JUDGMENT - M.N. CHANDURKAR, J.:---This revision application filed by original defendant No. 1 debtor has been referred to a Division Bench in view of the conflict arising out of two decisions of this Court one given by Mridul, J. and the other by Kantawala, C.J. on the constructions of the provisions of sections 11 and 12 of the Maharashtra Debt Relief Act, 1975 (hereinafter referred to as "the Debt Relief Act"). 2. The plaintiff creditor had filed Suit No. 101 of 1973 against the applicant debtor for recovery of an amount of Rs. 4, 329.90 on the strength of a promissory note for Rs. 3,000/- executed by the debtor in favour of the plaintiff on 24th December, 1970. In the suit the debtor raised a contention that in view of the Maharashtra Debt Relief Ordinance which was promulgated on 22nd August, 1975 which is now replaced by the Debt Relief Act, the debtor was a marginal farmer holding less than 1 hectre of unirrigated land and, therefore, under the provisions of the ordinance, the debt in question stood discharged and the suit was, therefore, liable to be dismissed. On this application the trial Court made an order on 3rd August, 1976 as follows : "Reference be made to the proper authority". Accordingly a reference came to be made to the Authorised Officer. 3. It appears that in view of the decision of this Court in (Promod M. Jhaveri v. Sukhdeo Ramratan)1, A.I.R. 1977 Bom. 43, the learned Civil Judge suo motu decided to recall the reference and made the following order on 14th March, 1978 without hearing the petitioner : "In view of A.I.R. 1977 Bom. 43, this Court has jurisdiction to try the matter under reference. Hence I call back the reference". This order has been challenged by the debtor defendant in this revision application. 4. When this revision application came up for hearing before D.B. Deshpande, J., apart from the decision in the Promod Jhaveris case, a another unreported decision of Kanatawalal, C.J. in (M/s. Vithaldas Raghunathdas Soni v. Ramgopal Hiralal Tapdiya)2, in Civil Revision Application No. 539 of 1976 decided on 12th December, 1977 was brought to the notice of the learned Judge. 4. When this revision application came up for hearing before D.B. Deshpande, J., apart from the decision in the Promod Jhaveris case, a another unreported decision of Kanatawalal, C.J. in (M/s. Vithaldas Raghunathdas Soni v. Ramgopal Hiralal Tapdiya)2, in Civil Revision Application No. 539 of 1976 decided on 12th December, 1977 was brought to the notice of the learned Judge. The learned Judge referred to the view taken by Mridul, J., that "the mischief of sections 11 and 12 does not extend to the cases of unsecured debts or debt aspects of secured debts, which matters being within the purview of Clauses (a), (b), (c) and (d) thereof have to be dealt with by the Civil Courts concerned", and Mridul, J., had rejected the objection to the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts to try the issues raised in the Civil Court in its insolvency jurisdiction. Kantawala, C.J. had taken the view that "the question whether a person who claimed to be a debtor was a worker or not was to be decided by the Authorised Officer" and two additional issues were, therefore, framed dealing with the question whether the defendants or any one or more of them were workers within the meaning of section 2(o) of the Debt Relief Act and whether the debt or the liability, if any, under the transaction in suit was wholly discharged by reason of the provisions of section 4 of the Debt Relief Act. Deshpande, J. took the view that the suit out of which the revision application decided by Kantawala, C.J. arose was for a simple money transaction and did not fall within the purview of section 4(e) of the Debt Relief Act and yet Kantawala, C.J. held that the jurisdiction was with the Authorised Officer alone and the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to decide this question. It is because of this conflict of views in the two decisions referred to above that this revision application has been referred to a Division Bench. 5. Mr. It is because of this conflict of views in the two decisions referred to above that this revision application has been referred to a Division Bench. 5. Mr. Karlekar appearing on behalf of the debtor defendant has contended that there is express provision in sections 11 and 12 as well as in section 4(b) of the Debt Relief Act which outs the jurisdiction of the Civil Court in respect of the issue which is required to be settled, decided or dealt with by the Authorised Officer under the Act and, therefore, according to the learned Counsel, when the debtor had applied to the trial Court that he was a marginal farmer because he owned less than 1 hectre of land, he was, therefore, freed of the debt liability by the provisions of the ordinance. The question as to whether he was a marginal farmer or not could be decided only by the Authorised Officer and the Civil Court did not have jurisdiction to decided that question in view of the express provision in sections 11 and 12 of the Debt Relief Act. The learned Counsel questioned the correctness of the view taken by Mridul, J. in Promod Jhaveris case. 6. Mr. Jahagirdar appearing on behalf of the plaintiff has wholly relied upon the decision of Mridul, J. in support of his contention that the reference as contemplated by section 12 of the Debt Relief Act could be made only in respect of matters which are covered by Clause (e) of section 4 of the Debt Relief Act and consequently, according to the learned Counsel since as held by Mridul, J. an occasion to make an application under section 7 by the creditor would arise only for the purpose of implementing the provisions of section 4(e) of the Act, the reference contemplated by section 12 could be made only in a case where the question arises out of a claim for of return of the pledged articles as contemplated by section 4(e) of the Debt Relief Act. 7. Before we deal with the decision of Mridul, J. in Promod Jhavris case, it is necessary to set out a few provisions of the Debt Relief Act. We are not concerned with the provisions of the Ordinance which stands repealed by the Debt Relief Act and the relevant provision admittedly are now the provisions of the Debt Relief Act. 7. Before we deal with the decision of Mridul, J. in Promod Jhavris case, it is necessary to set out a few provisions of the Debt Relief Act. We are not concerned with the provisions of the Ordinance which stands repealed by the Debt Relief Act and the relevant provision admittedly are now the provisions of the Debt Relief Act. The substantive provision providing for liquidation of certain debts is contained in section 4 of the Debt Relief Act. Section 4 provides : "Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force or in any contract or other instrument having force by virtue of any such law, and save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, every debt of a worker whose immovable property, if any, does not exceed twenty thousand rupees in market value and every debt of any other debtor, outstanding on the appointed day, including the amount of interest, if any, payable by a debtor shall be deemed to be wholly discharged". The substantive provision in section 4 thus firstly deals with every debt of a worker, whose immovable property does not exceed twenty thousand rupees in market value and it further deals with every debt of any other debtor. The debts of those persons which are outstanding on the appointed day are now statutorily deemed to be discharged and the debtors are freed from any liability which they may have originally owned to the creditors. 8. Section 4 further enumerates the consequences which will follow as a result of the statutory discharge of the debt liability of the workers and the debtors. The first consequence is that no such debt due from the debtor on the appointed day would be recoverable from him or from or against any moveable or immovable property belonging to him and further no such property is liable to be attached and sold or proceeded against in any manner in the execution of any decree or order relating to such debt against him. The other consequence stated in Clause (b) is that no Civil Court shall entertain any suit or proceeding against such debtor for the recovery of any amount of such debt, including interest, if any. The other consequence stated in Clause (b) is that no Civil Court shall entertain any suit or proceeding against such debtor for the recovery of any amount of such debt, including interest, if any. However, where a suit or proceedings is instituted jointly against such debtor or any other person, the suit or proceeding in so far as it relates to such other person is not affected. Further all suits and proceedings (including appeals, revisions, attachment or execution proceedings) pending on the appointed day for the recovery of any such debt against such debtor abate. This however, does not apply to the sale of any movable property confirmed before such day. If a debtor is undergoing detention in a civil prison in execution of any decree for money passed against him by a Civil Court in respect of any such debt, the law directs that he shall be released. 9. An important consequence which follows the extinction of the debtors liability is with regard to the right to receive back the pledged property by the debtor. This consequence is stated in Clause (e) and since the decision in Promod Jhaveris case is based mainly on section 4(e) read with section 7, we reproduce Clause (e) which reads as follows :--- "(e) every property pledged or mortgaged by such debtor shall stand released in favour of such debtor, and the creditor shall be bound to return the same to the debtor forthwith on the debtor making an application in writing in that behalf; and the creditor shall pass a receipt to the debtor of having received the application. If the creditor refuses to pass a receipt, then the debtor may get the application endorsed to that effect under the signature and date of any of the officers referred to in section 6 or by any person authorised by them in this behalf. Explanation 1.---Nothing in this section shall be construed in entitle any such debtor to the refund of any part of a debt already repaid by him or recovery from him before the appointed day. Explanation 2.---For the purposes of this section, the expression debt of worker includes a debt arising out of loans taken from more than one creditor". Explanation 1.---Nothing in this section shall be construed in entitle any such debtor to the refund of any part of a debt already repaid by him or recovery from him before the appointed day. Explanation 2.---For the purposes of this section, the expression debt of worker includes a debt arising out of loans taken from more than one creditor". The effect of Clause (e) is that there is a statutory obligation created against a creditor to return the property pledged or mortgaged to a debtor forthwith when the debtor makes an application in writing in that behalf. When the debtor gives an application to the creditor, he has to pass a receipt acknowledging that the application has been received. If the creditor refuses to pass a receipt, then the latter may get that application endorsed to the effect that the creditor declines to pass a receipt under the signature and date of any of the officers referred to in section 6 or by any person authorised by them in this behalf. The officers referred to in section 6 are the Commissioner of Police, where there is one, and elsewhere the District Magistrate or the Superintendent of Police. 10. Section 5 of the Debt Relief Act prohibits the creditor from damaging, destroying or tampering with any property pledged or mortgaged with him or any document connected therewith or part with it or otherwise deal with the same except as provided in this Act. This provision operates from the appointed day. We need not refer to the provisions of section 6 which entitles a debtor to seek assistance of a Police Officer or the District Magistrate to take such steps as may be reasonably necessary for securing the delivery of possession of the property to the debtor. 11. This provision operates from the appointed day. We need not refer to the provisions of section 6 which entitles a debtor to seek assistance of a Police Officer or the District Magistrate to take such steps as may be reasonably necessary for securing the delivery of possession of the property to the debtor. 11. Then comes section 7(1) which reads as follows :--- "If, in the course of implementing the provisions of section 4, a creditor raises a question that the person who claims to be his debtor is not a marginal farmer, a rural artisan, a rural labourer or, as the case may be, a workers, or disputes the eligibility of the debtor for relief under this Act on any other ground including the valuation of the immovable property, if any, of a worker, then the creditor shall make an application in writing to an officer not below the rank of an Additional Tahsildar (or any officer in any department who in the opinion of the District Magistrate is of equivalent rank) duly appointed by an order in writing by the District Magistrate in this behalf (hereinafter referred to as "the Authorised Officer"). Under sub-section (2) of section 7, an application has to be made within seven days from the date of receipt of the application by the creditor under Clause (e) of section 4 or from the date of endorsement made on the application under that clause. Sub-section (6) which deals with the power and jurisdiction of the Authorised Officer reads as follows : "(6) The Authorised Officer shall have power to determine all questions in relation to, or connected with, the question or dispute raised by the creditor in his application, and accordingly, he may determine the extent, or as the case may be, the value of the property, give directions for the safe custody of the pledged property and may pass such orders as may be necessary in the circumstances of each case for enforcing and implementing the provisions of this Act. It shall be lawful for the Authorised Officer to take the assistant of there services of an expert for determining the value of any immovable property; and the provisions of sub-section (3) of section 9 for payment of honorarium shall apply to such payment". It shall be lawful for the Authorised Officer to take the assistant of there services of an expert for determining the value of any immovable property; and the provisions of sub-section (3) of section 9 for payment of honorarium shall apply to such payment". Sub-section (8) of section 7 deal with finality to the question which the Authorised Officer is required to decide under section 7(1) and section 7(6) of the Debt Relief Act. Sub-section (8) of section 7 reads as follows : "(8) The Authorised Officer shall decide the question as provided in this section and his decision shall be final and conclusive and shall not be called in question in any Civil Court. If the property or its value is in the possession of the Authorised Officer and the decision is in favour of the debtor, it shall be delivered to the debtor forthwith; and he shall make an endorsement on the order that the property or value has been delivered to the debtor". 12. It may be pointed out that a "worker", "debtor", "marginal farmer" and "rural artisan" have been defined in section 2 of the Debt Relief Act. It is not necessary to reproduce those definitions in full. It is enough to point out that "debtor" means a marginal farmer, a rural artisan or a rural labourer whose total income from all sources did not exceed two thousand and four hundred rupees during the year immediately before the 1st day of August, 1975 and a worker whose total income from all sources did not exceed, if living in an urban area six thousand rupees during the year immediately before the said date, and if living elsewhere four thousand and eight hundred rupees during that year is a debtor for the purposes of the Act. 13. It is now necessary to reproduce the provision of sections 11 and 12 of the Debt Relief Act on the construction of which the decision of this revision application will turn. Section 11 reads as follows : "11(1) No Civil Court shall have jurisdiction to settle, decide or deal with any question which is by or under this chapter required to be settled, decided or dealt with by the Authorised Officer. (2) No order of the State Government or any officer or authority made under this Chapter shall be questioned in any Court". (2) No order of the State Government or any officer or authority made under this Chapter shall be questioned in any Court". Section 12 reads as follows : "12(1) If a suit instituted in any Civil Court involves any issues which are required to be settled, decided or dealt with, by the Authorised Officer under this Act, the Civil Court shall stay the suit and refer such issues to the Authorised Officer for determination. (2) on receipt of such reference from the Civil Court, the Authorised Officer shall deal with and decide such issues in accordance with the provisions of this Chapter, and shall communicate his decision to the Civil Court ; and such Court shall thereupon dispose of the suit in accordance with the procedure applicable thereto". Section 11 and 12 both occur in Chapter III of the Debt Relief Act. The Debt Relief Act has been extensively amended by introducing Chapter V-A. It is also a common ground that apart from the provisions of Chapter III there is no reference to the Authorised Officer anywhere else in the Act and the only reference to the Authorised Officer is in section 7 and 10. 14. A section 11 bars the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to settle, decide or deal with any question which is by or under Chapter III required to be settled, decided or dealt with by the Authorised Officer. Section 12 lays down the course which the Civil Court has to adopt where a suit before it involves an issue which is required to be settled, decided or dealt with by the Authorised Officer. In case such an issue arises, the Civil Court has to stay the suit and refer the issue to the Authorised Officer for determination. Once the Authorised Officer deals with the issues and decides them and the reference is sent back to the Civil Court the, Civil Court has to dispose of the suit in accordance with the decision of the Authorised Officer in respect of those issues. 15. The crucial question which arises is which are the issues under Chapter III which are required to be settled, decided or dealt with by the Authorised Officer. The only relevant provision is in section 7 of the Debt Relief Act. 15. The crucial question which arises is which are the issues under Chapter III which are required to be settled, decided or dealt with by the Authorised Officer. The only relevant provision is in section 7 of the Debt Relief Act. Now, what is contended on behalf of the decree-holder is that section 7 specifically refers to the jurisdiction which the Authorised Officer has to exercise while implementing the provision of section 4 of the Debt Relief Act and according to the learned Counsel, the only material clause of section 4 for the purposes of section 7 is Clause (e). Therefore, according to the learned Counsel, unless the dispute between the debtor and the creditor is one which arises out of a claim under Clause (e) of section 4 with regard to the return of the pledged property there is no occasions for the creditor to make an application under section 7 and consequently it is only in such a case that the provisions under section 7 will be attracted. The learned Counsel, therefore, contends on the authority of Promod Jhaveris case that since the Civil Court is not implementing section 4 in a case where there is no question of return of pledged property to the debtor, no question of the Authorised Officer being required to determine any issue which is required to be decided under this Debt Relief Act arises in such a case. The argument, therefore, is that the scope of sections 11 and 12 of the Act is restricted only to a case in which the creditor would have had to apply under section 7 of the Debt Relief Act. As already pointed out, this contention is based mainly on the decision of in Promod Jhaveris case which we shall consider later. 16. Now there can be no doubt that the proceeding under section 7 before the Authorised Officer can arise only where a creditor wants to raise a question that his debtor is not entitled to the benefits of the Debt Relief Act and, therefore, his debt does not stand extinguished and, therefore, further he is not bound to return the pledged property to the debtor on an application being made by him as contemplated by Clause (e) of section 4. 17. 17. However, if a careful scrutiny of sections 7, 11 and 12 is made, it appears to us to be clear that the scope of section 11 cannot be restricted only to a dispute contemplated by section 4(e). Section 4(e) of the Debt Relief Act no doubt deals with a secured debt because it refers to "every property pledged or mortgaged by such debtor". The consequence of section 4(e) is that the pledged or mortgaged property shall stand released in favour of such debtor and the creditor is bound to return the same to the debtor forthwith on the debtor making an application in writing. Now if we read section 11 of the Debt Relief Act, it is clear that section 11 does not refer to any particular proceeding in which the Authorised Officer is to decide the question referred to in that section. Section 11 refers to "any question which is required to be settled, decided or dealt with by the Authorised Officer". For the purposes of identifying the question which is required to be settled, decided or dealt with by the Authorised Officer under the Act and to which reference is made in section 11, we have to go to section 7. 18. If we now go to section 7, it is no doubt true that proceeding contemplated by it arises out of a claim under section 4(e). What is, however, important is that section 7 also enumerates the questions which the creditor can raise before the Authorised Officer. Those questions are that: (1) the person who claims to be a debtor is not a marginal farmer, a rural artisan, a rural labourer or a worker; (2) the dispute regarding the eligibility of the debtor for relief under the Act on any other ground including the valuation of the immovable property of a worker. These are, therefore, the questions which are referred to in section 11 as the questions which are required to be settled, decided or dealt with by the Authorised Officer by or under Chapter III of the Debt Relief Act. A further jurisdiction of the Authorised Officer to determine all questions which are raised by the creditor is to be found in section 7(6) which provides that the Authorised Officer shall have power to determine all question in relation to, or connected with, the question or dispute raised by the creditor in his application. A further jurisdiction of the Authorised Officer to determine all questions which are raised by the creditor is to be found in section 7(6) which provides that the Authorised Officer shall have power to determine all question in relation to, or connected with, the question or dispute raised by the creditor in his application. This provision is merely ancillary to the provision in section 7(1) and where the determination of any question which is related to or connected with the questions referred to in section 7(1) becomes necessary, the jurisdiction to decide those additional questions is also with the Authorised Officer. Section 7, therefore, is in two parts. It deals with the nature of the proceeding and it further deals with the questions which can be decided in such proceedings. When section 11 refers to a questions which are required to be settled, decided or dealt with by the Authorised Officer, those questions are to be identified with reference to their mention in sections 7(1) or 7(6) of the Debt Relief Act for the purposes of section 11 or section 12. For ascertaining whether the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is excluded under section 11, all that is material is to ascertain whether any questions which under Chapter III or under the Debt Relief Act are required to be decided by the Authorised Officer have arisen for decision before the Civil Court and once such questions arise before the Civil Court the Civil Court is obliged statutorily to stay the suit and make a reference to the Authorised Officer. In our view, the fact that those questions are raised or could be raised in a proceedings arising out of a claim by a debtor under section 4(e) to be instituted by the creditor is of an no consequence for the purposes of ascertaining the nature of the questions which the Civil Court is barred from deciding. In our view, the fact that those questions are raised or could be raised in a proceedings arising out of a claim by a debtor under section 4(e) to be instituted by the creditor is of an no consequence for the purposes of ascertaining the nature of the questions which the Civil Court is barred from deciding. Therefore, wherever questions of the nature referred to in section 7(1) and (6) are raised before the Civil Court, the provisions of section 11 and 12 of the Debt Relief Act will be attracted and the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to decide those questions is ousted by section 11 and unless a reference is made to the Authorised Officer by the Civil Court for adjudication of those questions and the decision of the Authorised Officer is communicated to the Civil Court the Civil Court is incompetent to proceed to decide the suit if the decision of those question, is necessary for the decision of the suit. 19. A reference to Clause (b) of section 4 does not appear to be relevant for the purposes of construing the provisions of section 11 and 12. One of the consequences specified in section 4 of the Act is that in Clause (b) it is provided that no Civil Court shall entertain any suit or proceedings against the debtor for the recovery of any amount of such debt, including interest, if any. Now this, as already pointed out, is merely a consequential provision consequent upon the statutory extinguishment of the liability of the debtor as a result of the operation of the Debt Relief Act in respect of the debts of the debtor to whom the Act becomes applicable. Before, however, the bar of section 4(b) can be availed of, the question whether the debt of the debtor is extinguished will have to be decided and this issue will have to be decided by the Authorised Officer. Clause (b) of section 4 is, therefore, not of any assistance for the purposes of the construction of sections 11 and 12. 20. Clause (b) of section 4 is, therefore, not of any assistance for the purposes of the construction of sections 11 and 12. 20. Coming now to the decisions in Promod Jhaveris case, though we agree with the view taken by the learned Judge that the governing concept in section 7 is the implementation of the provision of section 4 and the Civil Courts are not instrumentalities charged with the task of implementing the provisions of section 4, we find ourselves unable to agree with the narrow construction which the learned Judge has placed on sections 11 and 12 of the Debt Relief Act. It was contended before the learned Judge, who decided the Promod Jhaveris case, on behalf of the creditor that only claims which relate to release and delivery of possession of security fall within the scope of the Authorised Officer authority. The learned Judge in that case has taken the view that "reading section 7 as a whole, the reference to section 4 in opening part of sub-section (1) of section 7 must be said to be a reference only to Clause (e) of the said section 4" and "the governing concept in sub-section (1) of section 7 is, implementation of the provisions of section 4". It is not possible to dispute the validity of the view. It is also not possible for us to dispute the view taken by the learned Judge that when the courts given effect to the consequences enumerated in Clauses (a), (b), (c) and (d) of section 4, the courts cannot be said to be the instrumentalities charged with the task of implementing the provisions of section 4 and that the courts do not implement the provisions of law, but they merely enforce the rights and liabilities recognised by law. The learned Judge has also, in our view, correctly taken the view that the jurisdiction of the Authorised Officer is confined to such questions as are raised by the creditor in his application and that the said sub-section (6) of section 7 enumerates powers of the Authorised Officer The learned Judge has further taken the view that the Authorised Officer has no jurisdiction to decide questions or disputes which are not capable of being raised by the creditor in his application to the Authorised Officer and in the proceeding under section 7, the Authorised Officer is not required by the Act to go into the questions of claims pertaining to debts simpliciter. 21. There can be no doubt that having regard to the provisions of section 4(e) and section 7(1), the jurisdiction to be exercised by the Authorised Officer under section 7(1) can be invoked only on an application made by a creditor disputing the debtors claim. It is, however, difficult for us to concur with the view taken by the learned Judge when he further holds that the applicability of the provisions of sections 11 and 12 of the Act is restricted only to a case which must fall under section 4(e). The relevant observations of the learned Judge in paragraph 44 of the judgment are as follows : "In my opinion, an authorised officer is entitled to settle, decide or deal with, questions which can be raised by a creditor in his application under section 7, that is to say, claims arising in connection with release and delivery of possession of property pledged or mortgaged by a debtor. That being so, civil courts have jurisdiction to adjudicate upon and adjudge all claims, questions and disputes other than those which are raised by the creditor in his application under section 7. As held above, the applications contemplated by section 7 of the Act do not take within their sweep claims, questions and disputes pertaining to Clause (a), (b), (c) and (d) of section 4 in so far as the said disputes relate to unsecured debts or merely to debt aspect of secured debts as contradistinguished from security aspect thereof. As held above, the applications contemplated by section 7 of the Act do not take within their sweep claims, questions and disputes pertaining to Clause (a), (b), (c) and (d) of section 4 in so far as the said disputes relate to unsecured debts or merely to debt aspect of secured debts as contradistinguished from security aspect thereof. In my opinion, the mischief of sections 11 and 12 does not extend to the cases of unsecured debts or debt-aspects of secured debts, which matters being within the purview of Clauses (a), (b), (c) and (d) thereof, have to be dealt by the civil courts concerned. 22. The learned Judge seems to have taken the view that section 7 does not contemplate decisions of questions pertaining to Clauses (a), (b), (c) and (d) of section 4. These observations in our view are not justified by terms of section 4 read with section 7. It will be clear from a careful reading of section 4 that the consequences specified in Clauses (b), (c), (d) and (e) thereof cannot survive independently of the consequences in Clause (a). The effect of the Act is mainly to be found in the substantive part of section 4 and in order to decide whether any of the consequences specified in Clauses (a) to (e) follow in a given case, one must first decide whether the debt stands statutorily extinguished as provided in the main part of section 4. Unless the debt is of the kind defined in the Act and the debtor satisfies the requirements of being a debtor as defined in section 2(f) of the Debt Relief Act, the question of ascertaining whether the consequences specified in section 4 can follow really could not arise. In order to decide whether even under section 4(e), a debtor is entitled to the return of the security, the Authorised officer even while making the enquiry under section 7(1) has to go back to the main provisions in section 4 because the claim of the creditor that the debtor is not entitled to the return of the debt security can be substantiated only if the creditor is able to satisfy the Authorised Officer that the debt of the debtor does not stand extinguished under the Debt Relief Act. 23. 23. These are the basic questions which are required to be decided before the provisions of section 4(e) are implemented, as will be clear from the provisions of section 7(1). There is no question which independently arises under section 4(e) and unless the Authorised Officer first decides the question as to whether the debtor satisfies the description of a marginal farmer, a rural artisan, a rural labourer or a worker, or whether the debtor is entitled to the benefits or the reliefs under the Debt Relief Act, even a claim under section 4(e) cannot be successfully made by the debtor. It is no doubt true that the basic questions referred to above do not fall expressly within the terms of the Clause (e), but for giving effect to the provisions of section 4(e), it is clear that these basic questions were required to be decided first and that is why the legislature has specifically made a reference to those questions in section 7(1). It would, therefore, be incorrect to say that section 7(1) does not contemplate the decision of the questions in Clauses (a) to (d), because unless the requirement of the main provisions of section 4 are satisfied, the consequences enumerated in the latter part of that section could not be given effect to. The main question which is required to be decided under Chapter III is the eligibility of the debtor or the applicability of the Act or whether the debt is a debt within the meaning of the Act and any other questions would be merely incidental to those main questions. As already pointed out, before giving effect to the provisions of Clauses (a) to (e), a determination of the questions referred to in section 7(1) is necessary for the purposes of the main part of section 4. 24. With respect to the learned Judge, it appears that the fact that sections 11 and 12 refer only to the questions which are required to be decided by the Authorised Officer and not to the proceedings in which those questions are to be decided under section 7 has been overlooked by him. Section 11 refers to the questions which are to be settled, decided or dealt with by the Authorised Officer under Chapter III. Section 11 refers to the questions which are to be settled, decided or dealt with by the Authorised Officer under Chapter III. Section 12 deals with the same questions but the terminology used is "any issues which are required to be settled, decided or dealt with by the Authorised Officer under this Act." Though section 11 uses the words "under this Chapter" and section 12 used the words "under this Act", that does not make any difference because admittedly the questions referred to in sections 11 and 12 are required to be decided by the Authorised Officer only under Chapter III. Thus, as already pointed out, all that has to be done for the purposes of sections 11 and 12 is to ascertain the questions which are to be decided by the Authorised Officer under Chapter III under the Act. For this one has to look to section 7. The fact that those questions are required to be decided in an application under section 7(1) does not cease to make those questions answer the description necessary for the attraction of sections 11 and 12 of the Debt Relief Act. We are, therefore, of the view that the learned Judge was not right when he held that the only question which is required to be settled, decided or dealt with by the Authorised Officer is one in respect of the return of the security contemplated by section 4 of the Act and that the mischief of sections 11 and 12 does not extend to the cases of unsecured debts or debt aspects of secured debts. Not much argument is necessary to point out that whether a debt secured or unsecured is not relevant for the purposes of the Debt Relief Act and both kinds of debts stand extinguished provided the necessary conditions required to be satisfied under the Act are fulfilled. Before each of Clauses (a), (b), (c), (d) and (e) are invoked by the debtor, it will necessarily require the decision on the questions referred to in section 7(1) and once these questions are raised in a suit, having regard to the provisions of sections 11 and 12, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to decide those questions will be ousted. We are, therefore, of the considered view that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to decide any of the questions referred to in section 7(1), i.e. whether the person who claims to be debtor is not a marginal farmer, a rural artisan, a rural labourer or, as the case may be, a worker, or where the eligibility of the debtor for relief under the Act on any other ground including the valuation of the immovable property, if any, of the worker, is taken away by section 11. Similarly, all questions in relation to or connected with the above questions also will be outside the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. The decision in Promod Jhaveris case must therefore, stand overruled. 25. We respectfully agree with the view taken by Kantawala, C.J. in unreported decision in M/s. Vithaldas Raghunathdas Sonis case. That was a case in which the plaintiff has filed a suit to recover a sum of Rs. 10,198.32 being the amount due from the defendants on account of a loan advanced to them. A claim was made by the defendants that their was income was less than Rs. 400 per month and their liability in respect of the transaction was wholly discharged by reason of the provisions of the Act and the application to refer the relevant issues under section 12 of the Debt Relief Act by the Authorised Officer was rejected by the trial Court and the defendants had filed a revision application. While allowing the revision application, Kantawala C.J. after making a reference to section 12 of the Debt Relief Act observed as follows: "Having regard to the provisions of section 7, the question whether a person who claims to be a debtor is a worker or not is to be decided by the Authorised Officer specified therein. It is unnecessary in the present case for me to consider in detail the various questions which are likely to arise in determination of the plea that has been taken by the defendants before the plea can be granted. It is unnecessary in the present case for me to consider in detail the various questions which are likely to arise in determination of the plea that has been taken by the defendants before the plea can be granted. Ordinarily, these matters are to be decided by the Authorised Officer in view of the provisions of section 11 read with section 12 of the Act because for any question which is required to be decided or determined by the authority under the act the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is expressly taken away to decide the same." Two issues one dealing with the questions as to whether the defendants or any one or more of them were workers within the meaning of section 2(o) of the Debt Relief Act and the other dealing with the question as to whether the debt or the liability, if any, under the transaction in suit was wholly discharged by reason of the provisions of section 4 of the Debt Relief Act were directed to be referred by the trial Court to the Authorised Officer. 26. We may, however, sound a word of caution to the Civil courts that while it is obligatory upon them to give effect to the provisions of sections 11 and 12, before making a reference to the Authorised Officer, it would be the duty of the Civil courts to first come to the conclusion that the issues which are asked for being referred to the Authorised Officer arise in the case and that they are required to be decided for the purposes of the suit. The Civil Court is not mechanically required to stay its hands the moment a plea is taken. It is common experience that vague pleas are taken by the defendants merely with a view to delay the proceedings in the Civil courts. Before framing issues, it must be ascertained that the plea is not a frivolous one in the sense that the defendant raising these issues must make a full and complete pleading in respect of those pleas in the written statement itself. Unless such full particulars of the plea are given, the Civil Court will be justified in not framing an issue on such a vague and in adequate pleading. Unless such full particulars of the plea are given, the Civil Court will be justified in not framing an issue on such a vague and in adequate pleading. It is well-known that once such reference is made, the reference takes a long time to be disposed of and maximum care must, therefore, be exercised by the Civil Court before exercising its jurisdiction to make a reference as contemplated by sections 11 and 12. The minimum that is demanded in such a case the Court must satisfy itself that the prima facie case of being entitled to the benefits under the Debt Relief Act must be made out in the pleadings by the party who desires to seek a reference to the Authorised Officer under section 11 of the Debt Relief Act. 27. In the view which we have taken, the order recalling the reference made by the trial Court in this case is liable to be set aside. It appears from the application on which the reference was made that the defendant had merely stated that the defendant had 1 hectre of land and, therefore, he was entitled to the benefits of the Debt Relief Act. The written statement of the defendant is not available at this stage. It will, however, be open to the trial Court to deal with the question of reference afresh in the light of the observations made in this judgment. 28. The revision application is, therefore, allowed. Rule made absolute. However, there will be no order as to the costs of this revision application. Revision application allowed. -----