Judgment :- 1. The first plaintiff in O. S. No. 276 of 1974 of the Subordinate Judge's Court of Trichur is the petitioner in this Civil Revision Petition. O. S.276 of 1974 is a suit for declaration that the petitioner herein is the duly consecrated Metropolitan of the Church of the East in India (Chaldian Syrian Church) and as such the sole authority to deal with all matters relating to that Church and for other consequential reliefs. They have prayed for a decree declaring that the first plaintiff is the duly consecrated Metropolitan of the Church of the East in India and the first defendant has no status as Bishop, Metropolitan or Administrator and for a mandatory injunction directing.the first defendant to vacate the Metropolitan palace and also to hand over to the first plaintiff the Sceptre, Cross, etc., which are the properties of the Church. The suit proceeds on the basis that the first defendant is not a Metropolitan of the Church of the East in India consecrated or appointed by the Patriarch as required by the Cannon Law. There was also no consecration of the first defendant herein by the proper authority and his consecration by the previous Metropolitan Mar Thorna Dharmo is invalid apart from the fact that he had no authority to consecrate a Metropolitan, he was on suspension and as such be had no authority to do anything as Metropolitan. There was a prior suit O. S.8 of 1965 in regard to the same Church. There the question that arose was whether the suspension by the Patriarch, of one Mar Thorna Dharmo, the previous Metropolitan was valid or not. The trial Court held that the suspension was valid. The appellate Court held that the suspension was not valid. The matter is now pending in appeal before the Supreme Court. The defendant filed I. A. 1952 of 1974 under S.10 of the Code of Civil Procedure for stay of this suit alleging that questions which arise in the present suit had been raised in O. S.8 of 1965, and that rnatter is now pending final adjudication in the Supreme Court. The petitioner herein resisted the application alleging that the questions involved in the present suit were not directly and substantially in issue in the earlier suit. 2. The petitioner herein resisted the application alleging that the questions involved in the present suit were not directly and substantially in issue in the earlier suit. 2. It might be noted that there was another suit also O. S.116 of 1968 in the same Court filed by two members of the Church of the East. That suit as well as the present suit in which the revision arises and the suit now pending adjudication in the Supreme Court had been filed as representative actions on behalf of the members of the Church of the East. In O. S. No. 116 of 1968 the first defendant herein is the defendant The prayer therein is for a decree declaring that the ordination of the defendant as Priest, Bishop and Metropolitan of the Church of the East in India is invalid, void and inoperative, that the defendant is not entitled to function as such in the plaint Church or use any of the properties of the Church and restraining the defendant from functioning in any of the said capacities in the Church or using any properties of the Church. It would appear that this suit had been stayed under S.10 of the Code of Civil Procedure on account of the pendency of O. S 8 of 1965 in appeal before the Supreme Court 3. In the application filed by the first respondent in the present suit the Court below has passed an order holding that under S.10 of the Code of Civil Procedure the suit has to be stayed. This order is now impugned in this Civil Revision Petition. 4. What is contended before me by the learned counsel for the petitioner Shri Balasubramanian is that the Court below had failed to understand the true scope and ambit of S.10 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It has failed to scrutinise the pleadings and failed to see that the question in this suit did not arise or survive for decision in the appeal from O. S.8 of 1965. Therefore, he contends that the Court below has illegally, erroneously and without jurisdiction stayed the suit under S.10 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 5. It would be useful in this connection to quote S.10 of the Code of Civil Procedure. "10. Therefore, he contends that the Court below has illegally, erroneously and without jurisdiction stayed the suit under S.10 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 5. It would be useful in this connection to quote S.10 of the Code of Civil Procedure. "10. Stay of suit:-No Court shall proceed with the trial of any suit in which the matter in issue is also directly and substantially in issue in a previously instituted suit between the same parties, or between parties under whom they or any of them claim, litigating under the same title where such suit is pending in the same or any other Court in India having jurisdiction to grant the relief claimed, or in any Court beyond the limits of India established or continued by the Central Government and having like jurisdiction, or before the Supreme Court. Explanation. The pendency of a suit in a foreign Court does not preclude the Court in India from trying a suit founded on the same cause of action." It is clear from the provision that the object of the Section is to prevent Courts of concurrent jurisdiction from simultaneously trying two parallel suits in respect of the same matter in issue. It might be noted that under the relevant provision in the earlier Code the suits should have been brought for the same reliefs. It has been held that the omission of the same words in the present Code shows that the identity of the reliefs claimed is non necessary. But certainly it is still necessary that the matter in issue in the matter in dispute should be the same. 6. In Bepin Behary v. Jogendra Chandra (AIR. 1917 Cal. 248) the following statement of law has been applied: "What then is the meaning of the expression 'the matter in issue'. The defendants invite us to hold that the expression is equivalent to 'any of the questions in issue'. The obvious answer is that if that bad been the intention of the framers of the section, appropriate words might have been used to bring out such sense. We are of the opinion that the expression 'the matter in issue' has reference to the entire controversy between the parties. The obvious answer is that if that bad been the intention of the framers of the section, appropriate words might have been used to bring out such sense. We are of the opinion that the expression 'the matter in issue' has reference to the entire controversy between the parties. The object of the section is to prevent Courts of concurrent jurisdiction from simultaneously trying two parallel suits in respect of the same matter in issue." This decision has been followed by various High Courts in other decisions. A Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court is Shaw Wallace & Co. v. Bholunath (AIR. 1975 Cal. 411 at page 412) held: "One of the most essential conditions of S.10 is that the matter in issue in the later ' suit which is sought to be stayed must be directly and substantially in issue in the earlier suit which is pending in the same or in any other court of concurrent jurisdiction. A mere identity of some of the issues in both the suits is not sufficient to attract this section in view of the law laid down by Sir Ashutosh Mookerjee. Unless the decision of the suit operates as res judicata in the other suit it cannot be said that the matter in issue is "directly and substantially" the same in both the suits." 7. However, it is not necessary that identity of issues between the suits are there. What the section requires is that the matter in issue in the two suits should be directly and substantially the same, and proper effect must be given to the language used by the Legislature in S.10. The identity required is a substantial identity. It is true, as the authorities have laid down that there must be an identity of the subject-matter; it is equally true that the field of controversy between the parties in the two suits must also be the same, but the identity contemplated and the field of controversy contemplated should not be identical and same in every particular. The identity and the field of controversy must be substantially the same. It may be noted in this connection the observations of Chief Justice Chagla sitting with Justice Gajendragadkar of the Bombay High Court in J. H. Iron Mart v. Tulsiram (AIR. The identity and the field of controversy must be substantially the same. It may be noted in this connection the observations of Chief Justice Chagla sitting with Justice Gajendragadkar of the Bombay High Court in J. H. Iron Mart v. Tulsiram (AIR. 1953 Bombay 117): "Apart from any authority, turning to the section itself, it will be clear that S.10 does not contemplate an identity of issues between the suits, nor does it require that the matter in issue in the two suits should be entirely the same or identical. What the section requires is that the matter in issue in the two suits should be directly and substantially the same, and proper effect must be given to the language used by the Legislature in S.10 that the identity required is a substantial identity. It is true as the authorities have laid down, that there must be an identity of the subject-matter, it is equally true that the field of controversy between the parties in the two suits must also be the same, but the identity contemplated should not be identical and the same in every particular, but the identity and the field of controversy must be substantially the same." 8. On the basis of these statements of law when we look into the present matter, I do not think the Court below has done any serious mistake which would require interference by this Court. The present suit centres around the questions whether the first defendant was consecrated as Metropolitan of the Church of the East and whether that consecration was valid. What is alleged is that Mar Thoma Dharmo had no authority to consecrate a person as Bishop, first defendant's consecration is therefore invalid and as such he could not function as the Metropolitan. A decision in the earlier suit O.S 8 of 1965 which is now in appeal before the Supreme Court in Civil Appeal 217/74 would give a quietus to the main controversies in this suit also In my view, to a great extent, there is an identity of subject-matter in this suit and in O.S. 116 of 1968 which now stand stayed under S.10 of the Code of Civil Procedure on account of the pendency of the earlier suit in the Supreme Court The Court below was right in granting the stay. I therefore dismiss the Civil Revision Petition. I therefore dismiss the Civil Revision Petition. However, in the circumstances of the case I make no order as to costs.