Judgment :- 1. These revision petitions are filed by the 'B' and 'G' Party respectively in M. C. No. 66 of 1980 on the file of the Sub Divisional Magistrate, Trivandrum. 2. On 29-5-1980 the Sub Inspector of Police, Parassala submitted a report to the Sub Divisional Magistrate, Trivandrum on the basis of a petition submitted before him alleging criminal trespass, mischief and other acts by one of the parties to the proceeding. The S. I. of Police found that the property is in the joint ownership of the parties to the proceeding. He further found that during the pendency of the final decree proceedings in O. S. No. 124 of 1970 on the file of the Munsiff's Court, Neyyattinkara, the parties were scrambling for actual possession of different portions of the property measuring in all 1. 12 1/2 acres of land. He reported that because of the clash of interests, the readiness of the parties to use force and also of the fact that the parties belong to rival communities, there was a likelihood of breach of peace. On 8 71980, the Sub Divisional Magistrate, Trivandrum passed an order under S.145 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Code'). On the same day he passed another order keeping the property under attachment under S.146 of the Code and appointing the Village Officer, Parassala as the receiver with respect to the property. The 'G' Party, who purchased 7 cents of land from the 'C' party, put up a structure and was conducting a tea shop in that structure, moved the Sub Divisional Magistrate for granting him permission to continue in occupation of the structure. Permission was originally granted by the Magistrate. Subsequently when it was brought to the notice of the Magistrate that the civil court had passed orders directing maintenance of the status quo by the parties (though 'G' party was not a party to the civil suit) and that this structure was put up by the 'G' Party after the order of the civil court, the learned Magistrate passed another order directing the receiver to evict the 'G' party from this structure. The validity of the order passed under S 145 of the Code and the validity of the order directing eviction of the 'G' party are being challenged in these proceedings. 3. The learned counsel for the revision petitioners, Sri. The validity of the order passed under S 145 of the Code and the validity of the order directing eviction of the 'G' party are being challenged in these proceedings. 3. The learned counsel for the revision petitioners, Sri. Siby Mathew, urged three main contentions before me, viz , (i) that the order passed by the Magistrate under S.145 (1) of the Code is invalid since the grounds of satisfaction and the fact-um of satisfaction have not been mentioned therein; (ii) that the case on hand is not a case of disputed possession, but a case of admitted joint possession and therefore the Magistrate had no jurisdiction to initiate action under S.145 (1) of the Code, and (iii) that the Magistrate travelled beyond his jurisdiction in directing the receiver to evict the 'G' Party from the structure. All these contentions are rebutted by the respondents. 4. S.145 (1) of the Code states that on receipt of information either in the shape of police report or otherwise, if an executive magistrate is satisfied that a dispute likely to cause breach of peace exists concerning any land, etc. within his local jurisdiction, he shall pass a written order stating the grounds of his being so satisfied and requiring the parties concerned to such a dispute to attend his Court in person or by pleader on a specified date and time to put in written statements of their respective claims. The subsequent procedure to be adopted by him is regulated by the other clauses of S.145, while the power of attachment is invested with him under S.146 of the Code. Thus, it is seen that in order that the Magistrate should exercise his jurisdiction he must have some information and that information must reveal the existence of a dispute likely to cause breach of the peace concerning any land, etc. within his local jurisdiction and he must be satisfied about the same. When once these conditions exist, it is within his power to pass a written order as contemplated under S 145 (1), and the written order must mention the grounds of his satisfaction. The argument advanced on behalf of the revision petitioners is that the impugned order does not state that the Magistrate was satisfied; nor does it mention the grounds of satisfaction. 5. The order passed in this case by the Magistrate refers to the report of the S.1. The argument advanced on behalf of the revision petitioners is that the impugned order does not state that the Magistrate was satisfied; nor does it mention the grounds of satisfaction. 5. The order passed in this case by the Magistrate refers to the report of the S.1. of Police, Parassala indicating the existence of a dispute likely to cause breach of peace among the parties 'A' to 'G' concerning the property mentioned therein and after so referring to the report, the Magistrate directed the parties to appear before him on 23 -7-1980 and file their written statements of claims, if any. The learned counsel for the petitioners placed reliance on the decision reported in Thankayyan v. Perumal Nadar (1977 KLT. 511), where, according to him, a similar order was struck down as one without jurisdiction, relying on a decision of the Madras High Court reported in Peria Mannadha Gounder v. Marappa Gounder (AIR. 1969 Madras 411). In discussing the matter Kader J. observed as follows: "There is nothing in this order to indicate that the learned Magistrate has applied her mind to the materials before her and was being satisfied that a dispute concerning the possession of an immovable property really existed and such a dispute was likely to cause a breach of peace. If the grounds are not stated in the order, it will be difficult to test the correctness and validity of the order. It would appear that it was only because the police reported that a dispute regarding possession of immovable property existed and not because she was satisfied as required under subsection (1) of S.145 of the Code that she passed the preliminary order under attack." 6. The Supreme Court as well as some other High Courts had occasion to consider the nature of an order contemplated under S 145 (1) of the Code and the effect of the departure from the provisions of S.145. In the decision reported in R. H. Bhutan v. Miss Mani J. Desai & Others ((1968) II S.C.W.R. 637) it was argued before the Supreme Court that the reasons for satisfaction or grounds of satisfaction have not been incorporated in the order. Dealing with this objection the Supreme Court observed as follows: "The section. no doubt, requires him to record reasons. Dealing with this objection the Supreme Court observed as follows: "The section. no doubt, requires him to record reasons. The Magistrate has expressed his satisfaction on the basis of the facts set out in the application before him and after he had examined the appellant on oath. That means that those facts were prima facie sufficient and were the reasons leading to his satisfaction." It appears that this decision was not brought to the notice of the Court in deciding the matter in Thankayyan v Perumal Nadar (1977 KLT. 511). A reading of the decision of the Supreme Court makes it clear that this Court is entitled not only to look into the preliminary order passed by the Magistrate, hut also into the materials which were placed before the Magistrate to enable him to come to a decision. In R. H. Bhutan's case the materials consisted of the application filed by the party as well as the statement of the party on oath. In the present case also the order of the Magistrate specifically refers to certain materials placed before the Magistrate, viz., the report of the Police. A reading of the report of the police in this case would show, just as the reading of the petition and the statement on oath in the case which came up before the Supreme Court for consideration showed, that there were sufficient materials or grounds to enable the Magistrate to come to a conclusion that the situation contemplated in S.145 (1) of the Code existed. 7. The other decisions cited before me by the learned counsel for the respondents are: (i) Kapoor Chand and another v. Suraj Prasad (AIR. 1933 Allahabad 264); (ii) Murali Patel v. Purusottam Bhatt and another (AIR. 1965 Orissa 208) and (iii) Bhagwat Saran v. State and others (AIR. 1967 Allahabad 164). The first of these decisions is a decision of the Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court. Dealing with a similar objection as in this case the Full Bench stated thus: "The jurisdiction of the Magistrate arises from the fact he has received certain information and that he is satisfied as to the truth of that information. The jurisdiction of the Magistrate does not depend on how he proceeds. There are two things: one is the authority conferred on him to act and the other is how he is to act. The jurisdiction of the Magistrate does not depend on how he proceeds. There are two things: one is the authority conferred on him to act and the other is how he is to act. If he has jurisdiction, he is not deprived of jurisdiction merely because his procedure is erroneous or defective. If this view be right, the omission on the part of the Magistrate to follow certain directions contained in the Code, although some of these directions may be more important than others, cannot be said to deprive him of jurisdiction. It was argued that the omission on the part of the Magistrate to record the fact that he was satisfied that a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace existed and further to record the grounds on which be was so satisfied, is an "illegality" which cannot be cured by S.537, Criminal P. C., which deals only with irregularities and not with "illegalities" " (Pages 267 and 268). "The object of procedure is to enable the Court to do justice, but if in spite of even total disregard of the rules of procedure justice has been done, there would exist no necessity for setting aside the final order which is just and correct simply because the procedure adopted was wrong." The Court proceeded to consider whether in fact prejudice was caused to the parties by the manner in which the Magistrate proceeded with the matter. More or less to the same effect are the other two decisions referred to above. 8. The question as to the effect of S.465 of the Code, curing irregularities in proceedings of courts in cases where failure of justice has not been occasioned, was not placed before the learned judge who decided the case is Thankayyan v. Perumal Nadar (1977 KLT. 511). The inferences which could be drawn from the fact that the Magistrate perused the police report before purporting to exercise jurisdiction under S.145 of the Code were also not placed before the learned Judge. The decision is with great respect, clearly distinguishable. 9. There can be no doubt that it is the duty of a Magistrate acting under S.145 of the Code to record in writing in clear and unambiguous terms that a dispute likely to cause breach of the peace exists and also the grounds of being so satisfied. The decision is with great respect, clearly distinguishable. 9. There can be no doubt that it is the duty of a Magistrate acting under S.145 of the Code to record in writing in clear and unambiguous terms that a dispute likely to cause breach of the peace exists and also the grounds of being so satisfied. If due to inadvertence or otherwise, he fails to state the grounds of his satisfaction or fails to state in so many words that he is so satisfied, the proceedings cannot be quashed as illegal or as one passed without jurisdiction, if it otherwise appears from the order and the records that there were sufficient grounds for his satisfaction and that he actually applied his mind and in fact was satisfied regarding the existence of the grounds necessitating his intervention under S.145(1) of the Code. I do not think, a hard and fast rule can be laid down in this matter. Each case has to be governed by its own facts. If it is found that a departure from the procedure laid down in S.145(1) of the Code has been made in any particular case, the Court has to look into the question whether there has been any failure of justice or whether the parties have been misled in any way in preparing or presenting their case. 10. The preliminary order passed by the Magistrate specifically refers to the police report. The parties are put to the notice of the existence of the police report. The police report specifically refers to a clash of interests between the parties, scramble for possession and the communal element, hovering around, the likelihood of breach of the peace. A reading of the preliminary order passed by the Magistrate makes it clear beyond any shadow of doubt that the Magistrate did go through the police report. The report was prima facie sufficient to satisfy the Magistrate exercising jurisdiction under S.145 of the Code to come to a conclusion regarding the existence of grounds for taking action under S.145 of Code. On a reading of the report and the order can it be said that the Magistrate proceeded on the basis that he need not apply his mind to the police report or to the question whether circumstances existed warranting action under S.145(1) of the Code?. On a reading of the report and the order can it be said that the Magistrate proceeded on the basis that he need not apply his mind to the police report or to the question whether circumstances existed warranting action under S.145(1) of the Code?. Can it also be said that the Magistrate took it for granted that the satisfaction of the S.1. was sufficient for the Magistrate to take action under S.145 of the Code.? I am unable to answer either of these questions in the affirmative in which case alone the order can be treated as vitiated. The ground is specifically referred to in the order and a further amplification is found in the police report itself. In any event, no material has been placed before me to show that any of the parties is in any way prejudiced by the manner in which the order is worded. As the parties were given notice regarding the report of the police, there was no difficulty at all for the parties to get a copy of the report. No prejudice has been made out in this case and no interference is called for on this ground. 11. It is next urged by Sri. Siby Mathew, counsel for the revision petitioner, that the police report proceeds on the basis that the property belonged jointly to parties 'A' to 'F', and that being so, the parties must be deemed to be in joint possession, and in a case of joint possession exercise of jurisdiction under S.145 (1) of the Code is contra indicated. The essence of a proceeding under S.145 (1) of the Code consists of a dispute regarding factum of actual possession on the date of the order or wrongful dispossession within two months next before the date of the police report or other information received by the Magistrate or thereafter before the date of the order as stated in proviso to sub-section (4). The Magistrate is expected to decide only the factum of possession on the date of the order or within two months prior as indicated above. The Magistrate is expected to decide only the factum of possession on the date of the order or within two months prior as indicated above. S.145 sub-section (6) states that where the Magistrate decides that one of the parties was, or should under the proviso to sub-section (4) be treated as being, in such possession of the said subject, he has to issue an order declaring such party to be entitled to possession thereof until evicted therefrom in due course of law, and forbidding all disturbance of such possession until such eviction; and when he proceeds under the proviso to sub-section (4), he may restore to possession the party forcibly and wrongfully dispossessed. When the jurisdiction of the Magistrate is to come to a conclusion regarding actual possession and when he can pass an order only to the effect that one of the parties is in possession or has been in possession as stated in proviso to sub-section (4), and prohibiting all disturbances of such possession, such jurisdiction cannot be exercised in a case where it is admitted or proved that the parties are in joint possession. 12. It is true that all the parties to the present proceedings, except 'G' party, are parties to the civil suit, which is now pending in final decree proceedings. The civil court has declared that the 'A' party (Plaintiff) is entitled to 1/4th share, 'B' and 'C' parties (Defendants 1 and 2) are together entitled to 1/4th share and 'D', 'E' and 'F' parties (Defendants 3 to 5) are together entitled to one half share. Normally in case of co-owners, one could presume that they are in joint possession. If that alone exists on the face of the record I would have agreed with the contention that the Magistrate had no jurisdiction to interfere in this matter under S.145 (1) of the Code. This is clear from the decisions relied on by the learned counsel for the revision petitioners, viz.. (i) Khem Chand v Balwant (AIR. 1967 Allahabad 44); (ii) Hanumappa v. Kondappa (AIR. 1964 Mysore 195); (iii) Nahar Singh v. The State (AIR. 1951 Rajasthan 156) and (iv) Gopi Nath Singh v. Emperor through Surajpal Singh (AIR. 1948 Oudh 130). 13. In this connection, the police report becomes relevant. (i) Khem Chand v Balwant (AIR. 1967 Allahabad 44); (ii) Hanumappa v. Kondappa (AIR. 1964 Mysore 195); (iii) Nahar Singh v. The State (AIR. 1951 Rajasthan 156) and (iv) Gopi Nath Singh v. Emperor through Surajpal Singh (AIR. 1948 Oudh 130). 13. In this connection, the police report becomes relevant. The police report mentions about the existence of a civil suit between the various sharers and that the parties have Oodugoor rights over the property. At the same lime the police report states that during the pendency of the final decree proceedings, there has been scramble for possession between the parties. In other words, the parties are trying to assert that each of them is in actual possession of portion of the property. It is clear that the parties do not concede that they are trying to get exclusive possession. The parties maintain that they are in actual possession of portions of the property thereby laying hostile claims against each other. Even at the bar, 1 did not hear any argument advanced to the effect that the parties are in joint possession. In fact, with reference to the 'G' party, it has been pointed out that he purchased a specific plot of 7 cents of land from the 'C' party. This is sufficient to show that atleast the revision petitioners are claiming actual possession of portions of the property. Therefore, we cannot proceed on the assumption that on the date of the preliminary order the parties were in joint possession. I cannot, therefore, agree that the Magistrate had no jurisdiction to act under S.145(1) of the Code. After taking evidence or even at some other appropriate stage the Magistrate may be satisfied that it is a case of joint possession. When he is so satisfied, he has to terminate the proceedings. But, it cannot be said that the materials at present on record, are sufficient to show that the parties were in joint possession of 1.12 1/2 acres of land on the date of the preliminary order. 14. The last point relates to the structure built up by the 'G' party in a portion of the property in which he is claiming to be running a tea shop. 14. The last point relates to the structure built up by the 'G' party in a portion of the property in which he is claiming to be running a tea shop. At one stage, the learned Magistrate gave him protection by directing that he may continue in occupation of the structure on executing a bond in favour of the receiver appointed by the Magistrate. Subsequently, it was brought to the notice of the Magistrate that the structure was put up sometime after the civil court passed orders directing the parties to maintain the status quo. It has to be noted that the 'G' party was not made a party to the civil suit. It maybe that he can be treated as a successor-in-interest of the 'C' party, who is already on record in the civil suit. It may be that it is open to the civil court to proceed against 'C' party or the 'G' party for violating the orders of that Court or even for contempt of court. But, this in my opinion did not afford sufficient justification to the magistrate to pass another order directing eviction of the 'G' party. By the earlier order passed by the learned Magistrate, the 'G' party's occupation was protected till final disposal of the case. There is no reason why that protection should not continue as long as he occupies the structure under the receiver appointed by the Magistrate. Change in the earlier order was brought about for no valid reason at all and therefore the same requires interference. In the result, Crl. R. P. No. 293 of 1980 is dismissed. In Crl. R. P. No. 294 of 1980, the order passed by the Sub Divisional Magistrate, Trivandrum on 20-8-1980 directing the receiver to take urgent steps to evict the 'G' party is hereby set aside. The order passed by the Magistrate on 21-7-1980 allowing the 'G' party to reside in and run the tea shop in the structure subject to the execution of a bond in favour of the receiver till the final disposal of M. C. 66 of 198 is restored. Crl. R. P. No. 294 of 1980 is allowed to this extent and is dismissed in other respects. Issue carbon copies of this order to the learned counsel appearing on both sides on realisation of usual charges.