REGIONAL DIRECTOR, EMPLOYEES STATE INSURANCE CORPORATION, TRICHUR v. TAJ TEXTILES INDUSTRIAL CO-OP. SOCIETY LTD. , CALICUT
1980-01-24
P.JANAKI AMMA, P.SUBRAMONIAN POTI
body1980
DigiLaw.ai
Judgment :- 1. In both these cases a common question arises Are the employees of a Co-operative Society, deemed to be registered under the Kerala Co-operative Societies' Act, 1969, liable to be insured under the provisions of the Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948? It is contended by the Employees' State Insurance Corporation that they are liable to be so insured. The stand taken by the employers in these two cases is that there is no scope for such coverage since the employees are members of the Society and as such there cannot be an employer-employee relationship between them and those employed by them. This seems to have appealed to the Employees' Insurance Court with the result that the applications by the employers have been allowed in both the cases. In M.F.A. No. 404 of 1978 there is a further question to which we will refer later. 2. A Society registered under S.7 of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act is a body corporate known by the name under which it is registered, having perpetual succession and a common seal and with power to hold property, enter into contracts, institute and defend suits and other legal proceedings and to do all things necessary for the purposes for which it is constituted. S.9 provides so. It is a legal entity distinct from its shareholders. The shareholders may, no doubt, be interested in the proper governance of the Cooperative Society and its proper functioning, but that is not to say that they are owners of the Co-operative Society. That this is the position was held by this Court as early as in 1964 in the decision in Kerala State Handloom Ltd v State of Kerala (1964 KLJ. 175). There the question arose under the Industrial Disputes Act and the contention that there cannot be an employer-employee relationship between a Co-operative Society and its employees, who are members of the society was negatived in that case on the same reasoning as we have pointed out here. But, nevertheless the decision of the Employees' Insurance Court is sought to be supported by the learned counsel appearing for the respondent in M. F. A. No. 404 of 1978 on the authority of the decision of the High Court of Madras in S. A. Co.-op. Motor Transport Soc.Syed v. Batcha (1964 (1) LLJ. 280).
But, nevertheless the decision of the Employees' Insurance Court is sought to be supported by the learned counsel appearing for the respondent in M. F. A. No. 404 of 1978 on the authority of the decision of the High Court of Madras in S. A. Co.-op. Motor Transport Soc.Syed v. Batcha (1964 (1) LLJ. 280). A Division Bench of the High Court of Madras no doubt considered more or less a similar situation in that case. The society which was the appellant before the Court in that case was one the membership of which was restricted to ex-servicemen and for getting employment in the society its membership was made a condition precedent. Some of the employees were retrenched and the claim made by the member-employees for retrenchment compensation under S.25F of the Industrial Disputes Act was negatived. When consequently the question of entertaining the dispute arose under S.33C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act before the Labour Court, the court held that it had jurisdiction. The matter ultimately reached the High Court and in this context the High Court found: "The object of the society among others is to carry on the business of running for hire, goods and passenger transport services. All the shareholders are interested in running the above services. They are members of the society and owners of the concern." On this approach, the court found that there could be no industrial dispute as the controversy was not between the workmen and the employer since the employees cannot be workmen as defined under the Act. With great respect to the learned judges of the Division Bench, we cannot agree with the statement of the law that the members of the society are owners of the concern. That was a case of a Co-operative Society registered under the Madras Cooperative Societies Act 6 of 1932. The provision for registration of a Co-operative Society under that Act is in S.9. 3. In the Bank Nationalisation case R. C. Cooper v. Union of India (AIR. 1970 SC. 564) the locus standi of a shareholder to challenge the Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Act came up for consideration. In that context the Supreme Court said at page 584 thus: "A Company registered under the Companies Act is a legal person, separate and distinct from its individual members.
1970 SC. 564) the locus standi of a shareholder to challenge the Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Act came up for consideration. In that context the Supreme Court said at page 584 thus: "A Company registered under the Companies Act is a legal person, separate and distinct from its individual members. Property of the Company is not the property of the share-holders, A share-holder has merely an interest in the Company arising under its Articles of Association, measured by a sum of money for the purpose of liability, and by a share in the profit." The reasoning applies equally well to a Co-operative Society. A member of a Co-operative Society is separate and distinct from the society as such which is a legal person. The property of a Co-operative Society does not belong to the members but to the society though such members have an interest in the society. This being the case identity between the company and the shareholder ought not to be read as has been done by the Employees Insurance Court. This answers the only question arising for decision in MFA. No. 409 of 1978. Consequently the appeal has to be allowed and the application before the Employees Insurance Court dismissed. We do so 4. In MFA. No. 404 of 1978 there is a further question. Before the notification under S.1(5) of the Employees' State Insurance Act was issued by the State Government extending the coverage of the Act to establishments the respondent's employees were sought to be covered under the Act as employees of a factory. That was resisted, and the Employees' Insurance Court found that the employees were not liable to be covered. The matter reached the High Court. Before the High Court the Employees Insurance Corporation did not press the appeal Consequently the appeal was dismissed. That is said to operate as res judicata. The decision of the High Court cannot be res judicata because there was no decision on any point by this Court. The decision before the Employees Insurance Court is not seen to have produced or marked in evidence and the appendix to the order of the Employees Insurance Court does not show that such a document was in evidence of the case.
The decision before the Employees Insurance Court is not seen to have produced or marked in evidence and the appendix to the order of the Employees Insurance Court does not show that such a document was in evidence of the case. Moreover, that decision was before the issue of notification under S.1(5) covering establishments also under the Act Further it is well-settled that in matters of recurring liabilities the adjudication for any one period need not necessarily operate as res judicata in respect of another period. Since this principle is conceded we are not dealing with it more elaborately. Whether in the particular circumstances of this case it would operate as res judicata nevertheless may be a matter for consideration, but that it is so is not made out. Therefore, we hold that any earlier decision is not shown to operate as res judicata in regard to claim for recovery of dues for the period relevant here which is after the issue of the notification under S.1(5). In the absence of material to show that any earlier adjudication was made on the merits of the case so as to operate as res judicata, we cannot decline to go into the merits of the appeal. On the merits what we have said in regard to the other appeal must apply to this case also. Consequently we hold that the applications by the respondents in these appeals before the Employees Insurance Court must stand dismissed on the ground that the employees are liable to be covered under the Employees' State Insurance Act. Parties will suffer costs. Allowed. In MFA. No. 404 of 1978 an oral application for leave under Art.134A of the Constitution is made by the counsel for the respondent. We do not see any substantial question of law of general importance which needs to be decided by the Supreme Court arising in this case. Leave refused. Leave refused.