G. N. SABHAHIT, J. ( 1 ) THIS appeal is by original opponent -1 (defendant-1) and the legaj, representative of original opponent-2 (de- fendant-2) and is directed against the judgment and decree dated 17-8-1978 passed by the Civil Judge, Gulbarga, in R. A. No. 84 of 1975, on his file, allowing the appeal and remanding the case for enquiry of mesne profits. ( 2 ) PLAINTIFF had filed a suit as OS No. 121-1 of 1961 on 12-10-61 before the court of the Subordinate Judge, Gulbarga, and it was subsequently transferred to the Court of the munsiff, Chittapur, and was numbered as O. S. No. 66-1 of 1964 and the same was decreed on 19-7-67. It was a suit for possession of three lands bearing Sy Nos. 9, 10 and 114 of gola village and the decree for delivery of possession was passed by the trial court. Aggrieved by the said judgment and decree, the defendants opponents preferred RA No. 164-4 of 1967 to the court of the Civil Judge, Gulbarga, in which the defendants got the execution of decree stayed. The plaintiff filed an application for vacating the stay and also for appointment of a receiver. But, the said application was disposed of by taking security for the mesne profits from the defendants. The defendants, subsequently, lost the appeal. They further preferred RSA no. 146-1 of 1970 before this Court and, again, obtained an ex-parte order of stay of the execution of the decree. On the objection made by the plaintiff respondent in the appeal, the stay was confirmed, on appellant furnishing security of Rs. 10,000 by this Court. The defendants lost the sepond appeal also. Thereupon, the plaintiff filed execution Petition No. 10 of 1973 and obtained possession, the plaintiff filed the present petition on 3-12-73 for mesne profits from the date of the suit till obtaining possession, i. e. from 11-10-61 to 6. 9. 73. The defendans opponents opposed the petition. They contended that the remedy for recovery of mesne profits was barred by limitation. According to them, the plaintiff had no right to sue for mesne profits for all those years. The quantum claimed was very heavy The petition was not maintainable under S. 144 cpc. Mesne profits were not asked for in the suit and there was no direc- tion for awarding mesne profits in the suit under Order XX Rule 12 CPC. According to them, the plaintiff had no right to sue for mesne profits for all those years. The quantum claimed was very heavy The petition was not maintainable under S. 144 cpc. Mesne profits were not asked for in the suit and there was no direc- tion for awarding mesne profits in the suit under Order XX Rule 12 CPC. ( 3 ) ON the rival -contentions, the learned Munsiff raised the following issues: (1) Whether the plaintiff petitioner is entitled to claim mesne profits ? (2) If so, at what rate ? (3) Whether the application is not maintainable as contended ? (4) What order ? ( 4 ) THE learned Munsiff heard Issue no. 3 as a preliminary issue and answered the same in the affirmative. Consequently, the petition was dismissed. Aggrieved by the said judgment and decree, the plaintiff petitioner went up in appeal before the Civil judge, Gulbarga. The learned Civil judge considered whether an application for mesne profits was maintainable under S. 144 read with S. 151 CPC and answered the point in the affirmative. He, however directed that the plaintiff I petitioner was entitled to mesne profits only from the date of the stay by the first appellate Court till possession was taken by the plaintiff petitioner, by his judgment and decree dated 21-8-78. Aggrieved by the same defendant-1 and the legal representative of defendant-2 have preferred the present second appeal before this court. ( 5 ) THE learned Advocate for the appellant vehemently contended that the petition for mesne profits even from the date of stay, under S. 144 o. f cpc was not maintainable. According to him there was no prayer for mesne profits in the suit and no direction for enquiry into future mesne profits was passed by the Court. Besides, there was no reversal of the decree by the appellate Court and, hence the petition was not maintainable. ( 6 ) AS against that, the learned advocate appearing for the respondent plaintiff submitted that it was the inherent power of the Court to see that parties did not suffer because of an order of, the Court and, since the jurisdiction to make restitution, is inherent in every Court, it was properly exercised by the first appellate Court. That way, he justified the decree of the first appellate Court. That way, he justified the decree of the first appellate Court. ( 7 ) THE sole point, therefore, that arises for my consideration in this appeal is: 'whether the first appellate court was justified in directing enquiry into the mesne profits from the date of the stay by the first appellate Court in the original proceeding till the date of taking possession? ( 8 ) THE stay of execution of the decree was passed by the first appellate Court in the regular appeal on 7-8-67. The plaintiff was thereby prevented from executing her decree and realising the fruits thereof. The stay was opposed and the respondents (defendants in the appeal furnished security before the Court undertaking to pay the mesne profits in case they lost the appeal. Subsequently, they lost the appeal. They came up in second appeal before this Court wherein, again on furnishing security, they obtained the stay of the execution of the decree. They lost the appeal before this Court also. In the circumstances, the plaintiff, after taking possession, has instituted the petition for mesne profits on the footing that the jurisdiction to make restitution is inherent in every Court and should be exercised whenever the justice of the case demands it. In the instant case, because of the stay orders issued by the first appellate court as well as by this Court in first and second regular appeals, the plaintiff has lost the income from the lands which she should have otherwise realised by executing the decree for possession which she obtained before the trial court as early as on 19-7-67. That way, she has averred in the petition that the act of the Court has resulted in her losing the profits on the lands and, as such, it is the duty of the Court, under s. 144 of CPC to award it by way of restitution. ( 9 ) THE learned Civil Judge, relying op the decision, rendered by the Madhya pradesh High Court in the case of inderam v. Ramdin (1) - has rightly held that the plaintiff petitioner is entitled to mesne profits from the date of the stay till the date of recovery of possession. In that case also, it was a suit for possession of an estate. No future mesne profits were claimed in the suit. The suit was decreed. The decree-holder filed an application for execution on 21-6-54. On 22. In that case also, it was a suit for possession of an estate. No future mesne profits were claimed in the suit. The suit was decreed. The decree-holder filed an application for execution on 21-6-54. On 22. 6. 54, however, the defendants applied to the trial Court for stay under Order 41 rule 5 (3) CPC and it was granted- subsequently, the defendant obtained stay in the, first appeal on 17-7-54. The first appeal was allowed on 21-9-1955. The plaintiff went up in second appeal and succeeded. The decree obtained from the trial Court was confirmed in the second appeal. The plaintiff executed the decree and obtained possession on 22-8-59. He applied for restitution of mesne profits accruing from the year 1953-54, i. e. , the date of filing the suit till the date of delivery of possession The judgment-debtors opposed the claim on the ground that the decree-holder had to file a separate suit, as is contended in the instant case. The matter was taken up before the high Court. After referring to the various decisions on the point. , the high Court observed:"i have no doubt tha'-i where a party is deprived of possession of property due to an order or decree of the Court below, which is later on reversed or varied by the appellate court, the Court could, under the powers conferred by S. 144 of the civil Procedure Code place the party, who has been deprived of possession temporarily in the same position as if the reversed decree had not at all been passed. Had the reversed decree not at all been passed and had the Court whose decree has been reversed not granted the stay order, the party would be entitled to immediate delivery of possession in pursuance of the decree of the first Court, which has ultimately been upheld by this court in the second appeal. Therefore, in my opinion, the question of mesne profits for the period from 22-6-54 to 22-8-1959 clearly falls within the ambit of the powers conferred by S. 144 of the civil Procedure Code "thus, in that case, his Lordship granted mesne profits from the date of the stay granted by the Court of the first instance till the date of taking possession, in the proceedings instituted under S. 144 CPC. ( 10 ) AGAIN, in the case of Ratansi v. Jaisingh, (2) (a Division Bench Decision), the appellants had obtained a decree for possession of some properties on 29-4-1940. The other side went up in appeal and obtained stay of the decree. However, the plaintiffs succeeded in both the Courts of Appeal thereupon, the plaintiffs |decree-holders filed an execution petition for possession and for mesne profits by way of rent collected by the judgment-debtors from 29-4-1940 to the' date of delivery of possession. A question arose as to whether the plaintiffs, who were deprived of the fruits of the decree, were entitled to mesne profits by way of restitution. After reviewing the english and Indian authorities, Their lordships, in para-13 of the judgment, have observed thus:"the Court has ample powers under S. 144 of the Code of Civil procedure to make restitution to the party which has been deprived of the fruits of its decree by an order of the Court at the instance of the judgment-debtor. This power, as has been held on authority, is not derived merely from S. 144 of the Code, but is inherent in the nature of things. The executing Court can, acting under S. 151 read with S. 47. make restitution to the party who has thus been deprived of the fruits of his decree by an order of the Court. It is not necessary in such cases that the order passed should be incorporated into, and made a part of, the original decree. . . . . ( 11 ) DEALING with the question of first principles it has been pointed out by Their Lordships of the Privy council in Jai Berham v. Kedar Nath marwari (3) thus:" It is the duty of the Court under S. 144 CPC to place the parties in the position, which they would have occupied, but for such decree or such part thereof as has been varied or reversed'. Nor indeed does not duty or jurisdiction arise merely under the said section. In is inherent in the general jurisdiction of the Court to act rightly and fairly according to the circumstances towards all parties involved. "quoting from an earlier case in rodger v. The Comptoir D'escompte de. Nor indeed does not duty or jurisdiction arise merely under the said section. In is inherent in the general jurisdiction of the Court to act rightly and fairly according to the circumstances towards all parties involved. "quoting from an earlier case in rodger v. The Comptoir D'escompte de. Paris (4) they pointed out:"one of the firs't and highest duties of all Courts is to take care that the ac'' of the Court does no injury to any of the suitors and when the expression 'the act of the Cour ' is used, it does not mean merely the act of the primary Court, or of any intermediate court of Appal, but the act of the court as a whole from the lowest court which entertains jurisdiction over the matter up to the highest Court which finally disposes of the case. " ( 12 ) THIS principle has been followed in the case of Lal Bhagwant Singh, v. Sri Krishen Das (5) and Binayak swain v. Ramesh Chandra Panigrahi, (6 ). The ratio of these authorities is obviously that on the reversal of a judgment or an order passed by a court, the law raises the obligation on the party to the record, who received the benefit of the erroneous judgment or order, to make restitution to the other party for what he had lost and it is the duty of the Court to enforce its obligation unless it is shown, that restitution would be clearly contrary to the interests of justice of the case ( 13 ) IN the instant case, as pointed out above, the plaintiff could not obtain possession because of the stay order issued by the first appellate court as also by the second appellate court. It is worthwhile to note in this context that those Courts had taken care to see that the defendants who obtained the stay furnished security to pay the mesne profits that might be found due in favour of the plaintiff in case defendants failed in the appeal. Ultimately, they have failed in the appeal. Therefore, it is the duty of the Court to see that the benefits which the plaintiff has lost because of the stay order, is restituted to him. Ultimately, they have failed in the appeal. Therefore, it is the duty of the Court to see that the benefits which the plaintiff has lost because of the stay order, is restituted to him. The Court has npt only jurisdiction to do this but it has also an obligation to do it not merely under S. 144 CPC but under the inherent jurisdiction, as pointed out above, under S. 151 read with S. 47 CPC. ( 14 ) IN the result, therefore, I am satisfied that the learned Civil Judge was perfectly justified in directing the trial Court to hold enquiry and to award mesne profits from the date of the stay till the date of possession, instead of driving the plaintiff to a separate suit. Accordingly, the appeal fails and is dismissed. I make no order as to costs of this appeal. --- *** --- .