Judgment :- 1. The tenant within the meaning of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act 18 of 1960, hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’, is the petitioner in this revision. The respondent is the landlord within the meaning of the Act. The landlord is the Communist Party of India (Marxist) of Coimbatore and Nilgiris, and it is being represented by its secretary, Comm. Venkidu. There is no dispute that the premises in question is a non-residential building. The land-lord sought the eviction of the tenant on two grounds, namely (1) requirement of the promises for the purposes of its business, viz., running its office in the premises, under S. (3) (a) (iii) of the Act, and (2) requirement of the premises for the purpose of demolition and reconstruction under S. 14 (S)(b) of the Act. 2. Various contentions were put forth by the tenant in defence to this petition for eviction preferred by the landlord and they are not very germane for the purpose of deciding the question which alone is being agitated in this revision. The Rent Controller found that the requirement of the landlord on both the grounds was not tenable and as a result, the petition for eviction by the landlord was dismissed. The landlord preferred an appeal and the Appellate Authority upheld the case of the landlord on the ground of requirement of the premises for the purpose of its business within the meaning of S. 10 (3) (a)(iii) of the Act. The other ground of requirement of the premises for the purpose of demolition and reconstruction was not pressed before the Appellate Authority by the landlord. 3. In the present revision case, Mr. O.M. Nathan, learned counsel for the petitioner, raises the point that the requirement of the landlord of the premises for running its office cannot come within the scope of S. 10 (3) (a) (iii) of the Act, in the sense that running the office of a political party will not come within the meaning of the expression ‘for purposes of a business* occurring in the section. It must be pointed out that this contention was not raised at all in the Courts below and It is being raised for the first time In this revision only. It must be pointed out that this contention was not raised at all in the Courts below and It is being raised for the first time In this revision only. The section deals with two classes of buildings, namely, residential and non-residential, while purporting to grant relief to the landlord to obtain possession thereof from the tenant. While the Act has defined ‘building’ as such, we do not find a definition of either ‘residential building’ or ‘non-residential building’ set out in the Act. We can take it that a building other than a residential building will fall within the category of a non-residential building. There is no difficulty with reference to a residential building. S. 10 (3) (a) (ii) of the Act specifically refers to “non-residential building which is” used for the purpose of keeping a vehicle or adapted for such use.” S. 10 (3) (a) (iii) speaks about ‘other non-residential building.’ If a building other than a residential building and other than the category of a non-residential building mentioned in S. 10 (3) (a) (ii). Is required by the landlord for the purpose of its business at per S. 10 (3) (a) (iii), the requirement has not to be succeed by not giving a technical interpretation to the expression ‘for purposes of a business.’ 4. According to Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, the following meanings are also attached to the word ‘business— “the state of being busilv engaged in anything; activity what about which one Is busy; function; occupation; that with which one it concerned at the time”. If a building other than a residential building is required by the landlord for any legitimate activity, occupation or avocation of his, that must come in with the expression ‘for purpose of a business’ occurring in S. 10 (3) (a) (iii) of the Act. To give a restricted meaning will defeat the very object of the provision. The activity, occupation or avocation need not necessarily have the colour of a pecuniary transaction added to it. Equally so, it need not strictly be a commercial activity. If the activity or occupation involves the care and attention of the landlord, or his labour that will satisfy the expression ‘for purposes of a business’. 5. In P. Vairamani Ammal v. K.N.K. Rm. Equally so, it need not strictly be a commercial activity. If the activity or occupation involves the care and attention of the landlord, or his labour that will satisfy the expression ‘for purposes of a business’. 5. In P. Vairamani Ammal v. K.N.K. Rm. Kannappa , 1 Kailasam, J. as he then was, had occasion to consider the question as to whether carrying on of the thanneerpandal activity is a business, as required under S. 10(3) (a) (iii) of the Act The learned Judge, after considering the question elaborately and succinctly, held that the carrying on of thanneerpandal activity would be for purposes of business as required under S. 10 (3) (a) (iii) of the Act. The following passage in the judgment of the learned Judge is very elucidative and helpful to assess the question— “The Oxford Dictionary gives the meaning of the word ‘business’ as being busy, task, duty habitual occupation, profession, trade’ serious work”. It If, therefore, to be seen that the word has a very wide import and would cover every activity where men keep themselves busy. In Halsburys Laws of England, 3rd Edn. Vol.38, the word business’ is stated as a wider term than and not synonymous with, trade and means practically anything which is an occupation as distinguished from a pleasure. Examining the scheme of the Act it will be seen that the purpose of the enactment is to consolidate the law relating to the regulation of the letting of residential and non-residential bull-dings and the control of rents of such buildings. Is this context, the meaning of the word ‘business, will have to be determined. The main object of the enactment being to regulate the letting of residential and son-residential buildings, the Act provides under, what circumstances the landlord is entitled to get possession of the premises for his own occupation-It may be stated that the Act does not define ‘residential’ or “non-residential” building, ‘Building’ is defined in the Act. While the tenants are granted certain rights of occupancy the landlord also is entitled to get possession under certain circumstances As already stated. S10 is a provision which enables the landlord to get an order directing th e tenant to put him in possession. While the tenants are granted certain rights of occupancy the landlord also is entitled to get possession under certain circumstances As already stated. S10 is a provision which enables the landlord to get an order directing th e tenant to put him in possession. It provides that in case of a residential building be is an itled to such an order if be or his son requires it for his own occupation and if he or his son is not occupying a residential buildings. Apart from the clauses relating to residential building, there are two clauses regulating the right of the landlord to get possesion of non-residential buildings There is no prohibition in the Act to the landlord carrying on any kind of activity in his own building But if he wants possesion of his own building in the occupation of others he must fulfil the conditions that are set ont in S. 10 (3). In this context the term ‘for purposes of a business’ will have to be construed. There can be no objection to the landlord carrying on a business which is not strictly commercial as for instance, using the building as a place of worship or Bajana Mandapam or thanneerpandal . These are absolutely legitimate objects to which the landlord can put to use his building. The object of the enactment being one to regulate the occupation of residential and nonresidential buildings, I can see no prohibition against the landlord putting the building to any legitimate use and also requiring the building bona fide for any legitimate use So long as the objeet legitimate is a one and so long as the requirements of the sub section are fulfilled, I see no reason for restricting the meaning of the term ‘for purpose of a business’. If the legitimate activity by the landlord will be his business the ordinary meaning of the word ‘business’ applies, and there is no warrant for construing the word ‘business’ in the very restricted way and to confine it to commercial activities or activities of trade alone” Support for this view Is also derived from the English decisions. If the legitimate activity by the landlord will be his business the ordinary meaning of the word ‘business’ applies, and there is no warrant for construing the word ‘business’ in the very restricted way and to confine it to commercial activities or activities of trade alone” Support for this view Is also derived from the English decisions. In Rolls v. Miller, 1 where it was held that the carrying on of a charitable home for working girls, boarding without payment was not a trade, but it was the business of loding house keeper t was held that the word ‘business’ meant almost anything which was an occupation as distinguished from a pleasure, anything which was an occupation or duty which required attention was a business. This view was affirmed in South West Suburban Water Co v. St. Maryle Bone Union , 2 In Kesaran Nair v. Baba Naldu 3 this Court held that the term ‘business’ had no technical meaning, but is to be read with reference to the object and intent of the Act in which it occurs”. 6. S. Mohanlal v. Kondaiah 4 a Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court consisting of Gopal Rao Ekbote and Ramachandra Rao, JJ. considered the question as to whether the profession of an advocate will fall within the meaning of the expression ‘carrying on business’ occurring under the relevant provisions of the Andhra Pradesh Buildings (lease Rent and Eviction) Control Act 15 of 1960. It must be pointed out that the language of the relevant provisions of the Andhra Pradesh Act is similar to the language used in the Tamil Nadu Act 18 of 1960. The learned Judges of the Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in that decision, quoting the various dictionary meanings for the expression ‘business’ have also adverted to the meaning found in Bouviers Law Dictionary and it runs as follows— ‘that which occupies the time, attention and labour of men for the purpose of livelihood or profit, but It is not necessary that it should be the sole occupation or employment. It embraces everything about which a person can be employed; It is a word of large and Indefinite import the legislature could not well have used a larger word.” It is also useful to note the following observations of the Division Bench at page 388 of the report— “Even if we take the scheme of S. 10 (3) of the Act a broad distinction is drawn between a residential and non-residential building. A landlord can seek eviction from a residential building for residential purpoce and a non-residential building for non-residential purpose. The word ‘business’ should be construed as in the sens of a non-residential purpose; be it a commercial activity or a professional activity or an officiai activity.” This decision of the Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court was taken in appeal to the Supreme Court and the decision of the Supreme Court is reported in S. Mohan lal v. Kondiah 5 . While affirming the decision of the Division Bench, the Supreme Court observed— “It is needless to refer to the meanings given to that term in the various dictionaries except to say that everyone of them notices a largo number of meaning of the word. In a broad sense, it is take to mean’ everything that occupies the time, attention and labour of men for the purpose of livelihood or profit’. In a narrow sense it is confined to commercial activity.” Mr. G.M. Nathan, learned counsel for the petitioner, submits that the observations of the Supreme Court in the above decision form the guidelines and the broad sense and unless the ‘business’ can be characterised as one occupying the time, attention and labour of men for the purpose of livelihood or profit, it cannot be a business for pupose of S. 10 (3) (a) (iii) of the Act. I am not able to appreciate and accept this construction which the learned counsel wants to put on the observations of the Supreme Court. As pointed out earlier, in Bouviers Law dictionary ‘business’ has been defined as that which occupies the time, attention and labour of men for the purpose of livelihood or profit, I find that the Supreme Court has also adopted the same meaning to define the expression ‘business’ in a broad sense. According to Mr. As pointed out earlier, in Bouviers Law dictionary ‘business’ has been defined as that which occupies the time, attention and labour of men for the purpose of livelihood or profit, I find that the Supreme Court has also adopted the same meaning to define the expression ‘business’ in a broad sense. According to Mr. G.M. Nathan, learned counsel for the petitioner, when a business is not for the purpose of livelihood, then it must be for the purpose of monetary profit. It must be straight way pointed out that the expression ‘profit’ cannot be equated to monetary profit or pecuniary gains only. In Shorter Oxford English dictionary, the following definitions amongst others are found for the expression ‘profit— “To make progress; to advance; to improve; to be of advantage; to benefit further, promote.” It is not proper to confine the meaning of the expression ‘profit’ to monetary benefit or pecuniary gain. Every legitimate activity, avocation or occupation of a landlord, which obviously must exclude his own residential purposes, can fit in with the expression ‘business’ occurring in S. 10 (3) (a) (iii) of the Act. To tie down the said, expression to only commercial activities involving pecuniary or profit-making transactions will practically nullify the intendment of the Legislature. 7. Mr. V. Nicholas, learned counsel for the respondent’ draws my attention to the decision in Papaehery v. Country Tobacco Merchant Association 1 where Ramachandra Rao, J. was concerned with a case in which an association of merchants sought the eviction of the tenant from the premises owned by it on the ground that it required the said premises for the purposes of its business. The learned Judge found that even though the Association did not by itself carry on any business, yet its objects and its several activity would amount to carrying on a business activity and that would satisfy the requirements of the provision. 8. In the instant case, the landlord is a political party and its business is to carry on activities to progress, to advance and to improve its cause in the political sphere, and it must have an office and it is only to serve this requirement of the landlord, the eviction was sought for under S. 10 (3) (a) (iii) of the Act. In view of the above position, it must be held that the requirement of the landlord definitely fits within S. 10(3) (a) (iii) of the Act and there is no warrant for discountenancing the case of the landlord on the ground urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner. Accordingly, the revision fails and the same is dismissed. But there will be no order as to costs. 9. Order (6th August, 1980):—This matter comes up today at the request of Mr. G. M. Nathan, learned counsel for the petitioner, as per his letter, dt. 1st August, 1980. The learned counsel for the petitioner mentions to me that there was an omission, at the time when orders were passed on 25th July, 1980, to pray for time for the petitioners to vacate the premises in question and he prays for six months time and assures that possession will be delivered on expiry of this period of six months. In view of the above assurance, Mr. V. Nicholas, learned counsel for the respondent, has no objection for grant of time. In the said circumstances, the petitioners will have six months time from today to vacate the premises in question and it shall continue to pay the rents regularly.