Judgment : Against the order of the VI Additional Sessions Judge, City Civil Court Madras, dated 17th December, 1979, holding that the respondent herein is entitled to the return of the documents Exhibits P.2 to P. 4 and directing the return of the said documents to the respondent herein, the above Criminal Revision has been filed. The facts of the case in brief are as follows: The petitioner herein is a broker dealing in real estate business. It appears that the respondent herein wanted to sell his house bearing Door No. 16, 6th Main Road, Raja Annamalaipuram, Madras-28. As per the letter Ex.P.1, dated 6th November, 1975 written by the respondent to the petitioner, in which both the respondent and the petitioner have signed, the petitioner agreed that he would sell the respondent’s house as per the terms of Ex. P.1. The contents of the letter Ex. P. 1 are as follows: "I hereby authorise you to sell my land and building in No. 16, 6th Main Road, Raja Annamalaipuram, Madras-28 on agency basis as per conditions below; 1. The total cost for the land, building as per schedule with all fittings, half horse power meter; compound wall, trees, well etc., in as it is condition is Rs. 1,15,000 (Rupees one lakh and fifteen thousand only) net. 2. I will register the sale deed in your name or in your nominee’s name. 3. Any amount in excess of the sale price may be retained by you as a share of profit. 4. The stamp and registration charges will be borne by the purchaser. 5. The papers may be scrutisied by your lawyer whose opinion is final. 6. All Government dues, property tax, urban land tax etc., and any other dues upto the date of registration will be borne by me. 7. It is confirmed by me that there are no legal disputes or proceedings, attachment, acquisition or any other encumbrances on this property. 8. I will get the income-tax clearance before registration. 9. Time two months." 2. In pursuance of the letter Exhibit P-l, the title deeds in respect of the aforesaid property belonging to the respondent were handed over to the petitioner. Since the deal of sale did not go through, a complaint was lodged by the respondent against the petitioner to the police. 9. Time two months." 2. In pursuance of the letter Exhibit P-l, the title deeds in respect of the aforesaid property belonging to the respondent were handed over to the petitioner. Since the deal of sale did not go through, a complaint was lodged by the respondent against the petitioner to the police. It was contended by the respondent that the petitioner had not arranged for the sale within the stipulated period of two months, that the petitioner was retaining the title deeds with him and that the petitioner has collected certain amounts. The Magistrate on receipt of the complaint under section 156 (3), Criminal Procedure Code, by the respondent, referred the case to the police. The Sub-Inspector of police, after investigation, filed a charge-sheet against the accused/petitioner under sections 420 and 409, Indian Penal Code. On the evidence projected by the prosecution before the trial Court, it came to the conclusion that a oase has not been made out against the petitioner to warrant his conviction under the aforesaid sections and therefore, acquitted the petitioner. With reference to the return of the title deeds, which formed part of the exhibits in the case C.C. No. 15156 of 1977 the trial Court observed: "So far as the dispute regarding the return, of documents are concerned, since it is already held that on account of the fault of P.W. 1, the transaction has failed, it is held that P.W. 1 is not entitled to claim return of the title deeds in this case. If at all advised, it is for him to take appropriate proceedings in a civil Court. On the other hand, it is hereby ordered to return the title deeds to the accused. In fact there is no harm in returning the documents to the accused since the accused by himself cannot execute any sale deed on the basis of the title deeds without the assistance of P.W. 1, the owner of the property". 3. Against the above order of the Trial Court, the respondent herein preferred C.A. No. 225 of 1979, before the VI Additional Sessions Judge, City Civil Court, Madras. The lower appellate Court, on a review of the entire evidence and also on the question of the return of the documents to the petitioner herein, came to the conclusion that the respondent herein is entitled to the possession of the documents Exhibits P-2 to P-4. The lower appellate Court, on a review of the entire evidence and also on the question of the return of the documents to the petitioner herein, came to the conclusion that the respondent herein is entitled to the possession of the documents Exhibits P-2 to P-4. The lower appellate Court held that the said documents were handed over to the petitioner herein to enable him to show the same to the intending purchasers and, that, since the sale has not taken place within the two months’ time as contemplated by the parties under Exhibit P-l, it is just and necessary that the said documents should be handed over to the respondent herein and that the petitioner herein is not entitled to the possession of, the said documents. It is with this observation that the order of the Trial Court directing the return of the documents to the petitioner herein was reversed and the appellate Court directed the return of the said documents to the respondent herein. It is against this judgment of the appellate Court that the petitioner herein has filed the above criminal revision. 4. The short question that arises on the facts of this case is whether the respondent is entitled to the possession of the documents, or the petitioner. 5. The learned Counsel, appearing for the petitioner contends before me that when once allegations have been framed and charges have been framed under sections 420 and 409, Indian Penal Code, against the petitioner, and when the petitioner, on the evidence, has been acquitted, the property seized from the petitioner, namely, the documents Exhibits P-2 to P-4 should be returned to the petitioner. This proposition of law which is general in nature cannot be disputed but the question on the facts in this case is, who is entitled to the possession of the documents Exhibits P-2 to P-4. For this purpose, the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner based his reliance to a decision reported in State Bank v. R.K. Singh.1The facts of this case were that currency notes to the value of Rs. 21,000 were seized by the Madhya Pradesh Police from the Beawar Branch of the State Bank of India in the course of an investigation of a case under sections 420, 406 and 120-B of the Indian Penal Code, against one Krishnan Gopal. This Krishnan Gopal came into possession of a sum of Rs. 21,000 were seized by the Madhya Pradesh Police from the Beawar Branch of the State Bank of India in the course of an investigation of a case under sections 420, 406 and 120-B of the Indian Penal Code, against one Krishnan Gopal. This Krishnan Gopal came into possession of a sum of Rs. 1,50,000 in Government currency notes by cheating the first and second respondents therein. The currency notes seized from Krishnan Gopal were part of the currency notes of the State Bank of India. The State Bank of India contended that it had come into possession of the said currency notes in the usual course of its business partly through the Bank of Rajasthan Limited and partly through the Mahalaxmi Mills Company Limited without any knowledge that the said currency notes had been the subject-matter of an offence. In the proceedings that followed on the investigation of the said case, the accused persons including the third respondent were acquitted by the trial Court. Before the trial Court, the State Bank of India made an application under section 517 (1), Criminal Procedure Code, asking for delivery of the said 21 currency notes on the ground that the said currency notes had been seized by the police from the Bank and that the Bank had received the said notes without any knowledge or suspicion with respect to the offence involved. The trial Court allowed the application and directed the currency notes to be returned to the State Bank of India. Subsequently, an appeal was filed by the State of Madhya Pradesh before the High Court. The appeal was allowed and the High Court of Madhya, Pradesh set aside the order of acquittal of the third respondent therein and convicted him under sections 420, 406 and 120-B, Indian Penal Code. Thereafter, the first respondent in the case, Rajendra Kumar Singh, made an application to the High Court asking for delivery of the currency notes as they belonged to him and the second respondent. This application was allowed by the High Court and the currency notes were ordered to be handed over to the first and the second respondents therein. Against his order an appeal was filed by the State Bank of India before the Supreme Court. This application was allowed by the High Court and the currency notes were ordered to be handed over to the first and the second respondents therein. Against his order an appeal was filed by the State Bank of India before the Supreme Court. Before the Supreme Court, it was contended, inter alia by the State Bank of India that the order of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in reversing the order of the Sessions Judge and directing the return of the currency notes, without giving any notice to the State Bank of India and without giving an opportunity for being heard, was in violation of the principle or natural justice and that the order of the High Court was illegal. The Supreme Court has held that: "The appeal must be allowed and the order of the High Court, dated 5tb April, 1963 set aside. The seized currency notes must be directed to be returned to the appellant. It is manifest that the High Court was bound to give notice to the appellants before reversing the order of the trial Court directing the disposal of the property under sections 517 of the Code of Criminal procedure. As no such notice was given to the appellant, the order of the High Court dated 5th April, 1963, is vitiated in law. A though the statute does not expressly require a notice to be issued, or a hearing to be given to the parties adversely affected, there is in the eye of law a necessary implication that the parties adversely affected should be heard before the Court makes an order for return of the seized property. The appellant asserted that it has obtained the currency notes in the normal course of its business and without any knowledge or suspicion of their having Seen Involved in the commission of any offence and that the respondents had not alleged fraud or lack of good faith on the part of the appellant. In the circumstances, the High Court should have directed the return of the currency notes to the appellant which had the ‘right to possess’ the notes within the language of section 517 of the Code of Criminal Procedure". 6. In the said case, no notice was given by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh to the concerned person and an order was passed that the curiency notes should be returned to the appellant therein. 6. In the said case, no notice was given by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh to the concerned person and an order was passed that the curiency notes should be returned to the appellant therein. In the circumstances, the Supreme Court has held that, without giving notice to the concerned parties, directing the return of the currency notes is violative of the principle of natural justice and illegal. This decision is not helpful to the Counsel for the petitioner, for, the facts in the present case are quite different. The question of not giving notice to the other side does not anise in this case. 7. The learned Counsel for the petitioner cited another decision N. Madhavan v. State of Kerala,1 That is also a case coming from the Supreme Court wherein it has been held: "When after an irquhy or trial the accused is discharged or acquitted, the Court should normally restore the property, which is produced before it or which is in its custody, to the person from whose custody it was taken. Departure from this rule of practice is not to be lightly made when there is no dispute or doubt that the property was seized from the custody of such accused and belonged to him." (Italics is mine) 8. In this case, the Supreme Court has held that when the accused is discharged or acquitted, the normal procedure is that the property has to be delivered to the person from whom it was taken and departure from the rule of practice is not to be lightly made when there is no dispute or doubt that the property was seiged from the custody of such accused and belonged to him. It is on the basis of these two decisions cited, Mr. Chelliah, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner, contends in this case that the properties, namely, Ex-bits P-2 to P-4, were taken from the petitioner herein and the lower appellate Court has erred in making an order to return the document to the respondent herein. I am of the view that the Court should restore the property produced in Court to the person from whose custody it was taken or seized, but, before doing it, the Court must also note whether there is a dispute between the parties with reference to the property seized. 9. I am of the view that the Court should restore the property produced in Court to the person from whose custody it was taken or seized, but, before doing it, the Court must also note whether there is a dispute between the parties with reference to the property seized. 9. In this case, the question that arise on the facts is, as to who is entitled to possession of the title deeds, Exhibits P-2 to P-4, belonging to the respondent. For this purpose we have to see the terms and conditions of Exhibit P-l, letter written by the respondent to the petitioner, wherein the petitioner and the respondent have signed and agreed to the terms and conditions mentioned therein. In Exhibit P-l the time given is only two months to effect the sale of the property belonging to the respondent. If the petitioner has not completed the transaction within two months as contemplated and agreed to between the parties under Exhibit P-1. he is not entitled to retain the documents belonging to the respondent. The learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner contends that though the petitioner has tried to contact third parties for the purchase of the property, like P.W. 2 in this case, it is only at the default of the respondent that the transaction could not go through. But the learned Counsel for the respondent has brought to my notice the evidence of P.W. 2 wherein it has been mentioned that P.W. 2 himself was not ready to purchase the property belonging to the respondent. The evidence of P.W.-22, is to the effect that he abandoned the idea of purchasing the property and asked for the return of the advance Amount from the petitioner. 10. The learned Counsel appearing of the respondent cited before me a decision in A.S.S. Ahmed Sahib v. Commissioner of Police, Madras and another.1 The relevant principle laid down by Krishnaswamy Reddy, J., in that case is to the effect that: “Normally, in case where the offence is not made out, the property should be delivered to the person from whom it is seized or taken. But it will depend upon the circumstances of each case. In such cases, the actual possession of the property at the time it was seized may he a relevant factor but not conclusive to determine the entitlement of such possession. But it will depend upon the circumstances of each case. In such cases, the actual possession of the property at the time it was seized may he a relevant factor but not conclusive to determine the entitlement of such possession. The words used in section 523 (1), Criminal Procedure Code, are ‘the person entitled to the possession of the property’. These words cannot be equated with actual possession. Nor can they be equated with the expression ‘the person from whom the property is seized or taken. A person may be in unlawful possession at the time it was seized though he has not committed the offence, and in that circumstance, it cannot be said that he is entitled to possession. It must be a lawful possession. The expression ‘entitled to possession’ is the sine qua non for the delivery of property under section 523, Criminal Procedure Code.” 11. I respectfully agree with Reddy, J. The facts of this case make it clear that the person who is entitled to possess the documents is not the petitioner but only the person who is ‘entitled’ to the same. The documents, no doubt, were produced by the petitioner before Court on the strength of Exhibit P-l. But the Court has to use absolute discretion in disposing of such property. In this case, Exhibits P-2, P-4 are the title deeds pertaining to the respondent’s property and they were handed over to the petitioner under Exhibit P-l, to effect the sale within two months. The petitioner, on the pretext of disposing. the property, cannot for all times contend, that he is a person entitled to retain or get the return of the documents from Court. The intention of the petitioner is asking the documents from Court is only to keep the real owner of the property at bay without being sold to any one. The time stipulated in Exhibit P-l, to complete the contract or to effect the sale has expired Under the circumstances, the petitioner cannot now contend that he is entitled to get back the documents since it was he who had filed the same into Court as exhibits. 12. Mr. Chelliah, learned Counsel for the petitioner, further contends that the respondent has to pay the petitioner some brokerage and other expenses which the petitioner has incurred for bringing certain persons for the sale of the property. 12. Mr. Chelliah, learned Counsel for the petitioner, further contends that the respondent has to pay the petitioner some brokerage and other expenses which the petitioner has incurred for bringing certain persons for the sale of the property. If the petitioner has incurred expenses with reference to the sale of the property on behalf of the respondent, it is open to him to seek his remedy in a civil Court and the petitioner, under the circumstances, cannot claim the return of the documents to him or retain the same for ever. 13. I have gone through the judgment of the lower appellate Court and the evidence in this case and also heard the arguments of the learned Counsel appearing for the respective parties. The lower appellate Court, on a clear discussion, based its firm finding on a sound reasoning and allowed the appeal filed by the respondent. I do not find any law or perversity in the judgment to warrant interference in this revision. Hence, this criminal revision case is dismissed. Revision dismissed.