Judgment :- 1. To quote the words of the learned Munsiff in the order under revision; "The respondent-defendant is sentenced to undergo imprisonment for two days in the civil prison." The Court of the Munsiff has no powers to sentence a person to imprisonment even for two days. It is a penal power that is not to be exercised by the learned Munsiff. Evidently such exercise is the result of a wrong impression about the provisions under which he could act. The court does not indicate in its order under revision the authority by which he is sentencing the party to the suit to imprisonment. 2. The complaint before the learned Munsiff was that the defendant in the suit against whom there was an order of injunction in force during the pendency of the suit had violated such order The significant fact is that the violation was said to be in the year 1976 and the petition for taking action for such violation was moved by the plaintiff on 16-2-1978. The suit in which the injunction was sought was dismissed by the Munsiff on 25-2-1978. It was long after such dismissal and while such dismissal was in force that the court below passed the impugned order. It is therefore evident that at the time the order for imprisonment was passed there was no question of the defendant continuing to disobey any order of injunction since that had ceased to be in force on 25-2-1978. I am mentioning this to indicate that it was not as a measure to compel compliance with any order that the order for imprisonment was passed it was intended and intended only as a punishment for some past act of the defendant. 3. The powers of the Civil Court to take action for disobedience of order of injunction are contained in 0.21 R.32 of the Civil Procedure Code and O.39 R.2A of the Civil Procedure Code. O.21 R.32 deals, inter alia, with a case where a decree for injunction has been passed and the person who is bound by the decree wilfully fails to obey. In other words, that arises in a case where there is a decree which calls for enforcement. O.21 R.32 deals, inter alia, with a case where a decree for injunction has been passed and the person who is bound by the decree wilfully fails to obey. In other words, that arises in a case where there is a decree which calls for enforcement. That is not the case here 0.39 R.2A deals with consequences of disobedience or breach of injunction passed not by the final decree in the suit but on an interlocutory application In case of disobedience of any injunction or other order made under R.1 or R.2 of 0.39 the Court granting the injunction or making the order or the Court to which the suit or proceeding is transferred is empowered to attach the property of the defaulting party and also to detain such party in civil prison for a term not exceeding three months Sub-rule (2) of R.2A indicates that the attachment itself is only for the purpose of compelling obedience, for it provides that the attachment shall not remain in force for more than one year at the end of which time, if the disobedience or breach continues the property attached could be sold. In other words, if the disobedience does not continue by the time one year has passed there is no adverse consequence to the party. Attachment automatically ceases. Therefore attachment would not operate as an expropriatory measure or as a penal measure. In that setting detention in civil prison must also be held to be not intended as a penal measure but as a mode of enforcement of the injunction order. That is so is indicated by the Supreme Court in the decision in The State of Bihar v. Rani Sonabati Kumari, AIR. 1961 SC. 221. In Para.23 of the judgment the court observes: "Though undoubtedly proceedings under 0.39 R.2 of the Civil Procedure Code have a punitive aspect as is evident from the contemner being liable to be ordered to be detained in civil prison, they are in substance designed to effect the enforcement of or to execute the order". If the provision in 0.39 R.2A and the similar rule in 0.21 R.32 are intended to enable enforcement of the order or decree for injunction, as the case may be, there is no scope for invoking that rule when the order is no longer in force and by the decree in the suit the prayer for injunction stands negatived. If the provision in 0.39 R.2A and the similar rule in 0.21 R.32 are intended to enable enforcement of the order or decree for injunction, as the case may be, there is no scope for invoking that rule when the order is no longer in force and by the decree in the suit the prayer for injunction stands negatived. Therefore the order impugned could not have been passed. 4. Even otherwise an order in the nature of the one passed by the learned Munsiff is highly objectionable. Detention in civil prison is not the same as imprisonment for two days. Detention and imprisonment are two different concepts altogether Taking punitive action in order to visit penal consequences upon a person who has disobeyed as order is a function which falls within the scope of this court and not of a subordinate court. A contempt Of any subordinate court is within the province of the High Court. Contempt may be civil or criminal. It would be a civil contempt when there is wilful disobedience of any judgment, decree, direction or order or other process of a court or wilful breach of undertaking given to a court. That is liable to be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months or with fine to the extent of Rs. 6,000/-. Sub-section (3) of S.12 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 provides that notwithstanding the provisions in S.12 enabling the imposition of sentence for civil contempt, where a person is found guilty of a civil contempt the court if it considers that fine will meet the ends of justice and that sentence of imprisonment is not necessary shall instead of sentencing to simple imprisonment direct that he be detained in a civil prison. This indicates that detention in a civil prison has a lesser punitive content than sentence of simple imprisonment and that these two are different. Again it is only if a court finds that a fine will not meet the ends of justice that a contemner guilty of civil contempt is to be sentenced to imprisonment. These are the safeguards available to a person when action is taken against him under the Contempt of Courts Act by the High Court. The learned Munsiff has assumed to himself the power to sentence and sentence to imprisonment in the civil prison. The order is vacated. 5. These are the safeguards available to a person when action is taken against him under the Contempt of Courts Act by the High Court. The learned Munsiff has assumed to himself the power to sentence and sentence to imprisonment in the civil prison. The order is vacated. 5. I do not think that any action would be called for of the nature found by the court. This is not a case in which this court should take notice of the contempt, for the suit is found to be dismissed and further the party had offered an unconditional apology in court. Discretion should have dictated to the learned Munsiff to drop action. Had the court accepted the apology and closed the case it would not have had occasion to commit the very serious error that is seen committed by the order. The Revision Petition is allowed as above. No costs.