K. A. SWAMI, J. ( 1 ) IN this petition, under Art. 226 of the Constitution, the validity of the order dated 25-8-1978 passed by the taluk Magistrate, Anekal Taluk, in case No. DRA 90/77-78 allowing the application filed by the 2nd respondent under Sec. 4 (f) of the Karnataka debt Relief Act, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'), is challenged. ( 2 ) THE lands in question are Sy. No. 11 wet land measuring one acre 7 guntas, Sy. No. 16|2 garden land measuring 25 guntas, Sy. No. 18)2 wet land measuring 1 acre 8 guntas and 8 annas and Sy. No. 207 dry land measuring 3 acres 10 guntas. All these lands are situate at Bannerughatta, jigani Hobli, Anekal Taluk. ( 3 ) SRI S. Krishnaiah, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, has raised the following contentions for consideration, (I) The Taluk Magistrate of Anekal taluk had no jurisdiction to decide the application filed under Sec. 4 (f) of the Act, by the 2nd respondent as he was not authorised by the State government in this regard. (II) Respondent-2 has not proved that he is a debtor as defined in the act, by adducing legal evidence. (III) That there was a preliminary decree passed by the Munsiff Court, bangalore, in O. S. No. 706 of 1950-51 between respondents 2 and 3 and one narayanappa for redemption of the mortgage properties in question and as such, the Taluk Magistrate had nc jurisdiction to entertain the application and to extinguish the liability existing under the preliminary decree. (IV) The petitioner is not the creditor of the second respondent. Therefore the application against the petitioner under S. 4 (f) of the Act is not maintainable. ( 4 ) TO decide the aforesaid contentions, the necessary facts of the case which are not in dispute are as follows: On 12-11-1943 an usufructuary mortgage came into existence by reason of execution of the mortgage deed by Respondent No. 2 in favour of the 3rd respondent and in pursuance of the said usufructuary mortgage the possession of the lands in question came to be delivered to the 3rd respondent. There after, the 2nd respondent filed O. S. No. 706 of 1950-51 in the court of the second munsiff at Bangalore for redemption of the mortgage properties against respondent No. 3 and one Sri Narayanappa. There after, the 2nd respondent filed O. S. No. 706 of 1950-51 in the court of the second munsiff at Bangalore for redemption of the mortgage properties against respondent No. 3 and one Sri Narayanappa. In that suit, a preliminary decree under Order 34 Rule 7 CPC came to be passed on 30-6-1952. The following are the terms of the preliminary decree:"this suit coming on this day for final disposal before Sri V. Gundappa, B. A. LL. B. , II Munsiff, bangalore, in the presence of Sri k. R. Parthasarathy, advocate for the Plaintiff and Sri M. L. V. Narasimhiah, advocate, for the defendants, it is hereby declared that the amount due to the Defendants on account of principal, interest and costs calculated upto the 30th day of December, 1952, is rs. 1,298|- together with current interest at 6% per annum on Rs. 800 from the date of suit to 30th december, 1952. And further that the parties do bear their own costs of the suit. That if the plaintiff pays into court the amount so declared due on or before 30th day of December, 1952, the defendant shall deliver up to the plaintiff or to such person as he appoints, all documents in his possession or power relating to the mortgage property, and shall, if so required, re-transfer the property to the plaintiff free from the mortgage and from all encumbrances created by the defendant or any person claiming under him and shall put the plaintiff in possession of the property. "that if such payment is not made on or before the said 30th day of december 1952, the plaintiff shall be debarred from all right to redeem the property and the property shall be sold. It is also not in dispute that pursuant to the preliminary decree, the second respondent has not deposited any amount in the court and has not asked for drawing up of a final decree. In the meanwhile, the 3rd respondent (mortgagee) has assigned his right to the petitioner under a registered deed da ted 8-4-1956. Though the document reads as a deed of mortgage, but in effect, it should be construed only as an assignment of the right of the mortgagee in favour of the petitioner. In the meanwhile, the Act came into force. In the meanwhile, the 3rd respondent (mortgagee) has assigned his right to the petitioner under a registered deed da ted 8-4-1956. Though the document reads as a deed of mortgage, but in effect, it should be construed only as an assignment of the right of the mortgagee in favour of the petitioner. In the meanwhile, the Act came into force. Pursuant to the Act, the 2nd respondent made an application before the Taluk Magistrate under S. 4 (f) of the Act, for redeeming the mortgage and for possession of the mortgaged properties. The Taluk magistrate after holding an enquiry came to the conclusion that the 2nd respondent was a debtor within the meaning of the Act, being a person belonging to weaker sections of. the people, therefore, the debt stood discharged. As a consequence thereof, the petitioner was directed to deliver possession of the lands in question. It is also to be noticed that the original mortgagee has also been made a party to the proceeding. ( 5 ) THE first contention of Sri S. Krishnaiah that the Taluk Magistrate of Anekal had no jurisdiction to entertain the application under S. 4 (f) of the Act and to decide the same as he had not been authorised in this behalf under the provisions of the Act, was not well founded. It was brought to the notice of the court by the learned Second Additional Government Advocate that the State government by its order dated 18-2-77 bearing No. RDC 157 CML 76, had authorised all the Taluk Magistrates in the State to exercise the power under s. 4 (e) and (f) and S. 5 of the Act. Thus, the first contention must fail and it ts, accordingly, rejected. ( 6 ) THE second contention also cannot be accepted; because, in this case the Taluk Magistrate has held an enquiry and during the course of the enquiry has also recorded the statement of the petitioner. The 2nd respondent has stated in his evidence (Ex- G) that he has no other source of income. That being so, it cannot be held that the second respondent has not proved that he is a debtor as defined in the Act. It is not the case of the petitioner that he has adduced any other evidence which the Taluk Magistrate has ignored. That being so, it cannot be held that the second respondent has not proved that he is a debtor as defined in the Act. It is not the case of the petitioner that he has adduced any other evidence which the Taluk Magistrate has ignored. That being so, it cannot be held that the finding recorded by the Taluk magistrate that the second respondent belongs to weaker sections of the people is not based on legal evidence. Therefore, the second contention of the petitioner must also fail. ( 7 ) BEFORE dealing with the third contention, the fourth contention, can be taken up, as it does not require much consideration. The fourth contention of the petitioner is that she cannot be considered to be the creditor of the 2nd respondent; therefore, the application under S. 4 (f) of the Act against her is not maintainable. The learned counsel for the petitioner places reliance in support of this argument on the wording contained in S. 4 (f) of the Act which reads as follows: "every mortgage executed by the debtor in favour of the creditor shall stand redeemed and the mortgaged property shall be released in favour of such debtor and where the creditor fails to do so, the Subdivisional magistrate having jurisdiction over the place where the mortgaged property is situate may, suo moto or on application of the debtor and after such inquiry as he may deem fit, put the debtor in possession of the mortgaged property. The argument ignores the fact that the petitioner is no other than the assignee of the mortgagee. That being so, she cannot claim any different status or different rights other than those possessed by the 3rd respondent and cannot escape from the jural relationship of mortgagor and mortgagee existing between the 2nd and the 3rd respondents, inasmuch as, she steps into the shoes of the 3rd respondent and thereby she can very well be considered as the creditor of the 2nd respondent. Hence, the fourth contention has no substance and it is accordingly rejected. ( 8 ) THE 3rd contention, as already pointed out, is raised on the basis of the preliminary decree passed by the civil Court. Hence, the fourth contention has no substance and it is accordingly rejected. ( 8 ) THE 3rd contention, as already pointed out, is raised on the basis of the preliminary decree passed by the civil Court. Elaborating this contention, it is submitted by sri Krishnaiah, learned counsel for the petitioner, that if it is held that the Taluk magistrate has got jurisdiction to entertain the application in a case where there is a preliminary decree passed in a suit for redemption, the resultant effect of such a decision would be that the Taluk Magistrate would have power or would be competent, to extinguish the liability incurred under the decree passed by a civil court and such a situation cannot be said to have been intended by the legislature inasmuch as the Legislature has not ousted the jurisdiction of a civil court. There is no provision contained in the Act to oust the jurisdiction of a Civil Court. Similarly, there is no provision contained in the act making it the exclusive jurisdiction of the Taluk Magistrate to decide the questions arising under S. 4 (e) and (f) of the Act. In a suit for redemption after a preliminary decree is passed, until the payment is made the final decree will not be drawn and there is no time limit as such prescribed for making the payment by the mortgagor and requesting the Court for drawing up of a final decree. Thus, the preliminary decree passed by the civil court in the instant case is still in force and it is also open for the 2nd respondent to make an application before the civil court for drawing up of a final decree. Of course, Rule 8 of order 34 CPC says that on payment of the amount the mortgagor may make an application for drawing up of a final decree. The mere fact that there is a preliminary decree passed in respect of the mortgage debt, the liability under the decree does not cease to be a debt as defined in the Act. The definition of the word "debt" as found in sec. 3 (b) of the Act, is wide enough to take into its fold the liability created under a preliminary decree passed in a suit for redemption of mortgage properties. The definition of the word "debt" as found in sec. 3 (b) of the Act, is wide enough to take into its fold the liability created under a preliminary decree passed in a suit for redemption of mortgage properties. That being so, Sec. 4 (a) of the Act, is attracted irrespective of the command of the preliminary decree that the mortgagor should pay the amount and apply for drawing up of a final decree. Though the mortgagor is the decree-holder in a suit for redemption, but nevertheless, such a decree is a decree for repayment of the debt and it is a debt advanced within the meaning of Sec. 4 (a) of the Act, which reads as follows:"4. Relief from indebtedness: notwithstanding anything in, any law for the time being in force or in any contract or instrument having force by virtue of any such law and save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, with effect from the date of commencement of this section, (a) Every debt advanced before the commencement of this section including the amount of interest, if any, payable by the deblor to the creditor shall be deemed to be wholly discharged. ( 9 ) THUS, if the debt (the liabilty under the preliminary decree in question) by operation of law stands extinguished, the debtor is not required to make actual payment for discharging such debt and he can very well request the court to declare that the debt is extinguished and to draw up a final decree directing the mortgagee to deliver possession, of the suit properties, irrespective of the command contained in Rules 7 and 8 of Order 34 of the CPC and irrespective of the command of the preliminary decree in view of the relief from indebtedness flowing from S. 4 of the act, which provides that notwithstanding anything in any law for the time being in force or in any contract or instrument having force by virtue of any such law and save as otherwise expressly provided in the Act, with effect from the date of commencement of section 4, the consequences envisaged in section 4 (a) to (f) of the Act will follow. 'thus, it is open for the mortgagor to make an application before the civil court in the aforesaid suit for passing a final decree for possession of the suit properties on the ground that he is a debtor within the meaning of the Act, therefore the debt has stood extinguished. This interpretation will also be consistent with the principle of law that where an enactment does not oust the jurisdiction of a civil court, but nevertheless entrusts the jurisdiction to the other authorities, such ouster cannot be presumed or easily conceded, unless it is necessary for the enforcement of the Act or to avoid the conflct of jurisdiction. In the instant case, though the Taluk Magistrate or the sub-Divisional Magistrate have been endowed with the jurisdiction to deal with the cases falling under Sec. 4 (e) and (f) of the Act, but there is no specific provision contained in the Act to oust the jurisdiction of a, civil court. Therefore, it is open for the 2nd respondent to obtain a final decree for possession from the Civil court in the aforesaid suit on his proving that he is a debtor as defined in the Act, and as such, the liability under the preliminary decree has stood discharged. Thus, it has to be held that where a liability is created under a preliminary decree passed in a suit for redemption of mortgage properties or a liability created under any decree passed by a civil Court falling within the scope of the definition of the word "debt" as defined in the Act, the relief as contemplated under sec. 4 of the Act, can only be had from a Civil Court and such liability cannot be declared to have been discharged by the Taluka magistrate or the sub Divisional magistrate, as the case may be, as they have no jurisdiction to wipe out the liability created under a decree passed by a civil court even though the liability created under a decree of a civil court is a debt as defined in the act. This interpretation accords with the intention of the Legislature in not ousting the jurisdiction of a civil court; and on the same basis, it can also be held that it is not intended by the Legislature to invest the Taluka magistrate or the Sub-Divisional magistrate with the jurisdiction to discharge the liability created in a decree passed by a civil court. Thus, such an interpretation will not only avoid the conflict of jurisdiction and will not also deprive the debtor as defined in the Act from obtaining relief under the Act and at the same time it will accord with the intention of the legislature. Therefore, it is held that the Taluk Magistrate had no jurisdiction to entertain and decide the application under sec. 4 (f) of the act, relating to the mortgage debt in question in respect of which there is a preliminary decree passed by the civil court. Accordingly, the application filed by the 2nd respondent before the Taluk Magistrate under section 4 (f) of the Act, was not maintainable and as such, the order passed thereon was without jurisdiction. Consequently, the third contention is answered in favour of the petitioner. ( 10 ) FOR the reasons stated above, this writ petition is entitled to succeed. As stated above it is made clear that it is open for the 2nd respondent to make an application in the OS No. 706 of 1950-51 on the, file of the Munsiff court at Bangalore for drawing up of a final decree on the ground that he is a debtor as defined in the Act and as such, the debt due under the decree has been extinguished. On such an applicatton being filed, it is open for the court to decide as to whether the 2nd respondent is a debtor within the meaning of the Act. If the court comes to the conclusion that he is a debtor within the meaning of the Act, it has to inevitably hold that the debt due under the preliminary decree has stood discharged and to pass a final decree for possession of the mortgage properties. ( 11 ) ACCORDINGLY, subject to the above clarification, this writ petition is allowed and the impugned order of the Taluk Magistrate, Anekal, bearing no. DRA 90/77-78 dated 25-8-1978 is quashed. ( 11 ) ACCORDINGLY, subject to the above clarification, this writ petition is allowed and the impugned order of the Taluk Magistrate, Anekal, bearing no. DRA 90/77-78 dated 25-8-1978 is quashed. ( 12 ) IF such an application is filed before the Court in the aforesaid suit, the court shall dispose of the said application within three months from the date of filing of the application. ( 13 ) LET a copy of this order be sent to the civil - Court. ( 14 ) THE learned Second Additional government Advocate, who has appeared in the case on the direction of the court, is permitted to file his memo of appearance on behalf of the first respondent, in six weeks. --- *** --- .