K. S. PUTTASWAMY, J. ( 1 ) WHETHER a person that files a voluntary declaration under S. 31-B of the karnataka Rent Control Act of 1961 (Karnataka Act No. 22 of 1961) (hereinafter referred to as the Act) can withdraw the same or not and whether a person who makes such a declaration can be evicted without a notice and an order thereto under S. 10a of the Act, are the two questions that arise for determination in this case. In order to decide those questions and other incidental questions that disclose certain disturbing features, it it necessary to notice the facts that are not in dispute in the first instance. ( 2 ) ON 28-12-78, the petitioner, a tax practitioner of Gadag city, claiming himself to be in occupation of two premises bearing C. T. S. Nos. 3999/12 and 3787/4 and 5 as tenant and as owner of two other premises bearing C. T. S. Nos. 6776 and 30611 and 666013/4 having let out the said two premises to others filed a voluntary declaration under S. 31-B of the Act before the assistant Commissioner and the Rent controller, Gadag Division Gadag (hereinafter referred to as the Controller) requesting that authority to regularise his unauthorised occupation or the unauthorised lease of the premises to others. We are principally concerned with the occupation of premises C. T. S. No. 3999/12, item no. ,1 of the declaration. The petitioner claims that he had taken the said premises on lease some time in 1955 from respondent No. 3 who was then its owner. On that declaration, the petitioner and respondent No. 3 were notified fixing the date of hearing as 8-1-79, on 'which day the petitioner filed a statement inter alia stating that respondent No. 3 had agreed to sell the premises to him and that he had become its owner and the declaration in respect of the premises be, therefore, dropped. Respondent No. 3 who was not served by that date, did not appear on that day. He was later served and filed a statement on 5-5-80 stating that he had sold the said premises to respondent No. 4 for valuable consideration on 4-3-80 and, therefore, notice be issued to him. Respondent No. 3 who was not served by that date, did not appear on that day. He was later served and filed a statement on 5-5-80 stating that he had sold the said premises to respondent No. 4 for valuable consideration on 4-3-80 and, therefore, notice be issued to him. In that view, the Controller notified respondent No. 4, who filed a statement opposing the request of the petitioner for regularisation to the said premises on the ground that he owned houses in his own name and in the names of his wife and children. ( 3 ) ON 17-5-80, the Controller virtually treating the declaration as seeking for regularisation in respect of the aforesaid premises only, upholding the objections of respondent No. 4 rejected the declaration made by the petitioner and directed him to vacate the said premises under intimation, to him (Annexure-E ). Against the said order of the Controller the petitioner filed an appeal on 31-5-80 before the deputy Commissioner, Dharwar under s. 12 of the Act with an application for stay of the operation of the order of the Controller. Respondent No. 4 suo motu entered appearance in that appeal and opposed the stay sought by the petitioner. On 9-6-80 the Special deputy Commissioner, Dharwar (hereinafter referred to as the D. C.) heard the petitioner and respondent no. 4 and dismissed the said appeal (Annexure-G ). Evidently, having regard to the order made by the D. C. , the Controller by his letter No. RQC sr. 655 dated 11-6-80, received by the petitioner on 17-6-80, directed the petitioner to vacate the aforesaid premises within 7 days from the date of receipt of that letter (Annexure-H ). In his petition presented on 21. 6. 80 the petitioner has challenged the orders dated 17-5-80 and 11. 6. 80 of the Controller (Annexures E and H) and the order dated 9-6-80 of the D. C. (Annexure-G ). ( 4 ) THE petitioner has alleged that he sought for the withdrawal of his declaration on 8. 1. 79 before the Controller arid that authority instead ol permitting the withdrawal of the same proceeded with the matter and made an order to benefit respondent No. 4. ( 4 ) THE petitioner has alleged that he sought for the withdrawal of his declaration on 8. 1. 79 before the Controller arid that authority instead ol permitting the withdrawal of the same proceeded with the matter and made an order to benefit respondent No. 4. He claimed that the tenancy created between him and respondent No. 3 was a lawful tenancy and there was no need to make a declaration and the same had been made by him out ot sheer ignorance, though there was no necessity for the same. In conformity with that stand, the petitioner has filed a memo before this court seeking the leave of this court to permit him to withdraw the declaration made by him on 27-12-78 in its entirety. Apart from this the petitioner has contended that the order dated 11. 6. 80 of the controller (Annexure-H) without issuing him a show cause notice, providing him an opportunity of hearing and determining the cause that may be shown by him, is violative of s. 10a of the act. ( 5 ) RESPONDENTS 1 and 2 who have been duly served have not entered appearance and have not filed their returns. Respondent No. 3 has entered appearance and has supported respondent No. 4. Respondent No. 4 who is the contesting respondent, has filed his return supporting the action of the authorities. He has alleged that the petitioner, having voluntarily filed his declaration, cannot seek for its withdrawal and the order for eviction made against him is in conformity with the Act. He claims that the house in the occupation of the petitioner is genuinely required for his bona fide use and occupation and this is a fit case in which this court should decline to exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction, even if there is any infirmity in the orders of the authorities. ( 6 ) SRI S. G. Bhat, learned counsel for the petitioner, has contended that the petitioner sought for withdrawal of the declaration made by him before the controller and the same should have been permitted by him or by the D. C. and in any event by this court. ( 6 ) SRI S. G. Bhat, learned counsel for the petitioner, has contended that the petitioner sought for withdrawal of the declaration made by him before the controller and the same should have been permitted by him or by the D. C. and in any event by this court. Elaborating his contention, sri Bhat maintained that a person that makes a voluntary declaration seeking for regularisation, has always the right to withdraw that declaration though it may be that he may be exposed to such actions that are permissible under the Act. In support of his contention Sri Bhat, strongly relied on a ruling of the supreme Court in Hulas Rai v K B bass and Co. , AIR 1968 SC 111 . ( 7 ) SRI Shivraj Patil, learned counsel for respondent No. 4 who addressed leading arguments which was supported by Sri S. R. Bannurmath, learned counsel for respondent No. 3, contended that a voluntary declaration under the Act is almost in the nature of intimation of a vacancy under the act and the same cannot be permitted to be withdrawn either by the subordinate authorities or by this court. In support of his contention Sri Patil, strongly relied on the ruling of jagannatha Shetty, J. in vasantha Ambakumar v. Kari Guddaiah, 1975) 1 Kar. LJ. Sh. N. item 48. ( 8 ) A voluntary declaration made under S. 31b of the Act, in reality, is an application made by the person seeking regularisation of his unauthorised occupation or unauthorised letting out of the premises. When he makes that declaration and furnishes the particulars, he moves the authority to declare and hold that his occupation or letting out of the premises which was contrary to law should be regularised. The effect of an order of regularisation is that what was initially invalid and had continued to be so, becomes valid from its inception subject to the rights of the parties under S. 21 of the Act (vide s. 31d of the Act.) A lease that is contrary to law that was then in force becomes a valid lease and thereafter it is not open to the controller to evict the person in occupation under s. 10a of the Act or launch a prosecution under S. 4 (3) of the Act. ( 9 ) A plaintiff or an applicant that files a suit or makes an application before a court or an authority has an absolute right to withdraw his suit or application. A person's right to file a suit or make an application and withdraw the same go together. What consequences will follow on the person withdrawing the suit or the application filed by him will undoubtedly follow, but the same can have no relevance in upholding the right of the person to withdraw his application or a declaration under S. 31b of the Act. A declaration under S. 31b of the Act cannot be equated to an initiation of a criminal proceeding where different considerations prevail, but must be equated to a civil proceeding before a civil court which adjudicates only the rights of the parties. No legal principle prohibits a declarant to withdraw his declaration and by permitting its withdrawal no legal principle or public policy is violated. ( 10 ) FOR the purposes of this case, i will assume that the case in vasantha Ambakumar's case (2) has been correctly decided and the principles stated therein by Jagannatha shetty, J, is unexceptionable. But, even then it is not possible to treat a declaration made under S. 31b as an intimation of vacancy under S. 4 (1) of the Act and the principle enunciated in that case governs the case, as contended by Sri Patil. In my opinion, the ratio in Vasantha Ambakumar's case (2) is clearly distinguishable and has no application to the question that arises for determination in the case. ( 11 ) IN Hulas Rai's case (1) the supreme Court was undoubtedly dealing with the withdrawal of a suit under Order 23 Rule 1 of the Code. But, still I am of the opinion that the principle stated therein is a general legal principle and can be applied to any civil proceeding. On the principles enunciated by the supreme Court in Hulas Rai's case (1), it is open to a declarant to withdraw his declaration filed under S. 31b of the Act. On the same analogy that a plaintiff can withdraw his suit before an appellate court or a revisional court, it is open to the petitioner to withdraw his declaration in this proceeding also and this court is competent to grant leave to the petitioner to withdraw his declaration. On the same analogy that a plaintiff can withdraw his suit before an appellate court or a revisional court, it is open to the petitioner to withdraw his declaration in this proceeding also and this court is competent to grant leave to the petitioner to withdraw his declaration. In this view, whether the petitioner sought for leave before the controller or before the appellate authority or not loses all significance and an enquiry into what happened before those authorities is wholly unnecessary. ( 12 ) IN the memo filed on 30-9-80, the petitioner has sought for leave to withdraw his declaration in its entirety. As I have upheld the right of the petitioner to withdraw his declaration, he is entitled to withdraw the same before this Court. I, therefore, grant leave to the memo filed by the petitioner and reject his declaration as withdrawn by him. But, this should not be understood as this court deciding on the validity of the lease or the power of the Controller to evict the petitioner under S. 10a or the right of respondent No. 4 to seek for the eviction of the petitioner under s. 21 of the Act. ( 13 ) IN normal circumstances by permitting the petitioner to withdraw his declaration, the orders made thereto on that declaration had to be quashed without examining any other question. But, as Sri Patil strenuously contended that the order of eviction is a valid order and can be independently maintained, it is now necessary to examine the other contention urged for the petitioner on the validity of the same. ( 14 ) SRI Bhat contended that the order and the direction for eviction of the petitioner without issuing a show cause notice, considering the cause shown and determining the same, is violative of S. 10a of the Act. ( 15 ) SRI Patil urged that when the petitioner had made a voluntary declaration for regularisation and when the authority found that the same could not be granted, it was open to the authority to order the eviction of the petitioner without a further show cause notice, considering the cause that may be shown thereto and determining that question over again. In support of his contention, Sri Patil strongly relied on a decision rendered by me in ( 16 ) FOR purpose of examining this contention of the parties, I will assume that the voluntary declaration made by the petitioner under S. 31-B of the act has been rightly rejected by the authority and the petitioner had not also sought for the withdrawal of the declaration made by him. ( 17 ) ON the voluntary declaration made by the petitioner, the Controller had notified the petitioner and respondents 3 and 4. At any rate, in the hotice issued to the petitioner, the controller had not stated that the petitioner was in unlawful occupation of the premises and that he must show cause as to why he should not be evicted under S. 10a of the Act. While rejecting the declaration made by the petitioner, the controller has not found that he was in unlawful occupation of the premises and, therefore, he was liable to be evicted under s. 10-A of the Act. ( 18 ) IN Sameeulla Khan's case, (3) i have examined the legislative history, the true scope and ambit of S. 10a of the Act and the same, therefore, does not require any further elucidation. Before a person can be evicted, a notice under S. 10-A of the Act has to be issued, the cause shown by him has to be considered and then an order made giving such time as the Controller may decide to the person in unauthorised occupation to vacate the premises. But. the question is whether the ratio in that case is applicable to the question that arises for determination in this case, on the facts found by me. ( 19 ) IN Sameeulla Khan's case (3) the petitioner had made an application for regularisation of a non- residential premises to which Chapter v-A was inapplicable. On that application, the controller taking the view that that declaration was prima facie not maintainable, issued a special show cause notice to the petitioner and the owner of the shop premises in that case under Ss. 4 (3) and 10a of the Act. In response to that show cause notice, the petitioner filed a statement reiterating his case for regularisation which was opposed by the respondent. 4 (3) and 10a of the Act. In response to that show cause notice, the petitioner filed a statement reiterating his case for regularisation which was opposed by the respondent. On a consideration of those matters, the controller found that regularisation in respect of non- residential premises was impermissible and the petitioner who was in unlawful occupation of that premises was liable to be evicted under S. 10a and made an order thereto in terms of that section. On those facts, having regard to the contentions that were urged before me in that case, I upheld the order of the authorities. But, that is not the position in this case. Apart from this, a specific contention as is now urged for the petitioner was not even urged in that case. For these reasons, the ratio in sameeulla Khan's case (3) has no application to the question that arises for determination in this case. ( 20 ) WHETHER the Controller should make an independent order under S. 10a or make a composite order while rejecting a declaration under S. 31-B is not a matter of substance. But, what is important is that before a person can be evicted, the Controller is bound to notify him, consider the cause shown by him and make an order giving such time as he deems necessary in the circumstances of the case. What time should be given for a person to vacate depends on the facts and circumstances of each case and no hard and fast rule can be laid down in such matters. But, in granting time, the authority must act reasonably and grant reasonable and sufficient time to such person to make alternative arrangements and vacate the premises. In my opinion, the controller in ordering the eviction of the petitioner had clearly violated S. 10a of the Act and the D. C. in affirming that part of the order, which was clearly appealable has not considered the illegality committed by 'the Controller and corrected the same as he was bound to In, this view, the orders of the Controller and the D. C. directing the eviction of the petitioner, suffer from manifest illegalities and are liable to be quashed. ( 21 ) SRI Patil urged that this is a fit case in which this Court should decline to exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction in favour of the petitioner and allow respondent No. 4, an ex-serviceman, to occupy the premises as he is in dire need of the same, if necessary by granting reasonable time to the petitioner to vacate the premises. ( 22 ) AS noticed earlier, the illegalities committed by the authorities are serious and if they are allowed to stand, the very object and purpose of Art. 226 of the Constitution would be defeated. There are no circumstances on which this court can hold that the conduct of the petitioner disentitles him for the reliefs under Art. 226 of the Constitution. The fact that respondent No. 4 is an ex-service man, cannot be a ground for any authority or any court to disregard law and allow him to occupy the premises in utter defiance of law, as was done by them. For these reasons, I see no merit in this contention of Sri. Patil and reject the same. ( 23 ) BEFORE parting with this case, it is necessary to notice a, few disturbing factors that rudely shake the confidence of the public in the rule of law, an important pillar or edifice of our Constitution. ( 24 ) IN his declaration, the petitioner sought for regularisation in resgect of two premises occupied by him as tenant and two premises leased by him as owner thereof. But, at all stages, the Controller and the D. C. appear to have concerned themselves only with residential premises No. 3999/12. On what basis, the controller proceeded to deal with the same cannot be made out from the records of his office. On receipt of the declaration made by the petitioner, the controller has not opened a note sheet as is generally done in a government office or an order sheet that is more appropriate. He has dealt with the declaration and the several applications made before him in a somewhat causal manner. A proceeding under Chapter V-A of the Act and any order made thereto which is quasi judicial in nature has serious civil consequences on the person that makes the declaration and also on others like the owner of the premises, which is also subject to judicial review by this Court. A proceeding under Chapter V-A of the Act and any order made thereto which is quasi judicial in nature has serious civil consequences on the person that makes the declaration and also on others like the owner of the premises, which is also subject to judicial review by this Court. A Controller functioning under S. 10a and Chapter V-A will do well to open a regular order sheet and deal with the proceedings as a quasi judicial proceeding. ( 25 ) AFTER the disposal of the appeal by the D. C. , the Controller addressed a letter to the petitioner (Annexure- h) in these terms: * * * while the said letter commences with the heading 'tarana Thorisua noticu' or a show cause notice, it directs him to vacate the premises within 7 days from its receipt, though the order dated 17-5-1980 (Annexure-E) did not specify any time. The contents of this letter can only be read as a specific direction by the authority to vacate the premises and cannot be read as a show cause notice as superscribed in that letter and that is how the same was understood and executed by the controller. An order for eviction should be clear and unambiguous and not even create an impression that it is a show cause notice. I do hope that the controller will avoid addressing such inaccurate letters. ( 26 ) THE petitioner received the letter dated 11-6-80 on 17-6-80 and on the same day he made an application before the Controller to stay the execution of the same for a period of two months to enable him to approach this court and obtain an order of stay. But, very surprisingly the controller taking the view that the period of one month and 6 days had already elapsed, rejected the same. Assuming that all orders made thereto were valid, even then, the time granted by the Controller viz. , 7 days having regard to all the circumstances of the case was inadequate and short to vacate the premises and make alternative arrangements. I am deeply distressed to notice that the controller has granted so short a 'time to vacate the premises. I do hope that the Controller will be more circumspect in future and grant reasonable time to the parties to vacate the premises. I am deeply distressed to notice that the controller has granted so short a 'time to vacate the premises. I do hope that the Controller will be more circumspect in future and grant reasonable time to the parties to vacate the premises. ( 27 ) EARLIER, I have noticed that the writ petition was filed before this court on 21-6-80 and that even according to the notice dated 11-6-80, the petitioner had time to vacate the premises till 24-6-80. On the filing of the writ petition, the petitioner who was evidently in Bangalore, sent a telegraphic communication to his counsel at Gadag about the filing of the writ petition requesting him to see that the order dated 11-6-80 is not executed till an order of stay issued by this court. On 24-6-80 the local counsel enclosing that telegram filed a petition before the Controller requesting him not to execute his earlier order. On the same day, Mr. Bhat also sent a telegram to the Controller giving the writ petition number and requesting him not to proceed with the eviction till the matter is decided by this court. The controller rejected the earlier application made by the local counsel on the ground that this court had not granted an order of stay and made a note on the telegram sent by sri Bhat in these terms: "tahsildar, Gadag has already been directed to execute eviction order. Sd/- 11-40 a. m. 24/64 the Controller is undoubtedly right in stating that this court had not granted an order of stay till then restraining him from executing his eviction order and, therefore, there was no legal impediment for executing his order. But, prudence and human considerations should have dictated the controller to postpone the execution of the order and await the orders of this court on the interim prayer made by the petitioner for a reasonable time. After all heavens would not have fallen if the Controller had awaited the order of this court and take further action. ( 28 ) UNFORTUNATELY, the petition filed by the petitioner on 21-6-80 was not posted for admission on 23-6-80 because papers were returned to comply with certain office objections. On removing the office objections, the petitioner re-presented the papers on 23-6-80 and requested the case to be posted for preliminary hearing with prayer for stay on 24-6-80. ( 28 ) UNFORTUNATELY, the petition filed by the petitioner on 21-6-80 was not posted for admission on 23-6-80 because papers were returned to comply with certain office objections. On removing the office objections, the petitioner re-presented the papers on 23-6-80 and requested the case to be posted for preliminary hearing with prayer for stay on 24-6-80. But, that was not done for the reason that 24th and 25th were declared as holidays and, therefore, the petition was posted for preliminary hearing on 26-6-80 before Swami, J. On that day his lordship issued rule nisi and also interim order sought by the petitioner. But, before that i. e. , on 25-6-80, a holiday, the Tahsildar, as if it was a case of war operation which brooked no delay, forcibly took vacant possession of the house, locked and sealed the premises with police help. In this view, the petitioner made I. A. No. I on 27-6-80 for a direction to respondent No. 2 to restore possession of the premises forthwith. On that i. A. , Swami, J made an order on the same day in these terms:"the 2nd Despondent is directed to put the petitioner in possession forthwith of the premises in question bearing No. CTS 3999-B/12 of gadag-Betageri City. "in compliance with the said order of swami, J. the Controller has restored possession of the premises to the petitioner on 1-7-80. I. A. No. II made by Respondent No. 4 for vacating the interim orders made earlier, was rejected by the same learned Judge on 2-7-80. In view of the interim orders made by this court, the petitioner who lost possession briefly has now regained possession and continues to be in possession of the premises. All this discloses the unseemingly haste on the part of the authorities giving rise to considerable agony and distress to the petitioner and also this court. A little reflection and human attitude on the part of the Controller would have avoided all this unfortunate situation. I fervently hope that the Controller will at least hereafter avoid such ugly situations. ( 29 ) ON 30-5-80, respondent No. 4 presented a petition before the D. C. requesting him to intervene in the matter and see that possession of the premises in dispute is delivered to him. I fervently hope that the Controller will at least hereafter avoid such ugly situations. ( 29 ) ON 30-5-80, respondent No. 4 presented a petition before the D. C. requesting him to intervene in the matter and see that possession of the premises in dispute is delivered to him. On that petition the D. C. wrote a letter to the Controller in these terms: "sub: Welfare of ex-serviceman- application from Sri Sayad Nooruddin Bellary of Gadag Ex-IAF an application dated 30-5-80 received from the above ex-serviceman along with its accompaniment are forwarded herewith for necessary action. It is seen from the above application that the Assistant Commissioner, Gadag sub-division has already heard the case and ordered the tenant, Sri S. V. Vastrad to vacate the house, you are requested to take stringent measures and get the house vacated without any delay and hand over the possession of the house to the above ex-serviceman who is put to great hardship for want of living accommodation. Action taken may kindly be intimated to this office at an early date. Sd/- for Deputy Commissioner and President, Zilla sainik Board, Dharwar". Undoubtedly respondent No. 4, who is an ex-serviceman, was entitled for consideration and sympathy. But, that by itself was no ground for the D. C. to intervene in the matter and directhis subordinate to take stringent measures and get the house vacated without any delay and hand over possession of the house to him in disregard of law. It appears to me that the precipitate and ugly actions taken by the A. C. and Tahsildar can only be traced to the aforesaid directions issued by the D. C. The D. C. who functions in more than one capacity would be well advised in not directing his subordinates that exercise judicial or quasi judicial powers to act in a particular manner, as was done in the case. An authority constituted under the Act must necessarily act only in accordance with the Act. Th,e Act nowhere empowers the D. C. to intervene in all matters and issue directions to his subordinates. After all the D. C. should have realised that a person cannot be dispossessed and another put in possession in disregard of law, merely on, the ground that respondent no. 4 is an ex-serviceman. Th,e Act nowhere empowers the D. C. to intervene in all matters and issue directions to his subordinates. After all the D. C. should have realised that a person cannot be dispossessed and another put in possession in disregard of law, merely on, the ground that respondent no. 4 is an ex-serviceman. In any view of the matter, the D. C. was not well advised in issuing the direction which has led to unnecessary complication noticed by me earlier. I sincerely hope that the D. C. Dharwar, will avoid issuing such directions in future. ( 30 ) SRI Patil complained that he had entered caveat for respondent No. 4 on 16-6-80 and re-presented the same removing the office objection on 17-6-80, But still the orders dated 26-6-80 and 27-6-80 were made without notifying his name and Bearing him. I am not competent to go into these matters. But, I find that Sri patil had entered caveat on 16-6-80 and the same had been returned by the office on the same day with office objections which was removed by him and re-presented on 17-6-80. On re-presentation of that caveat, there is an endorsement saying that "needful done. May this caveat be registered, since there is no defect". In view of the caveat entered by respondent No. 4, the petitioner had served a copy of the writ petition on Sri Patil on 23-6-80. A copy of I. A. No. I filed by the petitioner was not served on respondent no. 4 on the ground that the direction was sought only against respondent no. 2. Whether the name of the counsel for respondent No. 4 was notified or not on 26-6-80 and 27. 6. 80 is a matter that may have to be probed by the Registrar to avoid such complaints by counsel. I, therefore, direct the Registrar to verify this aspect and if the complaint of Sri Patil is found true, take necessary remedial action to avoid such lapses in future. ( 31 ) IN the light of my above discussion, I make the following orders and directions. (a) I quash the orders dated 17-5-80 (Annexure-E); 11-6-80 (Annex- ure-H) and 9-6-80 (Annexure-G) by issue of a writ of certiorari. (b) I grant leave to the petitioner to withdraw his declaration dated 28-12-78 filed before respondent no. 2 under S. 31b of the Act and reject the same as withdrawn by him. (a) I quash the orders dated 17-5-80 (Annexure-E); 11-6-80 (Annex- ure-H) and 9-6-80 (Annexure-G) by issue of a writ of certiorari. (b) I grant leave to the petitioner to withdraw his declaration dated 28-12-78 filed before respondent no. 2 under S. 31b of the Act and reject the same as withdrawn by him. But, this does not prevent respondent No. 2 from initiating proceedings under section 10a of the Act against the petitioner and deciding the same in accordance with law or respondent No. 4 from seeking eviction under section 21 of the Act which necessarily have to be decided by the appropriate authorities in accordance with law. ( 32 ) RULE issued is made absolute, ( 33 ) AS the petitioner has contributed to all the confusion and the incongruous orders made by the authorities, it is proper to direct all the parties to bear their own costs. I, therefore, direct the parties to bear their own costs. --- *** --- .