari Prasad v. Vishnu Kumar)1, A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 301, to the following effect :--- "Even assuming prima facie all the allegations in the complaint to be true, they merely amount to a breach of contract and could not give rise to criminal prosecution. Gurusahani, the learned Counsel for the petitioners-accused, rightly relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court in (Hari Prasad v. Vishnu Kumar)1, A.I.R. 1974 S.C. 301, to the following effect :--- "Even assuming prima facie all the allegations in the complaint to be true, they merely amount to a breach of contract and could not give rise to criminal prosecution. There was nothing in the complaint to show that the respondents had dishonest or fraudulent intention at the time the appellant parted with the money nor did not complaint indicate that the respondents had induced the appellant to pay them the amount parted with. The appellant also did not allege the respondents making any representation to him for parting with the money. Mere fact that they did not abide by their commitment as to starting of the business in complainants name as agreed to would to fasten them with criminal liability." Applying the ratio of the aforesaid ruling of this case and assuming to the purposes of those proceedings the case of the complainant to be true and correct, it would, at the highest, amount to breach of contract, to breach of the terms and conditions of the partnership deed any/or to breach of the terms and conditions of the dissolution deed and/or, if one may go further, to breach of the terms and conditions finally settled between the parties at the intervention of Mr. S.V. Pikale of Messrs. Pikale Co. In this context, it is significant to note that even in the declaration there is not a single averment regarding payment of any amount of Rs. 5,00,000/- to be made by accused No. 1 to the complainant. Such an averment coming out for the first time in the notice of March 1980 and pursued in the instant complaint fails, under the circumstances, to inspire any such confidence as to even prima facie suffice on that basis for the purposes of issuing process under section 420 read with section 34 of the Penal Code. Such an averment coming out for the first time in the notice of March 1980 and pursued in the instant complaint fails, under the circumstances, to inspire any such confidence as to even prima facie suffice on that basis for the purposes of issuing process under section 420 read with section 34 of the Penal Code. If criminal processes are to be issued on such complainant, nothing easier for a litigant than to ingeniously have a complaint framed and drafted so as to meet technical compliance with the infringements of a criminal offence and on the basis of pure surmises and conjectures set up, highly be latedly after settlement of all disputes between the parties, vague, ambiguous and obstruct allegations of some or the other criminal offence. No doubt, a particular set of facts and circumstances may, in a given case, give rise both to a criminal offence as also to a cause of action in a Civil Court. But much is not at all the instant case. I have no doubt in my mind that the instant complaint filed by the complainant against the accused is only with a view to pressurising the accused and threatening him with the harassment, many a time inherent in a criminal proceedings, to bring about what can, at the highest, be characterised as entirely and purely a dispute of a civil nature. In my view, the present proceedings initiated against the accused were clearly an abuse of the process of the Court. It was not a case where any process ought to have been directed to be issued against the accused. On the contrary, this was pre-eminently a case where the complaint ought to have been dismissed by the learned trial Magistrate. 9. Mr. Midha, the learned Advocate for the complainant, contended that since the process has now already been issued by the learned trial magistrate, nothing prevents the accused from appearing before the learned trial magistrate and satisfying the learned trial Magistrate of the absence of any material and after such satisfaction obtaining from the learned trial Magistrate himself an order of discharge. Of course, nothing prevented the accused from adopting the aforesaid course of action. At the same time, nothing prevented, the accused from approaching this Court challenging the order issuing process against the accused. Of course, nothing prevented the accused from adopting the aforesaid course of action. At the same time, nothing prevented, the accused from approaching this Court challenging the order issuing process against the accused. This Court would normally not readily entertain such application and would have normally directed the accused to approach the learned trial magistrate. But the facts and circumstances of this case are so strikingly and patently clear that to even then ask the accused to adopt the course of action suggested by the learned Advocate Mr. Midha would be a course not in consonance with justice and fairness to the accused. Moreover, the fact that the accused would be eventually discharged is hardly any consolation when it has now been found that the case of the accused that there were really no sufficient grounds to issue a process against them is more than fully justified. Criminal courts and criminal proceedings cannot be made the arena for seeking private vendetta. If the complainant really had any genuine grievance or dispute against his son accused No. 1, it was open and is still open to him to seek appropriate remedy in appropriate civil proceedings. And as indicated, the complainant has in fact already filed inter alia against accused No. 1 suit for dissolution of partnership and accounts. 10. Mr. Gurusahani, the learned Counsel for the petitioners, also relied upon an unreported decision of this Court in (Criminal Application No. 682 of 1967, decided on 14th December, 1967)2, by Palekar, J., wherein, though on different facts altogether, it was observed that where there are really no sufficient grounds for issue of process, it was open to this Court to quash a process already issued. Mr. Midha, the learned Advocate for the complainant does not dispute the power and jurisdiction of this Court to quash the process issued if this Court comes to the conclusion that the process issued is one fit to be so quashed. In my view, this is per-eminently a just fit and proper case for adopting the said course. Continuation of the proceedings in pursuance of the process issued by the learned trial magistrate would, in my view, is unwarranted and unjustified. In my view, this is per-eminently a just fit and proper case for adopting the said course. Continuation of the proceedings in pursuance of the process issued by the learned trial magistrate would, in my view, is unwarranted and unjustified. Basically and essentially, a civil dispute cannot be permitted to be converted into a criminal proceeding and when a civil proceeding has in fact been instituted any further continuation of an even otherwise unwarranted criminal proceeding would defeat the ends of justice. This, in my view, is a case where the impugned order of the learned trial Magistrate deserves to be set aside and the criminal proceedings deserve to be quashed. 11. In the result, this petition is allowed. The order dated 31st July, 1980 passed by the learned Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, 24th Court Borivli, Bombay, in Case No. 158/S of 1980 is set aside and the said criminal proceedings are quashed. Rule earlier issued on this application is made absolute. Petition allowed. -----