JUDGMENT V.K. Khanna, J. - This is a defendants' second appeal arising out of a suit for cancellation of the sale deed dated 18-7-1969 executed by defendant Nos. 3 and 4 in favour of defendant Nos. 1 and 2 and also for recovery of possession. It can be stated that in the alternative it was also prayed that if the plaintiffs were not found entitled to the earlier relief, then the house being a residential house, benefit of Section 4 of the Partition Act be given to the plaintiffs and the possession over the house be delivered to the plaintiffs after payment of compensation to defendants. 2. The plaintiffs case was that the house in dispute was got constructed by one Parshadi and the plaintiffs and defendant Nos. 3 and 4 were members of a joint Hindu family. After the death of Parshadi the plaintiffs and defendant Nos. 3 and 4 became owners in possession of the house in dispute. It was alleged that on 18-7-1969 defendant Nos. 3 and 4 executed a sale-deed in favour of defendant Nos. 1 and 2 who after execution of the sale-deed ejected the plaintiffs from the disputed house. It was further pleaded that the house in dispute was a family house and the plaintiffs having ?th share in the aforesaid house, were, entitled to the remaining ?th share in the house also after paying compensation to the defendants in view of Section 4 of the Partition Act. 3. The aforesaid suit was contested by defendant Nos. 1 and 2 on the ground that the house in suit was got constructed only by defendant Nos. 3 and 4 and not by Parshadi and that it was not the ancestral property. 4. The trial court decreed the plaintiffs suit for cancellation of the sale-deed to the extent of ?rd share only. The suit was also decreed for partition of ?rd share in the house in dispute in favour of the plaintiffs and the plaintiffs were directed to deposit Rs. 200/- as price of the ?rd share of the house in suit in Court within the prescribed period and defendants Nos. 1 and 2 were directed to execute the sale-deed with respect to ?rd share in the house in suit in favour of the plaintiffs. The trial court further directed to deliver possession in favour of the plaintiffs after execution of the sale-deed. 5. 1 and 2 were directed to execute the sale-deed with respect to ?rd share in the house in suit in favour of the plaintiffs. The trial court further directed to deliver possession in favour of the plaintiffs after execution of the sale-deed. 5. Feeling aggrieved, the defendants preferred an appeal which was also dismissed. The lower appellate court agreed with the trial courts finding that benefit of Section 4 of the Partition Act should be given to the plaintiffs. 6. In the present second appeal, learned counsel for the defendant-appellants has urged only one point. It has been contended that benefit of Section 4 of the Partition Act could be available to the plaintiffs of the present suit only when defendant Nos. 1 and 2 had filed a suit for partition. Strong reliance has been placed on a full bench decision this Court reported in 1957 Allahabad page 356 (Sakhawat Ali v. Ali Husain and others). The full bench of this Court has clearly laid down as follows :- "A suit for possession of the entire dwelling house is not a suit for partition. When such a suit is brought by a co-sharer against the transferee, of another co-sharer it is in the nature of a suit for pre-emption, and although Section 4 (1) does confer a right of preemption on a co-sharer against the stranger transferee that right is limited in its scope. It can be claimed, only if the transferee either sues for partition himself or makes the same claim when he is impleaded as a defendant in such a suit. That Section does not entitle a co-sharer to buy out the stranger transferee whenever he likes unless the transferee is claiming a partition of his share either as a plaintiff or as a defendant." The crucial question which thus falls for determination in the aforesaid case is as to whether this is a suit for possession of the entire dwelling house or it is a suit for partition. A bare perusal of the plaint and the reliefs claimed would show that as far as relief (a) is concerned, it was claimed in the alternative. In the first place the plaintiffs had claimed cancellation of sale-deed dated 18-7-1969 and for possession of the entire dwelling house. A bare perusal of the plaint and the reliefs claimed would show that as far as relief (a) is concerned, it was claimed in the alternative. In the first place the plaintiffs had claimed cancellation of sale-deed dated 18-7-1969 and for possession of the entire dwelling house. In the alternative a partition decree had been claimed and benefit of Section 4 of the partition Act had been prayed for after awarding compensation to the defendants. As far as the plaintiffs are concerned, it has conceded to the findings recorded by the two courts below that the entire sale-deed was not liable to be cancelled and the sale-deed was only liable to be cancelled to the extent of ?rd share in the house in suit. After recording of the findings, therefore there was no occasion for granting of the relief for possession over the entire house The only relief which could be granted in favour of the plaintiffs was the after native relief. The alternative relief has been granted to the plaintiffs treating the suit to be a partition suit. The full Bench has clearly laid down that if the nature of the suit is that of a partition suit, then it is immaterial as to whether the transferee of an undivided share who happens to be a stranger happens to be a plaintiff or a defendant. It has also been laid down as a condition for the application of Section 4 of the partition Act the transferee defendants should make a claim for partition. The full Bench has specifically taken into account the following example :- "Suppose however that the transferee defendant makes no such claim can the plaintiff obtain the benefit of Section 4 of the Partition Act ? In our opinion he cannot do so and we think it makes no difference whether the transferee defendant be in possession of the dwelling house (or part thereof) or not." In the present case from the reading of the written statement it is clear that as far as defendant Nos. 1 and 2 are concerned, they were making no claim for partition of the house in dispute and for allotment of their share. In view of the law laid down by the Full Bench in the case of Sakhawat Ali (supra), the provisions of Section 4 of the partition Act could not be availed by the plaintiff's of the suit. 1 and 2 are concerned, they were making no claim for partition of the house in dispute and for allotment of their share. In view of the law laid down by the Full Bench in the case of Sakhawat Ali (supra), the provisions of Section 4 of the partition Act could not be availed by the plaintiff's of the suit. The view taken by the courts below is thus erroneous in law and is liable to be set aside. 7. The present second appeal thus is allowed in part and the judgments and decrees of the courts below ordering defendant Nos. 1 and 2 to execute the sale-deed in favour of the plaintiffs are set aside. Thus suit of the plaintiffs for the declaration that the sale-deed is invalid to the extent of ?rd share is upheld. The plaintiff shall be entitled to get the aforesaid ?rd share partitioned. Let a preliminary decree for partition of ?rd share be prepared. However, in the circumstances of the case, the parties shall bear their own costs.