Judgment :- 1. The first accused in Sessions Case No. 44 of 1979 convicted by the Additional Sessions Judge, Kottayam under S.302 I. P. C. and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life is the appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 8 of 1980. The State has filed Criminal Appeal No. 119 of 1980 against acquittal recorded by the trial Judge against accused 2 to 5 for various of fences including S.302 I.P.C. read with S.149 I.P.C. The appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 8 of 1980 has been heard in person and also by counsel appointed for him. 2. The prosecution case may be briefly stated as follows: Accused Nos. 1, 3 and 4 are the sons of the second accused. Fifth accused is the son-in-law of the second accused. pws. 1 and 2 are the younger brothers of deceased Thankan. The two groups, related inter se, fell out on account of Thankan purchasing an item of property from pw. 13 by paying a price higher than that offered by the 2nd accused. pws. 1,2 and Thankan used to take their evening bath usually at Thuruthikkattu Kadavu in Kadammad village. On 28-12-1979 at about 8.15 p m. Thankan along with Pws.1,2 and 5 went to the kadavu to take bath. pw.2 had a lighted hurricane lamp with him. They had to pass through the courtyard of Pw.6 and on the way they invited him and he promised to come a little later. Accused were sitting on a rock in the thodu. Immediately the 5th accused flashed a torch light at the face of Thankan, who questioned him The first accused gave the reply saying that they came to do away with Thankan and others. The first accused with M. 0.1 Malappuram knife rushed towards Thankan and inflicted a stab injury on his chest and also further injuries. The second accused armed with MO. 2 tapping knife inflicted cut injuries on Thankan on his head and back. Accused 3 and4 also inflicted stab injuries on Thankan with Malappuram knife. When pws. 1 and 2 came to the rescue of Thankan, they were stabbed by accused 1,3 and 4. Thankan fell down dead. The 3rd accused threw pw. 2 in the canal. The 5th accused was flashing his torch all along with a view to help the other accused. Hearing the cries of pws 1 and 2, several people gathered there. 1 and 2 came to the rescue of Thankan, they were stabbed by accused 1,3 and 4. Thankan fell down dead. The 3rd accused threw pw. 2 in the canal. The 5th accused was flashing his torch all along with a view to help the other accused. Hearing the cries of pws 1 and 2, several people gathered there. Accused ran away with their weapons Hearing about the occurrence, uncle and mother of pw. 1 and Pw.2 rushed to the scene and took them to Government Hospital, Palai, where they were admitted as inpatients by the doctor, pw 8, who sent intimation Ext. P14 to the Palai Police Station. pw. 11, Head-constable attached to Palai Police Station received intimation, went to the Hospital and recorded first information statement Ext. P1 from pw. 1 at 2.45 a.m and prepared body notes of pws 1 and 2 He returned to the police station at 4.15 a.m and registered a case as Crime No. 360 of 1978 under Ext. P15 FIR. against 5 accused under S.143, 147, 148, 307, 302 IPC. read with S.149 IPC. Since the occurrence had taken place within the limits of Rama-puram Police Station, FIR. was transferred to that station. pw. 12, Head-constable attached to Ramapuram Police Station registered the case as Crime No 165 of 1978 under Ext. P16 FIR. In the morning of 29121978, the accused 1 and 3 who had some injuries, went to the Government Hospital, Ramapuram, where they were admitted as inpatients by the doctor pw. 9 who also sent intimation to Ramapuram Police Station. pw. 12 received the intimation, went to the hospital, recorded Ext. P17 statement from the 3rd accused, prepared body notes of accused 1 and 3 and registered a case as Crime No. 166 of 1978 under Ext. P18 FIR. against pws. I, 2 and Thankan under Ss 323, 324 and S.114 IPC 3. pw 14, the Circle Inspector of Police, Crime Detachment, Kottayam on orders from the Superintendent of Police, Kottayam, took up investigation of both the cases on 29121978. He proceeded to the scene and prepared Ext P9 inquest report and seized MOs 3 to 12 from near the scene. Post mortem was conducted by pw 7 of the Government Hospital, Palai. Meanwhile accused 1 and 3 were sent to Government Hospital, Palai pw. He proceeded to the scene and prepared Ext P9 inquest report and seized MOs 3 to 12 from near the scene. Post mortem was conducted by pw 7 of the Government Hospital, Palai. Meanwhile accused 1 and 3 were sent to Government Hospital, Palai pw. 14 questioned witnesses On 1211979, on the discharge of the accused 1 and 3 from the hospital, they were taken before pw. 14, who arrested and questioned them and sent them to court. On 2511979, the remaining accused surrendered before pw. 14, who arrested and questioned them and sent them to court. MO. 2 produced by second accused was seized under Ext P22 mahazar. MO. 14 produced by 4th accused was seized under Ext. P2I mahazar. MOs. 1 and 13 produced by the 5th accused were seized under Ext. P20 mahazar. Investigation was completed and charge was laid in due course in both the cases. 4. Both the cases were committed to the Sessions Judge, Kottayam by the Additional First Class Magistrate, Palai. Two cases were tried successively and judgment delivered on the same day by the Additional Sessions Judge, Kottayam. 5. The trial Judge framed charges under S.143. 147, 148, 149, 324 and 302 IPC. against the accused who pleaded not guilty. Prosecution examined 14 witnesses Exts P1 to P22, MOs. 1 to 14 and Ext. Dl were marked. Defence did not tender oral evidence. 6. When questioned in the trial court, the first accused admitted that out of MOs. 3 to 12, two kailies, a lungi and a thorthu belonged to them. He further stated that at 8 p.m. he and other accused had gone to the kadavu where they usually take bath changed their clothes and got down to bathe, that somebody came jumping from the southern kaiyala of pw. 6's compound and he saw pws. 1, 2, 5 and Thankan, that pw. 5 had a torch in his hand and Thankan uttered threats and ran up along with others and accused tried to run away, that pw. 2 caught the first accused and hit him with stone, that Pwl stabbed him with a Malappuram knife which he caught with his band and sustained injury, that Thankan ran up, sat on his abdomen and caught his neck and applied pressure and he felt suffocated. 2 caught the first accused and hit him with stone, that Pwl stabbed him with a Malappuram knife which he caught with his band and sustained injury, that Thankan ran up, sat on his abdomen and caught his neck and applied pressure and he felt suffocated. The 3rd accused, in addition, stated that when he tried to escape Thankan caught him and bit him on his ear, that Pw.l with a Malappuram knife stabbed him and sustained injuries on his right palm, that he and Pw.l tussled and fell down, that Thankan pulled the first accused down, sat on his abdomen and pressed his neck. The other accused adopted these statements. 7. The learned trial Judge held that the formation of unlawful assembly or the common object suggested has not been established, that pws. I and 2 sustained injuries during the scuffle which took place between them and accused 1, 3 and 4 after Thankan was attacked, that accused I, 3 and 4 did not voluntarily cause injuries on pws. I and 2, that the second accused did not inflict cut injuries on Thankan, that the 5th accused did not take part in the occurrence, that accused 3 and 4 also inflicted stab injuries on Thankan, that the injuries on accused 1 and 3 have been explained, that the 3rd accused did not throw pw. 2 into the thodu, that accused 3 and 4 did not stab Thankan and that the meeting was accidental. On these findings, the learned trial Judge convicted the first accused alone under S.302 IPC. simplicter, but acquitted him of all other charges and wholly acquitted the other accused. 8. The convicted first accused challenges his conviction. The State is aggrieved by the acquittal of the other accused. Thus, the entire prosecution case is now open before us for a fresh consideration and reappraisal, bearing in mind well-established principles requiring to be followed in the matter of d-ealing with an appeal against conviction and appeal against an acquittal. 9. There is no dispute that in the occurrence which took place on the night of 28-12-1978, Thankan as well as pws. 1 and 2 sustained injuries and Thankan succumbed to the injuries Inquest was held by pw. 14. Ext. P19 is the inquest report. Post mortem was conducted by pw. 7. Ext P5 is the post mortem certificate issued by him. 1 and 2 sustained injuries and Thankan succumbed to the injuries Inquest was held by pw. 14. Ext. P19 is the inquest report. Post mortem was conducted by pw. 7. Ext P5 is the post mortem certificate issued by him. His evidence shows that Thankan had as many as 14 incised injuries, that is one incised injury on the left chest, two on the right chest, two on the right upper arm, three on the right shoulder tip, one on the left neck, one near the left ear, one on the back of right thigh, one on the left illiac and one on the right index finger. There were abrasions found on the right knee, right thumb, abdominal wall, right chest, etc There was an incised wound on the lateral aspect of the right upper lobe with fluid blood in the right thoracic cavity, incised wound on the anterior aspect of the pericardium which contained blood, incised wound on the anterior wall of the right ventricle and an incised wound in the right dome of the diaphram extending into right lobe of the liver. The injury to the right upper lobe of the lung and the incised wound on the right dome of the diapbram correspond to the two stab injuries on the side of the chest (injuries 5 and 7 in Ext. P5). The wound on the anterior aspect of the pericardium corresponds to the stab injury on the left side of the chest (injury No. 1 in Ext. P5). Pw7 has deposed that injury Nos. 1, 5 and 7 together with the corresponding internal injuries were fatal, injury No. 1 was necessarily fatal. He further deposed that cause of death was syncope due to hock and haemorrhage as a result of the injuries. His evidence is not challenged before us. 10. pws. 1 and 2 were admitted in the Government Hospital, Palai by pw.8 at 9.45 p.m. on 28-12-1978. Ext. P6 and Ext P8 are the respective wound certificates. They were discharged on 17-1-1979 and 21-1-1979 under Exts, P7 and P9 discharge certificates respectively. The evidence of pw. 8 shows that Pw.l had a lacerated wound, four incised wounds and two parallel abrasions, all found in the palms of the upper-arm, the injuries were all simple. Pw2 had four incised injuries, and a contusion, all of which except one were simple injuries. 11. The evidence of pw. 8 shows that Pw.l had a lacerated wound, four incised wounds and two parallel abrasions, all found in the palms of the upper-arm, the injuries were all simple. Pw2 had four incised injuries, and a contusion, all of which except one were simple injuries. 11. The prosecution relies on (a) eye witness testimony of pws. 1,2.5 and 6, (b) evidence regarding motive given by pws 1 and 13, (c) evidence regarding recovery of material objects and Chemical Examiner's certificate and (d) medical evidence. x (Paras 12 to 17 dealing with discussion of evidence are omitted ) 18. The learned trial Judge concluded that the fatal injuries on Thankan were inflicted by the first accused and this finding is seriously challenged by his counsel. The evidence of pws. 1,2,5 and 6 is to the effect that one or two stab injuries on the chest were inflicted by first accused on Thankan, and these stabs were followed by three or four more stabs by the first accused. No witness has deposed that any other accused inflicted stab injuries on the chest of Thankan. The evidence would probabilise that the first three injuries must have been on the chest region. It is true that the witnesses were not able to mention which of the other injuries were inflicted by a particular person and on what parts of the body. But this is not sufficient to reject their uniform testimony regarding the first few injuries on the chest region. It is only reasonable to expect the witnesses to remember the location of the first few injuries, particularly When they were directed at the chest region. The evidence would tend to establish that the fist accused started the attack. This was spoken to by all the witnesses examined in the case including dis-interested witnesses like pws. 5 and 6. It is true that pw. 6 went back on a part of his case diary statement. But that circumstance is not sufficient to make the court reject his entire testimony. He is a person who knows the accused from the childhood. Naturally one would expect him to have some sympathy for them. It was not suggested to him that he was in any way interested in Thankan or others. But that circumstance is not sufficient to make the court reject his entire testimony. He is a person who knows the accused from the childhood. Naturally one would expect him to have some sympathy for them. It was not suggested to him that he was in any way interested in Thankan or others. Under these circumstances, his evidence that attack was started by first accused by inflicting injuries on the chest of Thankan is entitled to great weight. It is corroborated by other testimony also. This part of the prosecution case, which finds a place in the earliest version, Ext. P1 which came into existence within a few hours of the occurrence has been accepted by the learned trial Judge who, it appears to us, has carefully sifted and considered the evidence and circumstances of the case. There can be no doubt that first accused was the aggressor and not Thankan or any one else. Because Thankan knocked away a property by offering a price higher than the one offered by the first accused, it was natural that latter had resentment towards Thankan. At the scene, when accused No 5 flashed his torch, Thankan objected to it This must have provoked the first accused to rush towards Thankan and attack him. The prosecution case and the testimony in this behalf appears to be natural, cogent and probable. The defence version does not appear to be so. There is no evidence or circumstance placed before court in support of the defence version that Thankan and others were the aggressors. Even the hostile witness, pw.6, who knew the accused from the childhood, did not support the defence version to any extent. It was not suggested to any witness that Thankan had any particular reason for bearing animosity towards first accused or the others. There was no reason for Thankan and others to attack the first accused. (paras 19 to 26 dealing with discussion of evidence are omitted.) 27. We concur with the learned trial Judge in holding that accused No. 1 infilled the fatal injuries on Thankan. The fatal injuries were all in the chest region, i.e. a vital part. The injuries were all inflicted with the Malappuram knife. Medical evidence shows that these injuries were fatal, and one of these injuries was necessarily fatal. We concur with the learned trial Judge in holding that accused No. 1 infilled the fatal injuries on Thankan. The fatal injuries were all in the chest region, i.e. a vital part. The injuries were all inflicted with the Malappuram knife. Medical evidence shows that these injuries were fatal, and one of these injuries was necessarily fatal. Considering all these circumstances, we have no hesitation in agreeing with the learned trial Judge that the first accused inflicted these injuries intentionally and the injuries were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. In inflicting these injuries there can be no doubt that the first accused committed the offence of murder punishable under S.302 IPC. 28. It is argued on behalf of the accused that the charges framed by the Sessions Judge are not in accordance with law and per se the first accused has been prejudiced and his conviction has to be set aside for that reason alone. The argument is that there was no charge against the first accused for the offence under S.302 IPC. simpliciter, though there was a charge under S.302 IPC. read with S.149 IPC and therefore the trial court had no jurisdiction to convict him under 302 IPC. It is further contended that the omission to frame a charge against the first accused under S 302 IPC. simpliciter was an incurable illegality and not a curable irregularity. The learned Public Prosecutor on the other band would contend that the defect, if at all, and even if one existed was only a curable irregularity and since no prejudice has been caused to the first accused no interference is called for on that ground. 29. Manakchand v. State of Punjab (AIR. 1955 SC 274) related to a case where the Sessions Judge framed a charge under S.302 IPC. read with S.149 IPC., but held that there was no common object made out and convicted the accused under S.302 IPC read with S.34 IPC. In appeal by the convicted persons, the High Court acquitted the other accused and convicted one alone under S.302 IPC. simpliciter holding that S.34 IPC did not apply. The Supreme Court (Bench of three Judges) considered the scope of S.149 and 34 IPC. and observed that S.149 IPC. In appeal by the convicted persons, the High Court acquitted the other accused and convicted one alone under S.302 IPC. simpliciter holding that S.34 IPC did not apply. The Supreme Court (Bench of three Judges) considered the scope of S.149 and 34 IPC. and observed that S.149 IPC. is a specific offence in itself and did not merely declare a constructive liability as under S.34 IPC , that the charge under S.302 IPC. simpliciter is distinct and separate from a charge under S.392 IPC. read with S.149 IPC. and when there is a charge only under S.302 IPC read with S.149 IPC. the accused cannot be convicted under S.302 IPC. simpliciter. There was an observation that omission to frame a charge under S.302 IPC. was an illegality and not an irregularity However, the court went into the question whether the accused suffered prejudice and held that under the circumstances he was misled in his defence and could not be convicted. 30. In Surajpal v. State of U P. (AIR. 1955 SC. 419) a Bench of three Judges had to consider a case where 19 accused stood charged under S.147,148, 323 IPC. read with S.149,307 read with S.149 and 302 IPC. read with S.149. All were convicted by the Sessions Judge. In appeal the High Court held that there was no common object to commit murder or to attempt murder and therefore S.149 did not apply. Bus on the finding that it was the appellant who fired the shots which injured one and killed the other, High Court convicted him under S.302 IPC. simpliciter and acquitted the others under S.302 IPC. read with S.149 IPC. and S.307 IPC. read with S.149 IPC. The Supreme Court was of the opinion that though the absence of a charge under S.302 IPC. simpliciter was a serious lacuna, the real question was whether it bad prejudiced the accused. On facts, it was held that the appellant had been seriously prejudiced and consequently his conviction was quashed. 31. These decisions came up for consideration before a Bench of five Judges of the Supreme Court in W Slaney v. State of M.P. (AIR. 1956 SC. 116). The two decisions were distinguished and explained. Dealing with Nanak-chand's case (AIR. 1955 SC. On facts, it was held that the appellant had been seriously prejudiced and consequently his conviction was quashed. 31. These decisions came up for consideration before a Bench of five Judges of the Supreme Court in W Slaney v. State of M.P. (AIR. 1956 SC. 116). The two decisions were distinguished and explained. Dealing with Nanak-chand's case (AIR. 1955 SC. 274) in the leading judgment of Bose J. for himself and on behalf of S.R. Das, Acting C J., it was observed as follows: "Now it is true that there are observations there which, without close examination, would appear to support the learned counsel for the appellant. But these observations must be construed in the light of the facts found, the most crucial fact being that patent prejudice was disclosed. It was found that the appellant there was in fact misled in his defence and one of the factors taken into consideration, as indeed must always be the case, was that when he was told that be was to be tried under S.302 read with S 149 of the Indian Penal Code that indicated to him that he was not being tried for a murder committed by him personally but that he was only being made vicariously liable for an act that another had done in prosecution of the common object of an unlawful assembly of which he was a member. But that was only one of the matters considered and it does not follow that every accused will be so misled. It all depends on the circumstances. The entire evidence and facts on which the learned Judges founded are not set out in the judgment but there is enough to indicate that had the appellant's attention been drawn to his own part in the actual killing he would probably have cross-examined the doctor with more care and there was enough in the medical evidence to show that had that been done the appellant might well have been exonerated. x xx (55) Now having reached the conclusion that there was prejudice, the learned Judges were of the opinion that the irregularity, if it can be so called when prejudice is disclosed, was incurable and from that they concluded, that an incurable irregularity is nothing but an illegality: a perfectly possible and logical conclusion when the word "irregularity" and "illegality" are not defined. As there was prejudice in that case, the decision was invalid and being invalid it was illegal. We do not say that that is necessarily so but it is a reasonably plausible conclusion and was what the learned Judges had in mind. We agree that some of the expressions used in the judgment appear to travel wider than this but in order to dispel misconception we would now hold that the true view is the one we have propounded at length in the present judgment." (Paras 54 to 56 - Emphasis by us). 32. In dealing with Suraj Pal's case (AIR. 1955 S. C. 419), it was observed as follows by Bose, J.: "This court held that the omission to frame a charge is a serious lacuna but despite that the real question is whether that caused prejudice. The learned Judges then proceeded to determine the question of prejudice on the facts of that case. The conclusion reached 'on the facts' was that prejudice was disclosed, so an acquittal was ordered." (Para 51) 33. In the leading judgment of Bose, J., the law has been laid down thus: It Therefore, when there is a charge and there is either error or omission in it or both, and whatever its nature, it is not to be regarded as material unless two conditions are fulfilled both of which are matters of fact: (1) the accused has 'in fact' been misled by it 'and' (2) it has occasioned a failure of justice. xx In the end, it all narrows down to this: some things are 'illegal ", that is to say, not curable, because the Code expressly makes them so; others are struck down by the good sense of Judges who, whatever expression they may use. do so because those things occasion prejudice and offend their sense of fair play and justice Chapter XIX deals comprehensively with charges and S.535 and 537 cover every case in which there is a departure from the rules set out in that chapter. Such departures range from errors, omissions and irregularities in charges that are framed, down to charges that might have been framed and were not and include a total omission to frame a charge at all at any stage of the trial. In all these cases the only question is about prejudice. Such departures range from errors, omissions and irregularities in charges that are framed, down to charges that might have been framed and were not and include a total omission to frame a charge at all at any stage of the trial. In all these cases the only question is about prejudice. We say this because the Code repeatedly says so in express and emphatic terms and because that is the foundation on which rules of procedure are based. But when all is said and done what we are concerned to see is whether the accused had a fair trial, whether he knew what he was being tried for, whether the main facts sought to be established against him were explained to him fairly and clearly and whether be was given a full and fair chance to defend himself. If all these elements are there and no prejudice is shown the conviction must stand whatever the irregularities whether traceable to the charge or to a want of one. (45) In adjudging the question of prejudice the fact that the absence of a charge, or a substantial mistake in it, is a serious lacuna will naturally operate to the benefit of the accused and if there is any reasonable and substantial doubt about whether he was, or was reasonably likely to have been, misled in the circumstances of any particular case, he is as much entitled to the benefit of it here as elsewhere; but if, on a careful consideration of all the facts, prejudice, or a reasonable and substantial likelihood of it: is not disclosed the conviction must stand; also it will always be material to consider whether objection to the nature of the charge, or a total what of one, was taken at an early stage." (Paras 23, 34, 39, 44 & 45). 34. In Suraj Pal's case Chandrasekhara Aiyar, J. speaking for himself and Jagannadhadas J. concurred with the views expressed above and summarised the law in Para.86 as follows: "(86). S.34, 114 and 149 of the Indian Penal Code provide for criminal liability viewed from different angles as regards actual participants, accessories and men actuated by a common object or a common intention; 'and the charge is a rolled-up one involving the direct liability and the constructive liability' without specifying who are directly liable and who are sought to be made constructively liable. In such a situation, the absence of a charge under one or other of the various heads of criminal liability for the offence cannot be said to be fatal by itself, and before a conviction for the substantive offence without a charge can be set aside, prejudice will have to be made out". 35. The same principle has beer, laid down in Karnail Singh v. State of Punjab (AIR. 1954 SC. 204); Mathew v. T. C. State (AIR. 1956 SC. 241); Srikantiah v. State of Mysore (AIR. 1959 SC Reports 496); Venkatadri v. State of A. P. (AIR. 1971 SC. 1467); Bhoor Singh v. State of Punjab (AIR. 1974 SC.1256) and Ishwar Singh v. State of U.P (1976 SC. Cases (Crl) 629). All the above decisions stress the aspect that trial is vitiated only if prejudice is made out. 36. Chap.17 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 (for short Code) lays down the manner in which charges have to be framed Courts are bound to follow the dictates of Chap.17 of the Code. However, sometimes courts commit errors, departing from the rules laid down in Ss 211 to 224 of the Code These errors or departures may be of several kinds; they may be errors of omission or commission; they may be irregularities in charges that are framed or a total omission to frame a charge. All such "errors", to use a comprehensive term of wide import, are dealt with in S.464 and 465 of the Code. In all such cases, the only issue is whether the error has misled the accused causing prejudice and leading to failure of justice. This issue can be resolved by seeking answers to certain corollary questions, namely, did the accused have a fair trial, did he know what he was being tried for. whether the allegations and facts were explained to him fairly and clearly, whether he was given a full and fair chance to defend himself? If the answers are in the affirmative, the only conclusion could be that there has been no prejudice and failure of justice. If the answer is in the negative, the trial must necessarily be treated as vitiated. If there exists a reasonable doubt regarding the answers, the benefit of doubt must go to him. 37. If the answers are in the affirmative, the only conclusion could be that there has been no prejudice and failure of justice. If the answer is in the negative, the trial must necessarily be treated as vitiated. If there exists a reasonable doubt regarding the answers, the benefit of doubt must go to him. 37. The question which next arises for consideration is whether on the facts of the present case the defence has made out prejudice to the first accused in any way by the manner in which the charge has been framed. 38. The court charge more or less follows the pattern of the police charge. It mentions the unlawful assembly of the accused with the common object of committing the murder of pws. 1, 2 and Thankan, the commission of rioting by them and further states that the first accused with a deadly weapon stabbed on the chest and other parts four or five times. The second accused with a deadly tappers' knife cut Rajendran (i. e. Thankan) on his head and back and inflicted injuries, that accused 3 and 4 with deadly Malappuram knife stabbed him on several parts of his body and inflicted injuries: and stabbed pws. 1 and 2 in the course of which pw. 2 was injured and pw. 1 tried to ward off the stabs and received injuries, that the 3rd accused threw pw. 2 into the thodu and thereby tried to kill pws. 1 and 2, that on account of the injuries sustained by Thankan he died instantaneously, that during the occurrence the 5th accused lighted his torch so as to help the other accused: and therefore all the five accused were guilty of offences punishable under S.143, 147, 148, 149, 324, 327 and 302 IPC. 39. It is argued before us that no accused was sought to be made liable under S.302 IPC. simpliciter and it was not specifically alleged that the injuries inflicted by the first accused proved fatal and that the liability sought to be fixed on the first accused was only in the light of S.149. 40. In this connection we would like to refer to a few decided cases. In Vayu Pillai v. State (1956 KLT. 30) the Sessions Judge framed a vague charge without making the position clear against the first accused. 40. In this connection we would like to refer to a few decided cases. In Vayu Pillai v. State (1956 KLT. 30) the Sessions Judge framed a vague charge without making the position clear against the first accused. It was complained that the charge being in such a fashion the accused could not be expected to have known that he was being tried for the commission of the substantive offence of murder or rioting armed with deadly weapons. A Division Bench of this Court dealt with this objection in the following manner at para 7: "While this criticism is not without force, reading the charge as a whole we cannot think that accused 1 could have been misled as to the substantive offences for which he was being tried. In the body of the charge it is specifically stated that amongst the members of the unlawful assembly that lay in wait for Madhusoodanan Pillai, accused 1, was armed with a deadly weapon and that he used that against Madhusoodanan Pillai repeatedly with deadly effect. Nothing is therefore more clear from the charge than that accused 1 was being specifically charged with the commission of the substantive crimes of rioting armed with deadly weapon and for murder." 41. In the case reported in Mathew v. T. C. State (AIR. 1956 SC. 241) the Sessions Judge lumped together the charges stating that "the aforesaid offences having been proved by the evidence adduced by the prosecution, you the accused 1 27 have committed offences punishable under " and then followed a string of ten sections of the Travancore Penal Code. It was contended that the charge was vague and caused prejudice to the defence. Dealing with this objection, the Supreme Court held: "(6). We are satisfied that the charge neither caused, nor could have caused, prejudice. The body of the charge set out the fact that the accused 1 29 formed an unlawful assembly and stated the common object; and then the charge specified in detail the part that each accused had played. In the circumstances, each accused was in a position to know just what was charged against him because once the facts are enumerated the law that applies to them can easily be ascertained; and in this particular case it was just a matter of picking out the relevant sections from among the ten mentioned." 42. In the circumstances, each accused was in a position to know just what was charged against him because once the facts are enumerated the law that applies to them can easily be ascertained; and in this particular case it was just a matter of picking out the relevant sections from among the ten mentioned." 42. In the case reported in Ishwar Singh v. State of U. P. (1976 SC. Cases (Crl.) 629), one of the accused was convicted under S.302 IPC. simpliciter though the charge framed was under S.302 IPC. read with S.149 IPC. against him and another. When the accused was questioned by the trial court he was not asked any question to enable him to answer the allegation that he inflicted the fatal injury. Still, in view of the fact that the F.I.R and the evidence showed that the fatal injury was inflicted by him, it was held that no prejudice was caused to the defence. 43. Having carefully considered the materials before us, including the charge, the evidence and the statement of the accused we are satisfied that the manner in which the charge was framed by the Sessions Judge has not prejudiced the first accused in any way in the matter of bis defence. In referring to the stabs inflicted on Thankan the charge stated that the attack was begun by the first accused by stabbing on the chest and it was repeated four or five times. While mentioning the stabs inflicted by Accuseds and 4 on Thankan, the charge carefully refrained from saying that they inflicted any stab injury on the chest. In evidence also, the eye witnesses said that the first accused inflicted stab injuries on the chest and other parts and when referring to the stab injuries inflicted by accused Nos. 3 and 4 none of them said that any stab injury on the chest was inflicted by them. Medical evidence is that injuries 1, 5 and 7 (all of which were on the chest region), were fatal injuries. The sequence of injuries inflicted by the first accused as spoken to by the witnesses shows that the first accused inflicted one or two) injury on the chest and continued to inflict further injuries. Medical evidence is that injuries 1, 5 and 7 (all of which were on the chest region), were fatal injuries. The sequence of injuries inflicted by the first accused as spoken to by the witnesses shows that the first accused inflicted one or two) injury on the chest and continued to inflict further injuries. Viewed in this light, there can be no doubt that the consistent prosecution case has been that the stab injuries on the chest were caused by first accused and not by others. Under these circumstances, we are satisfied that the first accused had full notice of the prosecution case and evidence that he was responsible for the fatal injuries and he was not prejudiced in his defence in any manner by any defect in the charge. 44. We may not be understood to imply that the charge as framed by the trial court is satisfactory. In the decisions quoted by us, the Supreme Court has repeatedly pointed out the duty of trial court in taking care to frame proper charges. Framing of charge is not an empty formality. It is of vital import in the conduct of a trial. The task of framing charge should not be approached lightly. This is evident from the provisions of Chapter XVIII of the Code. S.226 of the Code requires that when an accused appears or is brought before the Sessions Court, the prosecutor shall open his case by describing the charge framed against the accused and referring to the evidence proposed to be adduced. This has to be followed by consideration of records and the documents of the case and hearing submissions of both sides It the accused is not discharged at that stage, a charge has to be framed under S.228 of the Code. A charge is to be framed when a Sessions Judge is of the opinion that the accused has committed an offence exclusively triable by Sessions Court, this conclusion is to be arrived at only alter consideration of the records of the case and documents and hearing submissions of both sides. S.228 clause (2) of the Code requires that where the Judge frames a charge, the charge must be read and explained to the accused and his plea taken. These provisions emphasise the deliberation with which the task of framing of charge is to be undertaken by Sessions Court. S.228 clause (2) of the Code requires that where the Judge frames a charge, the charge must be read and explained to the accused and his plea taken. These provisions emphasise the deliberation with which the task of framing of charge is to be undertaken by Sessions Court. Mere copying of the police charge is wholly unwarranted, not only because police charge is invariably a jumbled up charge, but more because law requires the Judge to apply his mind on the records and documents before framing a charge. Authoritative text books on the Indian Penal Code provide model charges. In particular, we refer to the model charges contained in the law of Crimes by Ratanlal. Courts would do well to seek guidance from these mode! charges before framing charges in criminal cases. We emphasise the need for the judges themselves bestowing their personal attention to the framing of charges to avoid prejudice and also allegations of prejudice to the defence. In the result, we affirm the conviction and sentence entered against the first accused by the learned trial Judge. We also confirm the acquittal recorded by the learned Sessions Judge against the other accused. Both the appeals are dismissed. Dismissed.