A proceeding under section 145 Cr. P. C. wai drawn with respect to some agricultural land. The land was attached also. The proceeding terminated on 6.8.74 in which possession of the petitioner was declared and the second party and his men were ordered not to disturb the peaceful possession of the first party. By the order passed on 6.3.74, the attachment of the land was vacated. It is the case of the patitioner that he star­ted possessing the land thereafter. A revision against the order of the learned Magistrate was dismissed by the learned Sessions Judge on 1.10.77. Around September, 1978, the opposite party No. 1 and his villagers started disturbing petitioner's actual possession, which led him to approach the learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Ukhrul, to draw a proceeding under section 144 Cr. P. C. An order uider sub-section (2) of section 144 was also prayed in view of the case being one of emergency. The learned Sab-Divisional Magistrate being satisfied about the urgency of the matter did so by an order passed on 16.9.78. The opposite party No. 1 moved the learned Sessions Judge, who, while admi­tting the revision, stayed the operation of the impugned order pending final disposal of the petition, This led the petitioner to invoke the inherent jurisdiction of this court, who by an order passed on 12.10.78 admitted the petition. The operation of the impugned order was also stayed. 3. The order of 16.9.78 having lost its force by efflux of time, the petition has become infructuous. The learned counsel for the petitioner, Shri Nilamani Singh, however, invited me to lay down some guidelines in this regard as the points involved are not confined to the case at hand, but have been cropping up in a large number of cases here. According to Shri Nila-maoi Singh, this court should say something as to when power under section 144 Cr. P. C. can be invoked in cases relating to disputes of the present nature and as to when interference with the same should be permissible by the higher courts. It was stated that there is no decision of this court to guide the litigants in this regard. He submitted that the only decision of this court which he could cite is Altaf Hussain vs. Akani Changmai, 1974 A. L. R. 54. It was stated that there is no decision of this court to guide the litigants in this regard. He submitted that the only decision of this court which he could cite is Altaf Hussain vs. Akani Changmai, 1974 A. L. R. 54. This case has dealt with the question as to when a previous decision regarding possession under section 145 Cr. P. C. is binding in a subsequent procee­ding under that section. As such, the same is not very relevant fur the matter at hand. 4. Shri Nilamani Singh states that the decision of the Supreme Court in Bajranglal Agarwalla vs. Brahmdeo Jha, which has been noted at page 839 under Note 31 of the Quinquennial Digest (1971-1975), volume 2, published by the All India Reporter Ltd., has laid down something of Import­ance in this regard. As that decision is not available having been reported perhaps only in 1966 Criminal Appeals Reporter 398, he could read what has been incorporated in the Digest. It states that if a person bound by a previous order under section 145 disobeys it, the Magistrate should, instead of drawing fresh proceedings, take steps to enforce obedience of the previous order. There cannot be two opinions about the soundness of this decision. But it also leaves the real question unans­wered, which is, as to when power under section 144 Cr. P. C. should be exercised in such a matter. 5. Shri R. K. Minisana Singh, learned Advocate General, Manipur, has appeared for the opposite parties. According to him, aid of section 144 Cr. P. C. cannot be taken in a case of present nature; at best, section 107 Cr. P. C. can be invoked in an appropriate case. The reason for the non-applicability of section 144, according to the learned Advocate General, is that under that section certain order relating to property can be given only when that property is in possession or under the management of the person against whom the order is aimed. P. C. can be invoked in an appropriate case. The reason for the non-applicability of section 144, according to the learned Advocate General, is that under that section certain order relating to property can be given only when that property is in possession or under the management of the person against whom the order is aimed. This submission was made because section 144(1) states that on the Magistrate being satisfied about the conditions empowe­ring him to invoke the power he could direct any person ''to abstain from a certain act or to take certain order with respect to certain property in his possession or under his management." (Emphasis supplied) So, even if a person has to be ordered to abstain from a certain act, the same must be with respect to certain property in his possession or under his management, contended the learned Advocate Gensral. Tnis submission was not ultimately pressed, and rightly, as I think this is untenable and cannot stand scrutiny, A proper reading of section 144(1) would show that the authority concerned could either "direct any person to abstain from certain act" or require the person concerned "to take certain order with respect to certain property in his possession or under his management." That the order relating to abstaining from doing a certain act need not be with respect to certain property in possession or management is firmly established by a plethora of decisions, some of which have been noted below. Had it been otherwise, various types of orders passed under this section like prohibiting assembly of five or more persons in public places would not have been and really could not have been, done. I therefore do not propose to cay much on this aspect. 6. It may, however, be stated that the first limb of the power is limited to negative or restrictive order, whereas under the second limb even positive orders could be made. To illus­trate, under the second limb, a person could be asked to remove a wall erected in contravention of an agreement (Jagat Chandra vs. Dhlrendra Chandra, AIR 1953 Tripura 6), or directed to cut a bundh created by him (Balaram vs. pran Ram, 38 Cr. L.J. 915). The latter decision of a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court was followed by the patna High Court In Lachmi Narayan vs. Nandkishore, 41 Cr. L. J. 98. L.J. 915). The latter decision of a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court was followed by the patna High Court In Lachmi Narayan vs. Nandkishore, 41 Cr. L. J. 98. Of course, the positive order must be in relation to a property in possession etc. of the person concerned. Thus, an order to a person to remove himself from a particular area cannot be passed under section 144, as was pointed out by Rankin, C. J,, in Sattndra Nath vs. Emperor, 32 Cr. L. 3. 592, 7. The learned Advocate General further submitted that in appropriate cases section 107 Cr. P. C. instead of section 144, could be invoked, because by doing so an offender could even be arrerted if that be felt unavoidable, which would therefore be very effective to avoid breach of peace. It may be that once recourse to section 107 it taken, the guilty person could be apprehended. Point is, as to when section 107 should be invoked. On this, I do not get any light. 8. I was thus left in the woods. Not only this, I was requested to guide also, if possible. The invitation being reasona­ble and justified, the same could not be refused by me. To get a clue to find the correct path. I had to search for beacon lights. The quest for knowledge necessary to come out of the woods opened a vast field, really a track of almost an endless journey, which I could not tread fully because of my short stay here, The glimpse of light which I got by travelling whatever distance I could has led me to chart the path as under. 9. There seems to be a triangular contest between sections 107, 144 and 145, Cr.P.C. I propose to reiolve the dispute bilaterally - (a) section 144 vis-a-vis 145, and (2) section 107 vis- a-vis 144. (A) Section 144 vis-a-vis 145: 10. 9. There seems to be a triangular contest between sections 107, 144 and 145, Cr.P.C. I propose to reiolve the dispute bilaterally - (a) section 144 vis-a-vis 145, and (2) section 107 vis- a-vis 144. (A) Section 144 vis-a-vis 145: 10. The following general propositions seem to emerge from the decided cases of different High Courts: (1) Section 145 applies only where the dispute is likely to cause breach of peace, whereas the field of operation of section 144 is wider as it may be invoked when the authority concerned considers that direction under that section is likely to prevent or tends to prevent obstruction, annoyance or injury to any person lawfully employed, or danger to human life, health or safety, or a disturbance of the public tranquillity, or a riot, or an affray. It could, therefore, perhaps be said that where the special conditions of section 145 are satisfied, section 144 should not be invoked, more particularly, because the former provides for an enquiry into the dispute relating to possession, as pointed by Jwala Prasad.J., in Shebalak vs. Kamrauddin, AIR 1922 Patna 435 (F.B.), which decision his been referred with approval in many subsequent judgments, including Viru Kamu vs. Dewandas, AIR 1940 Sind 158. It, however, deserves to be stated that though the reach of section 144 is in a way wider than section 145, it is narrower also at the same time, as there are many limitations on the exercise of this power which are not to be found in section 145. To wit, prohibitive orders under section 144 must (i) be to abstain from a certain act, (ii) be addressed to a definite parson or set of persons or to a party to the proceedings, and (iii) prohibit certain and definite act. (2) Action under section 144 is discretionary, whereas it is mandatory under section 145 once the conditions necessary for it a exercise are in existence, vide Shebalak (supra). The word "shall" in section 145 was regarded as mandatory in Gobindram vs. Basantilal, AIR 1929 Patna 46. In juxtaposition, the use of the word "may" in section 144 can be noted. Nonetheless, it would be apposite to say that it is a settled law by this time that where a power is conferred to be used in a particular situition, the same must ba uiad if the situation arises and invocation of the same is solicited. In juxtaposition, the use of the word "may" in section 144 can be noted. Nonetheless, it would be apposite to say that it is a settled law by this time that where a power is conferred to be used in a particular situition, the same must ba uiad if the situation arises and invocation of the same is solicited. (3) Section 144 could be invoked even relating to a dis­pute covered by section 145 if "immediate prevention or speedy remedy" is considered necessary.-section 145 being an ordinary measure of precaution when breach of peace is "likely". As the heading of Part C of chapter X Cr. P. C., in waich section 144 finds place, suggests an order u/s. 144 has to be passed in "urgent cases of nuisance or apprehended danger." There must thus ba a special reason to invoice section 144 in relation to a matter dealt by section 145. If the dispute remains alive even after the expiry of the period of two months of the 144 order, a proceeding could be drawn under section 145. Vide Abinash vs. Lokenath, 19 Cr. L. J. 367: Shebalak (supra). Agnikumar vs. Mantazuddin, AIR 1928 Calcutta 610 (F.B). and Madho Singh vs. Emperor, AIR 1942 Patna 331. (4) Repeated orders under section 144 Cr.P.C. should not however be passed and the same has been deprecated. The reason is that an order under section 144 does not resolve the dispute as such, nor can a person not in possession of the property be put in possession by an order under section 144. The dispute can thus raise its head again after the expiry of two months, which is the normal life of such an order. (see, judgment of Mullick, J. in Shebalak (supra), Viru Kamu (supra). Demon Gope vs. Het Narain, AIR 1940 Patna 382. Binde-swari Singh vs. Raghunandan AIR 1940 Patna 559.) 5. As already stated, if a bona fide dispute is found to be in existence, even after an order under section 144 has been passed, the proceeding should be converted into one under section 145 Cr. P. C. , as stated in Nandkishore vs. Bikan Singh, AIR 1922 Patna 557 and Viru Kamu (supra). A question of some importance arises in this context. The same is as regards the date which should be treated as the date cf preliminary order under section 145 Cr. P. C. , as stated in Nandkishore vs. Bikan Singh, AIR 1922 Patna 557 and Viru Kamu (supra). A question of some importance arises in this context. The same is as regards the date which should be treated as the date cf preliminary order under section 145 Cr. P. C., which assumes significance when the proviso to sub-section (4) is pre­ssed into service. Under the old Code, the period of two months was to be counted back from the date of the preliminary order. The new Code has made some changes in this regard. The period now relates back to two months next before date on which the report of a police officer or other information was received by the Magistrate; and if dispossession be after police report or information, then the period is counted from the date of the preliminary order. Apparently, the coversion order has to ba passed before the expiry of the 144 order. (See, Hadu Khan vs. Mahadeo Das, AIR 1965 Orissa 221.) (6) Where the Magistrate is satisfied, say, for the reason that in a very recent proceeding under section 145 Cr. P. C. possession of the other side has been declared, or in a civil suit a decree has been passed in favour of the person approaching him, invocation of section 144 is the proper course of action. An order under section 145 would be merited in case of a bona fide dispute relating to possession. If the Magistrate if satisfied that the claim of the other side is a mere pretence or unwarranted, or where the possession of the person approa­ching him is undisputed, section 144 could be pressed into service. Wnere one party is clearly in the wrong and threatens to urorp the right of another who is in actual possession of the land in dispute, the proper remedy is under seciion 144 and not under section 145, vide Kaniz Amina vs. Emperor, 19 Cr. L.J. 869, Bhairo Gope vs. Emperor, 21 Cr. L. J. 646. Shebalak (supra). Lachman Das vs. Ram Chhabila, AIR 1929 Patna 415, Kishore vs. Anand 31 Cr. L. J. 1005 and Bhuneswar vs. Rommy, 41 Cr. L.J. 417. Reference may also be made about the decision of Tirumalpad, J. C, (specially fitting at Imphal) in Y. Sajou Singh vs. C. Thambalangou Singh, 1962 (1) Cr. L. J. 821. L. J. 646. Shebalak (supra). Lachman Das vs. Ram Chhabila, AIR 1929 Patna 415, Kishore vs. Anand 31 Cr. L. J. 1005 and Bhuneswar vs. Rommy, 41 Cr. L.J. 417. Reference may also be made about the decision of Tirumalpad, J. C, (specially fitting at Imphal) in Y. Sajou Singh vs. C. Thambalangou Singh, 1962 (1) Cr. L. J. 821. Though that decision relates to Invocation of section 107, the principle would apply to exercising power under section 144. It has been stated by the learned Judicial Commissioner that a Magistrate shall have to distinguish between a case where one party is clearly in possession and the other party who is not in possession is attempting to Interfere and thereby attempting to cause breach of peace, and a case where a bona fide dispute regarding land exists. It is only in the latter case that a proceed­ing under section 145 should by drawn. In the former case, the offending party may be dealt under section 107. Caution is however merited in this regard, to which attention was drawn by Rowland, J., in Jagrupa vs. Chotey Narain, 37 Cr. L.J. 95. The same is that, it cannot be considered to be a good practice to prejudge without evidence whether the dispute of the other side is bona fide or not. So, except in clear-cut cases some illustrations of which have been given above, it may be difficult to be sure whether the dispute raised by the other side is a mere pretence, or it founded in, good faith. (7) If the Magistrate is of the opinion that the dispute is bona fide, recorse to section 145 would be proper, because by an order under section 144 possession of the wrong-doer cannot be disturbed. Only a negative or restrictive order could b3 passed under that section, whereas, by attaching the land under lection 146, a person committing wrong can be dispossessed also. So too, the person In whose favour the proceeding under section 145 terminates can be put back in possession even if he was out of possession for the period mentioned in the proviso to sub-section (4) of section 145, which cannot be done with the aid of section 144, which is really meant to cure and take care of temporary aberration only. [See, Puran Singh vs. Ramjhari, 36 Cr.L.J. 655, Bhikali vs. Achaibai, 41 Cr.L.J. 451, Rupan Singh vs. Emperor, AIR 1944 Patna 213, Padmanava vs. Bidhu Bhusan, AIR 1952 Trtpura 26, and Kala Meah vs. Raimohan, AIR 1958 Trtpura 47]. (B) Section 107 vis-a-vis 144 ; 11. As to the contest between section 107 and 145 it may be pointed out that sub-section (10) of section 145 has specifically provided that nothing in section 145 shall be deemed to be in derogation of the powers of the Magistrate to proceed under section 107. A full Bench of five Judges of Calcutta High Court held, as early as 1911, in Abbas vs. Emperor, 16 C. W. N. 83, that there is no conflict between sections 107 and 145 so that the fact that there is a dispute concerning land likely to cause breach of peace does not deprive a Magistrate of jurisdiction under section 107 when he has information that any person is likely to disturb the public tranquillity, or to do a wrongful act that may probably occasion a breach of the peace. It has been held in Emperor vs. Bandi Din, 22 Cr. L. J. 384, that even during the pendency of a proceeding under section 145, the power under section 107 could be invoked. 12. What has been stated about the application of section 144 in preference to section 145 would apply by and large, while using power under section 107 when recourse to section 145 is also permissible. I am therefore addressing myself now to the question as to when section 107 should be called in aid, Instead of section 144, relating to a matter which is covered by section 145. The following principles may terve as guidelines in his connection. (1) If the Magistrate be satisfied that it is a clear case of excess by the other side, he could proceed under section 107. In Shebalak (supra), Mullick, J., did not favour habitual use of section 144 as substitute either for a proceeding under section 145, or of section 107. This view was followed in viru Kama (supru). (2) Section 107 is meant to deal with desperate chara­cters habitual offenders. As such, if a person is found to persist in unlawful conduct, section 107 may be a proper remedy against him. M. Yaima Singh vs. Manipur Administration, AIR 1964 Manipur 62 . This view was followed in viru Kama (supru). (2) Section 107 is meant to deal with desperate chara­cters habitual offenders. As such, if a person is found to persist in unlawful conduct, section 107 may be a proper remedy against him. M. Yaima Singh vs. Manipur Administration, AIR 1964 Manipur 62 . (3) As an order under section 144 normally exhausts itself after two months, remedy under section 107 may be more appropriate if it is felt that the dispute is likely to occur again after two months. So too, as section 107 is of more permanent value and requires evidence etc. to be taken, invocation of power under section 107 would be more propar than a proceeding under section 144 in clear cases of excess. (See, Hansraj vs. Abdul Joffar, AIR 1935 Patna 461). (4) Where there are only general and vague allegations and there is no evidence of any overt act having been committed by the person concerned, institution of proceeding under section 107 is not warranted, vide judgment of M. Fazal All, I, (as his Lordship then was ) in Malta Mahamadoo vs. State, AIR 1966 J A K 29) (para 6 ). (5) It there be no definite material on record as to which of the parties is creating trouble, a proceeding under section 107, if drawn, should normally be against both, so that, one party may not get unfair advantage over the other. At its termination, the party who is found at fault may be ordered to execute necessary bond. [See, Malla Mahamadoo and Hansraj (supra), Kameswar Singh vs. Ramdhan, AIR 1954 Patna 114, and Amanai Ali vs. Emperor, AIR 1929 Patna 67). (6) A previous order under section 144 should not be made the basis for starting a proceeding under section 107, as the order under the former section Itself might have been made without proper enquiry relating to possession of the disputed land, In Kameswar Singh ( supra) this argument was virtually accepted in para 9. 13. As to the interference by the Court of Session with an order, say, under section 144, only this can be said that the aggrieved person should normally be left to approach the Magistrate concerned to rescind or alter the order, as in that case, if necessary, even evidence could be taken and an apro-priate order could be passed there after. As to the interference by the Court of Session with an order, say, under section 144, only this can be said that the aggrieved person should normally be left to approach the Magistrate concerned to rescind or alter the order, as in that case, if necessary, even evidence could be taken and an apro-priate order could be passed there after. Even If a revision petition against such an order is entertained, exparte stay order should be avoided generally, unless the court be of the firm opinion that in the garb of restrictive or negative order, a mandatory order affecting the property in lawful possession of the party approaching thss court has bjcn passed. Such a situation would not perhaps arise when in a proceeding under section 145, order declaring possession of a party has been passed recently. 14. Beyond the above, it has not been felt desirable or ex­pedient, really not possible, to say as to when one of these sections should be invoked in a case. The ultimate decisions would depend on the facts and circumstances of the particular case and on the judiciousness in exercising the power. 15. The present petition, however, having become infructuous is dismissed. A copy of this judgment may be sent to the Secretary, Government of Manipur. Law Department, to enable him to citculate its copies among the Executive Magistrates having to deal with the sections in question.