JUDGMENT : A.N. Varma, J. These two petitions can be disposed of by a common judgment as they arise out of the same case. Petition No. 2600 of 1979 has been filed by the landlord while the petition No. 2992 of 1979 is by the tenants of the accommodation in dispute. 2. These are the relevant facts: The Petitioner is the owner and landlord of a residential accommodation which is on the ground floor of a house No. 107/38 Chandra Nagar, Kanpur of which the Respondent No. 3 Inder Singh is a tenant. The landlord has one room, a Kothari and some other accommodations on the first floor of the building which are in occupation of the landlord. The landlord filed an application u/s 21(i)(a) of the U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972 for the eviction of Inder Singh, the tenant on the ground floor on the assertion that his children were experiencing difficulty and inconvenience in the accommodation which is on the first floor of the building. The accommodation at present available with the landlord is entirely insufficient for his needs. He therefore bonafide requires the accommodation in dispute. The application was contested by Inder Singh who asserted that he has a large family consisting of seven members. He has no other alternative accommodation. He would be "thrown on the streets if evicted from the accommodation in dispute and would thereby suffer much greater hardship than the landlord. The Prescribed Authority allowed the application of the landlord. Thereupon, the tenant filed an appeal which has been partly allowed by the learned District Judge. The learned District Judge modified the order passed by the Prescribed Authority to the extent that he directed that the accommodation on the ground floor would be released in favour of the landlord upon his making available the accommodation on the first floor on the aforesaid building to the tenant. 3. Aggrieved by the aforesaid order, both the landlord and the tenant have filed these petitions. 4. I shall take up the petition of landlord first namely Writ Petition No. 2600 of 1979. Counsel for the landlord submitted that it was not permissible for the learned District Judge directing the eviction of the tenant to make a further direction asking the landlord to make available the accommodation on the first floor to the tenant. Counsel submitted that no such power existed in the Act. Counsel for the landlord submitted that it was not permissible for the learned District Judge directing the eviction of the tenant to make a further direction asking the landlord to make available the accommodation on the first floor to the tenant. Counsel submitted that no such power existed in the Act. I do not agree, while disposing of the application u/s 21, the authorities are entitled to impose such conditions in regard to the release of the accommodation as may be relevant for effectuating the purpose for which power is vested in the authorities u/s 21. There is no warrant either on the language of Section 21 or having regard to the policy of the Act which may support the proposition canvassed by the counsel for the Petitioner. In any case, the learned District Judge has observed that the adjustment directed by him seem to me the only way in which hardship likely to be caused to the two parties could be balanced. This finding of the learned District Judge has not been assailed by the counsel for the Petitioner. On such a finding, I am not persuaded to interfere with the order passed by the learned District Judge. This case does not appear to be a fit one for interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in any view. The petition filed by the landlord is, therefore, liable to be dismissed. 5. As regards the petition of the tenant namely Writ Petition No. 2992 of 1979, learned Counsel for the Petitioner was entirely unable to point out any error, whether of fact or of law, in the finding recorded by the courts below that the landlord bonafide requires the accommodation in dispute and that upon a comparison of respective hardships, the landlord was likely to suffer more than the tenants unless equities were adjusted between the parties as directed by the learned District Judge. 6. The result of the aforesaid discussion is that both these petitions fail and are dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs of both the petitions.