JUDGMENT - Dharmadhikari C.S. J.-Petitioner Vasant Nare joined the service of the Maharashtra State Co-operative Land Development Bank Limited on 1st February 1960. At the relevant time he was working at Bombay office of the Bank. On 31st June 1969 he was arrested by the Police at Jalgaon on the complaint of one Gadekar, another employee of the Bank for the alleged offence punishable under sections 467 and 471 of the Indian Penal Code, allegedly committed by him in November 1968. The petitioner was then released on bail. By the letter dated 1lth August 1969, he was put under suspension and then a charge sheet dated 25th March 1970 was served on him on 30th March 1970. Then, an inquiry was conducted and the Inquiry Officer submitted his report dated 4th February 1971 proposing minor punishment and recommending reinstatement of the petitioner. On 11th May 1971 the petitioner was convicted by the Sessions Court. After this conviction the petitioner informed the Bank vide his letter dated 17th May 1971 that he was going to file an appeal to the High Court and, therefore, no action should be taken against him in the meantime. There­after the petitioner was called for further inquiry on 4th June 1971. But according to him no inquiry was held. Ultimately by the order dated 27th August 1971 the petitioner was dismissed from service with immediate effect. It is the case of the petitioner that this dismissal order was in sub­stance based on his conviction by the Sessions Court. 2. Being aggrieved by the order of conviction and sentence passed by the Sessions Court the petitioner preferred an appeal to this Court. The said appeal was admitted on 25th December 1971. It is the case of the petitioner that he received the dismissal order dated 27th August 1971 on 15th October 1971. It appears that vide the judgment dated 16th Septem­ber 1972 this Court set aside the order of conviction and sentence passed by the Sessions Court and the petitioner was acquitted of the charges levelled against him. Thereafter on 18th September 1972 the petitioner through his advocate wrote a letter to the Bank demanding his reinstatement with full back wages and other benefits. Vide letter dated 5th December 1972 the Bank informed him that the matter of his reinstatement was receiving attention. Thereafter on 18th September 1972 the petitioner through his advocate wrote a letter to the Bank demanding his reinstatement with full back wages and other benefits. Vide letter dated 5th December 1972 the Bank informed him that the matter of his reinstatement was receiving attention. Thereafter on 12th December 1972 the petitioner informed the Bank that the Bank was playing dilatory and time-consuming tactics and he should be reinstated with back wages immediately. On 20th December 1972 the petitioner through his counsel again served on a notice upon the Bank calling upon the President of the Bank to go through the papers immediately, other wise the petitioner will be forced to take legal proceedings for re­instatement and contempt of the Honourable High Court at the hands of the Bank. It appears that on 9th of January 1973 the petitioner again wrote a letter to the Bank in this behalf and ultimately vide the letter dated 20th January 1973 the Bank informed the petitioner that the matter was considered by the Executive Committee of the Bank and it was decided therein that the petitioner was free to avail of legal remedy available to him. This clearly shows that the Bank refused to reinstate the petitioner. There­after the petitioner filed an application on 17th of April 1973 before the Labour Court at Bombay bearing Application No. (ICB) 333 of 1973. The respondent Bank opposed this application raising various contentions, one of which was that the application was barred by limitation as prescribed by Rule 53 of the Bombay Industrial Relations Rules, 1947. The Bank also contended that the dismissal order issued by the Bank was perfectly legal and valid. After hearing both sides, Labour Court came to the conclusion that the application filed by the petitioner was barred by limitation. So far as the merits of the controversy are concerned, the Labour Court found that the order of dismissal was not properly issued, as it was found on an inquiry which was neither legal nor proper. However, since the application was barred by limitation, without going into the merits or demerits or the charges levelled against the petitioner or without giving any opportunity to the Bank to prove misconduct before it, the Labour Court dismissed the. application filed by petitioner vide its order dated 21st of June 1974. However, since the application was barred by limitation, without going into the merits or demerits or the charges levelled against the petitioner or without giving any opportunity to the Bank to prove misconduct before it, the Labour Court dismissed the. application filed by petitioner vide its order dated 21st of June 1974. Being aggrieved by this order the petitioner filed an appeal before the Industrial Tribunal, which was numbered as Appeal No. 1C (54) of 1974. The Indus­trial Tribunal agreed with the finding recorded by the Labour Court that the application filed by the employee was barred by limitation and, there­fore, ultimately dismissed the appeal filed by the petitioner. It is these orders which are challenged in this writ petition filed by the petitioner-employee. 3. Shri Deshmukh, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner contended before us that both the Courts below committed an error in construing the provisions of Rule 53 of the Bombay Industrial Relations Rules, 1947. According to him the view taken by the Courts below, that in view of the provisions of Rule 53 (1) of the said Rules, the application has to be filed within three months from the date of order itself and not from the date of its communication to the employee is wholly erroneous. According to him the expression used in Rule 53 viz. “from the date of such order” meant from the date of the receipt of the order by the employee concerned and the said expression cannot be literally construed to mean from the date of passing of the order itself. He-also contended that the Courts below committed an error in holding that the application as filed was beyond the period of limitation as prescribed by Rule 53(1). According to ShriDeshmukh from the facts and circumstances of this case it is quite clear that the order of dismissal which was issued on 27rh of August 1971 was wholly based on the conviction of the employee by the Sessions Court. If this is so, then till he was acquitted by this Court on 16th September 1972 there was no occasion for the petitioner to raise any dispute or to make a demand for change as contemplated by the provisions of the Rule. If this is so, then till he was acquitted by this Court on 16th September 1972 there was no occasion for the petitioner to raise any dispute or to make a demand for change as contemplated by the provisions of the Rule. After his conviction was set aside and he was acquitted by the High Court on 16th of September 1972 the petitioner got a right to raise a dispute and demand for a change in the Industrial matter. Thereafter he approached the Bank vide the letter dated 18th September 1978. The Bank informed him by its letter dated 5-12-1972 that the matter of his reinstatement was receiving attention, which clearly meant that by mutual agreement the period was extended so as to enable the parties to negotiate the matter and to reach a settlement. This period was mutually extended till the Bank informed the petitioner vide its letter dated 20-1-1973 that he was free to avail of legal remedy. Therefore according to the learned counsel till that date the period stood extended by mutual consent or a agreement and hence the application filed by the petitioner on 17th April 1973 was wholly within limitation. 4. On the other hand it is contended by Shri Ramaswamy, learned counsel appearing for the Bank that the order of dismissal issued by the Bank was not based on the conviction of the petitioner by the Sessions Court but was based on an independent inquiry conducted by the Bank. There­fore, the petitioner cannot take advantage of the factum of his acquittal by the High Court on 16th September 1972. Under the provisions of section 42 of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act read with Rule 53 of the Rules there­of the petitioner should have filed an application before the Labour Court within three months from the date of the order of dismissal itself. Hence the application filed on 17th April 1973 was wholly barred by limitation as it was filed after more than one year. Shri Ramaswamy further contended that the letter written by the Bank on 5th of December 1972 informing the peti­tioner that the matter of his reinstatement was receiving attention cannot be construed to mean that the Bank agreed to extend the period for arriving at an agreement after negotiations. Shri Ramaswamy further contended that the letter written by the Bank on 5th of December 1972 informing the peti­tioner that the matter of his reinstatement was receiving attention cannot be construed to mean that the Bank agreed to extend the period for arriving at an agreement after negotiations. According to Shri Ramaswamy this posi­tion is very clear from the letters written by the petitioner himself on 2-12-1972 as well as on 19th January 1973 Ultimately the letter written by the Bank on 20-1-1973 is nothing but a reply to the notice of the petitioner to the Bank and the said letter cannot be construed to mean that the period was mutually fixed or extended by the employer and the employee as con­templated by sub-rule (2) of Rule 53 of the Bombay Industrial Relations Rules, 1947. 5. A contention was also raised by Shri Deshmukh that the Rules framed by the State Government and particularly Rule 53 (1) of the Bombay Industrial Relations Rules, 1947 is ultra vires of the power conferred by the State Government by section 42 (4) of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946. For properly appreciating this contention it will be worthwhile to make a reference to the relevant provisions of section 42(4) of the Act, which read as under: “42(1) ........... ................... (4) Any employee or a representative union desiring a change in respect of (i) any order passed by the employer under Standing Orders, “or (ii) any industrial matter arising out of the application or inter­pretation of standing orders, or (iii) an industrial matter specified in Schedule III (except item (5) thereof) shall make an application to the Labour Court and as respects change desired in any industrial matter specified in item (5) of Schedule III to the Industrial Court. Provided that no such application shall lie unless the employee or a representative union has in the prescribed manner approached the employer with a request for the change and no agreement has been arrived at in respect of the change within the prescribed period.” According to Shri Deshmukh, the expression “shall make an application to the Labour Court” if read with the proviso, it is clear that a limitation could be prescribed by the Rules, only for arriving at an agreement and it is not open to the State Government to prescribe by Rules a limitation for approaching the employer. Section 42 (4) only empowers the State Govern­ment to prescribe manner of approach and further prescribes a period during which an agreement has to be arrived at. It does nor authorise the State Government to frame Rules for making an initial approach itself. Therefore, according to Shri Deshmukh Rule 53 ( l ) which prescribes a period of limitation for making an application in writing to the employer is ultra vires of the power conferred upon the State Government and is beyond the scope of rule making power itself. It was also contended by Shri Deshmukh that the decision of this Court in (Vithaldas Vallabhdas Vaishnav v. Kohinoor Mills Co. Ltd)1 Nos. 1 and 2 requires reconsideration, as it does not lay down correct law in this behalf. 6. So far as the first contention raised by Shri Deshmukh is concern­ed, that the limitation prescribed by Rule 53(1) will start to run from the date of the receipt of the communication of the dismissal order by the employee and not from the date of the order itself, in our opinion there is much substance in this contention. In this context it is worthwhile to note that even the Industrial Tribunal has observed:- “In fairness to the appellant, I must record that it is true that unless he becomes unaware of his right to have change, he could not ask for” it. In fairness I may also record that if he was unaware of the order dated 15-10-1971, he could not possibly have ever thought of asking for change.” In spite of this position the Industrial Tribunal came to the conclusion that the expression used in the Rule will have to be strictly construed and the period will have to be counted from the date of the order of dismissal itself and not from the date of the communication of the order. It is not possible for us to agree with this interpretation. In this context reference could usefully be made to the following observations of the Supreme Court in Slate of Punjab v. Amar Singh Harika2, which read as under : “It is plain that mere passing of an order of dismissal would not be effective unless it is published and communicated to the officer con­cerned. In this context reference could usefully be made to the following observations of the Supreme Court in Slate of Punjab v. Amar Singh Harika2, which read as under : “It is plain that mere passing of an order of dismissal would not be effective unless it is published and communicated to the officer con­cerned. If the appointing authority passes an order of dismissal, but does not communicate it to the officer concerned, theoretically it is possible that unlike in the case of a judicial order pronounced in Court, the authority may change its mind and decide to modify its order. It may be that in some cases, the authority may feel that the ends of justice would be met by demoting the officer concerned rather than dismissing him. An order of dismissal passed by the appropriate authority and kept with itself, cannot be said to take effect unless the officer concerned knows about the said order and it is otherwise communicated to all the parties concerned. If it is held that the mere passing of the order of dismissal has the effect of terminating the services of the officer concerned, various complications may arise. If before receiving the order of dismissal, the officer has exereised his power and jurisdiction to take decisions or do acts within his authority and power, would those acts of decisions be rendered invalid after it is known that an order of dismissal had already been passed against him? Would the officer concerned be entitled to his salary for the period between the date when the order was passed and the date when it was communicated to him? These and other complications would inevitably arise if it is held that the order of dismissal takes effect as soon as it is passed, though it may be communicated to the officer concerned several days thereafter. It is true that in the present case the respondent had been suspended during the material period but that does not change the position that if the officer concerned is not suspended during the period of enquiry, complications of the kind already indicated would definitely arise. It is true that in the present case the respondent had been suspended during the material period but that does not change the position that if the officer concerned is not suspended during the period of enquiry, complications of the kind already indicated would definitely arise. We are, therefore, reluctant to hold that an order of dismissal passed by an appropriate authority and kept on its file with­out communicating it to the officer concerned or otherwise published, it will take effect as from the date on which the order is actually written out by the said authority, such an order can only be effective after it is communicated to the officer concerned or is otherwise published. Even a Public Officer is removed from service, his successor would have to take charge of the said office, and except in cases where the officer concerned has already been suspended, difficulties would arise if it is held that the officer who is actually working and holding charge of his office can be said to be effectively removed from his office by the mere passing of an order by the appropriate authority.” Therefore, obviously an order of dismissal will become effective, if it is communicated to the employee concerned or is published in some recognised manner. As to how and when the order will be deemed to have been communicated or published must depend upon facts and circumstances of each case. However unless it is communicated or published, it does not become operative and if this is so, then in our opinion the expression used in Rule 53 (1) viz. “within a period of three months from the date of such order” will have to be construed to mean from the date of the communica­ tion or publication of the said order. Such a view has been taken by the Supreme Court in (Madanlal v. State of U. P. and others3 wherein it is observ­ ed that:- “It is a fundamental principle of justice that a party whose rights are affected, by an order, must have notice of it.” This is really a principle of fairplay and, therefore, the expression “date of $he order” will mean the date of knowledge of the order passed without notice and in the absence of the party or incumbent, A similar view has been taken by this Court in (Sitaram Mulchand Transport Co. v. Bashir Ahmed Statoo and another)4. Therefore, obviously the Courts below were not right in counting the period of limitation from the date of the order of dismissal itself. It is an admitted position that the petitioner came to know about this dismissal order on 15th October 1971 and, therefore, the period of limi­tation as prescribed by Rule 53 will have to be counted from that date viz. 15th October 1971. 7. So far as the second contention raised by Shri Deshmukh is con­cerned viz., that the dismissal order was wholly based upon the petitioner's conviction by the Sessions Court recorded on 11th May 1971, and, therefore, Jill such a conviction was set aside by the High Court, the petitioner had no occasion to approach the employer for a change. Prima facie, there is some substance in this contention also. Rule 53 cannot be construed de hors the provisions of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946. Sec­tion 78(l)(a)(i) provides for raising a dispute regarding the propriety or legality of an order passed by an employer under the standing orders. It contemplates raising of a dispute which will obviously mean raising of an industrial dispute. Expression “Industrial dispute” is defined in section 3(17) of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act which means any dispute or difference between an employer and employee or between employers and em­ployees or between employees and employees and which is connected with any industrial matter. Expression “industrial matter” is defined in section 3(18) which means any matter relating to employment etc. Therefore, under sec­tion 78 a dispute could be raised relating to an industrial matter. Then sec­tion 42 makes a provision for giving a notice of change and sub-section (4) thereof makes a provision for approach to the employer in that beha!f. There­fore, the occasion to approach the employer for demanding a change in the industrial matter will arise after a dispute comes into existence. In a given case if an order of dismissal is wholly based on conviction by criminal Court then so long as the conviction subsists there is no occasion for the employee to raise any industrial dispute or to make a demand for change. In a given case if an order of dismissal is wholly based on conviction by criminal Court then so long as the conviction subsists there is no occasion for the employee to raise any industrial dispute or to make a demand for change. Such an occasion will arise only when the said order of conviction is set aside by an appellate Court which will enable employee to raise an industrial dispute and make a demand in view of changed circumstances namely, that the order of conviction is no more in the field and therefore order based on such conviction is liable to be set aside. In a given case, if the standing order provides for filing an appeal against an order of dismissal, then such an occasion will arise after the order in appeal is passed. Therefore, occa­sion for demanding a change or approaching the employer will obviously depend upon the facts and circumstances of the case. 8. It cannot be forgotten that the present Act is essentially a remedial piece of legislation. The provisions of this Act will have to be construed liberally so as to achieve the object of the legislation. The object of the provision is to enable the employee to seek redress of his grievance. It being a beneficial piece of legislation, if there is any doubt as to the interpretation of any particular provision, normally it will have to be resolved in favour of a person upon whom the Legislature intends to confer the right. The provision relating to the limitation and particularly for raising an industrial dispute will have to be construed liberally so as to advance the remedy and not deny it. Therefore, it cannot be said that there is no substance in the contention raised by Shri Deshmukh in this behalf. However, it is not necessary to finally decide this question in this writ petition and, therefore, we are inclined to keep it open. This is more so in view of the amendment to section 79(3), whereby a proviso has been added to said section which now provides that the Labour Court may for sufficient reasons, admit an application even after expiry of the period of three months. This is more so in view of the amendment to section 79(3), whereby a proviso has been added to said section which now provides that the Labour Court may for sufficient reasons, admit an application even after expiry of the period of three months. Therefore, in a given case obviously depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case, if it is demonstrated that in no case an employee could have approached the employer or the Labour Court earlier, then obviously such a reason could be termed to be a 'sufficient reason' within the meaning of the said: expression as used in proviso to sub-section (3) of section 79. 9. It is no doubt true that to the present case the said proviso will not apply. However, in this “case it is the case of the employer that the order of dismissal is not based on the conviction recorded by the Sessions Court at all. But an independent inquiry was held and thereafter the peti­ tioner was removed from service for proved misconduct under the Standing Orders. The inquiry officer found him guilty of misconduct under standing order No. 18 (XIV)(XVII). He is not dismissed from service for his convic­ tion by the competent criminal Court, for offences punishable under sec­ tions 467 and 471 of Indian Penal Code. Even the Labour Court and the Industrial Tribunal have come to the conclusion that a legal and proper inquiry was not held and the petitioner was dismissed from service on the basis of a report which was not the result of any legal and proper inquiry. This clearly indicates that the respondent employer wants to support the order of dismissal on the basis of the inquiry held by him under the standing orders and the order is not based upon the conviction recorded by the Sessions Court. In this view of the matter it is not necessary to decide the wider question posed by Shri Deshmukh, as it does not directly fall for decision in this case. 10. In the view which we have taken we do not propose to deal with the argument advanced by Shri Deshmukh regarding the vires of Rule 53(1) of the Bombay Industrial Relations Rules, 1947. The provisions of section 42(4) read with section 78 and section 79 and Rule 53(2) fell for consideration of the Supreme Court in (Raipur Manufacturing Co. 10. In the view which we have taken we do not propose to deal with the argument advanced by Shri Deshmukh regarding the vires of Rule 53(1) of the Bombay Industrial Relations Rules, 1947. The provisions of section 42(4) read with section 78 and section 79 and Rule 53(2) fell for consideration of the Supreme Court in (Raipur Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. Okhabai Devrajbhai Patni)5. A reference could usefully be made to the following observations in para 6 of the said judgment, which reads as under: “It would, therefore, seem clear that if as a result of what transpired before the Labour Commissioner, further period for arriving at a settlement in respect of the change desired by respondent was mutually fixed between the appellant and the respondent, the dispute would not be deemed to have arisen till the expiration of such further period and in that event, the application made by the respondent on 7-6-1973 would be within time. The question, however, is whether it can be said at all that further period was mutually fixed by the appellant and the respon­dent before the Labour Commissioner. We do not think this question can be answered in favour of the respondent. If we look at the applica­tion of the respondent, we do not find in it anything even remotely suggesting that further period for arriving at a settlement was mutually agreed upon between the appellant and the respondent. In the first . place there must be specific period agreed upon between the parties. Here we do not find any averment of a specific period. Even if we construe the application of the respondent most liberally, the utmost we can extract from it is that adjournment must have been granted by the Labour Commissioner to the Labour Officer for the purpose of arriving at a settlement up to a specific date and that would indicate a specific period. The difficulty, however, still remains that there is no averment that such specific period was mutually fixed by the parties. The only averment made in the application of the respondent is that at the hearing before the Labour Commissioner, the Labour Officer of the appellant “took adjournment to make a compromise”, but ultimately no compro­mise was arrived at. The difficulty, however, still remains that there is no averment that such specific period was mutually fixed by the parties. The only averment made in the application of the respondent is that at the hearing before the Labour Commissioner, the Labour Officer of the appellant “took adjournment to make a compromise”, but ultimately no compro­mise was arrived at. It is not even stated in the application that the respondent consented to the adjournment, so that the application for adjournment by the appellant and the consent to the adjournment by the respondent could be construed as an agreement mutually fixing further period for arriving at a settlement. There being absolutely no averment of further period being mutually fixed between the parties, it is difficult to see how the case of the respondent could be brought within the latter part of Rule 53(2). It was never the case of the respondent that further period was mutually fixed and that saved his case from the bar of limita­tion. The relief that he asked for from the Labour Court as well as Industrial Court was condonation of delay but so far as this relief is concerned, the Labour Court had unfortunately no power to condone the delay and hence his request was rejected. We are, therefore, of the view, that the High Court was in error in holding that the application made by the respondent under section 78(1)(A)(a)(i) was within three months of the arising of the dispute and was hence not barred under section 79(3)(a).” It is quite obvious from these observations of the Supreme Court that in the first place there must be a specific period mutually agreed upon between the parties. Therefore, mutuality is the essence of the extension of the further period. The circumstances placed before us will have to be read in this context. It is no doubt true that by a letter dated 5th of December 1972 the Bank had informed the petitioner that the matter of his reinstatement was receiving attention which he should note. However, by this alone it cannot be said that the Bank agreed to extend time as contemplated by Rule 53 (2) of the Rules. The petitioner had also not understood this letter in that sense, otherwise the petitioner would not have said in his letter dated 12-12-1972 that the Bank was playing dilatory and time-consuming tactics. However, by this alone it cannot be said that the Bank agreed to extend time as contemplated by Rule 53 (2) of the Rules. The petitioner had also not understood this letter in that sense, otherwise the petitioner would not have said in his letter dated 12-12-1972 that the Bank was playing dilatory and time-consuming tactics. Subsequent letters dated 20th December 1972 and 9th January 1973 make this position further clear. Only because by the letter dated 20-1-1973 the Bank informed the petitioner that the matter was considered by the Executive Committee of the Bank and he was free to avail of the legal remedy available to him, an inference cannot be drawn that the Bank had agreed to extend the time for negotiations or the time stood extended by mutual consent or agreement till 20-1-1973. Agreement mutually fixing further period which is the essence of the matter is lacking in this correspondence. Further the letters written by the Bank were not understood even by the petitioner employee in that sense. In these circum­stances it cannot be said that the finding recorded by the Court below in that behalf is in any way perverse or calls for an interference in the extra­ordinary jurisdiction of this Court under articles 226 and 227 of the Constitu­tion of India. Once it is held that there was no mutual agreement between the parties for extending time within the meaning of Rule 53 (2) of the said Rules, then on any interpretation of the provisions of the Act as well as the Rules it cannot be held that the application filed on 17-4-1973 was not barred by limitation. In this view of the matter, the orders passed by the authorities below cannot be said to be perverse or illegal”. 11. In the result, therefore, the petition fails. Rule is discharged. However, in the circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs. At this stage Shri Deshmukh requested for grant of leave to file an appeal to the Supreme Court. In the view which we have taken this is not a fit case wherein such a leave can be granted. Hence the prayer for grant of leave to file an appeal to the Supreme Court is rejected. Rule discharged.