D. C. CHAKRAVORTI, J. ( 1 ) THIS appeal is from the appellate judgment and decree affirmed those of the court of first instance passed in a suit for declaration of title to the suit property and for recovery of possession thereof which was brought on the following allegations. ( 2 ) THE plaintiff Jogmaya and her mother Rai Kishori purchased the property described in schedule A to the plaint from one Bhani Ram Marwari by a registered deed of sale for a consideration of Rs. 1300/ -. After such purchase, they started possessing the suit property. Anukul Bhandari, the predecessor-in-interest of the defendants, took lease of the suit property described in Schedule to the plaint at a monthly rental of Rs. 5/- in the name of his son, the defendant No. 1 Ashutosh. Thereafter the plaintiff and his mother executed a kobala on November 11, 1943 in favour of one Khgendra Nath Dutta. That kobala in favour of Khagendra was a purely sham transaction and was not backed by any consideration. Khangendra used to manage the property on behalf of the plaintiff and her mother. On February 18, 1948, said Khagendra executed a fraudulent deed of sale in favour of said Anukul Bhandary, father of defendants Nos. 1 to 4 and 6 to 8 and husband of defendant No. 5 in respect of item No. 2 of property mentioned in schedule A to the plaint. The plaintiff and her mother accordingly filed a suit for declaration of title to the said property and a further declaration that the said Kobala dated November 11, 1943 was a benami Kobala. Khagendra and Anukul contested the suit and it was decreed in favour of the plaintiff and her mother. That suit came up to this Court and the plaintiff and her mother ultimately succeeded. Thereafter Rai Kishori the mother of the plaintiff died and her interest devolved on her sole heir, the plaintiff. The plaintiff accordingly became the 16 annas owner of the A schedule property. On February 12, 1961, said Anukul died and the tenancy right accordingly devolved on the defendants who were his heirs. Thereafter Rai Kishori the mother of the plaintiff died and her interest devolved on her sole heir, the plaintiff. The plaintiff accordingly became the 16 annas owner of the A schedule property. On February 12, 1961, said Anukul died and the tenancy right accordingly devolved on the defendants who were his heirs. As the defendants failed to pay rent since Falgoon 1367 B. S. and sublet a portion of the suit premises, the plaintiff brought the present suit for eviction of the defendants after duly determining their tenancy by serving a notice of ejectment requiring them to vacate the suit premises on the expiry of the 31st day of Ashar 1376. ( 3 ) THE defence as disclosed by joint written statement filed on behalf of the defendants Nos. 1 to 5 is as follows : The suit is not maintainable on the ground that the same stands barred by limitation. The truth of all material allegations made in the plaint was denied and the defence case is that Anukul Bhandary was never a tenant under the plaintiff and accordingly the defendants are not tenants under the plaintiff. The defendants acquired a good title to the suit property through adverse possession. ( 4 ) THE learned Munsif who heard the suit found that the suit was not barred by limitation, that the plaintiff was entitled to a decree for declaration of title and recovery of possession and in this view of the matter, the learned Munsif decreed the suit on contest with costs against defendants Nos. 1 to 5 and ex parte without costs as against the rest of the defendants. ( 5 ) ON an appeal being preferred from the decision of the learned Munsif the learned Subordinate Judge, 2nd Court, at Howrah, dismissed the appeal and affirmed the judgment and decree passed by the trial court. ( 6 ) MR. Bidyut Kumar Banerjee, learned Advocate appearing for the defendants appellants assailed the concurrent judgment of the courts below before me on several grounds which I take up for discussion and disposal one after the other. ( 7 ) IN the first place, Mr. Banerjee contends that as the sale deed executed in favour of Khangen was found to be a void document, the possession of said Anukul, the predecessor-in-title of defendants Nos. ( 7 ) IN the first place, Mr. Banerjee contends that as the sale deed executed in favour of Khangen was found to be a void document, the possession of said Anukul, the predecessor-in-title of defendants Nos. 1 to 5, became adverse against the plaintiff from the date of the said sale deed, viz. , February 18, 1948, and as the suit was brought on August 19, 1965, the suit was barred by limitation. In support of this contention, Mr. Banerjee relied on decisions in Bejoy Chunder Banerjee v. Kally Prosanna Mukherjee, I. L. R. 4 Cal 327, Collector of Bombay vs. Municipal Corporation of the City of Bombay A. I. R. 1951 S. C. 469 and Parbati vs. Mazaffar Ali Khan I. L. R. 34 AII. 289. In substance Mr. Banerjee's contention is that even though in the present case Anukul was a tenant in respect of the suit property, his possession ceased to be that of a tenant and become adverse to the rightful owner since the date of transfer of the suit property by the plaintiff and her mother in favour of Khagen after the deed of transfer was declared to be void. In the case of Bejoy Chunder Banerjee (supra), a wife during the prolonged absence of her husband, who was erroneously taken to be dead, acting in excess of the limited powers of a wife in possession of her husband's property, made a mourashi grant of a portion of her husband's estate an the grantee entered into and remained in possession of that portion for more than 12 years. It was held in such circumstances that the position of the grantee was not that of a lessee and that his position having continued for more than 12 years resulted in the acquisition of title by adverse possession. In that case prior to the said grant the grantee did not have possession of the property which was the subject matter of the grant. Accordingly, the grantee came into possession as a result of the grant and the grant having failed, the grantee's possession obviously became adverse but this principle has no application to the present case inasmuch as admittedly Anukul and for the matter of that his heirs were already in possession of the suit property as tenants from before the execution of the Kobala in favour of Khagendra. Accordingly, Anukul or his heirs are estopped from before the execution of the Kobala in favour of Khagendra. Accordingly Anukul or his heirs are estopped from asserting adverse possession against the true owner. In the case of Bejoy Chunder Banerjee (supra) it was also held that one who held possession on behalf of another did not by mere denial of that other person's title make his possession adverse so a to give himself the benefit of the Statute of Limitation. In the case of Collector of Bombay (supra) the position was similar to that in the case of Bejoy Chunder Banerjee. Here also the Corporation of the City of Bombay and its predecessor in title had no legal title but they were holding the land under colour of an invalid grant of the land in perpetuity. Such possession was not referable to any legal title. It was prima facie adverse to the title of the Government, the owner of the land, from the very moment the predecessor in title of the Corporation took possession of the land under the grant which was an invalid one. Accordingly the principle laid down in the case of Collector of Bombay (supra) has no application to the facts of the present case with which we are concerned. Parbati's case (supra) also on the same principle has no application to the present case. There also the transfer in question was by an unauthorized person and the possession was referable to that transfer and to no other valid title. Accordingly, the principle laid down in that case is of no avail to the appellant. It is significant to note here that there was an earlier suit brought by Jogmaya and Rai Kishori which come up to this court in second appeal being S. A. No. 1465 of 1955. During the pendency of that suit Rai Kishori died and as already stated, her interest devolved on Jogmaya. That was a suit where bot Khagen and Anukul were party defendants. It was held in that suit that the transfers in favour of Khagen and Anukul were both invalid, that no consideration did pass and so far as Anukul is concerned he could not be said to be a bonafide transferee for value without notice. That was a suit where bot Khagen and Anukul were party defendants. It was held in that suit that the transfers in favour of Khagen and Anukul were both invalid, that no consideration did pass and so far as Anukul is concerned he could not be said to be a bonafide transferee for value without notice. It was held in that case that Anukul before he had the suit property transferred to him by Khagen did have knowledge of the fact that the deed in favour of Khagen executed by Jogmaya and Rai Kishori represented a sham transaction, that no consideration did pass from Khagen to these two ladies and that the deed was accordingly a benami transaction. That S. A. 1465 of 1955 was disposed of sometime in 1960. That will appear form exhibit 10, certified copy of the judgment in that second appeal. It was held in that second appeal that Jogmaya did have title to the suit property and that decision was taken in the presence of both Khagen and Anukul who were parties to the suit out of which that second appeal arose. In the three cases cited by Mr. Banerjee and referred to above the person claiming adverse possession came into possession on the strength of a document later held to be void but in the present case possession of Anukul did not start on the basis of documents held to be void. Possession by Anukul of the suit property was referable to the right of tenancy which was validly created in his favour at a time long before the execution of the documents which were declared void. That makes all the difference. The principle underlying the decisions in the three cases relied upon by Mr. Banerjee has no application here. ( 8 ) IN the circumstances, aforesaid, when the said two deeds one in favour of Khagen and the other in favour of Anukul, the predecessor of the present appellants, were held to be void, the defendants appellants or their predecessor, Anukul, could not contended that their possession became adverse to the rightful owners since the date of transfer in favour of Khagen, that is, February, 1948. ( 9 ) WHEN landlord possesses land through tenant such possession should be deemed to be that of the landlord himself, In such cases the tenant cannot claim to be in adverse possession against the landlord. ( 9 ) WHEN landlord possesses land through tenant such possession should be deemed to be that of the landlord himself, In such cases the tenant cannot claim to be in adverse possession against the landlord. There may be cases where a tenant can claim to be holding the land adversely to the owner of the property when his character as tenant ceases and he become a trespasser on the land. In the present case it cannot therefore be contended that the possession of Anukul or after his death that of his heirs became adverse to the plaintiff. This view finds support form the decision in Bejoy Chand Mahatab v. Gurupada Halder 32 C. W. N. 720 relied upon by Mr. Bhattacharya appearing for the respondent. ( 10 ) SECONDLY it is contended by Mr. Banerjee on behalf of the appellants that when the sale deed in favour of Anukul which was executed on February 18, 1948, was declared to be void, the possession of Anukul become adverse. In view of what is stated in the foregoing paragraphs I cannot but hold that his contention also has no substance. The possession of Anukul is not solely referable to the deed executed by Khagen in his favour. Anukul was already in possession of the suit property in the capacity of a tenant under the plaintiff. ( 11 ) MR. Banerjee further argues that it cannot be said about Anukul that he continued to be both the owner of the suit property by virtue of the deed executed in his favour by Khagen and a tenantwhich he was from before the execution of that deed. Anukul never became the owner of the suit property, for, Anukul knew that Khagen was looking after the property on behalf of the plaintiff and had no title to the property itself. Further, as has already been pointed out, there was no passing of consideration in respect of the deed that was executed in favour of Anukul by Khagen. Therefore Anukul could not have acquired any ownership in the suit property. He was a tenant from before the execution of that deed in his favour and he continued to be so thereafter. ( 12 ) MR. Banerjee in assailing the judgment of the court of appeal below contends that now of the exhibits filed on behalf of the present appellants except Ext. He was a tenant from before the execution of that deed in his favour and he continued to be so thereafter. ( 12 ) MR. Banerjee in assailing the judgment of the court of appeal below contends that now of the exhibits filed on behalf of the present appellants except Ext. F was considered by the court of appeal below. In this regard he mentions in particular the rent receipts, exts. H series. Those rent receipts are said to have been granted by said khagen. When Khagen was acting on behalf of Jogamaya he could have granted those receipts not on his own account but on behalf of Jogmaya. Accordingly those receipts are of no assistance to the appellants. Mr. Banerjee cannot draw my attention to any other exhibited documents filed on behalf of the defendants appellants with a view to showing that they in any way had any important bearing on the question in issue before the court. Accordingly on this ground I find it difficult to interfere with the impugned judgment. ( 13 ) LASTLY Mr. Banerjee contends that the present suit is hit by the principal of res judicate. There was according to him an earlier suit filed in December 1961 and the judgment passed therein is Ext. 10 (a) and the judgment passed in appeal from the judgment Ext. 10 (a) is ext. 10 (b ). That was a suit by Jogamaya for eviction of Asutosh, the denfendant appellant no. 1 herein. There the clear case of Jogamaya was that Asuthosh was inducted as a tenant and on that allegation she sued Asutosh for his eviction. That suit failed and the appeal from the decision in that suit was also dismissed. That suit, according to Mr. Banerjee, should stand in the way of the present suit being filed. I find difficult to agree with Mr. Banerjee in this regard, for, the present suit was against all the heirs of said Anukul and not against Asutosh alone and the case of the plaintiff in the present suit is that Anukul was inducted originally as a tenant and on his death the defendants appellants who were his legal heirs and representatives succeeded him so far as the right of tenancy is concerned. In this view of the matter the present suit is not hit by the principle of res judicate because the two suits, the earlier and the present one, and the issues involved in those two suits are wholly different. It cannot be said that the question required to be determined in the present suit was substantially and materially in issue in the said earlier suit. Mr. Bhattacharya appearing for the respondent relies on Kaileswar Singh v. Upendra Nath Koyal, A. I. R. 1972 Cal. 276 for the principle that when certain lease was not in issue in a previous suit between the same parties, any decision in such suit with regard to that lease could not be binding in a subsequent title suit against the lessees. On the strength of that principle it may rightly be contended that the present suit is not hit by the doctrine of res judicate. ( 14 ) THERE was no other question raised before me in this appeal by Mr. Banerjee. As all the questions raised by him in this appeal fail the appeal ought to be dismissed. ( 15 ) THE appeal is accordingly dismissed and the judgment and decree appealed from are affirmed. There will, however, be no order for costs. Appeal dismissed.