S.K. MAL LODHA, J.—On May 24, 1977, the following substantial question of law was formulated: Whether the relationship of landlord and tenant must be treated to have come to an end when the lessees accepted new relationship and became mortgagees of the same property which they were holding as tenants? 2. The plaintiff respondent No. 1 instituted a suit for redemption in the court of Munsif, Shahpura against defendants No. 1 to 3, who are appellants in this appeal Defendant No. 4 is pro-forma party in this appeal. The case of the plaintiff was that he and defendant No. 4 mortgaged the shop described in para 1 of the plaint with defendants No. 1 to 3 for Rs. 3200/- on July 27, 1965 by means of a registered mortgage-deed, the copy of which has been submitted and marked as Ex. Al. A notice was issued on behalf of the plaintiff and defendant No. 4 on April 10, 1971 to defendants No. 1 to 3 for redeeming the shop in question. The notice was not replied. Thereafter, the plaintiff went to defendants No. 1 to 3 in the presence of the persons, whose names are mentioned in para 4 of the plaint and asked to accept the mortgage amount and to redeem the shop, to which defendants No. 1 to 3 declined. Hence the suit was instituted on April 29, 1971. Defendants No. 1 to 3 contested the suit. It was, inter alia, stated that they had been in continuous possession of the shop prior to the mortgage-deed Ex. Al, dated May 27, 1965. It was, amongst others, stated that the plaintiff and defendant No. 4 are entitled to redeem the shop but they are not entitled to get its possession, for, after redemption, the relationship of landlord and tenant, which existed between them prior to the mortgage-deed, shall be revived. The trial court framed the necessary issues and recorded evidence of the parties Thereafter, vide its judgment dated March 26, 1976, decreed the suit for redemption but declined the relief for possession. 3. Feeling dissatisfied with the judgment of the trial court, in so far as it related to the refusal of the relief for possession, the plaintiff went in appeal. The learned District Judge, Bhilwara by his judgment dated April 13. 1977, accepted the appeal whereby granting the relief for possession of the shop also. 3. Feeling dissatisfied with the judgment of the trial court, in so far as it related to the refusal of the relief for possession, the plaintiff went in appeal. The learned District Judge, Bhilwara by his judgment dated April 13. 1977, accepted the appeal whereby granting the relief for possession of the shop also. Hence this appeal by defendants No. 1 to 3. 4. I have heard learned counsel appearing for the appellants (defendants No. 1 to 3) and respondent No.1 (plaintiff). 5. It will be useful to reproduce the following terms and conditions contained in the mortgage-deed (Ex. Al). ^^--------ds jgu chy dCt djnh lks lgh gSA nqdku o esM+h dh ekeyq ejEer eqjrghuku ds ftEes gS vkSj ;fn dksbZ ykxr yxkus dh Hkfo"; esa t:jr gksxh rks vki eqjrghuku-----gekjh lkeykr ls ;k gesa lwpuk nsdj yxk ldsaxs vkSj tks ykxr dh jde ejgquk nqdku dh ykxr [kkrs ukes fy[k dj fglkc j[ksaxsA** ^^-------tc dHkh ge nqdku dks jgu ls ckxqtkjr djkosaxs rc vly jde jgu o ykxr dh jde ;fn dksbZ gksxh rks lc ,d eqr vnk djus ij jgu ls ckxwtkjr djk ldsaaxsA ;g nqdku igys vki eqjrghu lk- dks fdjk;s ij Fkh ,d eqr vnk djus jgu ls chy dCtk dh xbZ gS** In the light of the above terms and conditions, the above mentioned question will have to be answered. 6. It is clear that defendants No. 1 to 3, who are tenants prior to the mortgage-deed Ex. Al, became mortgagees with possession. It is further clear that the mortgagees (defendants No. 1 to 3) could spend money on the construction (LAGAT) if necessity arises in future in consultation with the mortgagors or after giving prior intimation to them. It was decided that the amount so spent shall be written in the accounts relating to the mortgage and that they shall be maintained. From a perusal of the mortgage-deed, it is abundantly clear that the parties were aware of the relationship of the landlord and tenants, which existed between them prior to the mortgage-deed Ex. Al, as it is written that— ^^;g nqdku ifgys vki eqjrghu lk- ds ikl fdjk;s ij Fkh oks gh nqdku jgu chy dCt dh xbZ gSA** 7. A similar question arose before their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Shah Mathuradas vs. Nagappa (1). Al, as it is written that— ^^;g nqdku ifgys vki eqjrghu lk- ds ikl fdjk;s ij Fkh oks gh nqdku jgu chy dCt dh xbZ gSA** 7. A similar question arose before their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Shah Mathuradas vs. Nagappa (1). A portion of the mortgage-deed, which was under consideration in that case, was reproduced in para 8 of the report. It was held, after scrutinising the terms and conditions of the mortgage-deed, in that case, that it established beyond doubt that the effect of the deed was inconsistent with the continuance or subsistence of the lease and that on the redemption of the mortgage, the respondent had a right to recover possession both on the terms of the mortgage-deed and under Section 62 of the Transfer of Property Act. It may be mentioned that prior to the decision in Shah Mathuradass case (1), a similar question arose before a learned single Judge of this Court in Bhanwarlal vs. Hibtullah (2), wherein it was held that the relationship of landlord and tenant had come to an end with the tenant entering upon the property as a mortgagee. The terms of the mortgage-deed (Ex. Al), in my opinion, clearly show that the intention of the parties was to terminate the relationship of landlord and tenant and to be governed by the real relation of mortgagee and the mortgagor. 8. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the decision in Shah Mathuradass case (1) was rendered in the light of the stipulations contained in the mortgage-deed in that case and, here, the stipulations in the mortgage-deed are different from those contained in the mortgage-deed in Shah Mathuradass case (1) and so, it is distinguishable. He also invited my attention to Patel Atmaram vs. Patel Babubhai (3). On the question of merger, he referred to Jyotishi vs. Tarakant (4) Patel Atmarams case (3) is wholly distinguishable. In that case, it was, inter alia, observed: "There was no question of merger of two interests. On the one hand he continued to be the tenant of the landlord and on the other hand he became a sub-mortgagee claiming title through the mortgagee. In that case, it was, inter alia, observed: "There was no question of merger of two interests. On the one hand he continued to be the tenant of the landlord and on the other hand he became a sub-mortgagee claiming title through the mortgagee. Hence, notwithstanding the decree for redemption, no physical possession can be claimed against him." Apart from the above, the finding of learned Judge that it would be unreasonable to attribute to a tenant the intention to surrender the tenancy and to invoke the sophisticated doctrine of implied surrender (which doctrine does not originate in his own mind) when the unsophisticated and ignorant (often illiterate) tenant knows nothing about it, is contrary to the principle laid down in Shah Mathuradass case (1) and with great respect, I find it difficult to agree with him. 9. In Jyotishis case (4), K.C. Das Gupta, J., speaking for the Court, observed as under: "In the absence of any express indication of intention the courts will proceed on the basis that the party had no intention to merge if it was to his interest not to merge and also if a duty lay on him to keep the interests separate. In deciding the intention of the party the court will have regard also to his conduct." The question, which arose, was whether the raiyati interest continued to subsist after the raiyat acquired property interest. While dealing with this question, in para 16, it was held that the doctrine of merger does not apply to the ease of a raiyati holders in the Santhal Parganas. In this connection, it was also observed : "...but we do not want to express a final opinion on this point in the present case." This decision is of no avail to the appellant. Shah Mathuradass case (1) and Bhanwarlals case (2), being nearer-home are applicable to this case. The substantial question of law formulated by this Court on May 24, 1977 is answered in the affirmative and it is held that the relationship of landlord and tenant had come to an end when defendants No. 1 to 3 accepted the new relationship of mortgagees and mortgagors. 10. In view of this answer, the learned District Judge was right in modifying the preliminary decree for redemption passed by the trial court and also in allowing the relief of possession to the plaintiff. 11. 10. In view of this answer, the learned District Judge was right in modifying the preliminary decree for redemption passed by the trial court and also in allowing the relief of possession to the plaintiff. 11. The net result of the discussion, made hereinabove is that there is no merit in this appeal and it is dismissed without any order as to costs.