Judgement CHANDURKAR, J. :- The short ques­tion which arises in this appeal filed by the Union of India is whether goods im­ported within the limits of municipality by the Railway Administration are liable to Octroi Duty which the respondent Bhusawal Municipal Council is seeking to recover under a Notification issued under Section 135 of the Railways Act, 1890, on 29th November, 1907. 2. Facts in this case are not in dis­pute. The Catering Department of the Railway Administration admittedly brought within the limits of the Bhusawal Municipal Council certain articles required by them for catering admin­istration at the Bhusawal Railway Sta­tion during the period from 2nd Novem­ber 1963 to 1st November 1966. The Railway Administration not having paid the necessary Octroi Duty which, ac­cording to the Municipal Council, the Railway Administration was liable to pay for those articles brought within the municipal limits, a suit came to be filed for the recovery of the amount of Octroi Duty to the tune of Rs. 7,766.14 along with interest amounting to Rs. 2,611.21. Thus, in the suit filed on 6th February 1969 a sum of Rs. 10,377.35 was claimed from the Union of India. The plaint it­self does not refer to the Notification dated 29th November 1907 but it is com­mon ground that liability to pay Octroi Duty is fastened on the Union of India, according to the Municipal Council, by the Notification dated 29th November 1907 (Exhibit 86). This Notification reads as follows : "In pursuance of Clause (i) of Sec­tion 135 of the Indian Railways Act, 1890 (IX of 1890) and in supersession of the notifications of the Government of India in the Public Works Department, No.270, dated the 12th June, 1890, and No.136, dated the 5th April, 1893, the Governor General in Council is pleased to declare that every railway admin­istration in British India shall hereafter be liable to pay, in respect of property within any local area, every tax which may lawfully be imposed by any local authority in aid of its funds, under any law for the time being in force." Two defences were raised by the Union of India to this claim. According to the Union of India, it was not liable to pay any Duty in the absence of any Notifi­cation in the Official Gazette declaring the Railway Administration to be liable to pay such taxes and that the Union of India was further protected under the provisions of Section 3(1) and Section 4 of the Railways (Local Authorities' Taxation) Act, 1941 (hereinafter referred to as the 1941 Act). According to the Union of India, the provisions of the 1941 Act will be saved by Article 372 of the Constitution of India. The issue of limi­tation was also raised. It appears that the plea that a Notification under Sec­tion 135 of the Railways Act relating to Octroi tax was not issued was not speci­fically taken probably because in the plaint no such Notification was disclosed. The questions involved in the suit were essentially questions of law, the facts having been admitted. The oral evidence in the case, therefore, does not become very material. 3. The trial Court took the view that Section 135 of the Railways Act regulat­ed the levy of taxes by a Local Auth­ority and unless a Notification was issu­ed under Section 3 of the 1941 Act, the property of the Railway Administration cannot be subjected to tax by the Local Authority. The trial Court further took the view that Exhibit 86 indicates that the Railway Authority was liable to pay taxes connected with immovable pro­perties such as house tax, water tax, conservancy tax, latrine tax, wheel tax and water rate, etc. and that there was no Notification in respect of Octroi on goods brought within the Municipal limits. With reference to the provisions of Article 285 of the Constitution of India, the trial Court took the view that under the Bombay Municipal Borough Act, 1925, when the Bhusawal Munici­pality had approved and levied Octroi since 1932 and the Octroi Rules were in force even before the Constitution came into force, the authority to impose Octroi Duty did not cease simply because the Constitution came into force. The trial Court found that the State Government has not framed any rules exempting the catering unit of the Railways from Octroi Duty. The trial Court took the view that the Railway Ad­ministration had paid Octroi Duty in the past and the articles were rightly taxed under the Octroi rules as there was no exemption. The trial Court found that the State Government has not framed any rules exempting the catering unit of the Railways from Octroi Duty. The trial Court took the view that the Railway Ad­ministration had paid Octroi Duty in the past and the articles were rightly taxed under the Octroi rules as there was no exemption. With regard to the limitation, the trial Court held that the claim in respect of all the items was within the period of limitation. A decree for Rs. 10,377.35 was thus being passed against the Union of India. This appeal has now been filed by the Union of India challenging the decree of the trial Court. 4. Mr. M.R. Kotwal, the learned Government Pleader, has mainly relied on the provisions of Article 285(1) of the Constitution of India under which, according to the learned counsel, there is a blanket exemption of the pro­perty of the Union from all taxes im­posed by a State or by any authority within a State unless provisions to the contrary is made by a law of Parliament. The learned Government Pleader therefore contended that goods brought with­in the municipal limits by the catering establishment of the Railway Adminis­tration were the property of the Union and since there was no law made by the Parliament providing for those goods being allowed to be taxed by the Local Authority, the Octroi Duty could not be levied by the Municipal Council on the articles in question. Mr. Abhyankar ap­pearing on behalf of the Municipal Council had relied mainly on the pro­visions of Article 285(2) of the Constitu­tion of India and the argument advanced before us was that goods brought within the municipal limits have already been made subject to tax by virtue of Notification Exhibit 86 and therefore such tax would be saved by the provision of sub-article (2) of Article 285. The learn­ed counsel pointed out that Notification of 1907 enabled the Municipal Council to levy Octroi Duty and that Notifica­tion continued to be effective even after the coming into force of the Govern­ment of India Act 1935 because the power to levy Octroi Duty was preserv­ed in the Municipal Council by the pro­viso to Sec.154 of the Government of India Act 1935. According to the learned counsel, as Octroi Duty was levied since 1907 and it continued to he levied even after the commencement of the Consti­tution, the Union of India could not avoid its liability. Now, admittedly, so far as the Notification of 1907 is con­cerned, it was revoked by another Noti­fication dated 6th October, 1953 Exhi­bit 9. That Notification expressly stated that the Central Government revokes the Notification of the Government of India "in the Department of Commerce and Industry No.9977-Rys. dated the 29th November, 1907, issued under Clause (1) of the said Section". The learned counsel contended that the Octroi Duty was legally levied till 6th October 1953 and that since the Railways have been treated as liable to pay Octroi Duty even thereafter, even though the levy may be illegal, the Union of India would be liable to pay Octroi Duty. It may be pointed out at this stage that the dispute with regard to the liability to pay Octroi Duty was for the first time raised by the Union of India in August 1969. 5. Article 285 of the Constitution reads as follows : "(1) The property of the Union shall, save in so far as Parliament may by law otherwise provide, be exempt from all taxes imposed by a State or by any authority within a State. (2) Nothing in Clause (1) shall, until Parliament by law otherwise provides, prevent any authority within a State from levying any tax on any property of the Union to which such property was immediately before the commence­ment of this Constitution liable or treated as liable, so gone as that tax continues to be levied in that State." Article 285 of the Constitution is thus in two parts. Sub-Article (1) provides for exemption of the property of the Union from all taxes imposed by a State or by any authority within a State which will include a Local Authority like a Municipal Council. This exemption can, however, be taken away by a law made by the Parliament. In other words, the property of the Union could be sub­jected to tax by a State or by a local authority only if it is so permitted by a law made by the Parliament after the Constitution has come into force. It is therefore a blanket exemption in respect of Union property from State taxation or taxation by any authority within a State. It is therefore a blanket exemption in respect of Union property from State taxation or taxation by any authority within a State. It is on the same pattern as is to be found with regard to exemption of federal property from State taxation in the Australian and the Canadian Consti­tution. Sec.114 of Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 provides inter alia that "A State shall not, with­out the consent of the Parliament of the Commonwealth, raise or maintain any naval or military force, or impose any tax on property of any kind belonging to the Commonwealth, nor shall the Commonwealth impose any tax on pro­perty of any kind belonging to a State." Section 125 of the British North America Act 1867 provides as follows : "No lands or property belonging to Canada or any Province shall be liable to taxation." It is, however, open to the Parliament to enact a law which will enable the State or any authority within a State to tax the property of the Union. 6. The latter part of Art.285 was in­tended to save the taxes which were be­ing levied on the property of the Union at the commencement of the Constitu­tion by any authority within, a State so long as the tax continued to be levied in that State. Thus, where a property of the Union was, immediately before the commencement of the Constitution, lia­ble to tax or treated as liable to tax levied by a local authority, that tax could continue to be levied in view of the express provisions in Art.285(2). Such property could be exempted from taxation only by a law made by the Parliament. The provisions of Art.285 will, therefore, make it clear that the property of the Union of India could not be subjected to tax by a Local Authority unless the condition in Sub-Art.(2) was satisfied. It is on this Sub-Art.(2) that Mr. Abhyankar placed heavy reliance. Now, there is no doubt that the word "property" used in Art.285 is a word of widest amplitude and it cannot be given any restricted meaning. It is on this Sub-Art.(2) that Mr. Abhyankar placed heavy reliance. Now, there is no doubt that the word "property" used in Art.285 is a word of widest amplitude and it cannot be given any restricted meaning. In order to find out whether the Municipal Coun­cil could claim protection in respect of power to levy Octroi Duty from Art.285(2), it becomes necessary to find out whether the Octroi Duty can be said to be a tax in respect of the property which was liable to that tax immediately before the commencement of the Con­stitution. Therefore, though the period in respect of which Octroi Duty is now sought to be recovered is a post-Consti­tution period, we will have to revert back to the position before the com­mencement of the Constitution on 26th January, 1950. 7. The Notification itself is dated 29th November, 1907 and the period from the first levy of the Octroi Duty which is said to have been made in 1932 up to the commencement of the Constitution would therefore have to be split up into two parts. Article 285 is the successor of the similar provision which was made in the Government of India Act in Sec­tion 154 of the Government of India Act 1935 which came into force on 1st April, 1937. Therefore, the period immediately preceding the commencement of the Constitution required to be considered for the purposes of the validity of the Octroi Duty would be from 1st April, 1937 to 25th January, 1950 and the other period would be from 1st September, 1932 to 31st March, 1937. Primarily therefore before the Municipal Council can claim that its power to levy Octroi Duty is saved by the provisions of Art.285(2), it would have to be estab­lished that the power to levy tax on the property of the Union validly vested in the Municipal Council up to 1st April 1937. 8. In this context, the provisions of S.154 of the Government of India Act 1935 become relevant. 8. In this context, the provisions of S.154 of the Government of India Act 1935 become relevant. It reads as fol­lows: "Property vested in His Majesty for purposes of the government of the Fede­ration shall, save in so far as any Fede­ral law may otherwise provide, be ex­empt from all taxes imposed by, or by any authority within, a province or Fed­erated State: Provided until any Federal law other­wise provides, any property so vested which was immediately before the com­mencement for Part III of this Act lia­ble, or treated as liable, to any such tax, shall, so long as that tax continues, con­tinue to be liable, or to be treated as li­able, thereto. A reading of S.154 of the Government of India Act 1935 will show that the scheme of that section is the same as the scheme of Art.285 of the Constitu­tion of India. Under Sec.154 property vested in His Majesty for purposes of the Government of the Federation is ex­empted from all taxes imposed by or by any authority within a province or a federated State. Prior to the commencement of the Constitution, it cannot be disputed that the railway property was property of the Crown. That property of the Crown is exempted from all taxes which may be imposed by a local authority or by a province or a federat­ed State. This exemption could be taken away by a federal Law which had to be a law made by the Central Legislature prior to the commencement of the Con­stitution. Now there can be no difficulty in holding that under the main part of S.154 of the Government of India Act 1935 all properties of the Crown would be exempt from taxes imposed by a local authority. The word property un­der S.154 is also used in its widest and generic sense. In Governor General of India in Council v. Corporation of Cal­cutta, AIR 1948 Cal 116 (2) B.K. Mukherjee, J. (as he then was) while deal­ing with the scope of S.154, has observ­ed as follows : "The language of S.154 is obviously very wide; it embraces within its scope all taxes and impositions levied by or by any authority within a province or Fed­erated State. The expression "property" has also been used in a perfectly general sense and would include land, building, chattles, shares, debts, and in fact every thing that has a money value in the market and comes within the purview_of any taxing statute." It was pointed out by Mukherjee, J. that under the English Law the Crown not being bound by any Statute unless ex­pressly named, property owned and oc­cupied by Crown shall be exempt from taxation unless rendered liable either by express words or by necessary implica­tion, and with reference to the provi­sions of S.154 the learned Judge fur­ther observed as follows : "In India it seems prior to the passing of the Government of India Act 1935, the question of exemption of Crown property from taxation was not definite­ly settled." Mukherjee, J. referred to the decision in Bell v. Commrs. for the City of Madras (1902) ILR 25 Mad 457. It was pointed out that the view expressed therein, was that according to the uniform course of Indian Legislation, statutes imposing duties or taxes bind Government unless the very nature of the duty or tax is such as to be inapplicable to Govern­ment. It was then observed by MukherJea, J., as follows: "It is a fact, however, that on the general question different views were taken in other cases : vide 14 Bom 213. Many properties vested in His Majesty were treated as liable to taxation, when the Constitution Act of 1935 came into force, and the proviso attached to Sec­tion 154 makes it clear that properties which were treated as so liable immedi­ately before April 1937, when Part III of the Act was to come into operation, would not enjoy the exemption given by the main provision of the section. The Parliament deliberately used the words "liable" or "treated as liable" with a view to avoid a final solution of the question regarding the legal liability of Crown property to taxation in India prior to the coming into operation of Part III of the Act." 9. The Parliament deliberately used the words "liable" or "treated as liable" with a view to avoid a final solution of the question regarding the legal liability of Crown property to taxation in India prior to the coming into operation of Part III of the Act." 9. Ormond, J., who was the other Member of the Bench, after pointing out that, "in England in the absence of spe­cial statutory provisions imposing a tax on Crown property, Crown property would be exempt by virtue of the Crown prerogative" and "it is equally well established that both in England and in India, liability for taxation may he im­posed against Crown property by apt sta­tutory provisions" set out in the scheme of S.154, in paragraphs 20 and 21, as follows : "The scheme of the section is that in the first part (the main body of it) there is an exemption from taxation in general terms. Then in the second part of the section (the proviso in it) there is an exception from that exemption. The re­sult is that any property covered by the exception will be liable to tax in spite of the exemption in the first part. Were it not for the exception in the second part, it is clear and undisputed that the whole of the........................." "The proviso is worded in a manner which lays down a positive liability to tax in the case of the particular class of Crown, property described in it ............................ The first result of the pro­viso is that any property covered by the exception in the proviso will he liable to tax, in spite of any exemption in the earlier part of the section within the section itself. The further result is also, that any property covered by the excep­tion will be liable to tax, in spite of any general exemption outside the sec­tion, such as might have been based on the general Crown prerogative." The learned Judge further dealing with the proviso pointed out that the only taxable property brought within the ex­ception contained in the proviso is pro­perty which was in physical existence before 1st April 1937. The four condi­tions which would be necessary to be established to bring the property within the proviso were set out as follows : "(1) Physical existence of the property before 1-4-1937, (3) Liability of that property to the tax then, (3) Physical existence of the same pro­perty now, that is to say, for the cur­rent period for which tax is sought to be levied, and (4) Liability of the property (if it were not Crown property) to the tax now." It may be pointed out that the learned Government Pleader has heavily relied on the fact that one of the conditions necessary for the Union property to be subjected to Octroi Duty was that the identity of the property must he estab­lished both prior to and after the com­mencement of the Constitution and both prior to and after 1st April, 1937. The contention was that Octroi Duty is levi­ed on goods as they come within the municipal limits and it is not a recur­ring duty on the same goods and the goods being different every time the duty is sought to be levied, whatever might have been the position prior to 1st April, 1937, after 1st April 1937 and 26th January 1950, in view of the sub­stantive provisions in S.154 of the Gov­ernment of India Act 1935 and Art.285 of the Constitution of India, the goods belonging to the Union of India are not liable to Octroi Duty. The wide meaning to the word property given by the Cal­cutta High Court has been expressly ap­proved by the Federal Court in the Corporation of Calcutta v. Governors of St. Thomas School, Calcutta. AIR 1949 FC 121. Dealing with S.154 and the meaning of the word property used therein, the Federal Court observed as follows : "Section 154 raises two questions for determination when an exemption from liability to tax is claimed : (i) whether tax is claimed in respect of property: and (ii) whether such property is vest­ed in Government : The word "pro­perty" is used in the context without any limitation and therefore should bear its normal meaning. Interpreted in that way it will embrace every kind of pro­perty. As observed by Langdale, M.R. in Jones v. Skinner, (1835) 5 LJ Ch 87 at p.90 : (42 RR 274) : " 'Property' is the generic term for all that a person has dominion over. Interpreted in that way it will embrace every kind of pro­perty. As observed by Langdale, M.R. in Jones v. Skinner, (1835) 5 LJ Ch 87 at p.90 : (42 RR 274) : " 'Property' is the generic term for all that a person has dominion over. It is the most comprehensive of all terms which could be used, inasmuch as it is indicative and descriptive of every pos­sible interest which the property can have." Without attempting to define affirmative­ly what the generic term will cover, it is sufficient for us to hold that the build­ings in question are property and as in India the ownership of a building is not necessarily related to the ownership of the land on which the building stands, the buildings in the present case were vested in the Government................................. In our opinion, the meaning of "property" adopted in Governor-General of India in Council v. Corporation of Calcutta. 52 Cal WN 173 : (AIR 1948 Cal 116) is correct." We have referred to this meaning given to the word property in S.154 because at one stage it was contended by the learned Government Pleader that in S.154 when the proviso referred to pro­perty or taxes on property, the reference was only to immovable property and that the proviso to S.154 did not save the power to levy Octroi Duty which was a tax levied on movable property, viz., goods. In view of the wide meaning which the word property bears, even movable property will be covered by it and if the Municipal Council succeeds in proving that Octroi Duty levied in respect of such property is saved by the proviso to S.154, it would be possible for it to contend that the requirements of Art.285(2) have also been satisfied. 10. Thus in the face of an express bar to tax Crown property contained in Sec­tion 154 of the Government of India Act 1935, it was incumbent on the Municipal Council to satisfy the Court that the power to levy Octroi Duty could be validly exercised even after 1937 when Part III of the Government of India Act 1935 came into force. It was for this purpose that a reference was made to the Notification of 1907 which was issu­ed under the Railways Act. It is neces­sary now, therefore, to refer to the pro­visions of S.135 of the Railways Act. It was for this purpose that a reference was made to the Notification of 1907 which was issu­ed under the Railways Act. It is neces­sary now, therefore, to refer to the pro­visions of S.135 of the Railways Act. The relevant provisions are contained in Clauses 1, 2 and 3 of the Railways Act which read as follows ; "135. Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any enactment, or in any agreement or award based on, any enact­ment, the following rules shall regulate the levy of taxes in respect of railways and from railway administrations in aid of the funds of local authorities, name­ly :- (1) A railway administration shall not be liable to pay any tax in aid of the funds of any local authority unless the Central Government has, by notification in the Official Gazette, declared the rail­way administration to be liable to pay the tax. (2) While a notification of the Central Government under Cl.(1) of this section is in force, the railway administration shall be liable to pay to the local auth­ority either the tax mentioned in the notification or, in lieu thereof, such sum, if any, as an officer appointed in this be­half by the Central Government may having regard to all the circumstances of the case, from time to time determine to be fair and reasonable. (3) The Central Government may at any time revoke or vary a notification under Cl.(1) of this section." Section 135 specifically deals with rail­way property which could be subjected to levy of taxes in aid of the funds of the Local Authority. By Cl.(5) of that section, the term Local Authority is given the same meaning as in the Gen­eral Clauses Act 1887. Under S.135 un­less the Railway Administration is ex­pressly declared as being liable to pay a tax, that tax cannot be levied on the Railway Administration. This declaration has to be by a notification issued by the Central Government. The second clause only deals with quantification of the tax liability. It provides that the liability could be discharged by paying a lump sum to be determined by an officer to be appointed by the Central Govern­ment. Clause (3) gives power to Central Government to revoke the said notifica­tion. The second clause only deals with quantification of the tax liability. It provides that the liability could be discharged by paying a lump sum to be determined by an officer to be appointed by the Central Govern­ment. Clause (3) gives power to Central Government to revoke the said notifica­tion. Now Exhibit 86, which is issued in exercise of power under S.135, enable the local authority to impose all such taxes in respect of property of the Rail­way Administration which could be im­posed by that local authority in aid of its funds. We do not think it can be seriously disputed that on the terms of this notification Octroi Duty could have been validly levied by the Municipal Council in respect of railway property because under Sec.72 of the Bombay Municipal Boroughs Act 1955 one of the taxes which could be imposed by the Municipality is "Octroi on animals or goods or both brought within the Muni­cipal limits for consumption, use or sale thereof". Articles brought within the municipal limits by the catering depart­ment of the Railway Administration were obviously brought either for con­sumption or for sale or use. The ques­tion, however, is : Does this power sur­vive after coming into operation of S.154 of the Government of India Act 1935? If the proviso to S.154 was not attract­ed, then there would be no power in the municipality to tax the property of the Railway Administration because of the express bar in the main part of S.154 of the Government of India Act 1935. The power under S.135 of the Railways Act to issue a notification could not have been exercised in respect of Government property after 1st April 1937 because S.154 of the Government of India Act 1935 exempted all such property from local taxation unless there was a federal law providing to the contrary. In view of the fact that S.154 of the Govern­ment of India Act 1935 exempted the railway property from provincial or local taxation, except so far as the leg­islation may otherwise provide and un­der the proviso, all the taxes payable by virtue of notifications issued under Sec­tion 135 of the Railways Act continue to be payable until Legislature otherwise provides, the Central Legislature enact­ed the Railways (Local Authorities Taxa­tion) Act 1941, reliance on which has been placed on behalf of the municipal­ity. The relevant provisions are in sec­tions 3 and 4 of that Act. The relevant provisions are in sec­tions 3 and 4 of that Act. The entire Act itself has only five sections. Sec­tion 3 reads as follows : "3. (1) In respect of property vested in the Central Government, being pro­perty of a railway, a railway admin­istration shall be liable to pay any tax in aid of the funds of any local auth­ority, if the Central Government, by notification in the Official Gazette, de­clares it to be so liable. (2) While a notification under sub-sec­tion (1) is in force, the railway admin­istration shall be liable to pay to the local authority either the tax mentioned in the notification or in lieu thereof such sum, if any as a person appointed in this behalf by the Central Government may having regard to the services rend­ered to the railway and all the relevant circumstances of the case, from time to time determine to be fair and reason­able. The person so appointed shall be a person who is or has been a Judge of a High Court or a District Judge." Section 4 reads as follows : "4. The Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, re­voke or vary any notification issued un­der Cl.(1) of S.135 of the Indian Rail­ways Act 1890; and where a notification is so revoked, any liability arising out of the notification to pay any tax to any local authority shall cease, and where a notification is so varied the liability aris­ing out of the notification shall be varied accordingly." Section 3 of this Act thus enables the local authority to levy a tax in aid of its funds in respect of property vested in the Central Government, being a pro­perty of a railway, only if the Central Government issues a notification declar­ing the Railway Administration to be so liable. Therefore, after coming into force of Part III of the Government of India Act 1935, before the Railway property can be taxed, a notification under S.3 of the 1941 Act has to be issued by the Central Government. Section 4 only em­powers the Central Government to re­voke or modify a notification issued un­der S.135 of the Railways Act. The con­sequence of revocation is that the liabi­lity to pay tax to any local authority under that notification ceases. The posi­tion, as it appears, is that the notifica­tion of 1907 was revoked in October 1953. Section 4 only em­powers the Central Government to re­voke or modify a notification issued un­der S.135 of the Railways Act. The con­sequence of revocation is that the liabi­lity to pay tax to any local authority under that notification ceases. The posi­tion, as it appears, is that the notifica­tion of 1907 was revoked in October 1953. Therefore, even assuming that the noti­fication of 1907 empowered the local authority to levy Octroi Duty, that liabi­lity ceased in terms of S.4 of the 1941 Act with effect from 3rd October 1953 and no recovery of Octroi Duty could have been made thereafter. 11. Looking at the matter from a dif­ferent aspect, it will have to be ascer­tained whether the notification of 1907 is such that the proviso to S.154 of the Government of India Act would be attracted to it. Now there can be no doubt, as already pointed out, that the notifica­tion of 1907 enables even Octroi Duty to be levied in respect of goods. But for the purposes of the proviso to S.154, the requirement of that proviso has to be satisfied. The requirement, as pointed out by Ormond, J. in Calcutta Corporation's case, is that the property which is being subjected to tax must be in existence before 1st April 1937 physically and the property must be the same at the time when the tax is sought to be levied. This is the undisputable effect of the proviso and the manner in which it is worded, and thus the proviso to Section 154, Government of India Act 1935 saved some taxes. The taxes saved were in respect of property which vested in His Majesty and was, immediately be­fore 1st April 1937, liable to tax and taxes only in respect of such property could be recovered after 1st April 1937. The physical identity of the property, before and after 1st April 1937, is there­fore a sine qua non for levy of a tax after 1st April 1937 by virtue of the proviso of S.154 of the Government of India Act 1935. Such cannot however be said to be the case where Octroi Duty is sought to be levied. Octroi Duty is levied once and for all on any parti­cular article or goods. There is no occa­sion to levy Octroi Duty again and again in respect of the same property. Such cannot however be said to be the case where Octroi Duty is sought to be levied. Octroi Duty is levied once and for all on any parti­cular article or goods. There is no occa­sion to levy Octroi Duty again and again in respect of the same property. In other words, the Octroi Duty is paid on a pro­perty which comes for the first time within the municipal limits and that is brought for consumption, sale or use and the same goods are not again liable to duty. Therefore, the physical identity of the property prior to 1st April 1937 can­not be the same where on and after 1st April 1937 new goods are brought with­in municipal limits and Octroi Duty is sought to be levied on those goods or articles. In the case of Octroi Duty, therefore, it is obvious that the proviso to S.154 would be wholly inapplicable and unless there is a Federal Law as contemplated by the substantive provision in S.154 of the Government of India Act 1935, there will be no power in any Municipal Council to levy Octroi Duty in respect of Government property after 1st April 1937. That will also be the position in the post-Constitution period and unless there is a law made by the Parliament permitting the pro­perty of the Union to be taxed, Octroi Duty could not be levied after 25th January 1950. 12. We may now refer to two deci­sions of the Supreme Court in which the scope of Article 285 has been considered. In Union of India owner of the Eastern Railway v. Commissioner of Sahibganj Municipality ( AIR 1973 SC 1185 ) a noti­fication was issued on 24th August 1911 under Section 135 of the Railways Act declaring that the Administration of East India Railway shall be liable to pay in aid of the funds of the local authorities set out in the schedule thereto annexed the taxes specified in the second column thereof. The taxes in question were house rate and latrine fees. Out of the buildings in question some were con­structed after 31st Mar. 1937 and some after 25th Jan. 1950. The Union of India contended that it was not liable to pay municipal tax by virtue of provisions contained in S.154 of the Government of India Act 1935 and Article 285 of the Constitution. Out of the buildings in question some were con­structed after 31st Mar. 1937 and some after 25th Jan. 1950. The Union of India contended that it was not liable to pay municipal tax by virtue of provisions contained in S.154 of the Government of India Act 1935 and Article 285 of the Constitution. The High Court had held that the 1941 Act was a Federal Law within the meaning of Section 154 of the Government of India Act and Sec­tion 4 of the 1941 Act rendered the buildings liable to taxation. Reversing the decision of the High Court it was pointed out by the Supreme Court that the High Court overlooked the effect of Section 3 of the 1941 Act which requir­ed a notification declaring a liability to pay and that the notification under 1941 Act created a liability for railway pro­perty coming into existence after 1941 Act but no such notification was issued. Pointing out that Section 4 of the 1941 Act did not provide for payment of taxes in respect of railway property and that there was no law contemplated by Article 285 providing for taxation of railway property the Supreme Court observed as follows (at p.1187):- "The High Court was in error in con­struing the notification issued in 1911 under the 1890 Act to continue by virtue of the provisions contained in Section 4 of the 1941 Act. These 32 blocks of build­ings vested in the Union some of them after 1st April 1937 and some after the Constitution came into existence. These properties could be made liable to pay tax to the municipality only if Parlia­ment by law provided to that effect." The Supreme Court thus held that the notification under the 1890 Act did not apply to the 32 blocks of buildings which were not in existence before 1st April 1937 and that there was no law declaring the 32 blocks of buildings to be li­able to payment of tax as claimed by the municipality. The Supreme Court decision therefore points out that the notification issued under the Railways Act could not be availed of by the Municipal Council after 1st April 1937. The scope of the proviso was, however, not in question in that case. The other decision is in Union of India v. City Municipal Council. Bellary, AIR 1978 SC 1803 . The Supreme Court decision therefore points out that the notification issued under the Railways Act could not be availed of by the Municipal Council after 1st April 1937. The scope of the proviso was, however, not in question in that case. The other decision is in Union of India v. City Municipal Council. Bellary, AIR 1978 SC 1803 . The Supreme Court referring to the scope of Article 285 observed as fol­lows (Para 7):- "The property of the Union is exempt from all taxes imposed by a State or by any authority within a State. But the Parliament may by law provide other­wise and then any tax on the property of the Union can be imposed and levied in accordance with the said law. But then an exception has been carved out in clause (2). The exception is not meant for levying any tax on such property by any State; but it is merely for the bene­fit of any authority including the local authority like the Municipal Council in question. Clause (1) cannot prevent such authority from levying any tax on any property of the Union if such property was exigible to such tax immediately be­fore the commencement of the Constitu­tion. The local authority, however, can reap advantage of this exception only under two conditions namely (1) that it is 'that tax' which is being continued to be levied and no other; (2) that the local authority in 'that State' is claiming to continue the levy of the tax. In other words, the nature, type and the property on which the tax was being levied prior to the_ commencement of the Constitu­tion must be the same as also the local authority must be the local authority of the same State to which it belonged before the commencement of the Con­stitution." 13. Mr. Abhyankar appearing on be­half of the Municipality has contended that when Octroi Duty is levied the na­ture and character is the same both as to the property and the tax. The conten­tion appeared to be that the property subjected to tax were goods imported within municipal limits and the nature of tax was Octroi tax and therefore ac­cording to the learned counsel even the condition laid down by the Supreme Court in Bellary Municipality's case was satisfied. The conten­tion appeared to be that the property subjected to tax were goods imported within municipal limits and the nature of tax was Octroi tax and therefore ac­cording to the learned counsel even the condition laid down by the Supreme Court in Bellary Municipality's case was satisfied. Now it is obvious that when the Supreme Court referred to the na­ture and type of the property on which tax was being levied, that was in the context of Article 285(2) which ex­pressly provided that the property in respect of which the tax was being sought to be levied must be the same property which was liable or treated as liable prior to the coming into force of the Constitution. As already pointed out, when Octroi Duty is levied on goods brought into the municipal limits for the first time, on each occasion the goods are different and not the same goods though in a given case the goods may be identical or of the same kind. 14. We may also point out that the Supreme Court in the Bellary Municipa­lity's case has taken the view that the provisions of the 1941 Act are not saved by Article 285 of the Constitution be­cause, it was not a law made by the Parliament as contemplated by Arti­cle 285(2). Referring to the provisions of the 1941 Act in the context of Art.285 and Article 372 of the Constitution the Supreme Court has observed as follows (Para 8):- "The Act of 1941 creating the liability of the Railways to taxation by local authorities was passed by the then Cen­tral Legislature which was a Federal Legislature of India. The present Cen­tral Legislature, namely, the Parlia­ment has not enacted any law after coming into force of the Constitution making any provision affecting the exemption of the property of the Union from all taxes imposed by a State or by any authority within a State. The 1941 Act is repugnant to clause (1) of Arti­cle 285. It is neither a law made by Par­liament nor a law made by the Central Legislature after the advent of the Con­stitution. The 1941 Act is repugnant to clause (1) of Arti­cle 285. It is neither a law made by Par­liament nor a law made by the Central Legislature after the advent of the Con­stitution. In either view of the matter it is not a law covered by the phrase 'save in so far as Parliament may by law otherwise provide' occurring in clause (1) of Article 285." It therefore appears to be clear to us that Octroi Duty which was permitted to be levied by the notification of 1907 could not have been levied on goods brought by the Railways after 1st April 1937 because of the bar under the main part of Section 154 of the Government of India Act and because such a tax was not saved by the proviso to Section 154, the Octroi Duty could also not be levied after the com­mencement of the Constitution because of the express bar in Article 285(1) and further because there was no Octroi Duty which could be claimed under Article 285(2). 15. It was at one stage contended by Mr. Abhyankar on the basis of the deci­sion of the Calcutta High Court in Cor­poration of Calcutta v. Union of India, AIR 1957 Cal 548 that even if the Octroi tax was illegally levied after 1953, when the notification of 1907 was revoked, the case would still be covered by Arti­cle 285(2) and the Municipal Council was therefore entitled to claim Octroi Duty from the Railway Administration. Dealing with the meaning of the words "treated as liable" which are to be found both in the proviso to Section 154 of the Government of India Act and Arti­cle 285(2) of the Constitution of India, the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court has observed as follows (at p.550): "The phrase "treated as liable" has the same legal meaning in both the pro­viso to S.154 of the Government of India Act, 1935, and clause (2) of Arti­cle 285 of the Constitution and it has the same purpose, namely, to avoid a final solution of the dispute as to the legal liability of the particular property to the disputed tax and to authorise or validate the levy of the tax in the post-Act and post-Constitution period respectively, at least when such tax was actually levi­ed and realised and paid, in fact for the particular property as Central Govern­ment property for the period immediate­ly before the relevant date, that is, the commencement of Part III of the Gov­ernment of India Act, 1935, in the one case and the commencement of the Constitution in the other, even if such levy was illegal." These observations are not of any as­sistance to the Municipal Council. The concept of "treated as liable" have been used by the learned Judges in the con­text of the particular property and it is in respect of such property which has once been treated as liable that it is said that the tax could be recovered even though it was illegally levied. That case dealt with house property which was assessed to municipal taxes and the con­tention on behalf of the Municipal Council was that though the assessment up to the end of the second quarter of 1950-51, i.e. up to a post-Constitution period was actually paid by the Union, the Union was disputing the assessment as illegal and ultra vires immediately when the property came under the own­ership to the Central Government on 1st April 1943 and the property, according to the Union of India, ceased to be liable to municipal taxes. The Calcutta High Court held that the levy of the disputed tax in the disputed post-Constitution period was valid in law because the disputed premises belong to Central Government and owned by it and were actually assessed to municipal tax and such tax was paid and realised imme­diately before the commencement of the Constitution. The Calcutta High Court held that the levy of the disputed tax in the disputed post-Constitution period was valid in law because the disputed premises belong to Central Government and owned by it and were actually assessed to municipal tax and such tax was paid and realised imme­diately before the commencement of the Constitution. The premises were there­fore held to be "treated as liable" for the purposes of Article 285(2). As al­ready pointed out, we are, in the pre­sent case, concerned with Octroi Duty and each levy is a fresh levy on fresh articles and tax was not intended to be recovered for the same goods for which once it is paid. The trial Court was, therefore, in our view, wrong in holding that the Union was liable to pay Octroi Duty as claimed. 16. This finding is sufficient to dispose the appeal. However, the question of limitation has been argued before us and we proceed to decide it. Admittedly, the Limitation Act, 1963 came into force on 1st January, 1964. Out of the several items which were subjected to Octroi Duty, there were only two items which fell within the period before 1st January 1964. Those are items 1 and 2 in Exhibit 41 dated 2nd November, 1963 to 17th De­cember, 1963. The remaining items are between 10th January, 1964 and 1st Nov­ember, 1966. Admittedly the suit is filed after the Limitation Act, 1963 has come into force. The trial Court has found that the limitation for the suit under the old Act would have been six years but under the new Act it is only three years under Article 113 which is the Article corresponding to Article 120 of the 1908 Limitation Act. The commencement of limitation in both the Acts would be from the time when the right to sue would normally accrue when the tax would become payable. It normally be­comes payable at the time when the goods are brought within the municipal limits. The commencement of limitation in both the Acts would be from the time when the right to sue would normally accrue when the tax would become payable. It normally be­comes payable at the time when the goods are brought within the municipal limits. Now the trial Court has taken the view that since under the new Limi­tation Act the period of limitation prescribed is less i.e. three years, than the one prescribed under the old Act, i.e. six years, the provisions of Section 30 of the Limitation Act 1963 could be invok­ed by the Municipal Council and there­fore the Municipal Council was entitled to file a suit within a period of seven years from 2nd November 1963. The only material provision is in clause (a) of Article 30 which reads as follows:- "30. Notwithstanding anything con­tained in this Act,- (a) any suit for which the period of limitation is shorter than the period of limitation prescribed by the Indian Li­mitation Act, 1908 may be instituted within a period of seven years next after the commencement of this Act or within the period prescribed for such suit by the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, which­ever period expires earlier;" The trial Court has taken the view that the suit could be filed within seven years from 1st January 1964 and making pro­vision for the statutory notice period of two months, it could be instituted on 1st March 1971 and since it was instituted on 6th February 1969, even the item dated 2nd November 1963 would be within limitation. In our view, the trial Court has fallen in a serious error of law in invoking the provisions of Section 30. A suit in respect of a claim for Octroi Duty arising after 1st January 1964 would be wholly governed by the pro­visions of Article 113 of the Limitation Act 1963. It is difficult for us to appre­ciate how the provisions of Section 30 of the Limitation Act could be made appli­cable to a cause of action which arises after the Limitation Act has already come into operation. Section 30 Cl.(a) refers to a suit for which the period of limitation is shorter than the period of limitation prescribed by the Indian Li­mitation Act, 1908. Section 30 Cl.(a) refers to a suit for which the period of limitation is shorter than the period of limitation prescribed by the Indian Li­mitation Act, 1908. It contemplates that the cause of action, has arisen prior to the Act of 1963 but that the limitation for such a suit which has not been filed before 1st January 1964 is shorter under the new Act. It is apparent therefore that the provisions of Section 30 of the Limitation Act could be invoked only in respect of the first two items dated 2nd November 1963 and 17th December 1963. In respect of the remaining items the suit would be governed by the provisions of Article 113 of the Limitation Act 1963. On that view, items between 10th Janu­ary 1964 and 10th January 1966 could not have been claimed in the present suit because the claim in respect there­of would be barred by limitation. If at all the Municipality was entitled to any claim, it could be only in respect of items between 2nd November 1963 and 17th December 1963 and for items 45 to 257. 17. In the view which we have taken on the constitutional position in the appeal, the suit filed by the Municipal Council must stand dismissed. The Judg­ment and decree passed by the trial Court are set aside and the appeal filed by the Union of India is allowed. Suit filed by the plaintiff is dismissed with costs throughout. Appeal allowed.