ORDER K.N. Singh, J. - This is a revision under Section 115 of the Civil P. C. by the plaintiffs for setting aside the judgment and decree passed by the Additional District Judge, Ballia. 2. The plaintiffs filed a suit for recovery of arrears of rent and ejectment against the defendant-opposite party with the allegation that the building in dispute was constructed in 1964 and that the provisions of U. P. Act XIII of 1972 were not applicable. The plaint further asserted that the defendants tenancy had been terminated under a notice issued under Section 106 of the T. P. Act. The defendant contested the suit on the ground that the building was old construction and the provisions of U. P. Act XIII of 1972 were applicable to it and the plaintiffs suit was not maintainable in view of S. 20 of the Act. The defendant further pleaded that no notice under Section 106 of the T. P-Act was served on him. The trial court decreed the suit on the finding that the building in dispute was constructed in the year 1964 and as such U. P. Act XIII of 1972 was not applicable to it. With regard to the service of notice, the trial court held that since the notice had been sent to the defendant under registered cover there was presumption of service of notice, lire defendant took up the matter in revision before the Additional District Judge under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1881. The Additional District Judge set aside the judgment and decree of the trial court on the finding that the presumption of service of notice on the defendant-tenant stood rebutted by his denial. Since the notice under Section 106 of the T. P. Act was not served on the defendant, the suit was not maintainable. Aggrieved, the plaintiffs have approached this Court by means of the present revision. 3. Learned counsel for the plaintiffs urged that the District Judge while exercising jurisdiction under Section 25 of the provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1881, had no jurisdiction to reassess the evidence or to set aside the findings of fact recorded by the trial court on the question of service of notice. He cited a number of authorities in support of his contention. He cited a number of authorities in support of his contention. I do not consider it necessary to discuss the matter in detail as in my opinion the revision is bound to fail on another ground. 4. The trial court had recorded finding that the building in question was constructed in 1964. That finding has not been upset by the lower revisional court. In tact the case set up by the plaintiffs in the plaint clearly stated that die building in question had been constructed in 1964. Consequently the building in dispute was in existence when the U. P. Act XIII of 1972 came into force on July 15, 1972. In the circumstances, the U. P. Act XIII of 1972 was applicable to the building in dispute as held by the Supreme Court in Ratanlal Shinghal v. Smt. Murti Devi (1979 All WC 752): ( AIR 1980 SC 635 ). A Division Bench of this Court has also taken the same view in Smt. Radha Devi v. Prescribed Authority (1979 All WC 770): (1980 All LJ 84). I, therefore, hold that the building in dispute was subject to the provisions of U. P. Act XIII of 1972. 5. The trial court had recorded a finding that the plaintiffs had not made out any case under Section 20 of the Act for filing the suit as none of the grounds contained therein were available. In fact the plaintiffs themselves asserted that S. 20 was not attracted and as such there was no necessity for complying with those provisions. Since I have already recorded a finding that the U. P. Act XIII of 1972 was applicable to the building in dispute, no suit could be filed for defendants eviction as he was entitled to the protection of Section 20 of the Act. Since admittedly the plaintiffs did not comply with Section 20 of the Act, their suit out of which the present revision has arisen was not maintainable. In this view of the matter I do not see any good ground to interfere with the judgment and decree of the lower revisional court. 6. The revision fails and is accordingly dismissed, but there will be no order as to costs. 7. Learned counsel for the applicants made oral request for grant of certificate to enable the plaintiffs to file appeal before the Supreme Court against this judgment. 6. The revision fails and is accordingly dismissed, but there will be no order as to costs. 7. Learned counsel for the applicants made oral request for grant of certificate to enable the plaintiffs to file appeal before the Supreme Court against this judgment. The ground on which the plea for certificate is founded is that since ten years period, from the date of completion of the building had not expired in July, 1972, on the date of the filing of the suit the defendant was not entitled to the benefit of the protection of the Act. This very question was considered by the Supreme Court in 1979 All WC 752 : ( AIR 1980 SC 635 ) and it was held that the Act was prospective and not retrospective. The Supreme Court decision was considered by a Division Bench of this Court in 1979 All WC 770: (1980 All LJ 84) and the Bench has made it clear that all the buildings which were in existence on July 15, 1972, the date the Act was enforced, would be subject to the provisions of the Act. Since the question raised by the applicants stands already decided by the highest court of the land, I do not find any reason to grant the certificate. The request for certificate is rejected.