JUDGMENT There are two writ petitions, one filed on June 17, 1980 by the three persons who are petitioners Nos. 1, 2 and 3; of them petitioner No. 1 is a guardian, petitioner No. 2 is the Head Clerk-cum-Accountant of Sohanlal Deoralia Balika Vidyalaya and the petitioner No. 3 is also one of the members of the non-teaching staff of the school; the other filed on June 19, 1980 by the same three petitioners. In the earlier petition the petitioners challenge the inaction on the part of the West Bengal Board of Secondary Education in not extending the term of Mr. Sarojesh Mukherjee, respondent No. 7, who was appointed administrator of the school, on the ground that the term of the administrator had expired on May 20, 1980 and inspite of repeated requests for extending his term nothing was done in this respect. In the second petition an order dated June 12, 1980 appointing Mr. Hari Kumar Mukherjee, Assistant Inspector of Schools (S.E.), Howrah, respondent No. 8 as Administrator of the school by the President, West Bengal Board of Secondary Education, has been assailed on the ground of mala fide and in violation of the provisions of Section 28(2) of the West Bengal Board of Secondary Education Act, 1963. 2. These applications were listed on June 19, 1980. On that day, it was directed that the applications would appear on Monday next and an interim order of maintaining status quo as on that date till the hearing of there applications was made. Certain other directions were also given on that day. Pursuant to the said direction Mr. Sarkar appeared on behalf of the State respondents and Mr. Suprokash Banerjee appeared on behalf of respondents Nos. 1, 2 and 3. 3. Three applications for addition of parties have been filed, one on behalf of the three petitioners who claim to be guardians of their wards reading in the school through their learned Advocate Mr. Pradipto Roy; another application for addition of parties was filed through Mr. Biswa Nath Chakraborty, learned Advocate by Smt. Maya Sharma. Headmistress of the said school and the last application for addition of parties was filed though their learned Advocate Mr. N.K. Mitra, on behalf of the three petitioners who claim to be the teachers and members of the non-teaching staff of the school. 4. Biswa Nath Chakraborty, learned Advocate by Smt. Maya Sharma. Headmistress of the said school and the last application for addition of parties was filed though their learned Advocate Mr. N.K. Mitra, on behalf of the three petitioners who claim to be the teachers and members of the non-teaching staff of the school. 4. Before considering the merits of the main petitions, it is better to dispose of these three above applications for addition of parties. Mr. Hari Narayan Mukherjee, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioner in the main petitions has placed before this court the provisions of Order 1, rule 9 and Order 1, rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure. He submitted that unless it is shown that the presence of the petition entire necessary to decide effectively and completely the matters in issue in these writ petitions, these applications should not be allowed and in support of this submission Mr. Mukherjee has cited some decisions. It is now well-settled that if it appears to the court that the presence of the parties are necessary to effectively and completely adjudicate the matters in controversy raised in this petition, the court can pass necessary orders for adding those persons as parties. As regards the two applications flied on behalf of the guardians of the school as well as the members of the teaching and non-teaching staff of the school, there cannot be any question for not allowing those applications since the petitioners are none but one guardian and two members of the non-teaching staff who have come before this court to challenge the appointment of the Administrator by the President of the West Bengal Board of Secondary Education. If these persons, i.e., the guardians and the members of the teaching and non-teaching staff are interested and the competent to challenge the appointment of administrator, then on the same analogy other guardians whose wards are also reading in the same school and also the members of the teaching and non-teaching staff are equally interested in the determination of the legality or illegality of the appointment of the Administrator by the President and as such they are necessary parties for the effectual and proper adjudication of the controversy raised in these two writ petitions. I therefore allow there two applications for addition of parties. All regards the third application filed by Mrs. I therefore allow there two applications for addition of parties. All regards the third application filed by Mrs. Maya Sharma, Headmistress of the institution, it is evident from the averments made in these two petitions that serious allegations have been made against her and as such it is fit and proper that she should be allowed to be added as a party respondent in order to have an opportunity of controverting those allegations made in the petitions. This being the position it is deemed just and proper to allow this application also. In view of the order made above let this applicant be added as party respondent in the writ petitions. 5. In a writ petition in order to obtain a rule it is for the petitioner to satisfy the court as to the existence of a prima facie case and if the petitioner fails to prove such a prima facie case the court will certainly be not inclined to issue any writ on such an application. As regards the first petition filed on June 17, 1980 it has been pleaded in paragraph 7 of the petition that the respondent No. 7, Sarojesh Mukherjee was appointed to act ad Administrator of the school by the West Bengal Board of Secondary Education for a period of six months and he was vested with all the powers of the managing committee with a direction to re-constitute the managing committee in accordance with the provisions of the prescribed rules and directions issued or to be issued by the Board from time to time. This tenure of office of the respondent No. 7 as administrator expired May 20, 1980. It has been pleaded in paragraph 14 of the petition that immediately after the expiry of the term the said Administrator requested the Administrator of the Board as well as the President to take prompt steps to extend the term of the Administrator, but the Board did not do anything in this direction. It has been pleaded in paragraph 16 of the petition that since the Board has turned a deaf ear to the affairs of the institution inspite of the fact that it was approached from all quarters this is a fit case where this Court should interfere and direct the Board or its President/Administrator to extend the term of Mr. It has been pleaded in paragraph 16 of the petition that since the Board has turned a deaf ear to the affairs of the institution inspite of the fact that it was approached from all quarters this is a fit case where this Court should interfere and direct the Board or its President/Administrator to extend the term of Mr. Sarojesh Mukherjee, respondent No. 7, by another six months and a writ of mandamus to that effect has been prayed. There was also a prayer for a suitable interim order. In the second petition as I have already mentioned the subject-matter of challenge was the order dated June 12, 1980 appointing the respondent No. 8. Assistant Inspector of Schools (SE), Hari Kumar Mukherjee, as Administrator of the Sohan Lal Deoralia Balika Vidyalaya. Howrah in place of Sri Sarojesh Mukherjee for a period of six months conferring on him all the powers of the managing committee and directing him to re-constitute the managing committee during the tenure of his appointment. 6. Mr. Mukherjee, learned Advocate appearing in support of the petition has eloquently argued that this order of appointment of the Administrator is bad on two grounds. Firstly, this order is mala fide and the appointment of respondent No. 8 at Administrator has been made at the instance of the Headmistress, Mrs. Maya Sharma, who was allegedly placed under suspension by the Administrator, Sri Sarojesh Mukherjee, respondent No. 7 and in support of his submission Mr. Mukherjee has drawn my attention to the statement made in paragraph 20 of the application for addition of parties where it has been stated that the applicant requested the President of the Board on March 29, 1980 to change respondent No. 7 as Administrator of the school and to appoint a new Administrator as his term had expired. It has been submitted, secondly, by Mr. Mukherjee that this appointment is bad as there is no emergency which enables the President under section 28 (2) of th Act to exercise the powers of the Board in appointing an Administrator and in support of his submission Mr. Mukherjee has relied on a decision of this Court reported in (1) Sachi Nath Ghosh v. W.B. Board of Secondary Education, 1976(2) C.L.J 289 . Mr. Mukherjee has relied on a decision of this Court reported in (1) Sachi Nath Ghosh v. W.B. Board of Secondary Education, 1976(2) C.L.J 289 . Mr. Mukherjee also submitted that his clients-one being a guardian and the other two being members of the non-teaching staff are interested in the proper education of the students and as such they are entitled to challenge the appointment of the Administrator by this writ petition even through their legal rights have not been affected or infringed. Mr. Mukherjee in support of his said submissions has drawn my attention to paragraphs 14, 15 and 19 of the writ petition filed on June 19, 1980 in order to substantiate his contentions that the petitioners are interested parties and as such, they are entitled to come before this Court in a writ petition attacking the impugned order of appointment of an Administrator. 7. Mr. Sircar, learned Advocate appearing for the State has submitted that the Administrator previously appointed, that is, respondent No. 7 has got no locus standi to claim legally to have his term extended nor the petitioners, one of whom is a guardian and others who are members of the non-teaching staff of the school have any locus standi to challenge the impugned order of appointment of Administrator by the Board as neither any of their legal rights have been infringed by the impugned order nor their legal interests have also been affected by the making of the impugned order by the Board. In support of this submission some decisions have been cited by Mr. Sircar. It has been nextly submitted by Mr. Sircar referring to two decisions delivered by two of the learned Judges of this Court that in case of replacement of an Administrator after the expiry of his term by the appointment of a new Administrator it is exclusively within the jurisdiction and ambit of the power conferred by the West Bengal Board of Secondary Education Act, 1963. Neither the Administrator nor the petitioners can attack the said order. It has also been submitted by Mr. Neither the Administrator nor the petitioners can attack the said order. It has also been submitted by Mr. Sircar that in reference to suggestion made by this Court his client is agreeable to solve the tangle pending for a long time and to modify the order passed by the Board by not giving effect to the order appointing respondent No. 8 as Administrator and appointing another officer of the Education Department as Administrator of the School. This suggestion however was not acceptable to the petitioners. 8. In (2) Biswanath Seth v. West Bengal Board of Secondary Education & Ors., an unreported Judgment of Anil Kumar Sen, J. dated February 21, 1971 in Civil Order No. 5741 (W) of 1970, a similar question arose for decision. In that case an Administrator was appointed by the Board for a certain term and after the expiry of the term the Board appointed another person as Administrator of a particular school. The Administrator whose term expired or rather to be precise the previously appointed Administrator challenged the subsequent order or appointment of another person as Administrator in a writ petition before this Court. After contested hearing our learned brother Anil Kumar Sen, J. held on February 24, 1971 as follows:- "I fail to understand how an Administrator appointed under Section 28(2) of the Act can claim a right to the post of an Administrator and challenge an order of his replacement by moving a writ application in this Court. I am of the view that such appointment confers no right and the authorities who had appointed him as an Administrator are legally competent in their wisdom to replace him. If that has been done certainly it is not within the powers of this Court to question or dispute the wisdom of the statutory authority." This view has been referred to and relied upon by Chittatosh Mookerjee, J. in (3) Ananta Kumar Chakraborty v. The West Bengal Board of Secondary Education, an unreported Judgment of Chittatosh Mookerjee, J. in Civil Rule No. 2884(W) of 1972 and his Lordship observed that he fully agreed with the above view and held that prima facie an application by an Administrator whose term had expired challenging the appointment of a new Administrator was not maintainable. In view of these decisions, I do not find any substance in this petition. In view of these decisions, I do not find any substance in this petition. Moreover, it has not been pleaded clearly in the petition how these three petitioners of whom I have mentioned hereinbefore are affected by the impugned order of appointment of Administrator or, in other words, how their rights and interests have been affected and they are aggrieved by it. It has been pronounced by the Supreme Court in no uncertain terms that it is only the person whose rights have been affected by the impugned order, is competent to come before the writ court challenging the order and reference may be made in this connection to the decision reported in (4) AIR 1962 SC 1045 at page 1047, paragraph 5. It has been observed by the Supreme Court that the legal right that can be enforced under Article 226 also shall ordinarily be the personal or individual right of the petitioner himself, though in the case of some of the writs, like habeas corpus or quo warranto this Rule may have to be relaxed or modified. In (5) AIR 1977 SC 876 it has been observed that though Article 226 of the Constitution in terms does not describe the classes of persons entitled to apply thereunder, the existence of the right is implicit for the exercise of the extra-ordinary jurisdiction by the High Court under the said Article. It is also well established that a person who is not aggrieved by the discrimination complained of cannot maintain a writ petition. It was tried to be contended on behalf of the petitioners referring to the decision reported in (6) AIR 1976 SC 578 that the expression, 'aggrieved person' includes within its fold persons interested and the petitioners are interested and as such the writ petitions at their instance are maintainable. In this case also the proprietor of a cinema house came before the writ court challenging the no-objection-certificate granted under Rule 6 of the Bombay Cinema Rules, 1964 by the District Magistrate. It was held that from his pleadings it did not appear how his rights or interests recognised by general law has been infringed as a result of this grant of no objection certificate to the respondents and on that basis it was held that he had no locus standi to invoke this special jurisdiction of Article 226 of the Constitution. It was held that from his pleadings it did not appear how his rights or interests recognised by general law has been infringed as a result of this grant of no objection certificate to the respondents and on that basis it was held that he had no locus standi to invoke this special jurisdiction of Article 226 of the Constitution. So this case instead of supporting the case of the petitioners goes against the petitioners. I have already stated that in this petition there is no averment or any pleadings to show how there three petitioners are interested in the appointment of an Administrator of a School which is more or less a matter exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Board as it principally related to the administration of a school while there is no Managing Committed. So, this application is not maintainable as the petitioners failed to prove their locus standi to challenge the impugned order. In view of my findings as above it is not necessary to enter into the merits of the order. However, when an elaborate argument has been advanced on behalf of the petitioners I shall also deal with the question as to whether the order has been made by the President in accordance with the provisions of S. 28(2) of the Act. Section 27 of the West Bengal Board of Secondary Education Act, 1963 clearly provides that the Board shall have generally the power to direct, supervise and control secondary education which includes the power to do such things which are necessary to give effect to this purpose and powers conferred on the Board. This includes the power to supersede the Managing Committee and to appoint an Administrator. Section 28(2) empowers the President in case of emergency to exercise any of the powers of the Board, the only restriction is that the President shall not act contrary to the decision of the Board and after exercising such powers shall report to the Board, the action taken by him together with reasons therefor. In hall been previously urged on behalf of the petitioners that there is no emergency which necessitates or impels the President to exercise the power of the Board and as such the order of appointment of the Administrator by the President is not in accordance with the provision of Section 28(2) of the Act. In hall been previously urged on behalf of the petitioners that there is no emergency which necessitates or impels the President to exercise the power of the Board and as such the order of appointment of the Administrator by the President is not in accordance with the provision of Section 28(2) of the Act. This argument falls through in view of the specific averments made in paragraph 15 of this petition dated June 19, 1980 where it has been clearly stated by the petitioners that because of the expiry of the term of the Administrator a vacuum has been created in the administration of the school to the great advantage of the defunct Managing Committee itself. There is no dispute that there is no Managing Committee in the school and the Administrator who was appointed to run the administration of the school is no longer in office since his term expired as early as on May 20, 1980. What more emergency there can be in such a situation when there is none to run the administration of the school. Merely because the word, "emergency" has not been used in the impugned order passed by the Board does not detract from the validity of the order itself on that ground as circumstances exist which clearly show that there is a great emergency and immediate appointment of an Administrator is necessary to run the administration of the School. This being the position, this argument has got no merit and so it is not sustainable. Reference has been made in this connection to the decision reported in Sachinath Ghosh v. W.B. Board of Secondary Education (supra). That case is patently not applicable to the present case for the simple reason that in that case there was a Managing Committee which was superseded without furnishing the Committee a copy of the report of the Director of Public Instruction and without giving it any opportunity of hearing as required under Rule 8 of the Rules for Management of Recognised Non-Government Institutions (aided and unaided), 1969. This is not the case here. I have already stated hereinbefore that there is no Managing Committee and an Administrator was already appointed. The term of that Administrator came to an end and in order to fill up the vacuum the Board had to make an order appointing an Administrator. This is not the case here. I have already stated hereinbefore that there is no Managing Committee and an Administrator was already appointed. The term of that Administrator came to an end and in order to fill up the vacuum the Board had to make an order appointing an Administrator. In such circumstances, in my view the order cannot be challenged on the ground that it has been made by the President in the absence of any emergency. As regards the contentions tried to be advanced that the order has not been placed before the Board for approval that is a routine matter which will be placed before the Board. It is not the case of the petitioners that the Board has disapproved the order and as such this question is premature at this stage and the order cannot be challenged on that count. 9. I hive already stated hereinbefore that this Court in order to solve that tangle gave a suggestion to the parties whether they are agreeable to have another officer of the Education Department appointed as Administrator. It is unfortunate that though the learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the Board welcomed this suggestion, the petitioners did not and this speaks a volume. However, it i. not for me to say anything on this point. 10. In the premises aforesaid I do not find that any prima facie case has been made out nor do I find that the petitioners have got locus standi to challenge the impugned order by this petition and I have also held that the order is not in breach of the provisions of Section 28 (2) of the Board of Secondary Education Act, 1963. For all these reasons, I reject this application without any order as to costs. All interim orders are vacated. Respondents have not filed any affidavit and so none of the allegations are admitted by them. Stay of operation of the order as prayed for is refused. Writ applications are rejected.