JUDGMENT 1. - These seven writ petitions relate to persons employed in the Irrigation Department of the State Government as Lower Division Clerks, whose services were terminated by the order of the Superintending Engineer, Irrigation Circle, Jodhpur, dated October 6, 1979. As the cases of all the seven petitioners are similar, their writ petitions are disposed of by a common order. 2. All the seven petitioners were appointed as Lower Division Clerks, in the Irrigation Department of the Government of Rajasthan by the order of the Superintending Engineer, Irrigation Circle, Jodhpur, dated February 26, 1979, in a temporary capacity, until persons selected by the Public Service Commission for the posts of Lower Division Clerks were available or the petitioners themselves qualified the test conducted by the Public Service Commission for the posts of Lower Division Clerks whichever may be earlier. The appointment of the petitioners made by the aforesaid order dated February 26, 1979, was purely temporary and in the conditions annexed to the order of appointment it was specified that their employment could be terminated at any time without notice. The petitioners joined service as Lower Division Clerks on various dates in the months of February, March and April, 1979. It may also be mentioned here that prior to their appointment as Lower Division Clerks in a temporary capacity, by the aforesaid order dated February 26, 1979, the petitioners were working on work charge establishment in the Irrigation Department. 3. The petitioners were required by the letter of the Superintending Engineer, Irrigation Circle, Jodhpur, dated July 11, 1979, to appear again at the typing test in Hindi and English to be held on August 30, 1979, but the petitioners refused to appear at the aforesaid typing test on the ground that there was no justification for holding the test again. Thereupon, the Superintending Engineer, Irrigation Circle, Jodhpur, by his order dated Oct. 6, 1979, terminated the employment of the petitioners as Lower Division Clerks in a temporary capacity, with effect from Nov. 9, 1979 and the intervening period was treated as one month’s notice, within the meaning of R. 23 A. of the Rajasthan Service Rules. Thereupon, the Superintending Engineer, Irrigation Circle, Jodhpur, by his order dated Oct. 6, 1979, terminated the employment of the petitioners as Lower Division Clerks in a temporary capacity, with effect from Nov. 9, 1979 and the intervening period was treated as one month’s notice, within the meaning of R. 23 A. of the Rajasthan Service Rules. It was also specified in the aforesaid order that the employees who were previously working on other posts or on work charge establishments should report themselves for duty at their respective places of posting which were also indicated in the said order dated Oct. 6,1979. Thus the employment of the petitioners as Lower Division Clerks in a temporary capacity stood terminated with effect from Nov. 9, 1979 and they were thereafter relegated to their earlier positions on the work charge establishment, where they were working prior to their appointment as Lower Division Clerks in a temporary capacity by the order dated Feb. 26, 1979. 4. The order of termination of the services of the petitioners, dated Oct. 6, 1979, had been challenged in this writ petition only on the ground that the petitioners were ‘workmen’ within the meaning of Section 25 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, hereinafter referred to as “the Act”. It was argued that the Irrigation Department of the State Government was an “industry”, within the meaning of Section 2 (j) of the Act and as such the services of the petitioners could not have been terminated by the employer without complying with the conditions specified in Section 25-F of the Act. 5. It is not in dispute that the termination of the services of the petitioners was by way of discharge simpliciter and Article 311 of the Constitution of India had no application, as the petitioners were neither dismissed nor removed from service, by way of penalty or punishment. It is also not in dispute that the provisions of R. 23 A of the Rajasthan Service Rules were complied with, even if they were applicable, as one month’s notice was given to the petitioners before they were discharged from service. Thus the only question is whether Section 25-F of the Act was applicable to the petitioners and whether the termination of their services is in violation of the provisions of Section 25-F? 6. Thus the only question is whether Section 25-F of the Act was applicable to the petitioners and whether the termination of their services is in violation of the provisions of Section 25-F? 6. It is not contested before me that the Irrigation Department of the State Government is an “industry” within the meaning of Section 2 (j) of the Act. 7. In Mahesh Chandra Sharma v. State of Rajasthan 1974 Raj LW 338 I had taken the view that the Irrigation Department of the State Government, which is engaged in constructing dams, canals, tanks etc. and in distributing and supplying water for irrigation purposes is rendering material service to the community at large or a part thereof with the help of its employees and, therefore, falls within the definition of “industry” contained in Section 2 (j) of the Act. On that basis it cannot also be disputed that the petitioners were ‘workmen’ within the meaning of sub-section (s) of Section 2 of the Act, as any Person employed in any industry to do any skilled or unskilled, manual, Supervisory, Technical or Clerical work for hire, or reward is a ‘workman’ for the purpose of the Act, subject to the exceptions specified in Section 2 (s). The petitioners did not fall within the exceptions enumerated in Section 2 (s) of the Act and they, therefore, fall within the ambit of ‘workmen’ for the purposes of the Act, as they were employed in a clerical capacity in an industry for hire or reward and did not draw wages exceeding Rs. 500/- per mensem, as Lower Division Clerks. 8. 500/- per mensem, as Lower Division Clerks. 8. Section 25-F, which is the bone of contention between the parties, reads as under:- “Conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen:- No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until- (a) the workman has been given one month’s notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice : Provided that no such notice shall be necessary if the retrenchment is under an agreement which specified a date for termination of service; (b) the workman has been paid at the time of retrenchment compensation which shall be equivalent to fifteen days’ average pay for every completed year of continuous service of any part thereof in excess of six months; and (c) notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government or such authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification in the Official Gazette.” 9. Now for the applicability of the provisions of Section 25-F what is necessary is that the workman should be employed in any industry for a continuous period of not less than one year under the employer and his service should be retrenched by the employer. Although the petitioners were given one month’s notice in writing as required in clause (a) of Section 25-F, yet it is admitted by the respondents that the petitioners were not paid any retrenchment compensation at the time of retrenchment, as provided in clause (b) of the aforesaid Section. It is also beyond dispute that the termination of the services of the petitioners by the order dated Oct. 6,1979, would amount to retrenchment, as according to the definition of retrenchment contained in Section 2 (oo), every termination of service subject to the exceptions enumerated therein amounts to retrenchment. It is also beyond dispute that the termination of the services of the petitioners by the order dated Oct. 6,1979, would amount to retrenchment, as according to the definition of retrenchment contained in Section 2 (oo), every termination of service subject to the exceptions enumerated therein amounts to retrenchment. Section 2 (oo) defines retrenchment as under:- “2 (oo) ‘retrenchment’ means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include: (a) voluntary retirement of the workman : or (b) retirement of the workman on reaching the age of superannuation if the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a stipulation in that behalf : or (c) termination of the service of a workman on the ground of continued ill-health.” 10. The key words of the Section are “termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reasons whatsoever”, which are words of very wide import and almost admit of no exception, except those which are specifically mentioned in sub-section (oo) of Section 2. Thus whatever may be the reason, every termination of service amounts to retrenchment and termination includes not only the act of termination of the employee, but also the fact of termination, howsoever produced. 11. It was argued by the learned Dy. Government Advocate that the order dated Oct. 6, 1979, is not of termination of service of the petitioners, as the petitioners were afforded alternative employment as work charge employees and their discharge from the post of Lower Division Clerks in a temporary capacity cannot amount to retrenchment as they were employed as Lower Division Clerks on work charge establishment. 12. In the State Bank of India v. N. Sundara Money AIR 1976 SC 1111 : (1976 Lab IC 769) it was held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that a composite order passed by the employer, one giving employment and the other ending or limiting it, would still amount to retrenchment and a separate or subsequent determination was not considered necessary. It was a case of a fixed term appointment, where in the order appointing the employee the term during which the employment would subsist, was also specified. It was a case of a fixed term appointment, where in the order appointing the employee the term during which the employment would subsist, was also specified. By a parity of reasoning, a composite order, by which one employment is terminated and another employment is given, should also amount to retrenchment. So far as the employment of the petitioners as Lower Division Clerks in a temporary capacity was concerned, it was definitely put an end to by the order dated Oct. 6,1979 and the offer made to them by employing them on the work charge establishment entailed financial loss to the petitioners, as the terms and conditions of employment as Lower Division Clerks on a work charge establishment were different from those as a Lower Division Clerk employed in a temporary capacity. It may perhaps be permissible that an employer may utilise the services of an employee, employed in one capacity, by transferring him or absorbing him after declaring him surplus in another capacity. But the essential condition of such change should be that the terms and conditions of service of the employee should remain the same. An alternative employment, offered by the employer in the same establishment or in any other establishment belonging to the same employer and in which the employee may be required to perform similar nature of duties and the employee is also offered wages which would normally have been paid to him in his original employment, may have different consequences. In that event, the terms and conditions of service applicable to the workman should not be in any way less favourable than those applicable to him earlier and the service of the workman after such transfer should be uninterrupted. But if the service conditions of the employee are altered to his disadvantage, merely an offer of an alternative employment cannot prevent the termination of the earlier employment falling within the ambit of retrenchment, as defined in Section 2 (oo) of the Act. 13. In Santosh Gupta v. State Bank of Patiala AIR 1980 SC 1219 their Lordships of the Supreme Court again reiterated the settled exposition of the law on the subject, that the expression “termination of service for any reason whatsoever” in Section 2 (oo) covers every kind of termination of service except those expressly excluded in Section 2 (oo). 13. In Santosh Gupta v. State Bank of Patiala AIR 1980 SC 1219 their Lordships of the Supreme Court again reiterated the settled exposition of the law on the subject, that the expression “termination of service for any reason whatsoever” in Section 2 (oo) covers every kind of termination of service except those expressly excluded in Section 2 (oo). In that case the workman was discharged from service on the ground that she did not pass the test which would have enabled her to be confirmed on the post she was holding. It was held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that such a discharge amounted to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2 (oo) and the requirements of Section 25-F were attracted. It was held in the aforesaid case that termination of service, except such as is not expressly included in 25-F or not expressly provided for by the other provisions of the Act, such as Sections 25 FF and 25 FFF, would fall within the expression retrenchment as defined in the Act. 14. As regards the applicability of Section 25-F it has been argued by learned counsel for the respondents that the petitioners were employed on the posts of Lower Division Clerks in a temporary capacity by the order dated Feb. 26, 1979 and they joined such employment on various dates in the months of February, March and April, 1979 and their service on such posts stood terminated with effect from Nov. 9, 1979, and so the petitioners were not in continuous service for a period of not less than one year, which was an essential condition for the applicability of Section 25-F. Learned counsel for the petitioners, while admitting that the petitioners have not been in continuous service for a period of one year argued that the provisions of Section 25-F would be applicable to the petitioners, as they had been in employment for a period of 240 days within the twelve months preceding the order of termination. Learned counsel for the petitioners sought to place reliance in this regard upon the provisions of Section 25 B of the Act which are as under:- “S. 25 B : Definition of continuous service - For the purpose of this Chapter, - (1) A workman shall be said to be in continuous service for a period if he is, for that period, in uninterrupted service, including service which may be interrupted on account of sickness or authorised leave or an accident or a strike which is not illegal or a lock-out or a cessation of work which is not due to any fault on the part of the workman; (2) where a workman is not in continuous service within the meaning of clause (1) for a period of one year or sue months, he shall be deemed to be in continuous service under an employer (a) for a period of one year, if the workmen, during a period of twelve calendar months preceding the date with reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer for not less than, (i) one hundred and ninety days in the case of a workman employed below ground in a mine; and (ii) two hundred and forty days in any other case; (b) for a period of six months, if the workman during a period of sue calendar months preceding the date with reference to which calculation is to be made, has actually worked under the employer for not less than, (i) ninety-five days, in the case of a workman employed below ground in a mine, and (ii) one hundred and twenty days, in any other case.” 15. Section 25 B provides for 2 contingencies; viz., when a workman has been in uninterrupted service, including service which may be interrupted on account of sickness or authorised leave or an accident or a strike which is not illegal, or a lock-out or a cessation of work which is not due to any fault on the part of the workman. The petitioners do not fall within this category as they were not in uninterrupted service for a period of one year. The petitioners do not fall within this category as they were not in uninterrupted service for a period of one year. Under clause (2) of Section 25 B provision is made for a workman who is not in uninterrupted service within the meaning of clause (1) and in that event, a workman may be deemed to be in continuous service under an employer for a period of one year in case during a period of 12 calendar months preceding the date, with reference to which calculation is to be made, he has actually worked under the employer for not less than 240 days. It may be pointed out that clause (2) of Section 25 B is applicable only in the case of a workman, who is not in continuous service, but his service is interrupted on account of causes other than those specified in clause (1) of that Section. The causes specified in clause (1) of Section 25 B will not result in the service of the workman being considered as interrupted. But if the service of the workman is not continuous, on account of any cause other than those enumerated in Section 25 B (1) then clause (2) of Section 25 B would be attracted if the workman has worked for at least 240 days during the period of 12 calendar months preceding the date of termination. The provisions of Section 25 B, as they stood before the amendment brought about by the Amendment Act No. 36 of 1964, were considered by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Sur Enamel and Stamping Works Ltd. v. The Workmen AIR 1963 SC 1914 wherein it was observed as under:- “On the plain terms of the section only a workman who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer is entitled to its benefit. “Continuous Service” is defined in Section 2 (eee) as meaning uninterrupted service, and includes service which may be interrupted merely on account of sickness or authorised leave or an accident or a strike which is not illegal or a lock out or a cessation of work which is not due to any fault on the part of the workman. “Continuous Service” is defined in Section 2 (eee) as meaning uninterrupted service, and includes service which may be interrupted merely on account of sickness or authorised leave or an accident or a strike which is not illegal or a lock out or a cessation of work which is not due to any fault on the part of the workman. What is meant by “one year of continuous service” has been defined in Section 25 B. Under this section a workman who during a period of 12 calendar months has actually worked in an industry for not less than 240 days shall be deemed to have completed one year of completed service in the industry. Nagen Bora & Manoharan were both re-appointed on 10th Mar. 1959. Their services were terminated on 15th Jan. 1960. Thus, their total period of employment was less than 11 months the position, therefore, is that during the period of employment for less than 11 calendar months these two persons worked for more than 240 days. In our opinion that would not satisfy the requirement of Section 25 B. Before a workman can be considered to have-completed one year of continuous service in an industry it must be shown first that he was employed for a period of not less than 12 calendar months, and, next that during those 12 calendar months had worked for not less than 240 days. Where, as in the present case, the workmen have not at all been employed for a period of 12 calendar months, it becomes unnecessary to examine whether the actual days of work numbered 240 days or more. For, in any case, the requirements of Section 25 B would not be satisfied by the mere fact of the number of working days being not less than 240 days". 16. After the provisions of Section 25 B were amended by the Amending Act No. 36 of 1964, the provisions of the amended section were considered by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Employers, Digwadih Colliery v. Their Workmen AIR 1966 SC 75 and it was observed that the amendment did not bring about any change in this respect that the employee should have been in employment for one year. Their Lordships in Digwadih Colliery’s case observed as under:- “The amended Section 25 B only consolidates the previous Sections 25 B and 2 (eee) in one place, adding some other matters which are not relevant to the present purpose, but the purport of the new provisions is not different. In fact the amendment of Section 25-F of the principal Act by substituting in clause (b) the words “for every completed year of continuous service” for the words “for every completed year of service” now removes a discordance between the unamended Section 25 B and the unamended clause (b) of Section 25-F. Neither before these several changes nor after these is uninterrupted service necessary if the total service is 240 days in a period of twelve calendar months. The only change in the new Act is that this service must be during a period of 12 calendar months preceding the date with reference to which calculation is to be made. The last amendment now removes a vagueness which existed in the unamended Section 25 B.” 17. It was contended that it was not necessary that a workman should have been in continuous service for a period of 12 months without interruption, as Section 25 B introduces a fiction converting service for a period of 240 days within a period of 12 calendar months preceding the date of termination, into continuous service of one completed year. By reading Section 25-F along with Section 25 B, it is clear that a workman who in a period of 12 calendar months has actually worked for not less than 240 days shall be deemed to have completed one year of continuous service, if the service rendered by such workman is interrupted one and is not continuous. 18. Thus, it is clear that in cases of uninterrupted service, except for the reasons mentioned in clause (1) of Section 25 B, the workman should have rendered service for a period of one year so as to get advantage of the provisions of Section 25-F. But in the case of interrupted service or in the case of service which is not continuous, for reasons other than those specified in clause (1) of Section 25 B, the workman shall be deemed to have worked for continuous period of one year if he has rendered service for at least 240 days during the period of preceding 12 months. Thus, sub-clause (2) of Section 25 B would apply only in case the service of a workman is interrupted owing to causes other than those specified in clause (1) of Section 25 B, while in the case of uninterrupted service or service interrupted on account of causes specified in clause (1) of Section 25 B, it would be necessary that the employees should have rendered service in such employment for a period of at least one year. In the present case the petitioners were not in employment for a period of one year on the post of Lower Division Clerks in a temporary capacity and as such they are not entitled to get the benefit of Section 25-F, as they had not been in continuous service for not less than one year under the employer. 19. Learned counsel for the petitioner drew my attention to a decision of a learned Single Judge of this Court in Viney Kumar v. State AIR 1968 Raj 227 : (1968 Lab IC 1180) wherein the Judgment of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Digwadih Colliery AIR 1966 SC 75 was sought to be distinguished, on the ground that the amendment brought about in Section 25 B in the year 1964 was intended to confer benefits on workmen and it was held that if a workman had worked even for 240 days, then he should be deemed to have been in continuous service for a period of one year, although he may not have been in employment during the period of 365 days. However, the aforesaid decision has been set aside on appeal by a Division Bench of this Court in State v. Vinay Kumar 1978 WLN (UC) 223 wherein it was held that in order to fulfil the requirements of Section 25 B, a workman should have remained in employment at least for a period of 12 calendar months. I may add that such an employment might be interrupted or uninterrupted. If it is uninterrupted or it is interrupted for the reasons enumerated in clause (1) of Section 25 B, then it will be considered as uninterrupted. But if it is interrupted for reasons other than those specified in clause (1) of Section 25 B, then the workman should have worked for at least 240 days during the period of preceding 12 calendar months. 20. But if it is interrupted for reasons other than those specified in clause (1) of Section 25 B, then the workman should have worked for at least 240 days during the period of preceding 12 calendar months. 20. In Workmen of Pure Kustore Colliery v. Central Govt Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court. Jabbalpur (1969) 1 Lab L.J 126 (Pat) a Division Bench of the Patna High Court, following the decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Digwadih Colliery case AIR 1966 SC 75 -held that before the workmen could have claimed benefits of the provisions of Section 25-F, they have to show that they were in employment for not less than one year. 21. As none of the petitioners were in employment for a period of 12 calendar months, they cannot be said to have been in continuous service for a period of not less than one year, within the meaning of Section 25-F of the Act and as-such they are not entitled to the benefits conferred upon workmen by the provisions of Section 25-F. 22. As a result of the aforesaid discussion, the claim of the petitioners in respect of non-compliance of the provisions of Section 25 fails and the petitioners are not entitled to any relief on that account.'All the seven writ petitions are consequently dismissed. However, the parties are left to bear their costs.Petitions dismissed. *******