JUDGMENT 1. The main question which is required to be determined in these writ petitions is as to whether the pasting of a notice on the notice board directing the workman, whose service has been terminated, to collect his wages from the office of the employer would amount to sufficient compliance with the provisions. of Section 25F (b) of the industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter called the Act As the same question has been raised in all these writ petitions, it would be proper to dispose them of by a common order. 2. The farts which have given rise to these writ petitions are short and simple. The petitioners were posted as Class IV -employees in the Loco Shed at Ranapratapnagar railway station of the Western Railway as substitute workmen. The Loco Foreman, Western Railway, Ranapratapnagar railway station, issued notices to the petitioners in March and April, 1975, intimating them that their services shall stand terminated on the expiry of a notice period of one month. The reason for the termination of the service of the petitioners as substitutes was given by the Loco Foreman .as 'reduction in cadre'. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that retrenchment compensation, within the meaning of Section 25F (b) of the Act. -.vas neither paid nor even offered to be paid to the petitioners at the time of their retrenchment and on this ground it was urged that the termination of the services of the petitioners was illegal and void, being in derogation of the provisions of Section 25F of the Act. The case of the respondents in this respect is that at the time when the notices relating to termination of services were given to the petitioners, the Loco foreman had asked each one of the petitioners to collect the amount of retrenchment compensation from the office before the expiry of the notice period. But as the petitioners did not turn up to receive the retrenchment compensation, a notice was pasted on the notice board on April 18, 1975, stating the amount, which was payable to each one of the employees by way of compensation under the Act, shall be paid on the date of termination of service, through Emergent Pay Sheets. In that notice the amount payable to each' one of the petitioners by way of retrenchment compensation was separately mentioned against the name of that person. In that notice the amount payable to each' one of the petitioners by way of retrenchment compensation was separately mentioned against the name of that person. According to the respondents. the petitioners deliberately reported sick and did not turn up for receiving the amount of retrenchment the compensation or even the wages which had become due, in spite of the fact that the said amount was available for payment to them. Thus the case of the respondents is that the pasting of the notice Annexure R/5 on the notice board along with the oral intimation said to have been given by the Loco Foreman to the petitioners, at the time of handing over to them the notices of termination, was sufficient in law to amount to an offer and that the same should be deemed to be sufficient compliance of the provisions of Section 25-F (b) of the Act. 3. Learned counsel for the respondents also raised a preliminary objection that the writ petitions were not maintainable as the only grievance advanced by the petitioners related to the alleged violation of a right, which was the creation of the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, and the ordinary remedy provided in the Act for redress of such a grievance should have been availed of by the petitioners instead of approaching this Court by way of writ petitions. There is no doubt that the claim of the petitioners is based on the alleged violation of the provisions of Section 25-1" (b) of the Act and it has been argued on their behalf that the termination of the services of the petitioners should be set aside for the noncompliance of the provisions of Section 25F of the Act. It is also true that the Act provides remedies for redressing the non-compliance or violation of the provisions of the Act. It is no doubt un-disputable that there is no right available to the petitioners to obtain retrenchment compensation from the employer. in the ordinary or common law. It is a special right which has been created by the provisions of Section 25F of the Act and in the absence of such provisions or if such provisions would not have been applicable to the petitioners, then the petitioners would not have been entitled to the payment of the amount claimed by them by way of retrenchment compensation. It is a special right which has been created by the provisions of Section 25F of the Act and in the absence of such provisions or if such provisions would not have been applicable to the petitioners, then the petitioners would not have been entitled to the payment of the amount claimed by them by way of retrenchment compensation. Thus, when a special right has been created by a statute, then ordinarily the remedy provided in that statute for the redress or the non-fulfilment of the right should be followed, rather than filing a Civil Suit or approaching this Court by way of a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the face of the specific legal remedy available to the petitioners under Section 10 of the Act, the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court should not ordinarily be invoked. 4. It would be pertinent in connection to recall the famous and of quoted observations made by Lord Ten. terden. C. J. in Doe v. Bridges (1841) 1 B, & Ad 847 , which is as under : "Where an Act creates an obligation and enforces the performance in a specified manner, we take it to be a general rule that performance cannot be enforced in any other manner." 5. The above passage was cited with approval by Earl of Halsbury, L, C. in Pasmore v. The Oswaldtwistle Urban District Council, 1898 AC 387 and by Lord Simonds at p. 407 in the case of Cutler v. Wandsworth Stadium Ltd., 1949 AC 398 . Willes J., classified the cases in three classes in the case of Neville v. London "Express" Newspaper Ltd., 9410 AC 368 (HL) , as under : "There are three classes of cases in which a liability may be established by statute. There is that class where there is a liability existing at common law, and which is only re-enacted by the statute with a special form of remedy, there, unless the statute contains words necessarily excluding the common law remedy, the plaintiff has his election of proceeding either under the statute or at common law. Then there is a second class, which consists of those cases in which a statute has created a liability, but has given no special remedy for it, there the party may adopt an action of debt or other remedy at common law to enforce it. Then there is a second class, which consists of those cases in which a statute has created a liability, but has given no special remedy for it, there the party may adopt an action of debt or other remedy at common law to enforce it. The third class is where the statute creates a liability not existing at common law, and gives also a particular remedy for enforcing it...........," with respect to that class it has always been held, that the party must adopt the form of remedy given by the statute." 6. As a matter of fact, it was Lord Watson who, speaking for the House of Lords observed in Barraclough v. Brown. 1897 AC 615 , that "when the right and remedy are given 'uno flatu' one cannot be dissociated from the other." 7. The Act creates rights and remedies and when both are provided by the provisions of the same Act, then following the dictum of Lord Watson, they cannot be separated. As such, the remedy has to be sought in respect of such rights, which are created by the Act, exclusively in the provisions of the Act. The object of the Act is to make provision for investigation and settlement of industrial .disputes and the adjudication of such disputes must be sought in the forums .created by the Act itself, as an ordinary Civil Court has no jurisdiction to try or adjudicate disputes so far as they relate to rights and liabilities created under the Act. 8. In Basant Kumar v. Saikar, AIR 1964 SC 1260 , their Lordships of the Supreme Court refused to entertain a question regarding the benefits to be allowed under a scheme brought into force under the Employees' State Insurance Act, on the ground that the matter which could be appropriately raised in the form of a dispute under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act should not be considered by the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the aforesaid case their Lordships observed as under : "It is true that the powers conferred on the High Courts tinder Article 226 are very wide, but it is not suggested by Mr. Chatterjee that even these powers can take in within their sweep industrial disputes of the kind which this contention seeks to raise." 9. In the aforesaid case their Lordships observed as under : "It is true that the powers conferred on the High Courts tinder Article 226 are very wide, but it is not suggested by Mr. Chatterjee that even these powers can take in within their sweep industrial disputes of the kind which this contention seeks to raise." 9. In Premier Automobiles Ltd. v. Kamlakar Shantaram, AIR 1975 SC 2238 , it was argued before their Lordships of the Supreme Court that the remedy provided by Section 10 of the Act is no remedy in the eye of law and it. is only a misnomer, as it does not confer any right on the litigant because the question of making a reference to a Labour Court or an Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of an industrial dispute, is dependent upon the exercise of the power by the Government under Section 10. This submission was repelled by their Lordships and it was observed as under : "It is no doubt true that the remedy. provided under the Act under Section C, on the facts and in the circumstances of this case involving disputes in relation to the two settlements arrived at between the management and the workman, was not the appropriate remedy. It is also true that it vas not open 'c' the workmen concerned to approach the Labour Court or the Tribunal directly for adjudication of the dispute. It is further well established on the authorities of this Court that the Government under certain circumstances even on the ground of expediency (vide State of Bombay v. R. P. Krishnan. (1961) 1 SCR 227 : ( AIR 1960 SC 1223 ) and Bombay Union of Journalists v. The State of Bombay, (1964) 6 SCR 22 : ( AIR 1964 SC 1617 ) can refuse to make a reference. If the refusal is not sustainable in law, appropriate directions can be issued by the High Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. But it does not follow from all this that the remedy provided under the Act is a misnomer. Reference of industrial disputes for adjudication in exercise of the power of the Government under Section 10 (1) is so common that it is difficult to call the remedy a misnomer or insufficient or inadequate for the purpose of enforcement of the right or liability created under the Act. Reference of industrial disputes for adjudication in exercise of the power of the Government under Section 10 (1) is so common that it is difficult to call the remedy a misnomer or insufficient or inadequate for the purpose of enforcement of the right or liability created under the Act. The remedy suffers from some handicap but is well compensated on the making of the reference by the wide powers of the Labour Court or the Tribunal. The handicap leads only to the conclusion that for adjudication of an industrial dispute in connection with a right or obligation under the general or common law and not created under the Acts the. remedy is not exclusive. It is alternative. But surely for the enforcement of a right or an obligation under the Act the remedy provided uno flat. in it is the exclusive remedy. The legislature in its wisdom did not think it fit and proper to provide a very easy and smooth remedy for enforcement of the rights and obligations created tinder the Act. Persons wishing the enjoyment of such rights and wasting its enforcement must rest content to secure the remedy provided by the Act. The possibility that the Government may not ultimately refer an industrial dispute under Section J on the. ground of expediency is not a relevant consideration in this regard." (Emphasis added) 10. In Premier Automobiles Case Untwalia, J., speaking for the Supreme Court, laid down the following principles in respect of the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts in relation to industrial disputes : "(1) If the dispute is not an industrial dispute, nor does it relate to enforcement of any right under the Act, the remedy lies only in the Court. (2) If the dispute is an industrial dispute arising out of a right or liability under the general or common law and not under the Act, the jurisdiction of the civil Court is alternative, leaving it to the election of the suitor concerned to choose his remedy for the relief which is competent to be granted in a particular remedy. (3) If the industrial dispute relates to the enforcement of a right or an obligation created under the Act, then the only remedy available to the suitor is to get an adjudication under the Act. (3) If the industrial dispute relates to the enforcement of a right or an obligation created under the Act, then the only remedy available to the suitor is to get an adjudication under the Act. (4) If the right which is sought to be enforced is a right created under the Act such as Chapter VA, then the remedy for its enforcement is either Section $3C or the raising of an industrial dispute, as the case may be." (Emphasis added) 11. Although the aforesaid case related to the jurisdiction of Civil Courts under Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure , yet their Lordships have clearly laid down that a person wishing to enjoy rights created by the Act and desiring their enforcement must resort to the remedy provided by the Act and such remedy is, in their Lordships' view the 'exclusive remedy' for the enforcement of rights or obligations which are created by the Act and are not right: or obligations under the general or the common law. The observations made by Untwalia, J. in Premier Automobiles" case, AIR 1975 SC 2238 were followed by the Supreme Court in Rohtas Industries Ltd. v. Rohtas Industries Staff Union AIR 1976 SC 425 : (1976 Lab IC 303 ; wherein Krishna Iyer, J., speaking for the Court, observed as under : "The Premier Automobiles' case, Civil Appeal No. 922 of 1973 decided on 26-8- 1975: (reported in AIR 1975 SC 2238 1 settles the legal issues involved in the above argument. The Industrial Disputes Act is a comprehensive and self contained Code so far as it speaks and the enforcement of rights created thereby can only be through the procedure laid down therein. Neither the civil court nor any other Tribunal or body can award relief." (Emphasis added). 12. In Mahabir v. D. K. Mittal, ::186 Lab IC 119 a Bench of the Patna High Court held that a remedy by way of adjudication before an Industrial Court does not amount to an alternative remedy, so as to bar the maintainability of a writ application and the decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court Premier Automobiles case, AIR 1975 SC 2238 was distinguished on the ground that that case related to a civil suit. Learned Judges of the Patna High Court in the aforesaid case emphasised upon the fact that under the Industrial Disputes Act it was unto the appropriate Government to refer or not to refer a dispute for adjudication to an Industrial Court and as such remedy was dependent on the will of the State Government, it could not be termed as an alternative remedy so far as writ proceedings were concerned. With great respect to the learned Judges of the Patna High Court, I am unable to agree with them on this question. I may respectfully point out that this aspect of the matter was considered by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Premier Automobiles case where the same argument was advanced before their Lordships and it was observed that the possibility that the Government may not ultimately refer an industrial dispute under Section 10 on the ground of expediency is not a relevant consideration in this regard. Their Lordships emphasised that if the industrial dispute related to the enforcement of a right or an obligation created under the Act then "the only remedy" available to the suitor is to get an adjudication under the Act. Their Lordships have held that persons wishing to enjoy rights created by the Act and desiring their enforment must depend upon the remedy provided by the very same Act, which their Lordships have described as "the exclusive remedy" for such class of cases, where the right or obligation is not available at the general or common law but is a creation of the Act. Thus I have no doubt that in respect of a matter relating to breach of the provisions of Section 25F of the Act and when the enforcement of such provisions is desired and the order of termination of the employee is said to be void on account of the violation of the provisions of Section 25F of the Act, the proper and exclusive remedy is the one provided by the Act itself. 13. However, as these writ petitions have been pending in this Court for the last about five years and not only that the writ petitions were entertained but arguments have also been heard on merits. In these circumstances, it would not be proper to dismiss these writ petition: at the fag-end on the ground of existence of an alternative remedy. 13. However, as these writ petitions have been pending in this Court for the last about five years and not only that the writ petitions were entertained but arguments have also been heard on merits. In these circumstances, it would not be proper to dismiss these writ petition: at the fag-end on the ground of existence of an alternative remedy. I have taken this view in the case of Mahesh Chandra Sharma v. State of Rajasthan, 1974 Raj LW 338 wherein it was observed that the objection regarding the existence of an alternative remedy could not be entertained at the fag end of the arguments when the matter had been heard fully on merits. Similar view was taken by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of L. Hirday Narain v. Income-tax Officer, AIR 1971 SC 33 wherein it was held that a High Court was not justified in dismissing a writ petition as not maintainable on the ground of existence of an alternative remedy when the writ petition was not only entertained but was heard on merits. It was observed by their Lordships that if the High Court would not have entertained the writ petition, the petitioners could have availed of the alternative remedy at that very time. It would indeed be unjust, harsh and improper to refuse to decide the writ petitions on merits after the same have not only been entertained but were kept pending in this Court for about 5 years and the arguments have also been fully heard on merits as well. 14. Now, coming to the merits, learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon my decision in Rajasthan Canal Project Vijaynagar v. Rashtriya Mazdoor Union, 1975 WLN 679 . In that case a notice of retrenchment of one month's duration was served on the workman concerned and he was informed that his services would stand terminated with effect from November 30, 1971. It was held that it was obligatory upon the employer to make payment of retrenchment compensation to the workman on or before November 30, 1971. But the said amount was not paid to the workman up to the aforesaid date. It was held that it was obligatory upon the employer to make payment of retrenchment compensation to the workman on or before November 30, 1971. But the said amount was not paid to the workman up to the aforesaid date. The employees took the plea that the amount could not be paid to the workman concerned as he absented himself from duty on November 30, 1971 and that he was not present at the head - quarters on the day when his service was to be terminated, on the expiry of one month's notice. It was held in these circumstances in the aforesaid case that the requirements of Section 25F were not complied with and it was observed as under: "It must be held that for making retrenchment complete, full compliance of the requirement of sub-sections (a) and (b) of Section 25F is necessary. Merely the readiness on the part of the employer to make payment of the retrenchment compensation is not sufficient but there must be either an offer or tender or actual payment to the workman concerned. It may be that either an offer or tender is made to the workman personally or by a postal money order or by the Bank Draft or any other well recognised media, but there should be an offer or tender in the real sense of the term and, if it is not made, it cannot be said the provisions of Section 25F were complied with." 15. In my view, the aforesaid passage correctly lays down the law on the subject. Merely the expression of readiness on the part of the employer to make payment of retrenchment compensation to the employee concerned cannot he considered as sufficient compliance of the provisions of Section 25F but what is required to be done is that there must be either an offer or a tender or an actual payment of the amount of retrenchment compensation to the workman concerned and such an offer or tender can be made to the workman personally or by postal money order or by Bank Draft or any other well recognised means and if the workman refuses to accept the payment so tendered to him, then the provisions of Section 25F would be deemed to have been complied with. However, the facts of that case are clearly distinguishable from the facts of the cases at hand. However, the facts of that case are clearly distinguishable from the facts of the cases at hand. In that case there was no offer or tender, what to say of actual payment, but there was merely an alleged readiness on the part of the employer to make payment and it was argued that if the employee would have been present at the headquarters on November 30, 1971, the amount of retrenchment compensation would have been offered to him. But, however, there was no actual offer or tender. 16. In the Straw Board Mfg. Co. Ltd. Saharanpur v. Govind, AIR 1962 SC 1500 the question was about making payment of wages to a workman before making an application under Section :33 (2 )(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed that Section 33 speaks of payment of one month's wages. It can only mean that the employer has tendered the wages and that would amount to payment or otherwise a workman could always make the section unworkable by refusing to take the wages. 17. In National Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. v. Third Industrial Tribunal, West Bengal, AIR 1964 Cal 194 the notice of retrenchment was posted on the very day when the retrenchment was 'o take effect and the workmen were asked to call at the office for receiving payment of wages and retrenchment compensation, either on the same day or on any subsequent date. It was held in that case that as there was no chance of the workmen receiving the letter posted on the same day, the notice really amounted to a call to receive payment of retrenchment compensation subsequent to the date of retrenchment, which made the offer bad and retrenchment order was consequently illegal. It was also observed in that case that for the purpose of making payment under Section 25F, the offer should be made prior to the retrenchment of the workman concerned. 18. In Nowrozabad Colliery Mazdoor Sangh v. F. Jeejeebhoy, 1970 FJR 225 (Madh Pra) the workmen were informed by a notice that they would be paid one month's wages and also retrenchment compensation at the company's cash office and they were requested to collect the retrenchment compensation and wages in lieu of notice from the cash office on January 27, 1965, on which date the order of retrenchment was to become effective. On these facts, it was held that the notice was valid and as the workmen were directed to collect their wages and retrenchment compensation from the company's cash office on January 27, 1965 i.e. to say prior to the retrenchment becoming effective the provisions of Section 25F were complied: with. It was observed by a bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Cour' in that case that payment includes an 'offer' provided it is definite, unequivocal and genuine and is not merely a pretext or show of an offer. The Madhya Pradesh High Court's decision was followed by Justice P. N. Shinghal, as a Judge of this Court, in Bhanwar Lal v. State of Rajasthan, 1972 WLN 530 . In that case a notice was displayed on the notice board informing the workman whose service was retrenched that he could collect the amount of retrenchment compensation from the office. It was held that the display of notice, prior to the date of retrenchment, asking the workman concerned to collect the amount of retrenchment compensation from the office of the employer, amounted to an offer and if the workmen did not turn tip to collect the same it could not be held that the amount of retrenchment compensation was not paid to the workman. It was emphasised that if such an offer would not be considered as sufficient compliance of the provisions of Section F (b) of the Act, then a workman could always make the provision nugatory by refusing to take the wages. The same view was taken by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Management of Delhi Transport Undertaking v. Industrial Tribunal, Delhi, AIR 1965 SC 1503 . In that case the workman was asked to report immediately to the Accounts Officer at the Head Office of the employer to receive the payment but the workman did not appear. It was argued in that case that one month's wages were not actually paid as required by the provision to Section 33 (2) (b) of the Act before the order of dismissal could be passed. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court held that it was not necessary that wages for one month should have been actually paid because in many cases the employer an only tender the amount before the dismissal of the employee and he cannot force the employee to receive the payment before the dismissal becomes effective. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court held that it was not necessary that wages for one month should have been actually paid because in many cases the employer an only tender the amount before the dismissal of the employee and he cannot force the employee to receive the payment before the dismissal becomes effective. Their Lordships observed that in the case before them the tender was definitely made before the order of dismissal became effective and that wages would certainly have been paid to the workman concerned if he would have gone to the Head Office of the employer, as notified to him. It was, therefore, held that there was no violation to comply with the provisions of Section 33 (2) (b) of the Act. 19. Learned counsel for the petitioners relied upon a decision of the Punjab High Court in Pepsu Transport Co. Pvt. Ltd, v. State of Punjab, AIR 1968 Punj & Har 90 wherein a learned single Judge of the Punjab & Haryana High Court held that mere sending notices calling upon the workmen to receive payment before the due date and equating such an offer to actual payment might lead to harsh results as the employer may refuse to make payment on the next day, on the plea that the notice itself was equivalent to payment and his obligation to make payment has ceased on the previous day. In that case it was held that calling upon the workman to receive payment on a particular date did not amount to tender. The aforesaid decision was dissented from by this court in Bhanwar Lal's case, 1972 WLN' 53,) and it may be observed that the same is not in conformity with the decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Delhi Transport Undertakings case, AIR 1965 SC 1503 . Even if there is no actual tender, an offer asking the workman to collect wages from the office of the employer would he sufficient compliance of the provisions of Section 25F (2) of the Act, provided such an offer is genuine unambiguous and clear. If the workman does not collect the wages from the office of the employer, even after he is informed by notice to do so, then it would be deemed as if the amount has been tendered and the workman has refused to accept it. 20. If the workman does not collect the wages from the office of the employer, even after he is informed by notice to do so, then it would be deemed as if the amount has been tendered and the workman has refused to accept it. 20. In the present case, at the time the petitioners were given notice of retrenchment the Loco Foreman personally informed them that they could collect their wages and retrenchment compensation from the office on any date before the expiry of one month's notice. Thereafter a notice was displayed or the notice board of the loco workshop on April 19, 1975, intimating the petitioners about the amount of compensation due to them under the Act and also that "the same will be paid on the date of termination of service through Emergent Pay Sheet". The emergent pay sheet of the Railway is an emergency pay order) issued by the Personnel Officer the Station-Master concerned to pay the, amount mentioned in the Emergent Pay Sheet in cash to the staff named therein. If the petitioners would have cared to appear at the office of the employer in pursuance to the aforesaid notice, then t here is no doubt that the amount of compensation would have been actually paid to them through emergent pay sheets. The petitioners in rejoinder have even denied that there was no notice board in the loco workshop and that, no notice was displayed, but the Assistant Loco Foreman, Ranapratapnagar, has, filed an affidavit stating that uch a notice was displayed on April 11. 1975, a copy of which has been placed on the record as Annexure R/5 and has stated that the amount of compensation payable to the petitioners was always readily available and could be drawn by Emergent Pay Sheets as and when the petitioners would have approached the office of the employer to receive the amount of retrenchment compensation, before the retrenchment became effective. In these circumstances, it is not possible to hold that the employer i.e. the Railway Administration was not willing or ready to pay retrenchment compensation to the petitioners, if they would have cared to approach the office for receiving the same. In these circumstances, it is not possible to hold that the employer i.e. the Railway Administration was not willing or ready to pay retrenchment compensation to the petitioners, if they would have cared to approach the office for receiving the same. The pasting of the notice, Annexure R/5 dated April 19, 1975, on the notice board, amounts to making a clear and unambiguous offer on the part of the Railway Administration for payment of the amount of retrenchment compensation to the petitioners. As the petitioners did not go to the office of the employer to receive the said amount on the date of termination of their service, it would be deemed that they were not willing to accept the amount offered to them and the provisions of Section 25F would be deemed to have been sufficiently complied with. In these cases, it is not in dispute that the petitioners were workmen and they should have been offered or tendered the payment of the amount of retrenchment compensation before terminating their service. As a matter of fact some of the petitioners approached this court by filing the writ petition even before the expiry of the one month's notice period, at the end of which the retrenchment would have become effective. 21. For the reasons enumerated above, I hold that the petitioners were offered the amount of retrenchment compensation and that the provisions of Section F were substantially complied with. 22. As no other point was argued before me by the learned counsel for the petitioners, there is no force in these writ petitions and the same are dismissed. 23. The parties are however, directed to bear their costs,Petitions dismissed. *******