Judgment :- 1. The revision petitioner is the landlord of a building let out on rental arrangement to the respondent in the revision. The landlord moved the Rent Control Court for eviction of the tenant under S.11(3) and S.11(4)(iii) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The revision petitioner is the partner of a firm carrying on wholesale business in piece goods under the style 'K. N. G. Brothers' at Shertallai in a building taken on rent from the Muttom Church, Shertallai. That building is being acquired by the State under the Kerala Land Acquisition Act. It was because of this circumstance that the petitioner claimed bonafide need for possession of the building let out to the respondent-tenant. The landlord required the building for the purpose of carrying on the business of the firm of which be was a partner. The respondent is carrying on business in the building taken by him from the petitioner, in rationed articles and cement. According to the landlord the tenant either owns or is in possession of several buildings near about the building he is occupying as a tenant of the petitioner and any one of them would be reasonably sufficient for his business. 2. The Rent Control Court found that the petitioner's need was bonafide, but nevertheless held against the claim under S.11(3) of the Act since the court further found that the petitioner had failed to prove that it was for his own occupation that he needed the building The occupation by the firm was found to be not within the scope of the Section. All the same an order for eviction was passed under S.11(4) (iii) of the Act accepting the case of the landlord that the tenant had other buildings reasonably sufficient for his requirements in that town. The tenant as well as the landlord filed appeals before the appellate authority. The tenant's appeal was dismissed. The appeal by the landlord seeking eviction also on the ground that he bonafide needed the building for his own occupation was allowed. The tenant filed two Revisions against this order of the appellate authority. One was intended to be the revision against the order in his appeal and the other a revision against the order passed in the appeal by the landlord. The tenant filed two Revisions against this order of the appellate authority. One was intended to be the revision against the order in his appeal and the other a revision against the order passed in the appeal by the landlord. The Revisional Court took the view that it was necessary for a partner of a firm seeking eviction of tenant from his building for the occupation of the firm to show that he was the managing partner and unless that was shown the landlord would not be entitled to seek eviction under S.11(3) of the Act. On the question of availability of other buildings the Revisional Court held that the building which had become available had not been shown to be reasonably sufficient for the business of the respondent. It is against this order of the Revisional Court that this Revision Petition has been moved by the landlord. 3. I will first consider the question of availability of S.11(3) of the Act to a landlord who seeks eviction for the purpose of occupation by a firm of which he is a partner S.11(3) enables a landlord to seek such eviction "if he bonafide seeds the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him". The latter part does not apply to the case of occupation by firm of which the landlord is a partner. Could it be said that when a person seeks possession of a building from his tenant for the purpose of occupation by a firm in which he is a partner he seeks the building for his own occupation or is the clause to be limited to occupation by him individually, i. e to a case where he carries on business by himself? Partnership is an arrangement reached between persons to carry on a venture jointly, the parties agreeing to share the profits or losses. Could it be said that in such a case a person carries on his business when the business carried on is that of the partnership of which he is a partner? Could it be said that he occupies the building either exclusively or along with others when he carries on a business in the building along with others? The idea of exclusive occupation is not necessarily indicated by the term "for his own occupation" in S.11(3) of the Act. Could it be said that he occupies the building either exclusively or along with others when he carries on a business in the building along with others? The idea of exclusive occupation is not necessarily indicated by the term "for his own occupation" in S.11(3) of the Act. Even when a person carries on business as a partner of a firm he occupies the business premises along with his partners. The one exception to this could be a case where he does not have any hand in the conduct of the business, though he is a partner. A dormant or sleeping partner does not actively associate himself with the conduct of the business though he may contribute capital and share in the profits or losses. Such a person may not be occupying the premises where the business is carried on by the firm. But in other cases where partners are actively associated with and are concerned in the conduct of the business they occupy the business premises for the purpose of the firm's business and such occupation is of all those who carry on such business. Therefore within the meaning of the term "for his own occupation", occupation by a partner of a firm other than a dormant or sleeping partner would be comprehended. 4. To give a narrow meaning to the term 'his own occupation' under sub-section (3) of S.11 would not promote the object of the Act. Conduct of business in partnership with others is a current practice and is as much relevant as mode of carrying on business as conduct of individual business. If conduct of business in partnership is excluded from the scope of S.11 (3) the benefit that should normally accrue to a landlord by reason of that Section would be denied to a large class of landlords who instead of doing business on their own resort to business as a firm, A restricted interpretation may not promote the object of the provision. 5. I do not think I should labour further to deal with this question because the observations made by the Supreme Court in the decision in D. N. Sanghavi & Sons v. Ambalal Tribhuwan Das, AIR. 1974 S.C. 1026 appear to be apposite to the case here. To understand that case it may be necessary to refer to the facts of that case in brief. 1974 S.C. 1026 appear to be apposite to the case here. To understand that case it may be necessary to refer to the facts of that case in brief. In that case the landlord of a building instituted a suit for ejectment of the tenants from the accommodation given to them. He alleged that he needed the accommodation for continuing his business within the meaning of S.12 (1) (f) of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961. At the trial he gave evidence that the building was needed for his partnership business. In that context the court was called upon to decide two questions; (1) what is the meaning of the phrase 'his business' within S.12 (1) (f) and (2) whether, in the circumstances of the case, the business for which he required the accommodation could be said to be his business? Besides himself there were two partners in the firm, they being his brothers. The High Court held that when a person runs a business in partnership with others he does it for himself and therefore his necessity is identified with the necessity of the firm. Therefore, if he does business along with others it still means that he needs the building for his own purpose. The Supreme Court did not agree with the approach made to the question by the High Court particularly because of the absence of examination of the scheme of the Act and setting of clause (f) of S.12 (1) so as to discover its real meaning. The Supreme Court examined the meaning of the term 'his business' in S.12(1) in the context in which that term appeared in the Act. Reference was made to S.39 (2) of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act to understand the scope of the term 'his business' in S.12 (1) (f). S.12 (1) (f) provided tor eviction of a tenant on the ground that the accommodation let out for non-residential purpose was required bonafide by the landlord for the purpose of starting or continuing his business. S.39 (2) dealt with the right to allot accommodation falling vacant and the first proviso to this sub-section excluded such allotment in cases where the landlord states that he needs the accommodation for his own occupation. Therefore while S.12 (1) (f) employs the words 'for starting or continuing his business' S.39 (2) employs the words "for his own occupation". S.39 (2) dealt with the right to allot accommodation falling vacant and the first proviso to this sub-section excluded such allotment in cases where the landlord states that he needs the accommodation for his own occupation. Therefore while S.12 (1) (f) employs the words 'for starting or continuing his business' S.39 (2) employs the words "for his own occupation". In the case before the Supreme Court the landlord had failed to lead evidence to show that the accommodation was needed directly and substantially for his own occupation by way of business. Though he filed the certificate of registration of the firm that was found to be sufficient only to hold that there was a firm in which there were certain partners. The deed of partnership was not filed and in this context the court commented thus: " The respondent did not file the deed of partnership. It would have disclosed whether the respondent was a mere sleeping partner or a partner who is entitled to manage the business either solely or with other partners or that they are the sole managing partners." Again the court said after referring to certain passages in his evidence, thus: "ln either of these two passages nor anywhere else in the evidence he has stated that on the terms of partnership he is entitled to manage the partnership business or even that he would also occupy the suit accommodation along with his partners on obtaining possession from the appellants." The Court concluded in paragraph II thus: "If the deed of partnership has excluded him expressly or impliedly from the management of firm's business and has made him a sleeping partner it cannot be held that the accommodation is needed directly and substantially for his occupation by way of business." 6.I may notice in this context that the accommodation envisaged in S.12(1)(f) for the purpose of continuing or starting business was read by the Supreme Court as really meaning "for the purpose of his own occupation by way of continuing or starting his business " The court found that the amplification was necessarily implied since the legislature intended to use the words 'for the purpose of continuing or starting his business' as a synonym for the phrase 'for his own occupation' in the first proviso to S.39(2). 7. 7. It is evident that the Supreme Court in the above case expressed its view that in the case of sleeping partner it cannot be said that he is one who carries on his business as a partner of a firm, evidently indicating that if it be otherwise it would be a case of occupation for his business. If the partner was one associated with the conduct of the business of the partnership he carries on business in the premises as a partner of the firm and therefore eviction can be sought on the ground that the building is needed for his occupation. 8. In this view the Revisional Court which reversed the decision of the Appellate Authority must be found to have an unwarranted approach to the case. Though the very decision to which I have adverted has been noticed by the Revisional Court, that court seems to think that it supports its view that when a partner seeks the building for occupation of the firm of which be is a partner it is not for his own occupation that he is seeking possession. The erroneous approach is noticed from the following passages of the Revisional Court's order: "The words contained in such section 'for bis own occupation or for the occupation by any member of bis family dependent on him' will not take in a case of necessity for housing a business of a partnership firm. The authority for this position is contained in a ruling reported in AIR. 1974 SC. 1026." Quoting the said decision the court concludes: "In this case also the fact that the petitioner-Landlord is a partner of a Firm and they are doing business in a rented shop is not disputed. It is also not disputed that the premises where the business is now being carried on is likely to be acquired " Having said this the Revisional Court proceeds to say: "The wording in sub-section (3) of S.11 is very clear in the sense that the need of the landlord must be 'for his own occupation or for the occupation of any member of his family dependent on him'. Here, as stated earlier, the landlord does not need the building/or his own occupation. Even according to the admitted facts he needs the building for housing the business of a partnership firm in which he is alleged to be one of the partners. Here, as stated earlier, the landlord does not need the building/or his own occupation. Even according to the admitted facts he needs the building for housing the business of a partnership firm in which he is alleged to be one of the partners. So in the nature of his case the case of the petitioner that he requires the building to house the business of a partnership firm is not a ground which is within the scope of S.11 (3) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act." 9. It is not easy to appreciate the logic which is apparently contrary to the dictum in the decision to which the court adverted. In addition reference is made to another reason and that it was not shown that the other partners had agreed to shift to the other buildings and therefore if ultimately they did not agree to the shifting the tenant will be put to difficulty. That is not a consideration which would arise in this case excepting perhaps in determining the question of bonafide need. On that the Revisional Court has not found against the landlord. 10. The order of the revisional court reversing the order of the appellate authority on the assumption that a partner carrying on the business of his firm is not in occupation of the building for his business is wrong, as already noticed. There was no justification for the revisional court, in exercise of its power under S.20 of the Act to interfere with the decision of the Appellate Authority. That order has to be set aside. The order of the Appellate Authority holding that S.11(3) enabled the landlord to seek recovery of the premises is affirmed. 11. Learned Counsel Sri T. S. Venkiteswara Iyer urged that it had been pleaded by the respondent-tenant before the Rent Control Court that he was depending mainly on the income from his business in the premises for bis livelihood and there are no other suitable buildings in the locality to which he could shift. It is true that such a plea was made but when the Appellate Authority decided against him on the question of liability to be evicted under S.11(3) and be took up the matter in revision this was not one of the grounds urged by him in the Revisional Court. It is true that such a plea was made but when the Appellate Authority decided against him on the question of liability to be evicted under S.11(3) and be took up the matter in revision this was not one of the grounds urged by him in the Revisional Court. He had no complaint that the Appeal late Authority failed to consider the availability of the provision in S.11(3) in this case. He bad no case before the Revisional Court that the availability of the proviso to S.11(3) should have been considered by the Appellate Authority or should be considered by the Revisional Court or that the case must be remitted back to the Appellate Authority for considering the applicability of the proviso. In short it appears he had not urged such a contention before the Appellate Authority and naturally that was not considered by the Appellate Authority. He had no grievance before the Revisional Court that it was otherwise. Therefore I would not be justified in considering that plea here. 12. Now I will come to the second question, the plea that the tenant was liable to be evicted under S.11(4)(iii). It was brought out in evidence that the tenant had come into possession of some buildings. In fact he had a building adjoining the one where he was running the business. It was in his possession He as CPW3 would say that he had some buildings in Muttathangadi which he had taken on rent from the Church 39 years ago and he was conducting business therein. But he would say that his daughter married an employee in the shop and he then gave the business to his daughter. He would say that in Vadakkeangadikadavu he had three shop rooms one of which was dilapidated and two were with others. He would say that another building was in the possession of his daughter taken on rent by her for running a wholesale depot under the Civil Supplies Department. He admits possession of a shop room adjacent to the business premises in which he was carrying on his business and according to him he had stocked superfine cement therein and soaps were also being stocked there. It is not necessary to mention about ail the buildings which have been referred to. He admits possession of a shop room adjacent to the business premises in which he was carrying on his business and according to him he had stocked superfine cement therein and soaps were also being stocked there. It is not necessary to mention about ail the buildings which have been referred to. It is in regard to some of them he had stated that the business therein was being run by bis daughter living with him. Evidently the attempt in the cross-examination was to suggest that the daughter was only a name lender and the business was really run by him. Whatever it be when the appellate authority has gone into the evidence on this question very elaborately the Revisional Court was thoroughly unjustified in dealing with this question in a very casual fashion as it has done in its revisional order. It says: "In this case there is absolutely no evidence to prove that the tenant is in possession of a building or he acquired a building reasonably sufficient for housing his business." Since in coming to this conclusion the Revisional Court had not established that there was a perverse or unreasonable approach by the Appellate Authority in the matter of appreciating the material available to it so as to justify invoking the revisional power under S.20, I must find that the appreciation of the evidence by the Revisional Court as if it was sitting in appeal, was unwarranted. Though I would have therefore remitted the case back for consideration of the question of availability of S.11 (4) (iii) it is submitted by counsel for the landlord-revision petitioner at the hearing that if relief under S.11 (3) is obtained there need be no consideration of the question of relief under S.11 (4) (iii). In that view I am not going into that question. That necessarily means that the petitioner is not obtaining relief of eviction by reason of S 11 (4) (iii) The result is that the revision petition is allowed and the order of the Revisional Court vacated in so far as it reversed the finding of the Appellate Authority on the question of the right of the landlord to obtain eviction under S.11 (3) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. The order of eviction passed by the Appellate Authority under S.11(3) is restored and to that extent the revisional order is set aside. The order of eviction passed by the Appellate Authority under S.11(3) is restored and to that extent the revisional order is set aside. No costs. There are two revisions here evidently because there were two revisions before the Court below though only one order. This order shall be treated as the order on both the revisions.